What made the Arab League summit in Cairo, focused on Gaza reconstruction and rejecting President Trump’s Gaza migration initiative, particularly notable was that for the first time Aarab nations attempted to formulate a solution to the Palestinian issue that doesn’t adopt PLO positions. Instead, they tried to impose on the Palestinians a solution preferable to Arab states.

We use the term “attempt” because while the Egyptian decision to reconstruct Gaza already represents an effort to bypass the Palestinian position, a consensus Arab stance acceptable to all parties has not yet emerged. The weakness of the final position is that it attempts to bridge differences that remain unbridged.

The Egyptian position is essentially the preparation of a plan for an April summit in Cairo aimed at developing a five-year reconstruction program worth approximately $50 billion, as if it were a contractors’ plan rather than one from nations declaring their political intentions.

Gaza would meanwhile be managed by a Palestinian technocratic committee, with Egypt and Jordan training Palestinian security forces to deploy in Gaza.

In other words, the summit—meaning Egypt—did not address Hamas’s fate whatsoever. This was the root of disagreements among Arab states during the summit and its preparations. These disagreements remain unresolved, which means Gaza reconstruction will remain on paper and not be implemented, as it will be impossible to raise the billions necessary for reconstruction while Arab nations have not reconciled their differences.

What were these disagreements? First and foremost, Hamas’s future. During the preparatory conference in Riyadh, defined as “friendly” to avoid making decisions, Saudi Arabia made it clear to the participants that if they expected it to open its wallet while Hamas remained in Gaza, they should look for another sucker. From Saudi Arabia’s perspective, Hamas’s removal from Gaza is an iron-clad condition for any participation in Gaza reconstruction.

At the opposite pole stood Qatar, which argued that any future solution must preserve the “muqawama” (resistance)—meaning Hamas rule.

This means that if Saudi Arabia indeed keeps its wallet closed, Qatar will step in, and with the advantage it has over other Arab states in its special relationship with Israel, it has a good chance of winning the grand prize, along with Hamas.

While the dispute between Qatar and Saudi Arabia was fundamental, there were also shades of disagreement with Egypt. From this disagreement, we can learn about Egypt and Saudi Arabia’s true positions on the Palestinian issue.

Egypt demanded that any formula for Gaza be linked to the West Bank—reconnecting Gaza and the West Bank, with Gaza reconstruction being just part of overall Palestinian Authority rehabilitation and concrete first steps toward establishing a real Palestinian state.

In other words, the Egyptian plan’s purpose is to create a political wall between itself and Gaza, reinforcing the physical wall it has already built. From Egypt’s perspective, Gaza must be connected northward to Israel and the West Bank, not southward to Egypt itself.

Saudi Arabia is unconcerned with all this and sees it as obstacles to the main goal—removing Hamas from Gaza. The Egyptian plan adopted in Cairo might attempt to accommodate Saudi Arabia by defining the “Palestinian state” as a “horizon,” not something concrete to be implemented here and now.

The Palestinian Authority’s position—that it is the only body authorized to take over Gaza’s administration—received no consideration whatsoever.

Egypt’s desire to distance itself from direct involvement in Gaza’s problems explains why it rejected preliminary initiatives for the Arab League to decide to send Egyptian “peacekeeping” forces to Gaza, similar to how during Lebanese crises, the Arab League authorized Syria to restore order in civil war-torn Lebanon.

From this perspective, it was interesting to hear Lebanon’s new president, Joseph Aoun, say that if Arabs decided to destroy themselves, at least it should be for themselves and not for others… In this, he echoed Saudi Arabia’s positions in closed rooms. The Lebanese example largely explains Saudi Arabia’s position on Gaza—Saudi Arabia entered Lebanon with its economic power and began reconstruction only after Hezbollah was removed from the picture.

Initially, Saudi Arabia withdrew its support from Lebanon after Saad Hariri refused to confront Hezbollah, pulling its money from Lebanese banks and causing the collapse of the “Land of Cedars.” Now it returns as President Aoun is willing to do what Saad Hariri refused to do.

Hence, the difference between Saudi Arabia and Egypt is the degree of determination to remove Hamas. Saudi Arabia demands its removal, while Egypt wants to maneuver between it and the Palestinian Authority.

Qatar wants to maintain Hamas, and Abbas wants to take over Gaza as part of implementing the Palestinian state, rejecting Egypt’s position that the PA and Hamas should agree on a technocratic committee to manage Gaza.

The bright spot in all this inter-Arab turmoil was the UAE’s position that educational reconstruction in Gaza is no less important than physical reconstruction. In other words, the UAE is ready to impart to Gazans their educational approach, in which Islam is not jihadist but inclusive, extending a hand to Judaism and Christianity.

This brings us to the UNRWA issue, which we will expand on another time. For now, we’ll say that to maintain the connection between Gaza and the West Bank, Egypt must adhere to “UN resolutions” and UNRWA, like the Ramallah-based PA.

Saudi Arabia sees no importance in this matter either, and it doesn’t appear it will agree to participate in Gaza reconstruction together with the UN, just as the UN is not involved in Lebanon’s reconstruction, certainly not in the Trump era.

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