In a speech to Fatah’s Revolutionary Council on Feb. 20 in Ramallah, Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas reaffirmed his commitment to ensuring that terrorists imprisoned in Israel and the families of so-called “martyrs” continue to receive financial benefits. This stance implicitly contradicts the reforms he announced on Jan. 26, which proposed changing the mechanism for paying salaries to imprisoned terrorists and the criteria on which these “pay-to-slay” payments would be based.
Abbas had earlier declared that responsibility for addressing the needs of imprisoned terrorists and the families of “martyrs” would shift from the P.A.’s Commission of Detainees and Ex-Detainees Affairs and the Foundation for the Care of Martyrs and Wounded Families to the newly established Palestinian National Institution for Economic Empowerment. He further asserted that payments would be determined based on family needs and principles of justice rather than by the length of a prisoner’s sentence. The latter criteria effectively linked the payments to the severity of the terrorist acts committed.
Abbas’s remarks align with additional clarifications from Fatah officials, who have repeatedly stressed that these reforms will not affect terrorist salaries in any way. Meanwhile, Israeli officials have dismissed the PA’s move as yet another deception intended to mislead the international community while continuing the reprehensible practice of paying salaries to terrorists. Notably, Abbas’s comments at the Fatah Revolutionary Council were addressed exclusively to a Palestinian audience and were not part of his official statements reported by Palestinian media. This suggests that the PA is sending a double message: projecting an image of reform to Western audiences while reassuring Palestinians that nothing has changed.
Abbas’s maneuver has also been criticized by Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and even by Qadoura Fares, head of the P.A.’s Commission of Detainees and Ex-Detainees Affairs. In response, Abbas promptly dismissed Fares and appointed Raed Arafat Abu al-Humus—formerly in charge of the commission’s international relations—as his replacement. Notably, Abu al-Humus sits on the board of trustees of the Institution for Economic Empowerment, which will now oversee payments to both imprisoned and released terrorists.
From the outset, there were ample reasons to doubt the sincerity of the P.A.’s reforms to the system of financial support for terrorists:
- The inclusion of “justice” as a criterion for payments immediately raised concerns that financial aid would continue to be influenced by factors beyond mere economic need, signaling an intent to deceive the international community rather than implement real change.
- No mechanism was established to specify how—or by whom—the international oversight promised by Abbas would be implemented. The regulations of the Institution for Economic Empowerment are too vague to clarify the criteria for financial support, especially given that all its officials are appointed by Abbas himself. Past experience has shown that international oversight of the P.A. is largely ineffective and is often exploited by the P.A. to temporarily ease pressure while buying time for diplomatic maneuvering.
- A genuine overhaul of the payment system would likely have provoked significant public outcry, including protests from the families of terrorists. In practice, aside from Fares’s criticism—which stemmed from his agency being sidelined—there has been no such reaction. This strongly suggests that the families view the move as a tactical ploy to appease Americans, Europeans and Israelis rather than as a substantive policy shift.
Although Israel is not fooled by what appears to be mere window dressing, Abbas may still achieve some of his objectives. The Trump administration has responded positively to the P.A.’s maneuver, even though it has not explicitly stated that the changes warrant lifting U.S. sanctions on the P.A.—which remain in place due to its continued payments to terrorists.
Under U.S. law, direct financial aid to the P.A. is prohibited as long as it continues these payments and fails to repeal the law that enshrines them. Nonetheless, Abbas’s move appears to have generated goodwill within the new administration, potentially boosting the P.A.’s chances of being included in plans for post-war governance in Gaza. European governments may also view the reform favorably, although they have never regarded terrorist salaries as a sufficient reason to cut aid to the P.A. in the first place.
Originally published by the Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security.