President Clinton deserves every praise for “Desert Fox.” Yet it, too, did not resolve the Iraqi dilemma: Iraq is still controlled by a pathological despot who initiated bloody battles with his neighbors (Iran in 1981, Kuwait in 1991) and his own people (the Kurdish minority) during which unconventional weapons were utilized.

Iraq paid with hundreds of thousands of casualties for these bloody adventures, and Saddam Hussein is hungry for more: more weapons and greater destructive power, endangering neighbors near and afar.

The threat is uniquely troubling as some of Saddam’s favorite weapons — biological, for example — can be miniaturized, hence easily concealed and transferred beyond control. Others — be they chemical or weapons-grade uranium-producing centrifuges — are hard to pin-point in the vast reaches of Iraq. This proved difficult under the U.S. and British-inspired United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) regime. It will be even more difficult — perhaps impossible — without it.

Saddam’s lethal arsenal is supported by a verbal one: He uses the name of Allah in order to incite Muslims the world over; he preaches the “liberation of Palestine” to mobilize support among Arabs; he creates images of fear to justify brutality at home.

If there is a war criminal in our midst, it is this man Saddam Hussein. The convergence of a serial murderer, weapons of mass destruction and verbal agitation all in one man creates an imminent threat that the world cannot ignore at the dawn of the second millennium.

Yet, the world is hardly united in addressing the menace. Some, most notably the United States and Great Britain, take the lead in shouldering global responsibility to contain Saddam and those who might otherwise emulate him. Others, such as China, Russia, and France, allow their hesitation to provide Saddam with illusions of hope. Those who question the U.S. military presence in the Middle East must ask themselves what would the region be like in its absence. How else can one prevent the emergence of a region saturated with chemical, biological and, eventually, nuclear weapons, and the means to deliver them with devastating accuracy in the service of violent fundamentalism or reckless dictatorship. Thus, ending a war with Iraq is hardly the objective. Removing its capacity — or, better yet, incentive — to build a new war machine, is. This cannot happen as long as Baghdad is ruled by Saddam.

An interesting and frightening New York Times article a few months ago described the devastating effect of germ warfare and the potential for bio-terrorism. The same article also told the story of another approach — of a country that undertook to destroy the arsenal and production capacity it inherited from days past.

The former Soviet Republic of Kazakhstan was the site of the Stepnogek germ production center. Today, those structures stand abandoned and serve no evil purpose. In 1996, the United States concluded its symbolic ($5 million worth) effort to transform the site into a peaceful location.

With 130 different ethnic groups and trying to accommodate the Muslims and Christians while still emerging from the ruins of the Soviet era, Kazakhstan proved it can be different. A Muslim society need not be aggressive. Quite the contrary. President Nursultan Nazarbayev has opted for a responsible course of internal reconstruction and external peace.

He proved it in his attitude toward Israel as well: Nazarbayev was the first president of a post-Soviet republic to visit Israel and has maintained most friendly relations since.

Kazakhstan is still struggling with serious socioeconomic challenges. Nonetheless, Nazarbayev has long concluded that a policy of development and progress at home must be reinforced by the pursuit of peace abroad. The alternative, the Saddam-like choice of an investment in the instruments of war, is an assured prescription for continued poverty.

Two Muslim countries. Two Muslim leaders. The one launched on a course of horror. The other choosing to invest in life. It is not Islam; it is Saddam. And he must go.