White House description of Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action

[Ironic mention of IR-8] White House description of Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (Iran)
[Dr. Aaron Lerner – IMRA:
Please note:

#1. All the centrifuges – including the most advanced ones – remain intact
in storage inside Iran.

#2. It appears Iran can BUILD advanced centrifuges. They just can’t install
them. Note the wording “limited to ensure a breakout timeline of at least 1
year”. As long as you don’t install them you can build a thousand IR-8s and
honor that restriction.

#3. Ironically, the White House fact sheet mentions IR-8s. The very
existence of the IR-8 was cited as a screw up in the JPA that President
Obama keeps bragging about as having been fantastic:

“Whatever the true value of the enrichment output of the IR-8 centrifuge,
Iran’s development of this centrifuge during the period of the JPA was not
expected by P5+1 negotiators. The IR-8 should serve as a warning that strict
limits on Iran’s centrifuge R&D activities, even if difficult to verify, are
necessary to limit Iran’s nuclear program in a predictable, stable manner
that reduces the chance of a secret breakout to nuclear weapons or a rapid
increase in enrichment capability if Iran reneges on a long term deal.”
Technical Note: Making Sense out of the IR-8 Centrifuge
By David Albright – Institute for Science and International Security Report
September 23, 2014
http://isis-online.org/uploads/isis-reports/documents/IR8_Sept__2014.pdf
http://bit.ly/1BNLqkX

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Parameters for a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action regarding the Islamic
Republic of Iran’s Nuclear Program
[White House website 2 April 2015
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/parametersforajointcomprehenisveplanofaction.pdf

Below are the key parameters of a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)
regarding the Islamic Republic of Iran’s nuclear program that were decided
in Lausanne, Switzerland. These elements form the foundation upon which the
final text of the JCPOA will be written between now and June 30, and reflect
the significant progress that has been made in discussions between the P5+1,
the European Union, and Iran. Important implementation details are still
subject to negotiation, and nothing is agreed until everything is agreed. We
will work to conclude the JCPOA based on these parameters over the coming
months.

Enrichment

– Iran has agreed to reduce by approximately two-thirds its installed
centrifuges. Iran will go from having about 19,000 installed today to 6,104
installed under the deal, with only 5,060 of these enriching uranium for 10
years. All 6,104 centrifuges will be IR-1s, Iran’s first-generation
centrifuge.

– Iran has agreed to not enrich uranium over 3.67 percent for at least 15
years.

– Iran has agreed to reduce its current stockpile of about 10,000 kg of
low-enriched uranium (LEU) to 300 kg of 3.67 percent LEU for 15 years.

– All excess centrifuges and enrichment infrastructure will be placed in
IAEA monitored storage and will be used only as replacements for operating
centrifuges and equipment.

– Iran has agreed to not build any new facilities for the purpose of
enriching uranium for 15 years.

– Iran’s breakout timeline – the time that it would take for Iran to
acquire enough fissile material for one weapon – is currently assessed to be
2 to 3 months. That timeline will be extended to at least one year, for a
duration of at least ten years, under this framework.

Iran will convert its facility at Fordow so that it is no longer used to
enrich uranium

– Iran has agreed to not enrich uranium at its Fordow facility for at
least 15 years.

– Iran has agreed to convert its Fordow facility so that it is used for
peaceful purposes only – into a nuclear, physics, technology, research
center.

– Iran has agreed to not conduct research and development associated with
uranium enrichment at Fordow for 15 years.

– Iran will not have any fissile material at Fordow for 15 years.

– Almost two-thirds of Fordow’s centrifuges and infrastructure will be
removed. The remaining centrifuges will not enrich uranium. All centrifuges
and related infrastructure will be placed under IAEA monitoring.

Iran will only enrich uranium at the Natanz facility, with only 5,060 IR-1
first-generation centrifuges for ten years.

– Iran has agreed to only enrich uranium using its first generation (IR-1
models) -entrifuges at Natanz for ten years, removing its more advanced
centrifuges.

– Iran will remove the 1,000 IR-2M centrifuges currently installed at
Natanz and place them in IAEA monitored storage for ten years.

– Iran will not use its IR-2, IR-4, IR-5, IR-6, or IR-8 models to produce
enriched uranium for at least ten years. Iran will engage in limited
research and development with its advanced centrifuges, according to a
schedule and parameters which have been agreed to by the P5+1.

– For ten years, enrichment and enrichment research and development will
be limited to ensure a breakout timeline of at least 1 year. Beyond 10
years, Iran will abide by its enrichment and enrichment R&D plan submitted
to the IAEA, and pursuant to the JCPOA, under the Additional Protocol
resulting in certain limitations on enrichment capacity.

Inspections and Transparency

– The IAEA will have regular access to all of Iran’s nuclear facilities,
including to Iran’s enrichment facility at Natanz and its former enrichment
facility at Fordow, and including the use of the most up-to-date, modern
monitoring technologies.

– Inspectors will have access to the supply chain that supports Iran’s
nuclear program. The new transparency and inspections mechanisms will
closely monitor materials and/or components to prevent diversion to a secret
program.

– Inspectors will have access to uranium mines and continuous
surveillance at uranium mills, where Iran produces yellowcake, for 25 years.

– Inspectors will have continuous surveillance of Iran’s centrifuge rotors
and bellows production and storage facilities for 20 years. Iran’s
centrifuge manufacturing base will be frozen and under continuous
surveillance.

– All centrifuges and enrichment infrastructure removed from Fordow and
Natanz will be placed under continuous monitoring by the IAEA.

– A dedicated procurement channel for Iran’s nuclear program will be
established to monitor and approve, on a case by case basis, the supply,
sale, or transfer to Iran of
certain nuclear-related and dual use materials and technology – an
additional transparency measure.

– Iran has agreed to implement the Additional Protocol of the IAEA,
providing the IAEA much greater access and information regarding Iran’s
nuclear program, including both declared and undeclared facilities.

– Iran will be required to grant access to the IAEA to investigate
suspicious sites or allegations of a covert enrichment facility, conversion
facility, centrifuge production facility, or yellowcake production facility
anywhere in the country.

– Iran has agreed to implement Modified Code 3.1 requiring early
notification of construction of new facilities.

– Iran will implement an agreed set of measures to address the IAEA’s
concerns regarding the Possible Military Dimensions (PMD) of its program.

Reactors and Reprocessing

– Iran has agreed to redesign and rebuild a heavy water research reactor
in Arak, based on a design that is agreed to by the P5+1, which will not
produce weapons grade plutonium, and which will support peaceful nuclear
research and radioisotope production.

– The original core of the reactor, which would have enabled the
production of significant quantities of weapons-grade plutonium, will be
destroyed or removed from the country.

– Iran will ship all of its spent fuel from the reactor out of the
country for the reactor’s lifetime.

– Iran has committed indefinitely to not conduct reprocessing or
reprocessing research and development on spent nuclear fuel.

– Iran will not accumulate heavy water in excess of the needs of the
modified Arak reactor, and will sell any remaining heavy water on the
international market for 15 years.

– Iran will not build any additional heavy water reactors for 15 years.

Sanctions

– Iran will receive sanctions relief, if it verifiably abides by its
commitments.

– U.S. and E.U. nuclear-related sanctions will be suspended after the IAEA
has verified that Iran has taken all of its key nuclear-related steps. If at
any time Iran fails to fulfill its commitments, these sanctions will snap
back into place.

– The architecture of U.S. nuclear-related sanctions on Iran will be
retained for much of the duration of the deal and allow for snap-back of
sanctions in the event of significant non-performance.

– All past UN Security Council resolutions on the Iran nuclear issue will
be lifted simultaneous with the completion, by Iran, of nuclear-related
actions addressing all key concerns (enrichment, Fordow, Arak, PMD, and
transparency).

– However, core provisions in the UN Security Council resolutions – those
that deal with transfers of sensitive technologies and activities – will be
re-established by a new UN Security Council resolution that will endorse the
JCPOA and urge its full implementation. It will also create the procurement
channel mentioned above, which will serve as a key transparency measure.
Important restrictions on conventional arms and ballistic missiles, as well
as provisions that allow for related cargo inspections and asset freezes,
will also be incorporated by this new resolution.

– A dispute resolution process will be specified, which enables any JCPOA
participant, to seek to resolve disagreements about the performance of JCPOA
commitments.

– If an issue of significant non-performance cannot be resolved through
that process, then all previous UN sanctions could be re-imposed.

– U.S. sanctions on Iran for terrorism, human rights abuses, and
ballistic missiles will remain in place under the deal.

Phasing

– For ten years, Iran will limit domestic enrichment capacity and research
and development – ensuring a breakout timeline of at least one year. Beyond
that, Iran will be bound by its longer-term enrichment and enrichment
research and development plan it shared with the P5+1.

– For fifteen years, Iran will limit additional elements of its program.
For instance, Iran will not build new enrichment facilities or heavy water
reactors and will limit its stockpile of enriched uranium and accept
enhanced transparency procedures.

– Important inspections and transparency measures will continue well
beyond 15 years. Iran’s adherence to the Additional Protocol of the IAEA is
permanent, including its significant access and transparency obligations.
The robust inspections of Iran’s uranium supply chain will last for 25
years.

– Even after the period of the most stringent limitations on Iran’s
nuclear program, Iran will remain a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty (NPT), which prohibits Iran’s development or acquisition of nuclear
weapons and requires IAEA safeguards on its nuclear program.

http://www.imra.org.il/story.php3?id=66870