The paradigm shift following the events of October 7 sparked a sharp public and strategic debate over the security worldview successive Israeli governments adopted in recent decades regarding Gaza. The guiding assumption, that Hamas was deterred and therefore did not constitute a significant threat, proved to be a flawed conception that exacted a devastating blood price. That said, it is important to note that the claim “Hamas is deterred” was only one component of the broader conception and does not capture it in full.

The government’s full conception was wider in scope and inherently political. According to this view, the split between Hamas rule in Gaza and the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank prevents the emergence of unified Palestinian representation, thereby thwarting any possibility of meaningful diplomatic negotiations.

However, this view disregards the security costs generated by Israeli policy. Israel assumed it could allow Hamas to stabilize its political standing while simultaneously preventing its military strengthening. To that end, Israel was required to preserve economic stability in Gaza. Consequently, it was not only necessary to permit the entry of goods, but also to allow the flow of Qatari cash directly to Hamas. This approach suffers from an obvious failure: once Hamas becomes sufficiently wealthy, it will possess the resources needed to grow stronger not only politically, but militarily as well.