The following is based on the text of Yossi Beilin’s Geneva Accord as obtained by Haaretz.[With thanks to Gershon Baskin]

A key feature of Beilin’s “Geneva Accord” is its anarchic rush to drop supervision (supervision to prevent the smuggling of weapons can last as little as 5 years), or even a semblance of a remnant of Israeli security (a 5.5 years limit for even a small Israeli presence in the Jordan Valley) combined with a cavalier attitude towards the removal of the current terror infrastructure (no time set for disbanding the terror groups and not even a reference the collection and removal of illegal weapons). To make matters worse, the “Accord” allows for the Palestinians to arm themselves with whatever they and a third party decide to allow – regardless of Israel’s position.

These and other problems with the “Geneva Accord” cited below are of such great significance that one can only wonder if Beilin and the other withdrawal supporters involved in this project operated on the assumption that no Israeli would have the attention span required to read the text.

#1 While there will be a schedule for Israeli withdrawals, with the first withdrawal “immediately upon entry into force of this Agreement (Article 5, Paragraph 7(b] no time element is associated with the disbanding of “irregular forces or armed bands” (Article 5, Paragraph 1(b)iv).

#2 While the “Accord” does talk about disbanding of “irregular forces or armed bands” (Article 5, Paragraph 1(b)iv), there is no provision for clearing out weapons present in the area of the Palestinian state that are not allowed by the “Accord”.

#3 While the “Accord” would detail the weapons the “non-militarized” Palestinian state’s Palestinian Security Force could posses is the yet to be written Appendix X, this list can be changed at any time without Israel’s consent. [“Any proposed changes to Annex X shall be considered by a trilateral committee composed of the two Parties and the MF (AL: Multinational Force) If no agreement is reached in the trilateral committee, the IVG (AL: Implementation and Verification Group composed of the US, Russian Federation, EU, UN and others) may make its own recommendations.” (Article 5 Paragraph 3(b]

#4 Israel is limited to a “small military presence in the Jordan Valley under the authority of the Multinational Force and that presence is only guaranteed for 5.5 years (Article 5, Paragraph 7(f].

#5 The two Early Warning Stations provided for Israel under the “Accord” are guaranteed for only a period of ten years. (Article 5, Paragraph 8(f].

#6 Monitoring of international entry points into the Palestinian state can be terminated by the Implementation and Verification Group composed of the US, Russian Federation, EU, UN and others after 5 years.

#7 During the monitoring period, there is an “unseen” Israeli presence that also monitors what transpires via “appropriate technology”. If the Israelis demand an inspection and are not satisfied with the inspection a Multinational Force inspector makes a final and binding decision.

#8 The West Bank is carved out of Israel’s air defense envelope. The IAF is barred from patrolling the airspace. “The Parties recognize and respect each other’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence, as well as the inviolability of each others territory, including territorial waters, and airspace.”(Article 4, Paragraph 1(a). The IAF is limited to “use the Palestinian sovereign airspace for training purposes in accordance with Annex X [AL not yet written], which shall be based on rules pertaining to IAF use of Israeli airspace (Article 5, Paragraph 9(b)i.)

#9 While “The Parties recognize the right of states that have hosted Palestinian refugees to remuneration”(Article 7 Paragraph 3(b], there is no reference to the possibility of offsetting the value of Palestinian property “at the time of displacement” against the value of lost Jewish property in Arab countries. And since “No further claims related to events prior to this Agreement may be raised by either Party.” (Article 1, Paragraph 2), it appears that the “Accord” would forfeit that right.

#10 Israel is to pay a “lump sum” covering the aggregate value of “Palestinians’ property at the time of displacement”. This property was not identified as “Palestinian refugee” property but as “Palestinians’ property”, opening the possibility that land that Israeli Arabs may also claim would be included in the calculation. A third party will determine the size of the “lump sum”. (Article 7 Paragraph 9).

#11 There is a permanently open corridor linking the West Bank and Gaza Strip that while under Israeli sovereignty is under “Palestinian administration in accordance with [AL unwritten] Annex X of this Agreement”. Israel cannot unilaterally shut down the corridor if the Palestinians abuse it. Disputes over the operation of the corridor are subject to third party arbitration (Article 4, Paragraph 6).

#12 Israel effectively forfeits its sovereign right to carry out defensive operations within the territory of the Palestinian state if the “Accord” falls apart since the Palestinians enjoy the protection of the Multinational Force (Article 5, Paragraph 6(d)ii).

#13 The Waqf may bar Jewish visitors to the Temple Mount on the grounds that it disrupts religious worship or decorum on the site (Article 6 Paragraph 5(b)iii.)

#14 While the Oslo Interim Agreement refers to respecting “the ways of worship” and “religious rights of Jews… ” at religious sites (Annex III, Appendix 1, Article 32) the “Accord” only refers to “access”. (Article 10). It should be noted that it is the position of the PA appointed Mufti of Jerusalem as well as the other Palestinian religious officials that while Jews may have “access” to such holy sites as the Tomb of the Patriarchs in Hebron and Rachel’s Tomb in Bethlehem that it is blasphemy for Jews and other infidels to pray at these sites as they are also considered mosques.

#15 All disputes between Israel and the Palestinian state are ultimately subject to imposed third party arbitration (Article 17 Paragraph 4).

#16 Israel is not guaranteed the use of various roads passing inside the Palestinian state such as the roads from Jerusalem to Tiberias via the Jordan Valley and from Jerusalem to Ein Gedi. Instead “Israelis may be granted permits for use of designated roads.” (Article 9 Paragraph 4).

Dr. Aaron Lerner, Director IMRA Independent Media Review & Analysis.

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