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- For more than a decade, the Iranian-backed Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Hamas terror groups have been holding summer camps for thousands of schoolchildren throughout the Gaza Strip. These camps have served as a framework for inculcating an extreme ideology that glorifies Jihad (holy war), terrorism, and armed struggle against Israel with the aim of “liberating Palestine from the [Jordan] River to the [Mediterranean] Sea.”
- The camps also provide military training, such as practice with knives and firearms; hand-to-hand combat, and marching and foot drills. The children also stage plays and enact scenes of fighting and capturing Israeli soldiers or firing rockets at Israel.
- Click here to rad full article.
Palestinians’ Summer Camps To Kill Jews
Palestinian boys register in a summer camp organised by the Ezz-Al Din Al-Qassam Brigades in Gaza City on June 14, 2021. (Photo by MAHMUD HAMS / AFP) (Photo by MAHMUD HAMS/AFP via Getty Images)
Urge California Legislative Jewish Caucus to Clarify Status of Ethnic Studies Bill and Help Stop Widespread Adoption of Antisemitic “Liberated” Curriculum
Despite “guardrail” amendments that were added to the California ethnic studies high school graduation requirement bill (AB 101) to ensure that required classes would not promote “bias, bigotry and discrimination,” since the bill’s passage in 2021 a growing number of school districts have adopted ethnic studies curricular materials with anti-Jewish and anti-Zionist biases or have contracted with consulting groups that promote an antisemitic “liberated” version of ethnic studies.
Last month, a Jewish Public Affairs Committee of California (JPAC) letter was sent to state officials underscoring the Jewish community’s fear that many school districts throughout the state will opt to teach a version of ethnic studies that promotes antisemitic stereotypes of Jews and Israel.
However, a recently published memorandum makes a compelling case that the state-mandated ethnic studies graduation requirement may not yet be operative, allowing school districts and the state time to re-evaluate whether and how to move forward with the requirement.
A last-minute amendment to AB 101, apparently added by legislators who worried that the guardrails would not be able to prevent antisemitic “liberated” curricula from being adopted in many school districts, stipulated that the bill is “operative only upon an appropriation of funds by the Legislature.” Yet since the passage of AB 101, no such funds have been allocated.
The stakes are too high to get this wrong.
An AMCHA-drafted letter calls on members of the California Legislative Jewish Caucus to:
- Clarify for the Jewish community whether the ethnic studies graduation requirement mandated by AB 101 is operative or not;
- If the bill is not currently operative, ensure that the bill will not be funded until the serious problems with the AB 101-mandated requirement – especially the likelihood that many schools will adopt an antisemitic “liberated” curriculum – are adequately addressed by the Legislature.
Please read the full letter to the Jewish Caucus (here) and sign in support.
The Biden Administration Redefines Antisemitism
Opposing antisemitism is easy, because everyone is on your side. Already 100 years ago, Henry Ford’s Dearborn Independent, in its notorious series “The International Jew,” complained that the term “antisemitism” is “used indiscriminately and vituperatively” against those who just want to “discuss … Jewish world-power.” Sophisticated antisemites do not come out and admit it. So to fight antisemitism, one must first define it.
This is even more challenging today, when the general anathema to antisemitism in polite society makes “anti-Zionism” a convenient and common substitute. Yet recent actions by the Biden administration show that the problem of antisemitism manifesting as “anti-Zionism” requires further clarification. By morally legitimizing the position of those who call Israel a “fascist” nation or an “apartheid state,” the Biden administration has upended, quietly and with little notice, the governing consensus on what constitutes antisemitism.
The only broadly accepted definition of antisemitism today is the working definition of the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA), an intergovernmental organization of over 30 member countries. After several years of consultations with academic experts from around the world, including debate about the role of “anti-Zionism,” IHRA unanimously adopted its definition in 2016. Crucially, it states that “anti-Zionist” or “anti-Israel” sentiments can be “manifestations” of antisemitism. IHRA’s definition provides several illustrations: claiming Israel’s existence is illegitimate; the regrettably widespread practice of “applying double standards” to the Jewish state; or “requiring of it a behavior not expected or demanded of any other democratic nation.”
To be clear, the IHRA does not equate criticism of Israel with antisemitism. It explicitly states that criticism of Israeli government policies is legitimate, as with any country. However, condemning Israel based on standards or supposed norms that are in practice applied only to the Jewish state may cross over into antisemitism. Even for such double standards, the IHRA definition only creates a presumption that must be corroborated by other contextual factors.
Opponents of the IHRA definition claim it is designed to silence ordinary criticisms of Israel. A number of such organizations wrote in a recent letter to the United Nations that “the IHRA definition has often been used to … chill and sometimes suppress, non-violent protest, activism and speech critical of Israel and/or Zionism, including in the US and Europe.” Yet IHRA stresses that its working definition is not legally binding, and its definition’s only role is to help create a consensus on what constitutes antisemitism—not how to regulate it. Under the First Amendment, the government must not, under almost all circumstances, restrict antisemitic speech (or other forms of hate speech), and can only deal with actual discriminatory conduct, such as boycotts. Similarly, principles of representative democracy demand that members of Congress should be permitted to say even antisemitic things, including about Israel (though this does not mean such statements should be rewarded with choice committee assignments).
The IHRA definition struck a chord, and has been formally adopted by at least 39 countries, including the U.S., and endorsed by the European Union and European Commission, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, most U.S. states, and a vast number of ideologically diverse jurisdictions, universities, and political entities around the world.
Not surprisingly, the IHRA definition is opposed by those who wish to engage in precisely the kind of anti-Israel double standards that the definition seeks to identify. In an effort to confound or counteract the legitimacy and clarity of the IHRA working definition, a few other groups have offered alternative definitions that greatly minimize the role of Israel-focused antisemitism.
One such effort is the Nexus Document, a project hosted by Bard University. The Nexus definition differs from IHRA primarily in its treatment of Israel-focused conduct. Nexus does not regard as presumptively antisemitic either the questioning of the basic legitimacy of Israel’s existence or the application of double standards to Israel. According to Nexus, such views may have legitimate grounds.
The differences between the IHRA and Nexus definitions of antisemitism don’t stop there. Unlike IHRA’s adoption by a wide range of countries (including many states that are often sharply critical of Israel), not one country or governmental entity has adopted the Nexus Document. The IHRA definition was developed by an international group of scholars not known for their views on Israel or their politics one way or another. The Nexus advisory board, by contrast, is overwhelmingly left-wing and includes people like the head of J Street. Members of Nexus’ advisory board have described Israel as “fascist,” denounced it as an “apartheid state,” and justified those who say it should have never existed.
While IHRA has become the global benchmark, the narrow Nexus definition has languished in total obscurity—that is, until the White House suddenly announced its “welcome and appreciation” of the Nexus Document in May, while still “embracing” IHRA. Nexus leaped from the discussions of like-minded academics straight into a White House policy document. While the IHRA definition remains the only one officially used by the government, the White House’s National Strategy harms efforts to respond to antisemitism by referring to two different, and fundamentally contradictory, definitions.
Just as the classic blood libel resonated with the theological preoccupations of earlier ages, today’s claims resonate with the ethnic justice concerns of our times.
The central claim of Nexus and other critics of the IHRA definition is that even vicious attacks on Israel should not be considered antisemitic because they are not about Jews per se, but about the Jewish state’s governmental policies. It would be lazy to dismiss this possibility out of hand. Let us examine these attacks first in the perspective of history and then in light of some of the “reasons” suggested by Nexus.
The obsessive focus on the supposed wrongs of Israel has resurfaced across an amazing array of cultures and epochs. From the Romans to the Crusades, the Reformation to the Inquisition, National to International Socialism. The justifications change but the target remains the same.
It is an illusion that antisemitism amounts to such only when it presents as pure unreasoned Jew-hatred or as stereotypes and “tropes.” Antisemitism has never been merely a hate-filled emotional state, it has always been what some academics have called a “pseudo-explanatory political theory.” The most effective antisemites have always sought to justify their bigotry by claiming they simply object to the bad things Jews do to the world: The Jews were hated for producing Jesus and for not accepting him; they were hated as representatives of global capitalism and of international communism. Even Hitler—hardly subtle about his hatred of the Jews—cited policy reasons: They have “the two million dead of the [First] World War on their conscience,” and “they undermine the economies of countries leading to poverty.”
The accusations leveled against Israel often resemble antisemitic claims made throughout history. Instead of the Jews being accused of killing gentile children, Israel is accused of deliberately killing Palestinian children; instead of Jews being accused of causing plague among gentiles, Israel is accused of causing disease among Palestinians. And the accusation of “apartheid” is a modern blood libel—an absurd “Big Lie” that cannot be rectified by mere refutation. Just as the classic blood libel resonated with the theological preoccupations of earlier ages, today’s claims resonate with the ethnic justice concerns of our times. That today several members of Congress can level such libels against the Jewish state without facing sanctions from their party demonstrates how dangerous “polite” antisemitism is.
The general anathema to antisemitism in polite society makes ‘anti-Zionism’ a convenient and common substitute.
A definition of antisemitism is inadequate if it cannot capture a phenomenon of such breadth, persistence, and significance in the treatment of Jews. Nexus argues, however, that discriminating against Israel should not be seen as presumptively bad because there exist good “reasons … for treating Israel differently.” Nexus cites two purported reasons—that people “care” more about Israel, and Israel’s receipt of U.S. military aid.
“Caring” of course is not a reason but a feeling, making this explanation circular. It is undeniable that much of the world “cares” a great deal about Israel, but such hostile caring is itself the phenomenon that requires explanation. Nexus suggests that perhaps someone’s “personal or national experience may have been adversely affected by the creation of the State of Israel.” This is a woefully inadequate account. If contemporary anti-Israel sentiment were limited to, say, Palestinians, we would not be having this hearing. This cannot explain the “caring” of large, impersonal institutions like the United Nations, and supposedly neutral groups like Amnesty International or Human Rights Watch, which lack “personal or national experiences.”
Table 1: Comparison of U.K. aid allocation to various groups and their number
of condemnatory votes in the United Nations General Assembly
Table 1: Comparison of U.K. aid allocation to various groups and their number of condemnatory votes in the United Nations General Assembly1: Russell Taylor, UK aid spending: Statistics and recent developments, House of Lords Library (Dec. 8, 2022), https://lordslibrary.parliament.uk/uk-aid-spending-statistics-and-recent-developments
The second justification Nexus cites is that Israel receives a significant amount of “American aid.” To be sure, criticizing U.S. aid to Israel is itself legitimate—but it hardly accounts for the double standards against Israel. For one, heightened hostility to Israel’s existence is not solely or even primarily an American phenomenon. IHRA grew out of European anti-racism monitoring efforts. European countries do not provide significant foreign aid to Israel, but the same kind of double standards are present there (see Table 1). Nexus wants us to believe that those Americans who oppose Israel, just as their European counterparts do, happen to do so for a distinctive American reason—an amazing coincidence.
Attempts to insulate delegitimization of Israel from accusations of antisemitism have no adequate response to the perfect segue from prior modes of Jew hate to the similarly singular hostiilty the Jewish state has received from the international community, from its creation until today. In anti-discrimination law, it is well established that using a proxy for a target group can still be discriminatory. And everyone agrees that countries can be proxies for their majority population—indeed, this was precisely the argument asserted against President Donald Trump’s immigration restrictions on several Muslim-majority countries.
Table 2: Comparison of leading recipients of U.S. aid with various indications of domestic and international special ‘care’
Table 2: Comparison of leading recipients of U.S. aid with various indications of domestic and international special ‘care’ 2: Julia Haines, Countries That Receive the Most Foreign Aid From the U.S., U.S. News & World Rep. (Feb. 28, 2023); 3: Sources: https://web.archive.org/web/20211217004605; https://foreignassistance.gov/; 4: 2022 UNGA Resolutions on Israel vs. Rest of the World (Nov. 14, 2022) https://unwatch.org/2022-2023-unga-resolutions-on-israel-vs-rest-of-the-world/; 5: See Amcha Initiative, Student Government BDS Resolutions and Statements, https://amchainitiative.org/israel-divestment-vote-scorecard/#divestment-resolutions/search-by-date/?view_272_page=1
The obsessive hostility to the Jewish state cannot be empirically explained by reference to its policies. For example, Table 2 compares leading recipients of U.S. foreign aid with various indications of domestic and international opprobrium—there is no relationship. Foreign aid cannot explain the broad phenomenon of extreme hostility to Israel.
It must be some other factor. Calling it antisemitism says nothing about the subjective psychological state of the antisemite—they likely experience themselves as heroes, not haters. But labeling particular forms of demonization as antisemitism is crucial to properly understand it as part of an ancient, global, relentless phenomenon.
Gershon Baskin: News Columnist or Fifth Columnist?
Columnists shape perspectives on our tumultuous world. An ethical responsibility rests on the shoulders of columnists in respected media to refrain from misleading audiences with false truths.
One writer who does not live up to this ethical standard and leads readers astray by presenting his opinions as incontrovertible facts is Gershon Baskin,
Baskin makes outlandish statements shaped by his perspective – but presents these opinions as truth.
Consider five examples of misconstrued facts from Baskin’s latest column, published on July 13, 2023,in the Jerusalem, Post, entitled, “Israel cannot be both a Jewish state and a liberal democracy.”
First example:
“The ultimate bottom line of the judicial upheaval that is being led by the Netanyahu government is to create the ability for Israel to annex the occupied territories without granting the Palestinians civil, political, and human rights.”
Such a statement is far from the intention of the government in its pursuit of judicial reform.
The statement is doubly outrageous: not only does it have no basis in reality – it is an opinion presented as fact.
The sentence indicates only how Baskin views the current political reality in Israel –not the reality of the situation.
But Baskin does not say that this is how he sees the situation. Instead, he says that this is a “fact”.
Baskin asserts that “The oppression of Palestinians is what leads directly to Palestinian violence against Israel today.” This claim is factually incorrect, as Palestinian Arabs perpetrated acts of violence against Jews, even prior to Israel’s creation in 1948. He refrains from clarifying that this falsehood is only his opinion and yet he writes it out as matter-of-factly – like a weather report.
A third example discusses the demographics of religious Zionists living within Judea and Samaria. Baskin asserts the wild claim that “Their life’s mission has been to prevent the establishment of a Palestinian state.” Did Baskin mention that this statement was only his own opinion? That would be a resounding NO. Once again, Baskin deceives his readers by providing his own views as accepted facts.
The fourth significant instance of Baskin’s verbal sleight of hand concerns his confluence of “anti-zionism” and antisemitism. Baskin declares, “I am not denying the existence of antisemitism. I am saying that being anti-Israel, or being against Israel’s policies regarding Palestine, or even supporting BDS, are not always antisemitism. In fact, most of the time, it is not.” The last sentence of this excerpt is especially glaring. How does Baskin know this to be true?
He convinces himself that the haters of the Jewish state, for the most part, feel nothing but love for the Jewish people. Yet again, he fails to mention that this statement is merely his opinion.
The unkindest cut of all: Baskin falsifies the intentions of the Netanyahu
government’s advocacy of judicial reform when he says that “… we have been played by the very same people who are currently shaping our reality and intend to convert Israel into a completely non-democratic state. Their success now will formally move Israel from a new form of an apartheid state into a full-blown apartheid reality.”
However, as he has done throughout this column, Baskin states this insult as a fact.
At a time when Israel is coping with a tidal wave of confusion, the time has come to fact-check Gershon Baskin, whose column is widely read by policy makers in Israel and around the world.
Bottom line: It is unethical to allow any writer, whether in news or opinion sections, to confuse facts with opinion.
In the immortal words of Ambassador and Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan, of blessed memory, the articulate advocate of American foreign policy for Democrats and Republicans alike: “Everyone is entitled to his own opinion, but not to his own facts.”
Column: Child Abuse, ‘Palestine’-Style
Quoth BBC journalist Anjana Gadgil, “Israeli forces are happy to kill children.”
Said Amr Khamour, 14, “I wished for martyrdom and I received it.”
If Israelis are indeed “happy to kill children,” they have an all-too-willing market out there.
Of 12 Palestinians killed in Israel’s in Jenin the other week, at least four were under 18, the Palestinian Health Ministry said, according to The New York Times. Terrorist groups claimed that at least five of those killed were fighters, including a 16-year-old boy. Israel said that all Palestinian fatalities were combatants.
Amr Khamour was shot twice by Israeli soldiers last January when he died as he tossed stones at a military jeep at Dheisheh Camp in the West Bank.
Martrydom is intertwined with the Arab wars against Israel, and a New York Times piece headlined “West Bank Teenagers Write Their Last Words” affirmed the participation of Palestinian youths in scuffles with Israeli troops. The July 6 article reports on how farewell messages of Arab martyrs are shared on social media and published by the Palestinian media, which in turn inspires young Palestinians to compose their own wills.
It is perverted enough that Palestinians are willing to sacrifice their own lives to harm Israel or anyone else. They compound this atrocity by allowing their youth to embrace it.
We are talking about child abuse. These Palestinians under 18 are applying a system that leads to their deaths, injury or imprisonment.
Child abuse comes to mind after I spent some years as a social worker in Philadelphia where I investigated abuse and neglect of children under 18. As far as I am aware, youths in Philadelphia never complied with a popular cultural practice to risk their lives to harm their perceived enemies.
Martyrdom was not listed as a form of child abuse. Maybe martyrdom should be.
Child abuse in America reflects individual violations that assigned agencies attempt to fight, yet martyrdom and other forms of child abuse and general crimes are spawned by Arab society.
The youths are also lied to about their enemies. While young people chafe over Israel’s so-called occupation of the West Bank, they are evidently not told of Israel’s multiple peace overtures since the modern-day state of Israel was established 75 years ago.
In particular, Israel proposed the creation of an independent state for most of the West Bank, part of Jerusalem and all of Gaza, but then-Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat rejected the plan while starting or facilitating an uprising against Israel.
Amr Khamour was born nearly a decade after then-Prime Minister Ehud Barak presented Arafat with plans for a peace deal during a summit at Camp David that commenced 23 years ago this week.
If Arafat continued negotiations and reached an agreement with Israel, what kind of life would Khamour be leading now? Would he have found it necessary to toss stones at a military jeep, and was then shot to death by Israel soldiers?
“If I come to you a martyr, God willing, don’t cry,” he wrote to his mother.
Or other young Palestinians who recount the words of Uday al-Tamimi, 22, in their farewell messages. Al-Tamimi wrote a message while on the run after firing at an Israeli checkpoint at the entrance of the Shuafat refugee camp, killing a soldier, according to the Times.
“I know that I will be martyred sooner or later, and I know that I did not liberate Palestine through this operation,” he wrote. “But I carried it out with a goal in mind; for the operation to mobilize hundreds of young men to carry arms after me.”
Many young people feel obligated to confront Israeli soldiers as part of assuming adult responsibilities, Dr. Samah Jabr, the head of the Palestinian Authority’s mental health unit, told a Times reporter. He explained that the wills are rooted in their experiences with checkpoints and frequent raids by Israeli soldiers.
Palestinian writer Jalal Abukhater told the Times that he attends wakes of young Palestinians in which he frequently hears their friends discuss taking a similar course. “It’s not that they want to die, but it’s that they feel like there’s nothing else to give to Palestine except martyrdom,” he said. “They think just throwing rocks at the jeep is the bravest act.”
Anjana Gadgil of the BBC tossed rhetorical rocks at the Israel Defense Forces when she held an on-air interview with former Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennett about Israel’s operation to locate terror cells in Jenin. When Bennett repeated the army’s position that all Palestinian dead, no matter their age, were fighters, not civilians, Gadgil responded, “Terrorists, but children. The Israeli forces are happy to kill children.”
How many reporters already had the answers, as she did? Why bother questioning Bennett? She could have billed the session as a lecture.
The Jewish Telegraphic Agency reported Bennett’s response: “It’s quite remarkable that you’d say that, because they’re killing us. Now, if there’s a 17-year-old Palestinian that’s shooting at your family, Anjana, what is he?”
Jewish leaders exploded when they learned of Gadgil’s concept of an interview. The Anti-Defamation League said that Anjana’s comment “speaks to a sustained anti-Israel bias within mainstream media outlets.” Bennett tweeted that the discussion “was one of the most hostile interviews toward Israel that I can remember.”
The BBC swiftly apologized for Gadgil’s comment.
It is not known if Gadgil still believes that “Israeli forces are happy to kill children.” There is no doubt that Palestinian children are happy to be killed by Israelis.
Israeli Security Force Operation in Jenin and the Jenin Refugee Camp Review and Summary
- Shortly before 2 a.m. on July 5, 2023, the Israeli security force operation in Jenin and the Jenin refugee camp ended; it had lasted for 48 hours. It was broadest Israeli security force activity in the Jenin area since 2002[1] and led to the destruction of about one thousand IEDs, the exposure and destruction of dozens of sites for the manufacture of weapons, underground shafts, and command and operation rooms. In addition, hundreds of thousands of dollars’ worth of shekels used to fund terrorist activities were seized. An IDF fighter was killed as the forces left the area.
- The ministry of health in Ramallah reported 12 Palestinians had been killed and 140 wounded, 30 of them critically.
- Three “revenge attacks” were carried out during the activity: a combined vehicular ramming and stabbing in Tel Aviv, a stabbing in Bnei Brak and a shooting at the settlement of Avnei Hefetz (southeast of Tulkarm). Five rockets were fired from the Gaza Strip at the Israeli communities near the border as the activity wound down. In response to the rocket attack, Israeli Air Force aircraft attacked two Hamas terrorist targets in Gaza.
- Local residents were elated when the Israeli security forces left the Jenin region and despite the destruction, went out into the streets to celebrate their “victory.” Palestinian sources, mainly in Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), which tried to create a victory narrative, claimed the operation was a Palestinian achievement and victory over Israel because it reaffirmed the unity of the [terrorist] organizations and had sent that message to Israel. In the meantime, the Palestinian Authority (PA) and its security services were severely criticized for not having helped the residents of Jenin, anger expressed on the ground in the attack on the building of the Jenin district governor and the forcible removal of senior Fatah and PA figures from the funerals held for Palestinians who had been killed.
Israel Security Force House and Garden
IDF activity in Jenin and the Jenin refugee camp
- Shortly before 2 a.m. on July 5, 2023, the last of the Israeli security forces left the area of Jenin and the Jenin refugee camp, ending Operation House and Garden. The activity began on July 3, 2023, and lasted 48 hours. An IDF fighter was killed as the forces left; the circumstances of his death are under investigation (IDF spokesman, December 5, 2023).
Palestinian picture of the IDF forces as they leave Jenin
(Twitter account of photojournalist Hassan Aslih, July 4, 2023).
- The IDF spokesman reported that the main objectives of the activity were to end the status of the Jenin refugee camp as a refuge and safe harbor for terrorists and destroy the terrorist infrastructure, including its laboratories for the manufacture of weapons, the IEDs planted under the refugee camp roads[2] and the camp’s network of cameras, which helped the terrorist operatives control events. Approximately one thousand IEDs were found and destroyed, dozens of sites for the manufacture of weapons were exposed and destroyed, along with underground shafts (two of which were located in the Ansar Mosque in the Jenin refugee camp), 14 safe houses used by Palestinians wanted for terrorist activities and a number of operations rooms. In addition, thousands of dollars’ worth of terrorism-funding shekels were confiscated (IDF spokesman’s Twitter account, July 5, 2023).
Right: A shaft were IEDs were stored (IDF spokesman’s Twitter account, July 4, 2023).
Left: A pit in the floor of a mosque where explosives and weapons were found (IDF spokesman’s Twitter account, July 3, 2023).
Right: Money for financing terrorism. Left: Boxes of ammunition
(IDF spokesman’s Twitter account, July 4, 2023).
IEDs waiting to be detonated to attack Israeli security forces in the Jenin refugee camp
(IDF spokesman’s Twitter account, July 4, 2023).
- During the operation 300 Palestinians suspected of terrorist activities were detained, 30 of them wanted by the Israeli security forces. Twelve Palestinians were killed, most of them terrorist operatives (see the Appendix). The IDF spokesman reported that many Palestinians were wounded because the terrorists hid within the civilian population, using civilians as human shields (IDF spokesman, July 5, 2023). The Palestinian media reported that thousands of local residents left the Jenin refugee camp.
Palestinian fatalities
- The ministry of health in Ramallah reported 12 Palestinians killed and 140 wounded, three of them critically (Wafa, July 4, 2023). An examination of the names of the fatalities indicated that at least ten of them were terrorist operatives, most of them young. Four of them were PIJ operatives, two were from al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades (AAMB), two from Fatah and one from Hamas. The organizational affiliation of the remaining two is unknown, but one of them wrote on his Facebook page that he wanted to become a shaheed.
- A mass funeral was held, also attended by armed operatives. The cortège began at the Abu Sina government hospital in Jenin, and according to reports, senior Fatah and PA figures including Fatah deputy chairman Mahmoud al-‘Aloul, and Azzam al-Hindi, a member of the PLO’s Executive Committee and Fatah’s Central Committee, were forcibly removed from the funeral procession by mourners to protest the fact that the PA security services did nothing to support local residents, did not stand with them during the operation and did nothing to counter the Israeli security forces (Shehab, July 5, 2023; Shehab Twitter account, July 5, 2023).
- The removal of the senior figures from the funeral procession was preceded by clashes on the night of July 4, 2023 between Jenin refugee camp terrorist operatives and PA security services’ operatives, who spent the days of the activity inside the Muqata’a headquarters in Jenin. The operatives went to the headquarters and threw rocks and IEDs at the building. PA security services armored vehicles dispersed the operatives and shot teargas canisters at them (Shehab, July 5, 2023).
The mass funeral (Right: Jmedia terrorist, July 5, 2023. Left: Shehab, July 5, 2023).
Reactions on the ground in Jenin
- During the operation three terrorist “revenge attacks” were carried out: a stabbing in Bnei Brak, a combined stabbing-vehicular ramming in Tel Aviv and shooting at the settlement of Avnei Hefetz near Tulkarm. Approximately one hour before the Israeli security forces left Jenin, five rockets were fired at Israeli territory from the Gaza Strip.
- Stabbing-vehicular ramming attack in Tel Aviv: On the afternoon of July 4, 2023, a Palestinian drove against traffic in Tel Aviv and mounted the sidewalk near a bus station where several people were waiting and rammed into them. He exited the vehicle armed with a knife and started stabbing people. He was shot and killed by an armed civilian at the site. He wounded nine people, three of them critically. According to reports, he worked in Israel illegally and used his employer’s vehicle for the attack (Israeli media, July 4, 2023).
- The terrorist was Abd al-Wahhab Issa Hussein Khalayleh, 20, from the village of Samu’, south of Hebron. Hamas published a notice claiming him as one of its operatives, stating the attack was a “legitimate case of self-defense [sic] in view of the Zionist slaughter in Jenin and the crimes of expulsion, killing and destruction carried out by the occupation forces” (Hamas website, July 4, 2023). A network calling itself the Samu’ Battalion, which claimed it did not belong to any Palestinian organization, stated Khalayleh was one of its operatives (Samu’ Battalion Telegram channel, July 4, 2023). His mother was interviewed and said her son did not belong to any organization, including Hamas (@AhmadHudaib13 terrorist, July 4, 2023).
Right: The scene of the terrorist attack in Tel Aviv (al-Fajr TV website, July 4, 2023).
Left: Abd al-Wahhab Khalayleh (Imad al-Aqili’s Facebook page, July 4, 2023.)
- Stabbing attack in Bnei Brak: On the evening of July 3, 2023, a Palestinian teenager armed with a knife went to the Kiryat Herzog neighborhood of Bnei Brak. He approached a young Israel and stabbed and wounded him. The Israeli fought him off and was taken to a hospital for medical treatment. The stabber was a 14 year-old from Jenin (Israeli media, July 3, 2023).
- Shots fired at the settlement of Avnei Hefetz: On the morning of July 3, 2023, shots were fired at Avnei Hefetz, southeast of Tulkarm. No casualties were reported; a bullet hole was found in the wall of one of the buildings. IDF forces initiated a search to locate the shooter (IDF spokesman’s Twitter account, July 3, 2023).
- Rockets fired from the Gaza Strip: Before dawn on July 5, 2023, about an hour after the Israeli security forces left Jenin, five rockets were fired from the Gaza Strip at the Israeli communities near the border and were intercepted by the Iron Dome aerial defense system. No casualties were reported. Debris from a rocket hit a home in Sderot. In response to the rocket fire Israeli Air Force aircraft attacked an underground facility for the manufacture of weapons belonging to Hamas’ chemical department and a facility for manufacturing raw materials for rockets (IDF spokesman’s Twitter account and the Israeli media, July 5, 2023). According to the Palestinian media, a Hamas post in Beit Lahia, in the northern Gaza Strip, was attacked (Twitter account of photojournalist Hassan Aslih, July 4, 2023).
Israeli Air Force attacks in the Gaza Strip (Wafa, July 5, 2023).
Reactions after the activity ended
- The exit of the IDF forces, which began on the evening of July 4, 2023, was documented by the Palestinian media outlets. Once the activity ended, despite extensive destruction, refugee camp refugees went out into the streets to celebrate (Ma’an, July 4 and 5, 2023). On the morning of July 5, 2023, after the “victory” celebrations, the Palestinian media began focusing on the damage and destruction, and pictures and videos were published showing residents visiting the ruins of their houses (Wafa and Ma’an, July 5, 2023). The Jenin municipality sent teams to remove the rubble and open roads which had been blocked during the activity (Ma’an, July 5, 2023).
Residents of the Jenin refugee camp celebrate the exit of the IDF forces
(“Palestine” Post Twitter account, July 5, 2023).
Pictures of the destruction in the Jenin refugee camp
(Right: Awda TV Facebook page, July 5, 2023. Left: Wafa Facebook page, July 5, 2023).
Bulldozers clear the rubble (Wafa, July 5, 2023).
- Various Palestinian sources referred to the activity as an “achievement and victory” over Israel and “the victory of the resistance in Jenin.” Hamas and the PIJ claimed it reaffirmed the unity of the [Palestinian terrorist] organizations, their ability to coordinate and the “unity of the arenas:”
- Hamas claimed the Palestinians were united and adhered to the option of “resistance” and confrontation with the “fascist Zionist occupation.” The announcement stressed the unity of the fighters from all the “forces and organizations” against Israel and the increase in the coordination on the ground. Moreover, according to Hamas, the “resistance” would continue defending the Palestinians, their lands and holy places, and Jerusalem would continue as the first address for “resistance” activity, because for the sake of Jerusalem they were willing to sacrifice what was most important to them (Hamas website, July 5, 2023).
- Isma’il Haniyeh, head of Hamas’ political bureau, stressed the “failure” of Israel, which had retreated “defeated with its head lowered” after the operatives of the various “resistance” wings had worked together and all options to support Jenin had been on the table. He added that the “heroic action” in Tel Aviv and the events in Judea and Samaria showed the Palestinians supported Jenin in its heroic battle, and the “resistance” was clearly the address and strategic choice of the Palestinians [in their “struggle”] to respond to aggression and expel the “occupation” from Palestinian lands. According to Haniyeh, through the negotiators, they had sent Israel the message that all the fronts were monitoring the events and Israel had to stop its aggression immediately. He claimed that despite the killed and wounded, they had taught Israel a lesson and caused it heavy losses, and the coming days would reveal the strength of the blow dealt to Israel by the “resistance,” which would force it to consider its steps carefully before it acted against the Palestinians again (Hamas website, July 5, 2023).
- The Izz al-Din Qassam Brigades, Hamas’ military-terrorist wing, congratulated the residents of the Jenin refugee camp, the fighters of the various organization and battalions, on their “victory.” They claimed the coming days would prove the Israeli leadership had miscalculated. Jenin and the other cities in Judea and Samaria would become sites that would anger Israel, and the “death ambushes” in Jenin and the activity in Tel Aviv had proved it. Accounts had not yet been settled, claimed the Izz al-Din Qassam Brigades, and the Palestinians would make Israel regret its actions (Izz al-Din Qassam Brigades website, July 4, 2023).
- Ziyad al-Nakhalah, PIJ secretary general, said the Palestinians had chalked up a great victory thanks to the Jenin Battalion leadership and its brave fighters, it had defeated [Israel’s] aggression in Jenin. The Palestinians had proved, by virtue of their unity and cohesion, that they could defeat Israel in every confrontation and battle, from “the Sword of Jerusalem” [Operation Guardian of the Walls] to “the Unity of the Arenas” [Operation Breaking Dawn], “the Free Men’s Revenge” [Operation Shield and Arrow] to “the Great Power of Jenin” [the most recent operation in Jenin]. He called for national unity to reinforce the Jenin refugee camp to keep it a center for revolutionary inspiration, jihad and “resistance” [terrorism] (PIJ website, July 5, 2023).
- Muhammad al-Hindi, deputy PIJ secretary general, tweeted that if such were the results of an operation for which Israel “had been making preparations for a year,” then it was to be congratulated on its achievement, deterrence and delusions. He added that Jenin was in good shape, the “resistance” was in good shape, the Jerusalem Brigades were in good shape and morale could not be higher (Shehab, July 5, 2023).
- Abu Hamza, spokesman for the Jerusalem Brigades, the PIJ’s military-terrorist wing, said in a speech that Israel had been deterred in every sense of the word, which explained its claims about its great imaginary achievements. He said Israel had already been deterred when the battle stated and had been deterred during the fighting. He said he saluted the Palestinians in all the arenas, especially in Jenin. He thanked all the organizations and the “resistance axis” headed by Iran, claiming the “resistance” fighters had not been alone, but behind them in several arenas, in “Palestine” and beyond, were loyal fighters whose fingers were on the trigger, and who were prepared to meet and fight the enemy, and if not in this particular battle, then in the future (Jerusalem Brigades website, July 5, 2023).
- Fatah’s media information and cultural commission said in a statement that the battle waged by the Palestinians in the Jenin refugee camp was a qualitative change in the “struggle” against Israel and a “historic message” written by the Palestinians with sacrifice, firm stance and integrated forces. According to the statement, the Palestinians had dispelled the Israeli government’s claims which tried to market its aggression as a military victory, and had defeated Israel’s “barbaric aggression” despite the destructive force Israel used. The commission said it saluted the Fatah fighters and operatives who had bravely defended the Palestinians in the Jenin refugee camp with their blood brothers from the other organizations and forces. The commission also saluted the medical teams, media correspondents and operatives of the Palestinian security services, who did not hesitate to fulfill their duty to strengthen the Palestinians’ firm stance (Telegram channel of Awda TV of Fatah’s media information and cultural commission, July 5, 2023).
- Khaled Jumaa, culture editor for the PA’s Wafa News Agency, published a column entitled “When willpower overcomes the machine of destruction.” Israel, he wrote, always forgets that the issue of “resistance” to the occupation is unrelated to the possession of weapons, or connected to the ability to manufacture IEDs or rockets. Israel always thinks that a “brutal invasion” of places like Jenin, the Gaza Strip or Nablus and getting rid of a group of “resistance fighters” is enough to write finis. However, they will not overcome Palestinian will power for the simple reason that the struggle is not between a war machine and a person or a group of people, but between ideologies. The Jenin refugee camp is not the issue, erasing it will not solve the matter the way Israel would like, because the idea is alive in the hearts [of the Palestinians] and is passed down from one generation to the next, not because it is what the Palestinians teach their children [sic], but because what Israel does keeps the problem alive (Wafa, July 5, 2023).
Palestinians cartoons of the “victory” Right: Jenin (al-Quds al-Arabi, July 4, 2023).
Left: The entrance to the Jenin refugee camp (Muhammad Sabaaneh’s Facebook page, July 4, 2023).
Appendix
Palestinian fatalities
- The ministry of health in Ramallah reported 12 Palestinians had been killed and 140 wounded, 30 of them critically (Wafa, July 4, 2023). An analysis of the names of the fatalities indicated that ten were terrorist organization operatives, five in their early 20’s, seven of them teenagers. Among them were four terrorists from the PIJ, three from the AAMB, two from Fatah and one from Hamas. Another belonged to both Fatah and the PIJ. Regarding two others, no organizational affiliation was noted, although according to the Facebook page of one, he wanted to become a shaheed.
- The Palestinian fatalities, the circumstances of their deaths and their organization affiliations were the following:
- Samih Firas Abu al-Wafa: 20 years old, killed when a house was attacked in the Jenin refugee campaign (Wafa, July 3, 2023; Fatah’s media information and cultural commission Facebook page, July 3, 2023). He was an AAMB operative. Fatah reported he was one of its operatives the son of Firas Abu al-Wafa, Fatah spokesman in Jenin (Telegram channel of Awda TV, Fatah’s media information and cultural commission, July 3, 2023).
Samih Firas Abu al-Wafa (Right: Awda, the Telegram channel of Fatah’s media information and cultural commission, July 3, 2023). Left: Samih Firas Abu al-Wafa’s Facebook page, June 6, 2023).
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- Aws Hani Hanoun: 19 years old. The PIJ in Judea and Samaria reported he was one of its operatives (PIJ website, July 3, 2023).
Aws Hani Hanoun (Paldf Twitter account, July 3, 2023).
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- Husam Muhammad Abu Deibeh: 18 years old. Fatah reported he was one of its operatives (Telegram channel of Awda TV, Fatah’s media information and cultural commission, July 3, 2023). The PIJ in Judea and Samaria also reported he was one of its operatives (PIJ website, July 3, 2023). According to reports he worked in the government hospital in Jenin (Yazan Yasin’s Facebook page, July 3, 2023).
Husam Muhammad Abu Deibeh (Right: Twitter account of journalist Firas Taneineh, July 3, 2023). Left: At work in the hospital in Jenin (Yazan Yasin’s Facebook page, July 3, 2023).
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- Nur al-Din Husam Marshoud: 16 years old. The PIJ in Judea and Samaria also reported he was one of its operatives (PIJ website, July 3, 2023).
Nur al-Din Husam Marshoud (Ali Muhammad Zurayiq’s Facebook page, July 3, 2023).
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- Muhammad Muhannad Shami (or al-Shami) Turkman: 23 years old. Killed in an attack in the Jenin refugee camp; his uncle Muhammad Shami al-Shami was wounded in the same attack (Ibrahim Shami’s Facebook page, July 3, 2023). The AAMB in reported he was one of its operatives (AAMB Panthers’ Telegram channel, July 3, 2023). His current and old Facebook page profile pictures show his connection to the AAMB (Muhammad Shami’s Facebook page, June 8, 2016). Nephew of Usama Sabah, a Jerusalem Brigades operative killed in a clash with IDF forces in the village of Burqin on September 26, 2021 (@jalestinian2 Twitter account, July 3, 2023).
Right: Muhammad Muhannad Shami Turkman (Musa Turkman’s Facebook page, July 3, 2023).
Left: Muhammad Muhannad al-Shami Turkman with his cousin, Muhammad Shami al-Shami (Ibrahim Shami’s Facebook page, July 3, 2023).
Muhammad Shami Turkman’s current and old profile pictures show his ties to the AAMB (Right: Muhammad Shami Turkman’s Facebook page, June 8, 2016. Left: Muhammad Shami Turkman’s Facebook page, October 3, 2015).
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- Ahmed Muhammad Amer (or al-Amer): 21 years old, represented as an AAMB operative (AAMB Panthers’ Telegram channel, July 3, 2023). He apparently belonged to the Jenin Battalion. Pictures on his Facebook page show him armed; in some he wears an AAMB headband. In others there are captions indicating he belonged to the Jerusalem Brigades’ Jenin Battalion. He also published a picture of himself with Yusuf Shreem, a Hamas Izz al-Din Qassam Brigades operative killed in Jenin on March 16, 2023.
Ahmed al-Amer wearing an AAMB headband (Ahmed al-Amer’s Facebook page, February 24, 2023).
Left: Ahmed al-Amer, with a Jerusalem Brigades –Jenin Battalion badge on the strap of one of his rifles (Ahmed al-Amer’s Facebook page, April 1, 2023).
Ahmed al-Amer with AAMB and Jenin Battalion armbands
Right: Ahmed al-Amer and Yusuf Shreem (Ahmed al-Amer’s Facebook page, March 16, 2023). Ahmed al-Amer’s most recent profile picture (Ahmed al-Amer’s Facebook page, June 6, 2023).
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- Majdi Yunes Ararawi: 17 years old. The PIJ in Judea and Samaria reported him as one of its operatives (PIJ website, July 3, 2023).
Majdi Yunes Ararawi wearing a Jenin Battalion headband
(@jeniincamp Telegram channel, July 3, 2023).
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- Ali Hani al-Ghoul: 17 years old. Hamas’ Izz al-Din Qassam Brigades in Judea and Samaria issued a mourning notice for him reporting him as one of its operatives, claiming he was killed while lying in ambush for the Israeli security forces who tried to enter the Jenin refugee camp (“West Bank Lion’s” Telegram channel, July 3, 2023). His body was wrapped for burial in a Hamas flag (“Palestine” Post Twitter account, July 5, 2023).
Ali Hani al-Ghoul (Right: Izz al-Din Qassam Brigades website, July 3, 2023. Left: Ahmed al-Ghoul’s Facebook page, July 3, 2023).
Ali Hani al-Ghoul’s body removed from the Abu Sina Hospital in Jenin, wrapped for burial in a Hamas flag (“Palestine” Post Twitter account, July 5, 2023).
- Mustafa Imad Qassem: 16 years old. No known organizational affiliation, but his Facebook page subject picture is the shahada with the caption, “We will live and die by [the shahada]” (Mustafa Qassem’s Facebook page, November 25, 2022). The inscription at the top of his Facebook page reads, “Allah is our goal, the Prophet [Muhammad] is our role model, and the Qur’an is our constitution; Jenin [refugee] camp; Amjad al-Fayid (Pharoah).[3]
Mustafa Qassem’s Facebook page
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- Uday Ibrahim Khamayseh: 22 years old from the village of Yamoun. A funeral was held for him in Yamoun (SND website, July 4, 2023). His body was wrapped for burial in a Fatah flag with an M-16 placed on top.
The funeral held for Uday Khamayseh in Yamoun (@elthwrah Twitter account, July 4, 2023).
- Abd al-Rahman Hassan Hardan Sa’abneh: 22 years old (according to Wafa), 17 years old according to other sources (Palestinian TV Facebook page, July 4, 2023). He was from the village of Fahma, southwest of Jenin (Wafa, July 4, 2023). The ministry of education in Ramallah issued a mourning notice stating he was an 11th grade student at in the boys’ high school in Fahma (ministry of education in Ramallah Facebook page, July 4, 2023). The PIJ reported he was one of its operatives (PIJ Telegram channel, July 5, 2023).
Abd al-Rahman Sa’abneh (Abd al-Rahman Sa’abneh’s Facebook page, May 31, 2023).
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- Jawed Mujahed Neirat: 22 years old from the village of Meithaloun, south of Jenin (Wafa, July 4, 2023). No known organizational affiliation. His body was wrapped for burial in a Palestinian flag.
Right: Jawed Mujahed Neirat (Jawed Mujahed Neirat’s Facebook page, March 7, 2023).
Left: The funeral held for Jawed Mujahed Neirat in Meithaloun. His body is wrapped for burial in a Palestinian flag (Meithaloun24 Group Facebook page, July 5, 2023).
[1] Operation Defensive Shield in 2002, during the second intifada. ↑
[2] Such as the IEDs detonated in the attack on IDF armored vehicles on June 19, 2023. ↑
[3] Amjad al-Fayid, whose nickname was “guardian of the Jenin refugee camp,” was a 17 year-old PIJ operative killed on May 21, 2023, in a clash with Israeli security forces. ↑
Essential Facts About the Judicial Reform
What Are the Details of the Judicial Reform Bill?
Reform on the Judges Selection Committee
The Current Selection Process:
A group of nine individuals constitutes the Judges’ Selection Committee. This includes the Chief Justice, two extra Supreme Court justices, the Justice Minister, a government representative, two Knesset members, and two members of the Bar Association. To appoint a new Supreme Court justice, a minimum of seven out of the nine members is necessary, providing the Supreme Court judges with the authority to veto. It is noteworthy to mention that since the establishment of the Committee in 1953, the three judges have consistently reached unanimous decisions regarding appointing justices to the Supreme Court.
The Proposed Changes:
The approved proposal, led by MK Simcha Rothman, Chairman of the Constitutional Committee, modifies President Herzog’s unsuccessful plan. The proposal expands the Judges’ Selection Committee to 11 members. This expanded Committee will consist of three ministers, three coalition Knesset members, two opposition Knesset members, and three Supreme Court justices. The framework for selecting magistrate and district judges will also change.
The new proposal aims to create a healthier balance, removing the Supreme Court judges’ veto power. During each Knesset term, a simple majority from the coalition will appoint the first two Supreme Court judges. The third judge will require the approval of one opposition representative, while the fourth judge onwards will require the approval of one committee judge, which means a broad consensus will be needed starting with the third appointment. This prevents the politicization of the Court.
The Committee’s composition will promote diversity among Supreme Court judges, reflecting various opinions and communities in Israel. The proposed framework protects legal diversity. Political impeachment of judges will not be allowed but would require the support of seven out of nine Committee members and approval from all three government branches.
The Committee will conduct public hearings for candidates, enhancing transparency about their legal and general worldviews. Additionally, the Chief Justice will be appointed by the Committee as opposed to the current seniority selection system.
Court Interference in Legislation and the Override Clause
The Current Reality:
The absence of checks and balances within the judicial branch in Israel has led to an imbalance of power. A significant transformation occurred in 1995 when the Supreme Court granted itself unprecedented authority. It took the power to determine which laws to strike down, who can petition the court, and to involve itself in various issues, effectively assuming the role of writing Israel’s constitution. As a result, democratic decisions are conditional, awaiting the court’s approval rather than being determined by public representatives.
The Supreme Court’s ability to strike down laws with a panel of just three judges, without requiring a supermajority, was not originally granted. The court gradually assumed this power during what is referred to as the Constitutional Revolution. An override clause already exists in the Freedom of Occupation: Basic Law, enabling the Knesset to override Supreme Court decisions with a majority of 61 members. It is important to note that there is no equivalent override clause in the Human Dignity and Liberty: Basic Law.
The Constitutional Revolution is founded on the premise that Israel’s constitution lies within the Basic Laws. Under this notion, when the Court invalidates laws, it does so on the grounds of their contradiction with the Basic Laws.
What is particularly concerning is that the Supreme Court has expanded its reach to interfere in the Basic Laws themselves, which are considered to be Israel’s constitution. This signifies a significant departure from the original intent.
The Proposed Reforms:
The process of striking down laws will require the full assembly of the Supreme Court, with 15 judges present to prevent any influence based on the panel’s composition. A supermajority of 12 out of the 15 judges will be necessary to invalidate laws.
Regarding the override clause, if the Supreme Court strikes down a law, the Knesset will have the opportunity to legislate it again within a limited timeframe, with a majority of 61 Knesset members. However, if the court unanimously invalidates a law, the Knesset will only be able to override it in the subsequent term rather than immediately.
In terms of the Basic Laws, the proposed reform suggests that the Supreme Court should not have the jurisdiction to rule on their validity. This adjustment brings Israel in line with other prominent democracies, as no other Western democracy permits its court to make determinations regarding the constitution itself.
The proposed amendments are intended to be moderate, aiming to define and regulate the powers of the Supreme Court while incorporating checks and balances into the current system. The objective is not to dismantle the system or entirely reverse the Constitutional Revolution but to establish a legal framework where the court is authorized to strike down laws.
Reasonableness Grounds
The Current Reality:
The “reasonableness ground” enables the Court to make decisions instead of elected officials, even without a legal basis. It allows the Supreme Court to overturn government decisions, regardless of their legality, simply because a judge disagrees with them. While the Court plays a vital role in rectifying illegal state actions, unauthorized activities, and discriminatory practices, it was never intended to replace the judgments of other government bodies. There is no inherent reason to assume that the Court’s judgment is superior.
The adoption of the reasonableness grounds has also granted legal advisors the power to interfere in the decisions made by elected officials.
The Proposal:
The reform aims to eliminate the reasonableness grounds, preventing judges from substituting their own discretion for that of legally appointed decision makers. It is crucial to emphasize that the Court will still fulfill its significant role in overseeing the government and conducting reviews based on established rules. These rules include examining lack of authority, ensuring due process, addressing illegitimate considerations, conflicts of interest, rights violations, discrimination, and adherence to clear legal standards.
Sourced from: “Details of the Reform.” הרפורמה המשפטית, https://legal-reform.org.il/en/details/. Accessed 13 July 2023.
Rabbi Leo Dee calls on Netanyahu to end financial support to PA
Leo Dee, who lost his wife Lucy and his two daughters Maya and Rina in shooting attack in the Jordan Valley, addressed Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu this morning (Wednesday) and called on him to act to end economic support to the Palestinian Authority.
He criticized the Palestinian Authority which, according to him, glorifies terrorists who murdered Israelis in front of children, including in the summer camps where they glorify terrorists, who, among other things, murdered his wife and daughters.
Leo opposed the economic reality in which the Palestinian Authority continues to receive budgets while it finances terrorism.
At the end of his speech, he called to stop the next war by ending the funding to the PA and the existing incentives from the international governments, in memory of his wife and daughters.
D66 leader Sigrid Kaag to quit politics, citing impact on family
July 13 2023
“D66 leader and finance minister Sigrid Kaag has decided to bow out of politics after the next general election, citing the negative impact of her job on her family.
Kaag, who joined D66 after a career with the UN, told Trouw in an interview on Wednesday that the many threats and online hate messages she receives have “taken a toll on the children”.
In particular, Kaag has been under attack from the far right, who have labelled her a “witch”, leading to demonstrators carrying torches turning up at her home and greeting her at meetings…”
https://www.dutchnews.nl/2023/07/d66-leader-sigrid-kaag-to-quit-politics-citing-impact-on-family/
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MIM:
NL Foreign Min. Sigrid Kaag is leaving politics due to ‘family concerns’ & ‘threats’ re the MSM who don’t mention this: NL FM accused of supporting Hamas Kaag wife of former sr. PA official Dr. Anis al Qaq has been funding Palestinian orgs & the PA.
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Dutch foreign minister accused of supporting Hamas
Sigrid Kaag’s ministries are refusing to account for funds transferred to Palestinian NGOs, including those operating out of the Hamas-controlled Gaza Strip.
6/1/2021
An official complaint against Kaag, who is known for her pro-Palestinian views, was filed by Dutch journalist Lukas Hartong, a former European Parliament lawmaker for the right-wing Party of Freedom under Geert Wilders.
Kaag, who is married to former senior Palestinian Authority official Dr. Anis al-Qaq, has served for the past three and a half years as the Netherland’s minister for foreign trade and development cooperation. Within the framework of that position, she has also been responsible for granting monetary aid to Palestinian organizations and the PA. Kaag still holds the foreign trade and development cooperation portfolio, in addition to now serving as her country’s foreign minister.
The Netherlands, via Kaag’s ministry, transferred aid money to a Palestinian NGO named the “Union of Agricultural Work Committee.” Several senior members of this NGO were involved in the murder of 17-year-old Rina Shnerb in August 2019. In the bombing attack, Shnerb’s father and brother were wounded. After evidence was provided of the NGO’s affiliations with the terrorist group the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, the Dutch government denied that it was transferring funds to the Union of Agricultural Work Committee. Ultimately, however, the Dutch government was forced to admit to funding the salaries of murderers.
With that, Kaag’s ministries still refuse to heed calls from Dutch lawmakers for transparent inspection of funds transferred to Palestinian NGOs, including those operating out of the Hamas-controlled Gaza Strip.
“Essentially, there is no information about where the money goes once it enters Gaza, where organizations tied to Hamas are more sophisticated in terms of concealing information and are less transparent toward Western money donors,” said Itai Reuveni of the Israeli watchdog group NGO Monitor.
Hartong based his complaint against the Dutch foreign minister on Article 421 of the Dutch Penal Code that “prohibits the intentional gathering, acquiring, holding or financing of objects that serve to give monetary support to terrorism,” and demanded that local police launch an investigation against her. According to Hartong, Dutch police have responded appropriately and were now awaiting Kaag’s response to the allegations.
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There’s much more:
Haaretz
https://www.haaretz.com › ty-article
‘Racist and Demagogic:’ New Dutch Minister in Charge of International Aid Blasted Netanyahu – Europe
Oct 22, 2017 — The wife of Anis al-Qaq, a deputy minister under Yasser Arafat in the 1990s and a Palestinian Authority ambassador to Switzerland, …
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Here’s her hubby’s bio on Passia the MB/Hamas org.
AL-QAQ, ANIS (1947-)
Born in Silwan, Jerusalem, on 1 June 1947; received a BSc in Dentistry from the University of Baghdad, Iraq in 1971; returned and opened a private clinic in Jerusalem; continued his education in Buckinghamshire, UK, from 1982-84, specializing in oral surgery; served as Chairman of the Dental Association in the West Bank from 1985-90 and as head of the Professionals’ Union from 1986-90; Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the Palestinian National Theater in Jerusalem from the late 1980s; Executive Member, Council for Higher Education from 1989; Pres. of the Palestinian-Swedish Friendship Society since 1989; Sec.-Gen. of the Health Services Council from 1989; Board Member of the International Coordinating Committee on the Question of Palestine (ICCP); member of the Coordinating Committee for NGOs on the Question of Palestine in the Occupied Palestinian Territories; member of the Palestinian Medical School Committee; became Deputy Assistant to the PA Minister of Planning and International Cooperation in 1996, later Undersecretary; President of the Center for Health Services in Jerusalem; Member of the Editorial Board of the Palestine-Israel Journal; Palestinian representative to Switzerland since 2004.
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(Note the reference to ‘Jerusalem 47)
Anis Al-Qaq
@Jerusalem47
Activist & Politician fighting for peace, justice and reconciliation in Near East International Forum for Peace
