Letter from UNRWA Official

David Bedein’s article “Why is the Shuafat Refugee Camp Seething?” (Israel Resource Review, October 13) outlines some of the urgent problems facing refugee camp residents, but it unfairly places the blame on the wrong party. The following outlines some of the services the UNWRA provides in Shuafat: Schooling for 1,571 children and a new girls’ school being built at a cost of over $1 million donated by the Saudi Fund for Development (SFD); medical care at a clinic which has more than 35,000 patient visits a year; environmental sanitation through a sewage and surface water drainage project, including asphalting of streets, at a cost of $1 million, also funded by SFD; and a new community center which houses UNRWA-assisted programs for women, the disabled and youth, a testament to the agency’s help to these groups.

There is close coordination between UNRWA and the camp committee on community-based activites and awareness campaigns. This cooperation is leading to the setting up of a children’s park with UNRWA’s technical assistance and support.

The writer points out the crowded conditions of the camp – which has an area of 203 dunams and a population of over 8,000. With a growing population and no more space for building housing, the refugees themselves are adding storeys to their houses. UNRWA does not build houses. Shuafat is located within the boundaries of the municipality of Jerusalem, so many responsibilities lie in the hands of the municipal government, such as the provision of adequate supplies of clean water, refuse collection and links to the muncipal sewage system. Shuafat does not belong to UNRWA, nor does any other refugee camp. The agency only provides services in camps. UNRWA’s mandate is regularly renewed by the UN General Assembly and it has no intention of giving up its responsibilities to provide services in Shuafat camp or in any other Palestine refugee camp.

Ron Wilkinson
Chief, Public Information Office, UNRWA

U.S. Letters of Assurance to Israel

Embassy of the United States of America
Tel Aviv
October 30, 1998

Mr. Dani Naveh
Cabinet Secretary
Office of the Prime Minister
Jerusalem

Dear Dani,

I wanted to confirm our policy on the issues of Reciprocity/Parallelism, Permanent Status Negotiations, and Prisoner Releases. In this regard, the statements issued publicly by the State Department on October 29, 1998, are accurate and represent our policies.

On Reciprocity/Parallelism, the statement said: “resolving the crisis of confidence between Israelis and Palestinians requires each side to fulfill a set of responsibilities based on the concept of reciprocity. I.E., both sides must carry out their respective obligations in accordance with the Wye River Memorandum. These obligations will be implemented or carried out in a parallel phased approach in accordance with the mutually agreed Time Line.”

As for Permanent Status Negotiations, the statement said: “the U.S. is highly sensitive to the vital importance of the permanent status issues to Israel’s future. We recognize that the security of the State of Israel and the Israeli public is at stake, and the U.S. commitment to Israel’s security remains ironclad.”

“We appreciate that if the U.S. is invited by both parties to participate in the permanent status talks, which are to be conducted between Israel and the Palestinians on a bilateral basis, we will do so for the purpose of facilitating the negotiations.”

“Only Israel can determine its own security needs and decide what solutions will be satisfactory.”

“We also understand that any decision to convene or seek to convene a summit to resolve permanent status issues will need the agreement of both parties.”

With regard to the issue of prison releases and the question of a “revolving door”, the statement said: “we have had discussions with the Palestinians and they have given us a firm commitment that there will be no ‘revolving door’.”

These public statements by the State Department represent our policies. We will not change them and they will remain our policies in the future.

Sincerely,

Edward S. Walker Jr.
Ambassador


U.S. State Department
Washington, D.C.
October 30, 1998

Mr. Dani Naveh
Cabinet Secretary
Government of Israel

Dear Mr. Naveh,

I wanted to provide further clarification of the understanding of the United States regarding one of the issues addressed in the “Wye River Memorandum.”

With respect to the Palestinian side’s provision of its list of policemen to Israel (II(C)(1)(a)), the U.S. has been assured that it will receive all appropriate information concerning current and former policemen as part of our assistance program. It is also our understanding that it was agreed by the two sides that the total number of Palestinian policemen would not exceed 30,000.

Sincerely,

Dennis B. Ross
Special Middle East Coordinator


Embassy of the United States of America
Tel Aviv
October 29, 1998

Mr. Dani Naveh
Cabinet Secretary
Office of the Prime Minister
Jerusalem

Dear Dani,

I wanted to confirm our policy on the issue of the 3rd phase of further redeployment. In this regard, the statement issued publicly by the State Department on October 27, 1998, is accurate and represents our policy.

Regarding the third further redeployment, the statement said: “during the discussions leading to this agreement, the U.S. made clear to both parties that it will not adopt any position or express any view about the size or the content of the third phase of Israel’s further redeployment, which is an Israeli responsibility to implement rather than negotiate.”

“Under the terms of the memorandum, an Israeli-Palestinian committee is being established. Nonetheless we urge the parties not to be distracted from the urgent task of negotiating permanent status arrangements, which are at the heart of the matter and which will determine the future of the area.”

“Our own efforts have been and will continue to be dedicated to that vital task.”

This public statement by the State Department represents our policy. We will not change it and it will remain our policy in the future.

Sincerely,

Edward S. Walker, Jr.
Ambassador


Embassy of the United States of America
Tel Aviv
October 29, 1998

Mr. Dani Naveh
Cabinet Secretary
Office of the Prime Minister
Jerusalem

Dear Dani,

I wanted to confirm our policy on the issues of unilateral actions and the Charter of the PLO. In this regard, the statements issued publicly by the State Department on October 27, 1998, are accurate and represent our policies.

With regard to unilateral declarations or other unilateral actions, the statement said: “as regards to the possibility of a unilateral decision of statehood or other unilateral actions by either party outside the negotiating process that prejudge or predetermine the outcome of those negotiations, the U.S. opposes and will oppose any such unilateral actions.”

“Indeed, the U.S. has maintained for many years that an acceptable solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict can only be found through negotiations, not through unilateral actions. And as we look to the future, that will remain our policy.”

“For the present, we are doing all we can to promote permanent status negotiations on an accelerated basis. And we are stressing that those who believe that they can declare unilateral positions or take unilateral acts, when the interim period ends, are courting disaster.”

With regard to the PNC, the statement said: “the Wye River Agreement specifies that the members of the PNC (as well as the members of the PLO Central Council, the Palestinian Council and the Heads of Palestinian Ministries) will be invited to a meeting which President Clinton will attend.”

“The purpose of this meeting of the PNC and other PLO organizations is to reaffirm Chairman Arafat’s January 22 letter to President Clinton nullifying each of the Charter’s provisions that are inconsistent with the PLO’s commitments to renounce terror, and to recognize and live in peace with Israel.”

“This process of reaffirmation will make clear, once and for all, that the provisions of the PLO Charter that call for the destruction of Israel are null and void.”

These public statements by the State Department represent our policies. We will not change them and they will remain our policies in the future.

Sincerely,

Edward S. Walker, Jr.
Ambassador

Why is the Shuafat Refugee Camp Seething?

At a time when the issue of Palestinian refugees surfaces on the agenda of the peace process, a visit to the one Palestinian refugee camp in Jerusalem can provide you with some understanding of the comlexity of the refugee issue at hand.

A three minute ride from Mount Scopus, traveling north, well within the city limits of Jerusalem, you will find the only UNRWA (United Nations Relief and Works Agency) Arab refugee camp in Jerusalem, in Shuafat. This is part of Jerusalem, and closures of the west bank do not affect Shuafat.

The Shuafat refugee camp gets into the news now and then when you hear about riots in the camp or stones hurled at passing vehicles. It remains a mystery to most people as to why there must be so much anger and tension in the camp.

I went to Shuafat to find out.

It would seem that some 5,500 Palestinian Arab refugees live in the Shuafat camp. 3,000 are children. They are descended from Arabs who in 1948 left what is now the Ashkelon region, and were initially settled in the hovels of the burnt out Jewish Quarter in the Old City of Jerusalem, from where they were abruptly relocated by King Hussein to Shuafat in 1966. Jordan had Arab renovation in mind for the Jewish Quarter of Jerusalem at the time. Little did the Jordanian king realize that his “Project Removal” to Shuafat would allow the IDF to enter an abandoned Jewish Quarter in 1967.

Ahmed, the volunteer head of the “committee for the disabled” in Shuafat, seems to be a one man greeting committee for Shuafat.

Ahmed introduces himself as the man who was elected by the residents of Shuafat to run programs for disabled Shuafat residents. The term disabled defines anyone from handicapped people to children with learning disabilities. Unlike other Arab neighborhoods in Jerusalem where some professional services exist in this regard, they do not exist except on a voluntary basis in Shuafat.

Without receiving a salary for his work with the disabled, Ahmed, who works as a school teacher at Shuafat’s elementary school, says that he devotes all of his spare time to work at the center for the disabled in the Shuafat camp. While Ahmed describes programs and centers in other areas of East Jerusalem that provide professional paid staff for the disabled, he explains that, “Well, UNRWA simply does not provide such services… People in the camp hate the UN and UNRWA. They strike them at work and when they come to visit the camp”.

Palestinians who were interviewed by IPCRI (Israeli/Palestinian Center For Research and Information) described UNRWA’s assistance as “meaningless”, while describing tensions between camp residents and UNRWA.

“We believe that UNRWA wants to withdraw from this camp and give it to the Palestinian Authority”, said Omar, Ahmed’s colleague on the ad hoc “PR committee for Shuafat”.

The PR committee, Omar says, figures that this is why UNRWA is not supplying services to the best of its ability.

Not that Omar is thrilled about the PA running things, either, since Omar claims that the PA does not have funds allocated to help UNRWA camps. “As far as the PA is concerned, Shuafat people have homes to go back to, in the villages that they left back in 1948”, says Omar.

Omar is correct. One of the first decisions of the Palestine Authority back in 1994 was to deny aid to the UNRWA refugee camps, because this would violate the right of return of Palestinian Arab refugees, as proscribed by UN resolution #194.

So much for the expectations of the Oslo process that hundreds of thousands of Palestinian Arabs living in refugee camps would be taken care of by an autonomous Palestinian entity.

Omar comments that when he walks around the camp every day, that he sees ” a look of abandonment upon the faces of the men sitting around me. UNRWA wants to desert them and they do not want to be under ownership of the Palestinian Authority. Their lives lay in the hands of ruthless politicians. As a result of this, the refugees maintain an unstable relationship between the UNRWA representatives and the residents in the camp”.

When Shuafat refugee camp opened in 1966, camp residents say, UNRWA was eagerly providing education, medical care, food, and social services.

That was then. Now, the reality is much harsher. The refugees of Shuafat camp wake up to the smell of urine breezing through their tiny apartments and winter flood steams that rush through their narrow alleyways. streets. Every year, there is talk of a new plan to pave streets and create sidewalks. Aid for this purpose is rejected from the Jerusalem municipality. The City of Jerusalem maintains a standard offer to help with sewage and paving the streets. Yet UNRWA will not allow this, since Israel is not recognized as a “host country”.

Children and the elderly meanwhile try to deal with the decline in services which were previously provided by UNRWA.

“Our children do not even have a playground,” Omar said, as he walked past a group of Shuafat children kicking around a plastic bottle.

Back in 1966, Shuafat camp was large enough to house all of its then 1,000 inhabitants. Not anymore.

In Shuafat, as in other UNRWA camps, there is not enough room in the area to expand the housing. Therefore, UNRWA builds upward. Apartments are stacked like blocks, one on top of each other. Families of ten are often packed in three bedroom apartments in the Shuafat camp.

Palestinian refugees have one of the largest population growth rates in the world, almost 5 per cent a year. In total, The 650,000 Arab refugees from 1948 have swelled to more than three million, confined by UNRWA since 1949 in fifty nine refugee camps. One million Arab refugees live in the UNRWA camps in the west bank and in Gaza.

The figures may be somewhat inflated, said one UNRWA health official, who asked not to be identified, “because some identity cards of deceased UNRWA residents get used again”.

“UNRWA promised us 12 sanitation workers and the exact number that work here is five,” barked an angry public relations committee member named Hadr. The lack of sanitation employment within the camp is evident by the piles of garbage and sewage that clog the streets of Shuafat. The small number of UNRWA sanitation employees are unable to stop the garbage from piling up. This is probably why Shuafat looks more like a trash dump than anything else.

Meanwhile, the refugees of Shuafat also complain about the UNRWA health care services. Some of the camp’s residents leave to find heath care outside of the camp because they feel that it better serves their needs

“Clinics within the camps are equal if not better than hospitals in the surrounding area,” responds Ibrahim Jibril, Public Information Assistant for UNRWA at UNRWA headquarters in Jerusalem.

Yet many UNRWA refugee camp residents receive health care insurance through their jobs outside of the camp, through Israel National Insurance Institute employment benefits. Yet many residents have to pay the full price to get reasonable medical care.

“When I go the UNRWA doctor for a stomachache he gives me parasetamol. When I go to the doctor because I have a headache he gives me parasetamol. When I ask him why he always gives me that same medicine, he says because UNRWA does not have money for medicine,” Omar said in a distressed voice.

Omar took out a blue card case and proudly presented it proudly to me.

That is because camp residents with blue cards, which are equivalent to Palestinian work permits, are able to seek medical care outside of the camp. However, there are hundreds of Shuafat residents who do not carry a blue card and therefore have to suffer miserably when they need real medical assistance.

“There are only two doctors who work in our Shuafat clinic: a general doctor and a dentist. The dentist never comes to work. When we ask to see him they (UNRWA) tells us to go to a private doctor or to go to Jerusalem,” Hadr said. Hadr, who recently needed a root canal, went to see if he could make an appointment with the dentist at the UNRWA clinic. The dentist was not in his office, he said. Hadr ran out of patience. Because of his extreme pain, he went to an Israeli dentist and paid a fee that he could not afford.

Anger in the UNRWA schools of Shuafat is demonstrated quite differently. One of the UNRWA perks is free education to twelfth grade. When you walk into a Shuafat school, it looks like any other modern school that you might see in Jerusalem. Indeed, the plaques on the adjacent boys and girls schools in Shuafat indicate that these schools were built from recent contributions of Saudi Arabia, which also constructed an adjoining mosque. The schools are much cleaner than the rest of the camp. The children seem well fed and well dressed in their neat school uniforms.

Yet the ascetic quality of the school contrasts with the curriculum. In an eighth grade English class, you hear the teacher proudly proclaim the words “occupation”, “land” and “return”, and asks the children to loudly repeat them. And then they sing their daily English song, a rendition of “We Shall Overcome… in Palestine”. When asked what the kids mean by the song, everyone of them spoke of returning to their homes in the area that is now Ashkelon. None spoke about living in the Palestinian entity in the west bank or Gaza. And one child introduced his grandfather, Mohamad, who offered to provide a personal escort to the village where they “will soon be returning to”, even though it no longer exists.

An UNRWA school official explains matter of factly that the Shuafat school curriculum is in keeping with the UNRWA mandate and the 1949 UN resolution #194 that is reaffirmed every two years which supports “the inalienable right of return” of all Palestinian refugee to be repatriated to the homes that they left in 1948.

Between the garbage, the reduced health facilities, the discouragement with UNRWA and the expectation of the right of return, it might be fair to say that Shuafat, the one refugee camp in Jerusalem is seething in expectation.

The Shuafat camp residents are well aware of the fact that the issue of “refugees” is now on the agenda of the Oslo process, as the final step in a peace process that has so far excluded them.

You can well expect the Shuafat camp residents, well educated and quite literate, to conduct further riots if their physical situation does not improve or if they do not have assurances that they will indeed return to Ashkelon very soon.

Meanwhile, the camp resident expectation that the Palestine Authority may soon take over official control of the Shuafat camp will represent a new headache to the city of Jerusalem and Israeli security services, which already copes with a dozen institutions of the Palestine Authority in its midst.

Al-Ahram: Weak Clinton, Egyptian Poll, Palestinian State, PA/Israel

Crime and Punishment
by Fayza Hassan Pot Pourri, a regular columnist

Excerpts:

The numerous episodes of the Clinton saga are telling proof that Americans have not really changed in their candid, puritanical morality since the days the Founding Fathers’ rule was established on a strict and literal observance of the Ten Commandments. It is becoming more apparent every day that the American public would be content with a ticking-off of their president by the Congress and a heart-felt public apology from the culprit, provided he shows befitting contrition, of course, till the end of his term at least. Condemnation followed by penitence are more than ever the order of the day. It is, however, regrettable that the same American people’s moral rectitude does not extend to the more serious transgressions of the Commandments committed by their otherwise philandering president and by their Congress. Could it be that their media is too busy to give a factual presentation of world events? Whatever happened to the global village? Is Monicagate effectively covering up what goes on outside the little study off the Oval Office? Or does the self-righteous American people honestly believe that wreaking havoc on faraway lands and murdering innocent, helpless populations on the other side of the globe are not sins covered by their Holy Book under the heading You shall not kill?

Listening to the Masses
by Nevine Khalil

Excerpts:

The results of a recent public opinion poll on political participation in Egypt showed that although the average Egyptian is not politically active, he (or she) is very aware of public affairs and holds strong views on political issues. It also concluded that the most disenchanted groups in society are the young, educated city-dwellers.

The Al-Ahram Centre for Political and Strategic Studies (ACPSS) polled 1,366 Egyptians in Cairo, Menoufiya in the north, and Qena in the south last June and July, submitting 41 questions on political, economic and social issues. The most surprising finding for ACPSS director Abdel-Moneim Said was the high level of satisfaction with the economic situation. “It was much higher than we thought,” he noted, “and people had more hope for the future than we expected, especially in light of the economic reform policies”.

In evaluating economic conditions, 59.3 per cent of those polled said they felt secure regarding their economic future for the next three years, compared to 31 per cent who felt insecure.

[T]he most negative replies came from Cairenes, the better educated and the younger age groups, which indicates that political stability is heavily dependent on positive conditions in rural areas.

While representing a minority of the population, these groups have a high potential of influencing policy and setting the national agenda….

Before the outcome was made public, Said told Al-Ahram Weekly that he would publish the results, no matter how negative or sensitive they were. “The public is maturing and learning how to appreciate good scientific work,” he opined, “and we’re not doing this to flatter or criticise anyone.” The survey was intended to explore trends in Egyptian political life, and was partially funded by the Ford Foundation in Cairo, which put up LE70,000 of the estimated LE90,000 budget.

[O]nly 8.4 per cent of those polled said they were members of political parties, and only 6.3 per cent were members of Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), which shows that the average Egyptian does not take much interest in political participation or public action, according to the pollsters’ analysis. Only 40.7 per cent of the participants voted in the last parliamentary elections of 1995.

At the same time, while Egyptians stay away from elections, they have a strong belief in democracy, reflected by the fact that 68.7 per cent prefer a democratic regime in comparison to 27.9 per cent opting for a “just dictatorship”.

41 per cent of the Muslims polled said they voted in the last elections, compared to 38.5 per cent of the Christians. Muslims polled amounted to an overwhelming 93.1 per cent of the sample, while Christians represented 6.7 per cent. The results showed that 77.8 per cent of those polled believed that there was equality between Muslims and Copts “to a large extent”. This sense of “extensive” equality was highest in Qena at 81.1 per cent, followed by 71.9 in Menoufiya and 67.8 in Cairo.

Regarding gender, the poll found that the rate of political participation by women, who constituted nearly half of the interviewees, was a low 21.1 per cent casting votes in the 1995 parliamentary elections, while 59.7 per cent of the men voted.

Political participation was markedly less in urban areas compared to rural areas. While 25.8 per cent of Cairenes voted in the elections, the figure was 44.6 per cent for those in the governorate of Qena, and for Menoufiya 43.7 per cent. The same trend could be found in membership of political parties. In Cairo and Menoufiya it was 6.7 per cent each, while in Qena it was 11.3 per cent.

Political participation is also lower among the younger generations, with only 26.5 per cent of those in the 18-25 age bracket casting votes in the last elections [IMRA: How many in the sample were below voting age in the last election?], and 4.1 per cent being members of political parties. In the 46-55 age bracket, 49.2 per cent voted and 11.3 per cent are members of political parties. According to the pollsters’ analysis, this indicates that the political sphere is relatively confined to the older generations who politically alienate the youths, and this possibly contributes to the rising rate of violence among the younger generation.

The poll indicates that the better educated sample has a greater interest in political participation, in comparison to those with little or no education. While 32.7 per cent of the illiterate or those with basic writing and reading abilities voted in the last elections, the figure was 51.4 per cent for university graduates. The disparity is even greater when it comes to membership of political parties, with 17.7 per cent of university graduates joining political parties, nearly seven times the figure of 2.6 per cent for the illiterate or those with basic writing and reading abilities. According to the researchers, this runs contrary to the general assumption that political apathy is rampant among the better educated.

Moving on to the people’s conceptions of political institutions and their performance, the poll found that while 55.9 per cent felt that press freedom was “extensive”, only 29.2 per cent felt that political parties enjoy the same amount of freedom, a figure close to the 30.3 per cent recorded for trades union freedoms.

Although there was majority agreement on equality between Muslims and Copts, the same sentiment was not reflected regarding equality between the rich and poor. Half of those polled believed that there was little or no equality between the two groups. This sense of inequality was strongly felt among Cairenes with 49.2 per cent agreeing that there was no equality, which is almost double Qena’s 27.8 and Menoufiya’s 22.5 per cent.

Results also indicate that the overwhelming majority of Egyptians have great faith in their country’s ability to deal with foreign economic or military threats. Only 6.1 per cent felt that Egypt would not be able to deal with foreign economic threats, such as the suspension of US aid. At the same time, 81.4 per cent believe that Egypt is “very capable” of confronting a foreign military threat, a figure which climbs to 86.5 per cent in the case of an Israeli military aggression.

Said hopes that ACPSS will initiate a tradition of opinion polling in order to gauge “the pulse” of average Egyptians on various issues. Said added that it was necessary to conduct polls on political opinions, “because people will make the most outrageous statements and claim that’s what the masses want”. He believes that “it’s about time to know what the people really think, not what we imagine they think”.

Letter to the Editor
Why Palestine?

Full Text:

Why Palestine?

Sir-I often receive your weekly newspaper from a friend, thereby providing me with information from home. However, in the past few months, to my amazement, I have noticed the enormous space you devote to news and views of Palestine. To an outsider, it appears as if your paper is controlled by Palestinians.

As a Canadian of Egyptian extraction, I know that we have our own myriad concerns and problems, whether they are in the sphere of health, economics, terrorism, education (or the lack of it), under-employment, democratic freedoms, or the population explosion — these are just some of the burning problems consistently facing our nation. Shouldn’t we concentrate on our own brothers and sisters, rather than devoting our efforts to the Palestinians? Let us not forget our thousands of compatriots who gave their lives away in past wars supporting the Palestinian cause, and the many millions wasted that caused our economic setback. As an Egyptian who lost three close relatives in those battles, I ask you not to let the Palestinians dominate your fine paper.

Mustafa Amin
Ontario, Canada

Soapbox: Why the Process Has Not Died
by Salah Bassiouni

Full Text:

Five years after the signing of the Oslo Accords, there is a very serious stalemate in the negotiations between the Palestinian National Authority and the Israeli government. The reasons for this unfortunate situation are known: the PNA has accepted the US suggestion of Israeli withdrawal from 13 per cent of the Occupied Territories, while the Israelis have tried to empty this initiative of its substance in the hope that the Palestinians will ultimately accept a compromise void of any tangible gains. [IMRA: Not so. There is agreement re land but the hold-up is PNA’s resistance to meeting its OSLO obligations.]

But it would be wrong to see this as the end of the peace process. This is a tough political struggle, in which each party tries to obtain the maximum, and neither will benefit from resorting to violence. The PNA is well rooted on Palestinian land, and can continue its struggle by all available means. Netanyahu cannot risk the failure of the peace process, if only for domestic reasons: he knows that 50 per cent of the electorate backs it. Given Clinton’s difficult situation, the US would not want to endanger its strategy for a new order in the Middle East, based primarily on achieving peace. Europe, though it concedes the upper hand to the US, will not accept to sit on the fence while the threat of failure looms; finally, Egypt remains steadfast despite the present difficulties. This is a political game, where consistency and time play a substantial role. The PNA has proved it can manage and sustain its struggle to achieve its legitimate national rights.

The writer is Secretary General of the Cairo Peace Society

A Real State Means Real Work
by Edward Said

“Palestinian citizens of Israel… would… be excluded [from a Palestinian State]”

Excerpts:

[T]he Arabic press has been reporting that, during his numerous visits to both Arab and non-Arab countries, Arafat has been seeking foreign support for his project. By now, then, the notion that a Palestinian state will be declared on 4 May, 1999 by Arafat has acquired a momentum, if not exactly a life, of its own.

One likely Israel reaction might be to say that the Palestinian entity has to be in Gaza, which is already cut off from the West Bank, and more or less force Arafat to confine himself and, alas, Palestinian national aspirations, to Gaza. This would be a severe blow, no matter how much international support the declared state would have at the time.

Supporters of Arafat’s idea of declaring a state in spite of the concrete demographic and territorial problems say that the project itself would have the positive effect of stirring the Palestinian population into some sort of energy, thereby compensating for the dismal failure of the Oslo Accords on which Arafat and his increasingly small circle of supporters, advisers, and hangers-on have staked so much.

It is true that the Palestinian Authority [IMRA: The PA governs 98% of Palestinians in the Territories.] has many functions of a state government — post office, birth certificates, security, municipal affairs, education and health — but it still far too dependent on Israel to do as states should be able to do. Thus, for instance, water is still under Israeli control, as is the use of land, and entrances and exits to the Territories.

The disadvantages of declaring a state seem to me far to outweigh the advantages. Most important, a state declared on the autonomous territories would definitively divide the Palestinian population and its cause more or less forever. Residents of Jerusalem, now annexed by Israel, can play no part, nor be, in the state…. Palestinian citizens of Israel… would also be excluded, as would Palestinians in the Diaspora, whose theoretical right of return would practically be annulled.

… Arafat is using the declaration of a state as a way of covering himself with what looks like a gain even as he is about to accept the treacherous Israeli “offer” of nine per cent plus three per cent as a nature reserve under Israeli control. Arafat is a prisoner of both the Israelis and the US….

Another disadvantage… is that the Israeli idea of getting rid of Palestinians by separation will be achieved not by Israel but by the Palestinian leadership. This would be the final triumph of the desire for the Palestinian people’s disappearance by dispossession for which a century of Zionist planning and belligerence has always plotted: the elimination of the Palestinian presence as a national group on the territory of historical Palestine. The Zionists consider it to be the Land of Israel, reserved exclusively for Jews. On the other hand, we should remember that every idea of Palestinian self-determination since the ascendancy of the present PLO has envisaged and embodied an idea of non-discriminatory equality and sharing in Palestine. [IMRA: Not so. This is a genteel restatement of the Palestinian Covenant.] This was the notion of a secular democratic state and, later, the idea of two states living side by side in neighbourly harmony. These ideas were never accepted by the Israeli ruling majority, and Oslo, in my view, was a clever way for the Labour Party to create a series of Bantustans in which the Palestinians would be confined and dominated by Israel, at the same time hinting that a quasi-state for Palestinians would come into being.

[T]hose who would argue that, for Palestinians, such a declared state would be the first step towards a real state, with true self-determination, are actually deluding themselves by thinking illogically.

[T]his hullabaloo about 4 May, 1999 is part of Arafat’s tried and true method for distracting us from the true difficulties we face as a people. He used to do the same thing before every National Council meeting, floating rumours about an upcoming date, then postponing, then announcing a new date three or four times….

If the last few years have proved one thing, it is the bankruptcy of the vision proclaimed by Oslo, and of the leadership that engineered the whole wretched thing. It left huge numbers of Palestinians unrepresented, impoverished and forgotten; it allowed Israel to expropriate more land in addition to consolidating its hold on Jerusalem, the Golan Heights, and the West Bank and Gaza settlements; it validated the notion of what can only be called petty Palestinian nationalism….

The only political vision worth holding on to is a secular bi-national one that transcends the ludicrous limitations of a little Palestinian state… without much land or credibility, as well as the limitations that have been so essential to the Zionist form of apartheid imposed on us everywhere.

It is this that united us all as a people, whether in Lebanon, Jerusalem, Nazareth, Amman, Damascus, or Chicago. The present Palestinian leadership has neither comprehended our dilemma nor, obviously enough, furnished an answer to it. This is why we shouldn’t be too excited by Arafat’s rather juvenile enthusiasm for the prospects of what might or might not take place on 4 May, 1999.

The real task, I think, is to be planning a real alternative to the nonsense at present being put about, that by declaring a state — somehow — we will actually get one — somehow. Typically, this silly slogan conceals the real difficulties in actually establishing a state, difficulties that can only be overcome by real work, real thought, the real unity and, above all, real representation of all (as opposed to a part) of the Palestinian people. Not unilateral, empty, repetitious slogans. It is an insult to the integrity of our people to keep on making up such make-believe “realities” and trying to pass them off as political substance. Arafat and his advisers should be ashamed of themselves for such banal tricks. They should stand aside so that a more serious and credible political process can replace their disastrous fumbling once and for all.

A Breakthrough, If Not Historic
by Mahgoub Omar

[Heading:] Since Oslo… the Palestinians have fought tooth and nail to consolidate every gain. A state is the next step.

“The Palestinians… have developed a military power… capable of inflicting losses on the Israeli army that the Israeli leadership would be unwilling to sustain.”

Excerpts:

To say that the Oslo Accords entailed “mutual recognition”… is technically incorrect. The recognition entailed in the accords was strictly one-sided. It involved Israel’s recognition of the PLO as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, a recognition it had withheld for so long. Israel’s refusal to recognise the PLO had obstructed all progress in Madrid for nearly two years, while the PLO, in contrast, had recognised Israel through its compliance with UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, as well as all pertinent UN resolutions, since 1974. [IMRA: Simply not so.]

… Palestinians were the winners in the Oslo Accords as far as recognition was concerned. Israel, on the other hand, obtained the deferral of fundamental issues, foremost among them the fate of the refugees of 1948, the status of Jerusalem and the Israeli settlements in the West Bank and Gaza, not to mention acceptance as a partner in economic regional and international frameworks.

The difference between the view of the Labour Party (Rabin and Peres) and that of Likud (Shamir and Netanyahu) with regard to the future of the Occupied Territories has been one of the major operative factors in the peace process. Whereas Labour allowed Israel to participate in negotiations in Madrid and then in Oslo, Netanyahu mainly attempted to empty Oslo of substance. Netanyahu has not succeeded in these attempts, yet he has managed to postpone implementing the bulk of the commitments Peres had made.

Perhaps this factor has driven the Palestinian leadership to advocate a more “comprehensive view”. They realise that Netanyahu may be prepared to offer partial concessions, but nothing that could lead to the formation of a Palestinian state. They hope to arrive, through negotiations, at a partial autonomy that could later develop into independent Palestinian statehood.

The transitional period will come to an end next May. Netanyahu has few options, the most dangerous of which would be to attempt to regain the territories from which the Israeli army has withdrawn. This would be suicidal. The Palestinians now residing in these territories have been able to develop their organisational capabilities. They have developed a military power that would make the next Intifada more formidable than its predecessor, and capable of inflicting losses on the Israeli army that the Israeli leadership would be unwilling to sustain. Any confrontation inside occupied Palestine in the near future will not pass unnoticed, particularly now that the Palestinian position has generated so much Arab and international support.

The Palestinian people have waited a long time for their nation’s reappearance on the map. Although a Palestinian state has not yet officially been declared, major steps have been taken toward that end. This is Netanyahu’s greatest fear. If, next May, Yasser Arafat declares an independent Palestinian state, the land which the Palestinian leadership demands will no longer be considered “under dispute” but, rather, the occupied territory of a sovereign state. Hence the importance at this stage of acquiring recognition for the declaration of a Palestinian state from Arab, Islamic and European countries.

Translations by
Dr. Joseph Lerner,
Co-Director IMRA (Independent Media Review & Analysis)
P.O.BOX 982 Kfar Sava
Tel: (+972-9) 760-4719
Fax: (+972-9) 741-1645
imra@netvision.net.il

Iraq News Update

  1. B. Gilman Introduces Bill to Support Opposition to Saddam, 29th September
  2. Robert Kagan, “A Way to Oust Saddam,” Weekly Standard, 28th September
  3. Iraqi Work Toward A-Bomb, Washington Post, 30th September
  4. Israeli Tips Aided UNSCOM, Washington Post, 29th September
  5. Scott Ritter Interview, Haaretz, 29th September
  6. Outgoing Aid Co-ordinator Blasts Sanctions, BBC, 30th September

This is the 57th day without weapons inspections in Iraq. The Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Terrrorism, Technology and Government Information will hold a hearing on the question of the six Iraqi opposition members, evacuated by the US Gov’t after Saddam’s Aug 96 assault on Irbil, and presently detained in California. The hearing will be Oct 5, 2:00 PM, Dirksen Bldg, Room 226.

The NYT, today, reported that Foreign Minister, Mohammed al-Sahaf, took a hard line in his speech yesterday to the UNGA. He denounced UNSCOM and said Iraq had complied with UNSCR 687. He also said sanctions were “tantamount to internationally proscribed acts of genocide.” He also seemed to assume Iraq could have the “comprehensive review,” provided for in UNSCR 1194, before allowing weapons inspections to resume.

USIS, yesterday, in “Iraq Liberation Bill Introduced into Congress,” reported on the “bipartisan support shown for [the] removal of Saddam Hussein.” Rep. Benjamin Gilman [R, NY], introducing the “Iraq Liberation Act of 1998” [HR 4655], Sept 29, explained that “the purpose of this legislation is to finally and irrevocably commit the United States to the removal from power of the regime headed by Saddam Hussein.

… If this man remains in power, Iraq will remain a clear and present danger to the United States and our allies. We heard as much from the Chief UN weapons inspector, Scott Ritter, and we have heard as much from the Administration.”

Robert Kagan, in The Weekly Standard, Sept 28, underscored the Iraqi threat, as detailed by Ritter and suggested by the long break in weapons inspections. “The Clinton administration clearly has no idea how to handle this imminent and devastating threat to American interests…. The unstated but de facto policy of the administration is now this slender hope: if and when Saddam builds his weapons of mass destruction, the United States will still be able to deter him from aggression against his neighbors. This must be comforting to the folks in Jerusalem, Riyadh, and Kuwait City, as well as to anyone else who cares about American credibility and Middle East peace. It has long been clear that the only way to rid the world of Saddam’s weapons of mass destruction is to rid Iraq of Saddam. Last week, Paul Wolfowitz, a defense official in the Bush administration, laid out in testimony before Congress a thoughtful and coherent strategy to accomplish that goal. The Wolfowitz plan calls for the establishment of a ‘liberated zone’ in southern Iraq… The zone would be a safe haven for the opponents of Saddam’s regime. They could rally and organize, establish a provisional government there, gain international recognition, and set up a credible alternative to Saddam’s dictatorship…. Arab officials have told Wolfowitz that the effect on Saddam’s regime would be ‘devastating.’ Wolfowitz predicts that the creation of such a zone would lead to the ‘unraveling of the regime.'” [see “Iraq News,” Sept 17 for Wolfowitz’ testimony]. Kagan stressed that the US should be prepared to back up the Iraqi opponents of Saddam with its own force.

The extremity of the Saddam menace was highlighted by yesterday’s Wash Post report on Iraq’s nuclear program. In 1996 and 1997, UNSCOM told US officials that it had credible intelligence indicating that Iraq had built and retained several implosion devices that lacked only enriched uranium cores to make 20-kiloton nuclear weapons.

David Steinmann, who just finished four years as president of JINSA [Jewish Institute for Nat’l Security Affairs] and now serves as Chairman of JINSA’s Board of Advisers, commenting on the story, noted “the now recognizable reaction of the Clinton Administration: 1) we didn’t get the information; 2) OK, we got it, but it’s not so credible; 3) OK, it may be credible, so 4) let’s investigate and smear the source of the information (Scott Ritter) instead of investigating the validity of the information and the danger it poses to the US and Iraq’s neighbors (this last point isn’t mentioned in this article but has been in previous pieces by the same journalist).”

Indeed, while the information about Iraq’s nuclear program is new in its detail, it has long been known in its generality. It came to light as a result of Hussein Kamil’s Aug 95 defection and was first reported by Paul Leventhal and Edwin Lyman, Nov 2, 1995 in the IHT, “Who Says Iraq Isn’t Making a Bomb.” Also, Mike Eisenstadt, of The Washington Institute, which sporadically reports on the Iraq threat, wrote “Still Not Bomb-Proof,” in the Wash Post, Feb 26 96.

And in Dec 95, a month after the assassination of Itzhak Rabin, Israeli Prime Minister, Shimon Peres, and Foreign Minister, Ehud Barak, visited Washington. Both raised the danger of an Iraqi nuclear breakthrough, but Barak did so in exceptionally strong terms. Evidently, they were rebuffed by the Clinton administration. Still, a key question is why no Israeli official spoke out subsequently. That is especially puzzling, given the Wash Post, Sept 29, and Haaretz, Sept 29, reporting on the close relations that developed between Israel and UNSCOM from Jul 95 onwards, which presumably kept at least some Israelis aware of the Saddam menace and the US failure to address it.

Finally, another attack on the administration’s Iraq policy came from a quite different direction. Dennis Halliday recently resigned his position as co-ordinator for UN aid in Iraq. As the BBC reported yesterday, Halliday denounced sanctions as “a totally bankrupt concept.” He explained that sanctions caused Iraqis to die, while they eroded the fabric of society, contributing to divorce, prostitution, and crime.

When the Bush administration announced, in May 91, that it would not agree to lift sanctions while Saddam remained in power, it did so in the context of a policy aiming to overthrow Saddam. That is the policy that Congress is seeking to restore. Sanctions were not intended to remain in place the rest of Saddam’s natural life. It was only the Clinton administration, looking to its own convenience, which came up with the idea. But the policy is cruel, as well as ineffectual, and the two together are a particularly dangerous combination.

I. Benjamin Gilman Introduces Bill to Support Opposition to Saddam

News from the House International Relations Committee Benjamin A. Gilman, Chairman Sept 29, 1998; Jerry Lipson, Communications Director (202) 225-5021. Gilman Introduces Bill to Support Democratic Opposition against Saddam Hussein

WASHINGTON – International Relations Committee Chairman Benjamin A. Gilman (20th-NY) has introduced legislation providing support for a democratic opposition to replace Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein.

Gilman’s bill, the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998 (HR 4655), calls on the President to designate groups that are committed to a democratic Iraq and authorizes up to $97 million in military assistance and $2 million for opposition broadcasting operations inside Iraq. Following is Gilman’s statement that accompanied introduction of his bill:

“As the title suggests, the purpose of this legislation is to finally and irrevocably commit the United States to the removal from power of the regime headed by Saddam Hussein.

“For almost eight years now, since the end of Operation Desert Storm, we waited for Saddam Hussein’s regime to live up to its international obligations: to dismantle its weapons of mass destruction under international inspections, to stop threatening Iraq’s neighbors, and stop menacing Iraq’s Kurdish and Shi’ite minorities.

“After dozens of U.N. Security Council resolutions, and compromise after compromise, we have too little to show. Our patience was misinterpreted by Saddam Hussein as weakness. Regrettably, America’s friends in the Middle East believe our policy lacked seriousness. The time has come to let Saddam know-to let the whole world know-that the United States will not tolerate this regime’s continued grip on power.

“We must abandon the fiction that there can be peace and security in the Persian Gulf region with Saddam Hussein’s regime still in power. Simply put, Saddam must go. This is not a simple task. Even when the international community was unified and the United States was energized, solutions were few and far between.

“Some suggest that our nation should go to war and rid the Persian Gulf of the threat posed by Saddam. We may yet be compelled to do so, but before we put American lives at risk in that far away land, we have a duty to explore the alternatives. One alternative is to assist freedom-loving Iraqis.

“Consider the people of Iraq who have no say in their future. Because of Saddam Hussein, they tolerated years of deprivation. At the hands of this man and his Republican Guards, tens of thousands of people were massacred. The people of Iraq are sick and tired of suffering; they have been willing to take up arms against Saddam Hussein, and they are willing to do so again.

“The Iraq Liberation Act is not a complete recipe for Saddam’s removal, but it contains some key ingredients. This bill calls on the president to designate a group or groups committed to a democratic Iraq. For the designated group or groups, it authorizes the President to provide up to $97 million in military assistance, to be drawn down from the stocks of the Department of Defense. In addition, it authorizes the provision of $2 million for opposition radio and television broadcasting inside Iraq

“These authorities, combined with other actions Congress already has taken, will contribute to a comprehensive policy of promoting democracy in Iraq. Earlier this year, the Congress appropriated $10 million to support pro-democracy groups, assist their organization, found Radio Free Iraq under the aegis of Radio Free Europe, and build a war-crimes case against Saddam Hussein. A further $10 million is contained in the Senate version of the Foreign Operations Appropriations bill that will soon go to conference.

“The Iraq Liberation Act marks an important step forward in our fight against Saddam Hussein. We must not fool ourselves: The man is the problem. If this man remains in power, Iraq will remain a clear and present danger to the United States and our allies. We heard as much from the Chief U.N. weapons inspector, Scott Ritter, and we have heard as much from the Administration.

“This bill will not tie the President’s hands. It does not mandate the actual delivery of military assistance. The only requirement it contains is that the President designate a group or groups as eligible to receive the assistance we are authorizing. I would hope, however, that the President will use the authority we are offering him begin to help the people of Iraq liberate themselves.”

II. A Way to Oust Saddam

The Weekly Standard September 28, 1998 A Way To Oust Saddam By Robert Kagan (Robert Kagan is a contributing editor)

SEVEN MONTHS AFTER the Clinton administration backed down from its confrontation with Saddam Hussein, the disastrous consequences of that retreat are on full display. Whether or not Saddam makes good on his threat to throw out the U.N. weapons inspectors, he has now enjoyed almost two months without U.N. inspections. What does the administration believe he’s been doing with all the free time?

Former weapons inspector Scott Ritter has been warning Congress that the day is not far off–maybe a matter of a few months–when Saddam will suddenly present the United States and the world with a horrifying fait accompli: He will have his weapons of mass destruction and the missiles to deliver them. If that day comes, no sanctions, no threat of sanctions, no angry U.N. resolutions, and no threat of “force” will be of any use. Saddam’s new weapons would dramatically shift the strategic balance in the Middle East, putting at severe risk the safety of Israel, of moderate Arab states, and of the energy resources on which the United States and its allies depend.

The Clinton administration clearly has no idea how to handle this imminent and devastating threat to American interests. Clinton officials want Americans to believe that winning votes in the U.N. Security Council constitutes a policy for dealing with the Saddam menace. They dismiss Scott Ritter as “clueless.”

But this Clintonian charade is a mammoth deception that will cause real damage in the world. The unstated but de facto policy of the administration is now this slender hope: If and when Saddam builds his weapons of mass destruction, the United States will still be able to deter him from aggression against his neighbors. This must be mighty comforting to the folks in Jerusalem, Riyadh, and Kuwait City, as well as to anyone else who cares about American credibility and Middle East peace.

It has long been clear that the only way to rid the world of Saddam’s weapons of mass destruction is to rid Iraq of Saddam. Last week, Paul Wolfowitz, a defense official in the Bush administration, laid out in testimony before Congress a thoughtful and coherent strategy to accomplish that goal.

The Wolfowitz plan calls for the establishment of a “liberated zone” in southern Iraq much like the zone the Bush administration created in the north of the country in 1991. The zone would be a safe haven for opponents of Saddam’s regime. They could rally and organize, establish a provisional government there, gain international recognition, and set up a credible alternative to Saddam’s dictatorship. Control of the southern zone would give Saddam’s opponents a staging area to which discontented Iraqi army units could defect, as well as access to the country’s largest oil field. Arab officials have told Wolfowitz that the effect on Saddam’s regime would be “devastating.” Wolfowitz predicts that the creation of such a zone would lead to “the unraveling of the regime.”

Unlike some of the ideas circulating on Capitol Hill, which suppose that Saddam will be toppled without any military action, the Wolfowitz plan rests on a guarantee of military support to protect the opposition within the liberated zone. If, as would be likely, Saddam sent his tanks to wipe out this new threat to his regime, the United States would have to be ready to defend the Iraqi opposition with overwhelming force. The United States could not again stand by while an uprising was crushed by Saddam.

Some on the Hill have been looking for an easy way out of the Iraq crisis, hoping that a few million dollars for the Iraqi opposition will by itself take care of the problem. But any serious effort to oust Saddam must also be backed by U.S. military might.

Republicans and Democrats on the Hill should advance the Wolfowitz plan in two ways. They should continue pressing the administration to support the Iraqi opposition–with money, weapons, and political recognition. And they should now pass a resolution authorizing the president to use force against Iraq as part of a strategy of removing Saddam from power.

The administration has proven itself incapable of carrying out a credible policy against Saddam. There is a real alternative to the present charade. Congress ought to let Americans know that.

III. Iraqi Work Toward A-Bomb

Iraqi Work Toward A-Bomb Reported U.S. Was Told of ‘Implosion Devices’ By Barton Gellman Wednesday, September 30, 1998; Page A01

United Nations arms inspectors reported twice to the United States, in 1996 and 1997, that they had credible intelligence indicating that Iraq built and has maintained three or four “implosion devices” that lack only cores of enriched uranium to make 20-kiloton nuclear weapons, according to U.S. government and U.N. sources.

American intelligence assessments, U.S. officials said yesterday, concur on the credibility of the reports but have not fully corroborated them. If Iraq has in fact managed to manufacture such devices–in essence, the shells of nuclear weapons without the atomic cores–it is substantially closer than previously known to joining the world’s nuclear powers.

There is no known evidence that the Baghdad government has acquired plutonium or highly enriched uranium, without which its weapons design cannot be completed. Many experts, including those in the U.S. government, regard the nuclear supply problem as a higher hurdle for aspiring weapons builders than fabrication of the shell of precision- shaped conventional charges that would be used to detonate the fissile material.

But the existence of weapons shells would be a milestone for Iraq and raise new questions about the policies and public assessments of the Clinton administration and the International Atomic Energy Agency, which is responsible for investigating any evidence that Iraq is violating a ban on its nuclear weapons program. Since 1996, the Vienna-based panel has reported regularly to the U.N. Security Council that it has found “no indication of prohibited equipment, materials or activities.”

A cache of undiscovered implosion devices would also illuminate the stakes involved in Iraq’s refusal since Aug. 3 to permit U.N. inspectors to mount new searches for banned materials. U.S. officials acknowledged that there is little prospect of discovering and destroying such devices without the active program of surprise inspections that has now been terminated.

Reports of the implosion devices were first aired publicly by Scott Ritter, a former Marine who has been critical of U.S. government policy since he resigned from the U.N. Special Commission, or UNSCOM, in August. After Ritter testified about the devices to Senate and House committees on Sept. 4 and Sept. 15, senior U.S. policy-makers said the government had never received such a report from UNSCOM and did not regard the claims as credible.

Both those assertions are contradicted by evidence emerging this week. In interviews and in documents made available to The Washington Post, U.S. government and United Nations sources confirmed that Ritter passed the intelligence orally to the Central Intelligence Agency’s Nonproliferation Center in 1996 and in writing in May 1997 to an interagency group supporting the weapons inspectors.

Some senior administration officials disputed yesterday that there is any reason to regard the UNSCOM intelligence as credible. But those U.S. officials most responsible for assessing the reports said in interviews that they believed the findings are plausible.

“It is credible that they [Iraqi designers] have all the parts to put together,” one of the officials said yesterday. “Do I think there might be parts out there that could provide the basis to put together several weapons? Yeah.”

Ritter’s original information, according to accounts he gave the U.S. government, was compiled from three Iraqi defectors. Ritter later told the IAEA, according to other sourc es, that the defector information came to UNSCOM by way of a “northern European” country.

It was not clear from the defectors, sources said, whether the devices would meet Iraq’s design goal of fitting inside the 88- centimeter (roughly 34-inch) warhead of a Scud missile. At 20 kilotons, the expected yield of the devices would be greater than that of the first atomic bomb, a 13-kiloton device dropped by the United States on Hiroshima in 1945.

The defectors’ credibility was enhanced by their detailed descriptions of the methods used by Iraq’s Special Security Organization to hide the weapons components, and because their story matched intelligence known only to a handful of Westerners at the time, sources said. Details included the use of a fleet of Mercedes trucks to shuttle the weapons among hiding places. The trucks had distinctive markings: White cabins with red stripes, a red diesel tank and wheel rims, and Ministry of Trade license plates numbered between 30,000 and 87,000.

Ritter said one defector sketched a map by hand depicting seven depots for those trucks. A subsequent review of surveillance imagery obtained by U-2 spy planes found five of them.

Further bolstering UNSCOM’s confidence in one of the defectors, Ritter said, was his identification of a concealment operations center in the Al Fao Building on Palestine Street in Baghdad. Inspectors later confirmed in a no-notice inspection in March 1996 that Iraq used the center to control several locations for concealing materials, Ritter said, but “the Iraqis had evacuated it in early January.”

About a year after the first report, UNSCOM summarized it in a briefing paper for a conference on Iraq held in Washington on May 19 and 20, 1997, with the U.S. and British governments, sources said. “It is assessed that Iraq has retained critical components relating to the most recent weapons design, which has not to date been turned over to the IAEA,” UNSCOM wrote in the briefing paper, which was classified upon receipt by the U.S. government. “These components may comprise several complete weapons minus the HEU [highly enriched uranium] core.”

The briefing paper also noted UNSCOM’s assessment that Iraq is hiding “undeclared feedstocks of UF6,” or uranium hexafluoride, a precursor to enriched uranium. The commission suspects, according to the memo, that Iraq maintains a secret enrichment capacity and secret machine tools to shape components of a bomb.

An American official familiar with that written account said the May 1997 report did not raise fresh alarms about Iraq’s nuclear program because its central emphasis was on Iraq’s deception program, not the substance of what was being hidden.

“The thrust of this report was on concealment, so when he put [nuclear weapons assessments] in it wasn’t, ‘Attention: They have this,’ “the official said. “It was one sentence.”

Senior administration officials also argued this week that the report is not significant even if true. “The hardest part of getting a nuclear weapon is the fissile material,” said one official. “Not that the science is easy, not that the problems of arming and fusing are easy, but they are easier than the problem of getting the fissile material and putting it together in the right way.”

Independent analysts, while agreeing on the central importance of a plutonium or enriched uranium supply, said the existence of working implosion devices would mean that it could take only days or weeks for Iraq to build working weapons if it managed to buy enriched uranium from a rogue supplier.

“It’s a question of how much reaction time you have,” said Paul Leventhal, president of the Nuclear Control Institute, a policy lobby. He added that the essential questions now are, “Could Iraq obtain [enriched uranium] on the black market, and could they already have obtained it?”

The existence of implosion devices in Iraq would revise the conclusions of recent reports by the IAEA, which is an uneasy collaborator with UNSCOM. Last October, the IAEA reported that active inspections were nearing the point of “diminishing returns,” a finding that led Russia, France and China to suggest closing the Security Council’s “nuclear file” on Iraq, in effect certifying that Baghdad had no capacity to build an atomic bomb.

In a confidential response to Ritter’s report this month, sources said Gary Dillon, chief of the IAEA Action Team on Iraq, described it as “unsubstantiated” and said it has “no credibility.” Dillon did not respond to several telephone messages requesting an interview.

Ritter rebutted that description in an interview. “I was never authorized by the executive chairman to tell [Dillon] the full extent of the information we had,” he said.

UNSCOM spokesman Ewen Buchanan said he would not discuss the substance of the case. Previously, the IAEA has acknowledged gaps in its information about Iraq. In a confidential report on Aug. 19, 1997, the Action Team wrote that it could not verify how much the Baghdad government had accomplished in its efforts to devise a working nuclear weapons design. After the 1995 defection of Lt. Gen. Hussein Kamel, for example, Iraq had turned over technical drawings on the use of precision-shaped charges known as “explosive lenses,” interlocking hexagonal blocks of explosives, designed to detonate inward and crush enriched uranium to a critically dense mass.

The IAEA could not assess the final progress on the weapons design, the Action Team wrote, because “the chart clearly illustrates several drawings are missing.” Iraq, the IAEA wrote, at first denied it had built molds for manufacture of explosive lenses, then admitted it had but said it “can’t find” the molds. Similarly, it first denied ever casting an explosive lens, then admitted it “had cast one 120mm cylindrical charge and it was tested for ‘velocity and pressure,'” the report said.

The United States has underestimated Iraq’s nuclear weapons program in the past. In 1991, at the start of the Persian Gulf War, the consensus intelligence estimate was that Iraq was 10 years from a working weapon. A senior official who took part in that estimate said the U.S. government was unaware of Iraq’s effort to enrich uranium using electromagnetic devices called calutrons, and did not know of the existence of the principal Iraqi weapons design center at Al Atheer.

“There were a lot of holes,” the former official said. “We were not aware of that facility, and it survived the bombing.”

IV. Israeli Tips Aided UNSCOM

For more than four years, United Nations arms inspectors have obtained many of their best leads on forbidden Iraqi weapons through a secretive and diplomatically risky channel from the Israeli government, according to knowledgeable sources in the United States, Israel and the United Nations.

After a wary start born of Israel’s long isolation at the world body, Israel began providing the U.N. Special Commission with increasingly detailed and sensitive intelligence on its Arab adversary, which launched 40 Scud missiles at Haifa and Tel Aviv during the 1991 Persian Gulf War. Among its most important contributions, from the U.N. panel’s point of view, were significant leads on the existence of a biological weapons program and the first concrete evidence that Iraq had a systematic campaign of deception to conceal weapons programs it was legally obliged to declare and dismantle.

The two-way exchange of information, which included meetings with the director and deputy director of Israeli military intelligence, eventually involved Israeli analysis of aerial photography taken by American U-2 surveillance planes, provision of raw reports from defectors and other human sources, and Israeli processing of other forms of information obtained by the special commission, known as UNSCOM.

According to three officials with direct knowledge of the relationship, Israel had become by July 1995 the most important single contributor among the dozens of U.N. member states that have supplied information to UNSCOM since its creation in April 1991. The United States, by all accounts, remained a major supplier of information, as well as UNSCOM’s most important material and political backer. But the arrival of fresh Israeli intelligence after most U.S. tips were exploited made for what one official called “this great big candy store of nice goodies.”

There is no evidence that Israel directed UNSCOM’s activity in any way, or that the U.N. panel gave information improperly or for Israel’s national benefit. But Israel and UNSCOM have protected the operation among their most sensitive secrets, fearing that Iraq would use it to feed propaganda attacks that already featured accusations of a Zionist conspiracy behind the commission’s work.

Even without evidence, those charges have resonated among intellectuals and in the government-controlled media in much of the Arab world, including pro-Western Persian Gulf states on which the American-backed U.N. panel has relied for practical and diplomatic support.

Ewen Buchanan, the spokesman for UNSCOM, said yesterday that the U.N. Security Council resolutions demanding Iraq’s disarmament call upon all member states to assist the panel “in discharging its mandate,” and more than 40 countries have “helped us in the form of experts, information, equipment, finance and in-kind help like laboratory analysis or helicopters.”

“As a general principle,” he added, “we will not confirm or deny our dealings with particular states.”

Israel’s U.N. ambassador, Dore Gold, consulted with superiors when asked about the cooperation. When he telephoned back, he said he could say only that “I cannot give any official Israeli response.”

Those willing to speak about the relationship, from UNSCOM’s point of view, said the commission had no choice but to seek assistance from foreign intelligence agencies once the extent of Iraq’s concealment efforts became clear. Israel had the means and motive to assist the disarmament panel, they said, but other adversaries of Iraq — including Iran and some neighboring Arab states — did so as well.

“I think it’s perfectly valid we had contact with the Israelis,” said Tim Trevan, a Briton who until 1995 was political adviser to Rolf Ekeus, UNSCOM’s executive chairman until last year. “There’s nothing to be ashamed about with that contact.”

Trevan, according to other sources, made the first chance link between the commission and the Jewish state. Ekeus had dispatched him to a January 1994 academic conference on disarmament in Delphi, Greece. There he sat in the audience as David Ivri, then director general of Israel’s Defense Ministry, made disparaging comments about UNSCOM and hinted it was not finding all of Iraq’s hidden weapon programs.

After Trevan stood up to criticize Ivri — arguing that Israel should “put up or shut up,” as one participant recalled — another Israeli pulled him aside and introduced him to Brig. Gen. Yakov Amidror, who was then deputy director of Israel’s Military Intelligence organization, known by its Hebrew acronym as Aman. Three months later, in April 1994, Amidror flew secretly to New York for a meeting with Ekeus, said sources with firsthand knowledge.

Scott Ritter, the U.N. inspector who resigned in protest last month, was a central conduit in the unfolding relationship, by his own account and those of others familiar with the details. Other UNSCOM staff members who traveled to the Aman headquarters in Tel Aviv’s Kirya complex included Frenchman Didier Louis, German Norbert Reinecke and Russian Nikita Smidovich.

The Clinton administration, which was aware of the relationship in detail, generally supported Israel’s aid to UNSCOM, but worried about the political difficulties that might be caused by public disclosure. Even so, the first public hint of the relationship came in a leak from the U.S. government aimed at discrediting Ritter, disclosing that he was under FBI investigation for his intelligence contacts with Israel.

Sources said that investigation remains open, and the FBI declined to comment. Current and former U.S. government officials at the policymaking level and current and former UNSCOM officials said, without dissent, that Ritter’s exchange of information with Israel was approved by his superiors at the commission and, in principle, by the United States.

But some of those officials said there were concerns about Ritter’s links with Israel that fell short of criminal suspicion. Ritter on several occasions brought canisters of U-2 film for processing in Israel, and from time to time allowed Israeli technicians to make copies, sources said.

There is apparently an unresolved legal question about the ownership of that U-2 imagery, which is normally classified secret in the United States. Washington had lent the aircraft and its product to UNSCOM. The imagery was stamped with the notation, “REL UNSCOM/IAEA ONLY,” meaning that it could be released to the special commission and to the International Atomic Energy Agency. U.S. government sources said the CIA’s general counsel wrote to the Justice Department, in the context of the Ritter investigation, that the release to UNSCOM was legally equivalent to declassification for purposes of U.S. espionage law.

Four independent sources with firsthand knowledge said that Ritter and his colleagues worked with the explicit consent of Ekeus, the Swedish diplomat who was UNSCOM’s first executive chairman, and of Richard Butler, Ekeus’s Australian successor. The U.N. panel was aware that Israel — like other cooperating nations, not least the United States — derived valuable military information from the relationship, but UNSCOM insisted it would provide only such information to Israel as would enable Israeli analysts to assist UNSCOM.

UNSCOM gave Israel U-2 photographs, for example, so that Israel could apply its own intelligence databases to the structures depicted, allowing the U.N. panel to combine information from many sources for a fuller picture. Those familiar with the relationship insist that UNSCOM never “traded” information in return for Israeli help. Still, the relationship eventually raised alarms among some in the U.S. government. Israel received so much American-shot imagery of Iraqi strategic facilities from UNSCOM, officials said, that the United States worried it could be held responsible in part if Israel used the pictures to select targets or flight routes for a strike on Iraq’s nonconventional weapons.

There was no doubt that Israel had strong incentives. In 1981, as a French-built nuclear reactor neared completion, Israeli warplanes launched a preemptive strike to destroy the facility at Osirak. Nine years later, a few months before invading Kuwait, Iraqi President Saddam Hussein threatened publicly to “burn half of Israel” in what was taken to be a reference to chemical weapons.

Asked whether his cooperation with Israel validated long-standing Iraqi charges that he was an agent of Israeli intelligence, Ritter said he was not “America’s spy or Israel’s spy or anyone else’s spy,” but an inspector working on explicit authority of his superiors.

“That’s a diversion,” Ritter said. “It’s typical Iraqi tactics. The commission wouldn’t have had to undertake these extraordinary measures if Iraq had been forthcoming.”

The commission went to Israel, he said, because it was not getting as much help as it wanted from Washington and London on the most sensitive forms of information-gathering and was looking for another source “with an open mind, with a proven track record of success.”

In September 1994, Israel gave UNSCOM its first major contribution — a detailed allegation that the Special Security Organization, run by Saddam Hussein’s younger son Qusay, was organizing the deception and concealment operation. The tip included physical descriptions of trucks and depots used to move forbidden materials and documents around the country, sources said.

Later, Israeli information helped provide what sources described as a key to unlocking a biological weapons program Iraq had long denied: Israel passed along the tip that Oxoid, a company in Basingstoke, England, had sold Iraq 40 tons of a biological growth medium that the Baghdad government could not account for.

In October and December 1994, Ritter led delegations to Tel Aviv for a meeting with Maj. Gen. Uri Saguy, then the chief of Israeli military intelligence, and panels of analysts from other Israeli agencies.

Thereafter, Saguy dispatched analysts on a regular basis to New York for meetings with Ritter and his colleagues in hotel basements and out-of-the-way bars. Sometimes Amidror, Saguy’s deputy, traveled personally.

V. Scott Ritter Interview

The jeep was already sitting waiting on the dune. Standing next to the jeep was a man, well equiped for the afternoon heat and the humidity, with a bottle of water and a walkie-talkie. Every few minutes, he raised his eyes skyward to look out for inspectors.It wasn’t easy for the jeep to escape the prying eyes of the inspector in the light plane above. The inspector, waiting for developments, ordered the pilot to double back and fly over the spot again.

The scenario was predictable. A jeep arrives at the sand dunes near Yavne and waits, on a look-out for inspectors, police, or any other official who is likely to frustrate his assignment – stealing sand.

As soon as the driver gives the all-clear on his mobile telephone, a caravan of trucks will pull up, and a tractor will load as much sand as possible, as quickly as possible. This series of events will be repeated several times, until the end of the day’s “work.” An inspector, high above in his Cessna, informs a colleague on the ground what is going on. If he does not arrive in time to block off the trucks’ exit from the site, the stolen sand will find its way on the market.

This is how it works nearly every day. Commercial quantities of sand are being stolen by what the Israel Lands Authority (ILA) is calling “organized sand bandits.” These groups are well-known to the authorities. The supervisory branch of the ILA has a list of thieves operating in various regions of the country.

The ILA estimates that around 20 percent of Israel’s annual sand usage is supplied by the sand bandits. The stolen sand is earmarked for the construction and paving industries, which together, use some 13 million tons of sand per year. The thieves operating today have developed a well-organized method of operation.

They are well equiped with walkie-talkies and vehicles suited to the terrain. The supervisory branch has recently identified legitimate companies (with the company name embossed on the trucks) from the north of the country, which made the trip to the center of the country in search of free sand.

The fact that the country’s legitimate sand reserves for construction are expected to be depleted within a year has opened the market for thieves intent on avoiding taxes. The price of stolen sand is the same as legal sand, say sources at the ILA – a clear profit for the thieves.

The air-borne enforcement activities began a few years ago. The ILA sends out a light plane every few days, with an inspector on board. His task is to locate, among the golden dunes, scrap iron, and piles of garbage, anything that moves. Eagle-eyed, the inspector photographs any vehicle involved in stealing sand. He is contact with an inspector on the ground and can summon the Green Patrol to undertake a chase. All of this activity is designed to make the sand stealers’ lives that much harder – but it hasn’t managed to put an end to the thievery.

The abandoned sand dunes near Ashkelon may look like a perfect lovers lane to spend some time alone, but beware; the dunes are not as deserted as they appear. Couples may not not be aware of the activity going on just a hundred meters from their romantic spot among the dunes. From his bird’s eye view in the Cessna, the inspector can make out more than one interesting activity.

Next to the Ashkelon garbage dump, a truck is waiting beside a pile of garbage. To the untrained eye, it looks like an innocent truck emptying its contents. Nearby is a tractor, a permanent companion in these banditry operations, for loading sand.

Every time the Cessna passes over head, all activity ceases for a few minutes. The thieves know the procedure: they wait for the plane to pass and then check if there are any vehicles approaching the area. The inspector informs his colleague on the ground of the activity, and within seconds another ILA inspector sets off to block the truck’s exit.

One way the thieves prevent other vehicles entering the area is to pile mounds of sand on the road leading to site, which gives them more time to escape if necessary.

On one occasion, a supervisor found himself driving toward a tractor that was piling sand onto a truck. The driver of the tractor threatened to dump his shovel-load onto the inspector, while the truck driver used the delay to flee the scene.

Over the past 12 months, the traffic police has joined the fight against the sand bandits.

A few days ago, a traffic police car blocked off the entrance to the sand dunes near Kibbutz Nitzanim for over a week. At a nearby area rich with sand, there were dozens of reported thefts before the police blockade. In the aftermath of the blockade, an ILA plane reported that the area was clear of thieves.

At the North Yavne Industrial Zone, the ILA was forced to replenish the sand supply, after a two-meter deep area was completely cleaned out. The area is a plot of land which the ILA had put on the market. But the replenished sand was then promptly stolen.

The national map of thefts shows that very few incidents have been recorded around Or Akiva, while the Givat Olga area appears to be favorite site for the sand bandits. Rishon Lezion has ceased to be prone to thefts, since the local municipality very strictly enforces the law.

The Palmachim region is still very popular, partly because it is so difficult to police and partly because it is close to the main market in central Israel, thereby reducing transportation costs. At the Shikma Reservoir, the thefts have caused serious damage to the nature reserve and a similar danger exists in Dimona, Ashdod and the Yavne area.

The demand for sand remained unchanged from year to year, but in the last two years a recession in the construction industry has brought about a 10 percent deline in annual demand.

Nonetheless, the procedure to receive official permission to mine for sand is considered long, compared with the demands of the market. This only serves to increase the power of the thieves, creating a situation in which the ILA is not issuing new permits (or renewing old ones) for mining sand, because of instructions from the attorney-general. The activity of “Sol-Nitzan” in the Nitzanim region is being cut back, because of the price war with the sand bandits.

In the areas of Zevulun, Givat Olga, Netanya, and north Ashkelon, the thefts have spread to privately-owned lands. The sand gangs operating from the Ashdod area have become so prosperous that they have started to operate in their own neighborhoods.

Even when the trucks and tractors are caught, the work does not drop. Thieves in these areas work often around the clock.

Veteran sand and gravel miners began operating even before the establishment of the state, starting along the coast and moving eastward.

Now, the attorney-general, the legal advisors at the ministry of national infrastructures, representatives from the ILA, and officials from the interior ministry are working on a new set of rules and regulations for legal sand mining.

Until they reach their agreement, the sand bandits will continue making their living and the sand dunes are, in effect, gold mines.

VI. Outgoing Aid Co-Ordinator Blasts Sanctions

The outgoing co-ordinator of the UN oil-for-food deal in Iraq, Denis Halliday, has launched a scathing attack on the policy of sanctions, branding them “a totally bankrupt concept”. In his surprise remarks, Denis Halliday, said his 13-month stint had taught him the “damage and futility” of sanctions.

“It doesn’t impact on governance effectively and instead it damages the innocent people of the country,” he told Reuters news agency.

“It probably strengthens the leadership and further weakens the people of the country.”

Mr Halliday, who has resigned after more than 30 years with the United

Nations, leaves his post in Baghdad on Wednesday. He was co-ordinator of the programme that allows Iraq to sell limited amounts of oil to buy food, medicine and other supplies.

He said maintaining the crippling trade embargo imposed on Iraq for its 1990 invasion of Kuwait was incompatible with the UN charter as well as UN conventions on human rights and the rights of the child.

But Mr Halliday believed UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan favoured a fresh look at sanctions as a means of influencing states to change their policies-in Iraq’s case making it scrap its weapons of mass destruction, and long-range missiles.

“I’m beginning to see a change in the thinking of the United Nations, the secretary-general, many of the member states, who have realised through Iraq in particular that sanctions are a failure and the price you extract for sanctions is unacceptably high.” His comments follow criticism recently by a top UN weapons inspector, Scott Ritter, of the US and UK for failing to take a tougher line over the inspections.

Mr Halliday said disarmament was a legitimate aim, but took issue with the “open-ended” and politicised nature of weapons searches in Iraq. “There is an awful incompatibility here, which I can’t quite deal with myself. I just note that I feel extremely uncomfortable flying the UN flag, being part of the UN system here,” he added.

Mr Halliday said it was correct to draw attention to the “4,000 to 5,000 children dying unnecessarily every month due to the impact of sanctions because of the breakdown of water and sanitation, inadequate diet and the bad internal health situation”.

But he said sanctions were biting into the fabric of Iraqi society in other, less visible ways. He cited the disruption of family life caused by the departure overseas of two to three million Iraqi professionals. He said sanctions had increased divorces and reduced the number of marriages because young couples could not afford to wed. “It has also produced a new level of crime, street children, possibly even an increase in prostitution,” he said.

“This is a town where people used to leave the key in the front door, leave their cars unlocked, where crime was almost unknown. We have, through the sanctions, really disrupted this quality of life, the standard of behaviour that was common in Iraq before.” Mr Halliday argued that the “alienation and isolation of the younger Iraqi generation of leadership” did not bode well for the future.

He said many senior government figures had been trained in the West and exposed to the outside world. Their children had stayed at home through the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq war, the 1991 Gulf War and now sanctions. “They don’t have a great deal of exposure to travel, even to reading materials, television, never mind technological change,” he said.

“I think these people are going to have a real problem in terms of how to deal with the world in the near future.”…

Laurie Mylroie can be contacted by e-mail on: sam11@erols.com

Netanyahu – Oslo Bad Deal But Continue, Hints Compromise on Demands

At the end of the day there are two ways to approach this. One is to say I am not going to make a deal under any circumstances if all of my conditions are not met and the other is to say that if all of my conditions are not met then all of their conditions will not be met.
Prime Minister Netanyahu

At the end of the day there are two ways to approach this. One is to say I am not going to make a deal under any circumstances if all of my conditions are not met and the other is to say that if all of my conditions are not met then all of their conditions will not be met. Prime Minister Netanyahu

The following are excerpts from an interview with Prime Minister Netanyahu in English on September 14 with a small group of reporters, including IMRA:

IMRA: The actions of compliance which are required of the Palestinians in return for the Israeli withdrawal are actions which can later be reversed. The Palestinians can cease arms and then distribute weapons.

Netanyahu: You are absolutely right. There is no question that there is an asymmetry between Israel’s obligations which, when fulfilled, are practically in point of fact irreversible and Palestinian obligations of which virtually all are reversible. This is part of the flawed deal of Oslo. I never said that the deal is good. Its not a good deal. I said its the deal we’ve got.

Other Reporter: Then why not drop it?

Netanyahu: First because we made a commitment to continue the process and to seek its conclusion. Its conclusion, by the way, is fulfilling the interim agreement and and negotiating a final settlement although there is no road map in Oslo to the actual shape of a final settlement. The Oslo process in its stipulations leads up to final status negotiations but leaves the outcome open. It is a big achievement for Israel to have been able to carry out its obligations but minimize the damage to the country. Obviously it is a far cry, if it come to pass, from the 90% of Judea and Samaria that the Palestinians expected to get.

It would be an achievement for Israel to fulfill its commitments while simultaneously insuring that the Palestinians keep theirs without having an international breakdown – or for that matter domestic – breakdown. There has to be also a civil peace among the majority of the Israeli public. I am not talking about the fringe of Israeli society that wants to give everything to the Palestinians and ask nothing for Israel. They are not relevant. But the vast majority of Israelis want to attempt to have progress with the Palestinians based of the principle that we have established: security and reciprocity and minimizing the damage which is exactly what we are doing. That is on the domestic side.

On the international side, responsible governments had better think long and hard before they jettison international commitments. Of course the Palestinians may create such a situation by making such a grievous violation – for example unilaterally declaring a Palestinian state – which would be a gross violation of the Oslo Accords and release us from it and thereby create the grounds for our taking unilateral action. This is highly inadvisable from their point of view and they should think long and hard before nullifying the Oslo Accords in that fashion.

A responsible government seeks to implement agreements and not to nullify them. Because unilateral and unprovoked nullification of agreements can lead to equal action on other international agreements which are of vital importance to the state.

… I would like to say that we will achieve all of our demands. I cannot tell you which is absolutely unconditional and so on. As far as I am concerned I want to achieve all of them. At the end of the day there are two ways to approach this. One is to say I am not going to make a deal under any circumstances if all of my conditions are not met and the other is to say that if all of my conditions are not met then all of their conditions will not be met.

Out of Shadows, Agency Is Directly Involved in Israeli-Palestinian Security Talks

The CIA has emerged from the shadows of diplomacy to play a unique, highly visible role in the Middle East peace process, mediating disputes between Israeli and Palestinian security forces and participating in negotiations over an elusive security agreement critical to completion of a final peace accord.

President Clinton and Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright made no mention of the CIA as they met this week at the White House with Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu and Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat and promised to sponsor intensive talks in Washington next month aimed at getting the peace process back on track.

But senior U.S. officials turned to the CIA two years ago to bring Israeli and Palestinian security forces back to the negotiating table when the peace process nearly collapsed, and both sides now want to keep the CIA playing the role of mediator as the talks move forward.

CIA Director George J. Tenet has met one-on-one with Arafat four times in the last 2 1/2 years, officials said. The agency’s station in Tel Aviv has hosted numerous meetings with Israeli and Palestinian security officials, and the CIA’s station chief in Tel Aviv — who once served as the agency’s lobbyist on Capitol Hill — came close to hammering out a security agreement between the parties nine months ago.

“If it had not been for the CIA, you would have had a virtual collapse in the security cooperation after the Netanyahu government” came into power in June 1996, said Anthony H. Cordesman, a former defense official and co-director of Middle East Studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

“There was simply no alternative,” Cordesman said. “There was no other service the Israelis would trust at all, and there was no other service with a record of dealing with the Palestinians.”

With Albright and U.S. Middle East envoy Dennis Ross headed back to the Middle East next week for further talks, a State Department official said the CIA’s ongoing involvement mediating disputes between Israeli and Palestinian security forces provides “a way that the United States can certify that an action is going on or not going on” when the parties might not accept each other’s word. Arafat met alone with Clinton at the White House again yesterday and told reporters afterward that “peace is a Palestinian need, an Israeli need, an Arab need, an international need.”

An Israeli source added that the CIA’s ongoing counterterrorism efforts in the region make it uniquely situated to judge Israeli and Palestinian claims regarding their arrest, imprisonment and release of suspected terrorists. “They are involved — because they are experts,” the source said.

CIA officials, clearly uncomfortable with the agency’s high-profile role, will say nothing about the agency’s involvement in the peace process, even though its role has become an open secret in the Israeli and Arabic press.

Newspapers and magazines in Israel and the West Bank routinely report on the comings and goings of security officials from meetings with the CIA station chief. Earlier this month, Israeli Army radio reported that the CIA would be opening branches at Palestinian military bases throughout the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Two years ago, an Arabic news magazine based in Paris, Al-Watan Al-Arabi, first disclosed that the CIA was training Palestinian security forces in the United States.

Intelligence analysts and former CIA officials said the agency’s high-profile involvement in what are probably the most closely watched negotiations in the world is unprecedented. But there is sharp disagreement in intelligence circles about the wisdom of such open involvement in policy matters that go way beyond traditional intelligence gathering and analysis.

“Obviously, this is a much more public mode than any secret intelligence agency is accustomed to,” said Yossi Alpher, a former Israeli intelligence official who now heads the American Jewish Committee’s office in Jerusalem. “It’s good for the process in the sense that this is an ailing process. What the U.S. can do is limited — it can try to keep this process alive.”

But Robert B. Satloff, executive director of the Washington Institute for Near East Studies, disagreed. “It dilutes the mission, it seems to me, when the intelligence agencies are responsible essentially for political judgments about one side or the other’s commitment to security,” Satloff said.

Melvin A. Goodman, a former CIA senior analyst and who now teaches International Security at the National War College, said that “the agency should not be so publicly involved in policy, particularly in such a prominent arena.”

Following its earlier involvement training Palestinian security forces at a counterintelligence center in Jericho and in the United States, the CIA took on a greater role in the peace process in early 1996, after the Gassem military wing of Hamas carried out four suicide bombings in Israel, killing 61 people.

Tenet, then the agency’s deputy director, and other CIA officials met with Arafat at the Erez border crossing between Israel and the Gaza Strip in March 1996 and urged him to arrest five Islamic militants believed to have been behind the bombings.

When Clinton left several days later to attend a U.S.-sponsored, anti-terrorism summit in Sharm el Sheik, Egypt, aimed at bolstering the flagging Middle East peace process, he took then-CIA Director John M. Deutch with him.

But it was not until fall 1996, when Netanyahu opened a tunnel near the Temple Mount in Jerusalem, setting off violent confrontations between Palestinian police and Israeli soldiers, and plunging the peace process into turmoil, that the CIA first started playing a mediating role between the Palestinians and the Israelis, according to Alpher and Satloff.

“At that moment of despair,” Satloff said, “the American intelligence organization became the communications link between the two sides.”

By August 1997, senior American officials had publicly announced that the United States would participate directly in all future security discussions, with the CIA station chief and other intelligence officials mediating disputes and offering advice. The announcement, according to one intelligence official, caused considerable anguish at CIA headquarters.

But the agency’s loathing of public attention didn’t stop its station chief in Tel Aviv from producing a draft security agreement in December that was initialed by top Israeli and Palestinian security officials, although Netanyahu ultimately rejected it.

Among others things, the 16-paragraph document called for the CIA to arbitrate disputes between the two sides, and it established a three-member committee to oversee its implementation to include Israeli, Palestinian and CIA representatives.

When Arafat returned to Washington in January for more talks aimed at restarting the peace process, CIA Director Tenet slipped into the ANA Hotel’s secure ninth floor for a one-on-one meeting with the Palestinian leader.

The agency’s direct involvement in the process may not have produced a breakthrough. But the CIA’s mere presence was having an effect in the region. Beyond provoking condemnation by Iran radio and numerous other media outlets throughout the Arabic world, the CIA’s involvement with Israeli and Palestinian leaders earned a backhanded tribute from Ibrahim Ghawshah, Hamas’s spokesman.

In an interview in March, Ghawshah told Amman al-Sabil, an Arabic newspaper that circulates on the West Bank and in Gaza Strip, that “military operations” against Israel have “become difficult” because of security cooperation between Arafat’s Palestinian Authority and Israel “especially after the CIA joined in this coordination… the CIA is working day and night.”

Hebron: A Peace With No Losers?

The cycle of violence continues in Hebron.

On one side, the Jewish residents are calling for a voiding of the Oslo process and a return of Hebron under total IDF control.

On the other side, the Palestinians are calling for a complete evacuation of all Jews from Hebron.

Neither solution is viable.

What can be done is to stop de-legitimizing both the Palestinians and Jews of Hebron. Both sides have a right to be there.

Hebron, according to both the Jewish and Palestinian definition, includes the neighborhoods of Kiriat Arba, Harsina (Givat Mamre), Givat Avot, and Ashmorot Isaac. We have, statically, a total population of around 8,000 men, women, and children.

Greater Hebron has between 80,000 and 120,000 Palestinians, depending on which census you use. An average estimate would be around 100,000 Palestinians.

This puts the total Jewish population of Hebron at around 8%. This is not merely a few fanatic settlers, but a minority population… a vibrant, living Jewish Community, which must be dealt with, as must all minorities — with compassion, justice, and guaranteed civil, and human rights under law.

Until now, the situation was viewed in terms of resistance to an occupying army and its surrogate presence — the settlers. With the advent of Palestinian autonomy and the likelihood of a Palestinian State, the armed struggle now ends and the political one begins. In the new political struggle, the Jews of Hebron find themselves in the same situation as any minority. No longer enjoying the full protection of the IDF, they will be forced to deal with continuing to live in the city of their Father’s under a new set of rules. The new rules will include reaching out to their Palestinian neighbors in an attempt at finding a compromise which will allow both Jew and Palestinian to share this holy city without bloodshed.

Neither side will oblige the other by ceasing to exist. Both sides are strong in their convictions that Hebron is theirs. Both sides enjoy the backing of military force — the IDF supporting the settlers and the PA Police supporting the Palestinians.

Whether or not the sides like it, a stalemate is rapidly becoming fact of life in the city.

If Hebron is to maintain its special identity, then the World Community must encourage the Palestinians to accept the fact that a Hebron Jewish Community with unbreakable ties to the State of Israel is a Fact.

The World Jewish Community, on the other hand, must convince the Jews of Israel and of Hebron to be more flexible in their dealings with the Palestinian population, and convince them to make a real effort at coexistence.

Until and unless a Peace with no Losers becomes a fact in Hebron, it is senseless to discuss solutions for Jerusalem.

Hebcom Middle East Bureau Analysis, Commentary, Information Insight into the Middle East by the People who live there

The Case of the Stolen Children from Yemen – Part 11: A Mother and Child Reunion

In the same week that four graves were opened, Tzila Levine arrived in Israel. Mrs. Levine came from Sacramento, California with the thought that she may have been taken from her original family and sold for adoption as a child.

She arrived in Israel with a written declaration she received from her adopting mother stating that she was adopted as a foundling. Also, her dark skin led her to believe that she may have been kidnapped from her parents as she heard happened with other children. She came to Israel to see if she could find her biological parents.

On the 18th of August, 1997, a report on Tzila Levine appeared in the Yediot Acharonot newspaper. Tzila was quoted as saying “I am only asking to find my biological parents and find out who really brought me into the world”. Levine (50), who lives in Sacramento, California was adopted by a couple who lived on the Ein Ha-Mifratz Kibbutz.

The newspaper further reported that her parents told her they had received her from a doctor in a medical clinic in the Haifa area, and told her that she was adopted when she was six years old. Levine was quoted, “All the years I was different in the Kibbutz. Everyone was light-skinned and I was the only one with dark skin”.

The article reports that Tzila Levine began searching for her parents when her adopting mother died, five years before the article was written. She also was quoted as saying, “I went to the archives of the Ein Ha-Mifratz Kibbutz, and asked for the documents related to my adoption. I found that the adoption certificates said I was a foundling child and my parents were not known. I spoke to the office of adoptions in Haifa and they asked me to come there. In the office, they checked the material they had and said that they had no file related to my adoption. ‘There was a big mess [in the files, back then], go home’, they told me. I left the office and started crying, because I’d never find my parents”.

One of the people that helped Tzila get started in her search was Mr. Sampson Giat, the President of the Federation of Yemenite Jews in the United States. Mr. Giat went on cable-TV and spoke at length on the subject of the kidnapped children. He then asked anyone who thought they might have been one of the abducted children to contact him. Mrs. Levine contacted Mr. Giat, and told him of her case. It was Mr. Giat who assisted her in finding the necessary contacts in Israel and establishing contact with them.

By the 21st of August, 1997 it was reported that as many as fifteen families who had heard of Mrs. Levine’s case, came to Rammy Tsuberi, Tzila Levine’s lawyer, saying that Tsila Levine might be their stolen child.

One specific family that came to Tsuberi’s office on the 20th of that month was mentioned: Mrs. Margalit Omessei, and her children. Mrs. Levine and the Omessei family met each other at Mr. Tsuberi’s office and, upon noticing the amazing similarity between her daughter Yehudit and Tzila, Margalit Omessei was reported to “have kissed Tzila warmly, and said that there is an amazing similarity between Levine and her daughter Yehudit. Margalit requested that Levine have a blood-test, so they would be able to check whether she was, indeed, her daughter. Dr Hassan Hatib, a genetics expert in the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, took the blood sample in Tsuberi’s office. The results were expected to be announced within days. ‘Even if you are not my daughter, know that you will always be in my heart, and will always have a place in Israel’, Mrs. Omessei told Mrs. Levine.” (Yediot Acharonot, 21st August, 1997). One of the reasons that Mrs. Omessei suspected Tzila might be her daughter was after she had seen a picture in the newspaper of Tzila when she was an infant. It was then that Mrs. Omessei noticed the resemblance between Tzila, as a baby, and Mazal, her daughter.

On the 25th of August, 1997, the phone rang in the home of Dina Frazer, a childhood friend of Tzila Levine’s, where she was staying. On the line was Tzila’s lawyer, Rammy Tsuberi. “That’s it, the tests were a success. We found your mother”, he said. Tzila was in shock when she heard the news. She was trembling with excitement as she drank some water, and took some time to recover. She then began crying, “Yes! It’s my mother! My mother!….”

Dr. Hassan Hatib of the Hebrew University’s Genetics labs tested both blood samples and reported, “With all the blood samples, I conducted D.N.A. tests in the PCR (Polymerase Chain Reaction) method in ten different genetic signs that are Polymorphic in different groups. (He then lists the ten different signs.) The results of my tests were as follows: In every one of the ten genetic signs that were tested the daughter, Tzila received one aponeurosis from the mother, Margalit. Of course, every one of Margalit’s children received one aponuerosis from the mother, Margalit. In the statistic calculations that are used in the forensic labs around the world, the chance that Mrs. Tzila Levine is the daughter of Mrs. Margalit Omessei is 99.99143%.” The report was signed “Genetics – Hebrew University, Dr. Hassan Hatib”. After Hatib conducted these tests, he repeated tests in another four genetic signs, also showing that Levine and Omessei were, indeed, mother and daughter.

After this report, the entire Israeli public was interested in Mrs. Omessei and Mrs. Levine’s reunion. For months it was the most common topic in public. One broadcast on the Arutz 7 radio station reported:

“Tzlia Levine, from the Unites States, is the biological daughter of Mrs. Margalit Omessei. This is the result of DNA tests carried out in the Genetics Laboratory in Hebrew University in Jerusalem. The tests found that there is a perfect match between the DNA of Mrs. Levine and the Omessei family.

“She arrived in Israel with the express purpose of finding her original family; the Omessei family claimed that she is their daughter who disappeared from a Rosh HaAyin infirmary in 1949.

“Levine was brought up on Kibbutz Ein Hamifratz by adoptive parents over 50 years ago. She began to look for her biological parents after the death of her adoptive mother five years ago. Margalit Omessei said she had never given up hope of finding her lost daughter.

“In a related item, the public committee investigating the disappearance of the Yemenite children heard the testimony today of Avraham Buzi, who said that his eighteen month old daughter disappeared from a babies’ home in Pardes Hanna in 1949.

“He visited her one day and found her healthy, but the next day was told that she had died. He said that he never received a death certificate nor saw her grave.” (26th August, 1997).

The truth is that the results of the tests were a surprise even to Dr. Hatib. He was quoted as saying, “The chance that two people, with no family relation, will have the same genetic ID is nil. In this case, I set the genetic ID of the mother, Margalit and in Tzila’s genetic ID it was found that half of what she has comes from Margalit. This happens only in a case of a mother and daughter.

“I was shocked at the results, because to find the daughter, out of all the people in the world, that belongs to the right mother is like taking a shot in the dark. At first glance, I did not believe the results, which is why I conducted another series of tests. The results are of a reliable test, that meets international standards and that are acceptable in the forensic laboratories all over the world”.

The tragic story of the separation of Margalit and her daughter began in 1949, as Margalit testified to the Cohen committee on the 15th of November, 1995. Part of this testimony was recorded as follows:

Chairman Judge Yehuda Cohen: “You came to Israel in 1949, Rosh Hashana,” [Jewish New Year].

Margalit Omessei: “Right.”

Chairman Cohen: “With your girl…”

Margalit: “Right… my family”

Chairman Cohen: “You didn’t write here… did her father come too?”

Margalit: “No, I divorced him three months before I came to Israel.”

Chairman Cohen: “Did you notify the authorities you were divorced?”

Margalit: “Yes, he even didn’t know the girl…he was very ill back in Yemen.”

Chairman Cohen: “Did he ever come to Israel?”

Margalit: “Yes, almost the same month, but he came alone, and I came alone with my family”

Chairman Cohen: “And he showed no interest in the girl,”

Margalit: “Not at all, he was very ill”.

Chairman Cohen: “And then they took you to Rosh Ha-Ayin,”

Margalit: “I came to Rosh Ha-Ayin, camp Alef, on the day of Rosh HaShana.”

Chairman Cohen: “Was it a tent-camp?”

Margalit: “Yes,”

Chairman Cohen: “And they took the children to a baby-home?”

Margalit: “Children… right… when…”

Member of Committee, Brigadier David Maimon: “You had only Mazal, right?”

Margalit: “Only Mazal. “

Maimon: “Did you have any other children?”

Margalit: “No.”

Chairman Cohen: “I say they took all the children that arrived at that time were taken to the baby home, as was Mazal,”

Margalit: “The moment we reached the main road of Rosh-Ha-Ayin, the nurses came and snatched every child from their mother’s arms, with no explanation, without saying anything about where to and why, nothing. They took us to the bathing rooms, while they took the children to the baby homes, with Magen David [Adom], and we came out and asked where our children are, and got no answer. They then put us into tents, every mother crying for her child. I was in the same tent with two other mothers, and we started looking through the tents during the night to find for our children, until the morning when we heard our babies crying. We asked the guards, and went and saw screaming children, and mothers screaming in the babies’ home. So, we went back to the tents, and saw our children every morning, every day I got my baby, I was still nursing her, getting her in the morning, and feeding her. I did the same every afternoon, but all day every day we looked at our babies through the windows of the baby home.”

Chairman Cohen: “But she was then about a year and a half old,”

Margalit: “A year exactly”

Chairman Cohen: “A year?”

Margalit: “When she was taken from me. She was a year and a half old… when she disappeared, she was a year and a half old,”

Chairman Cohen: “You’re saying it took six months [from your arrival] until she disappeared,”

Margalit: “Yes, and I always gave her food, I gave her everything, and she wasn’t at all sick, except when her throat was a bit red, she suffered some diarrhea when her teeth were first coming in, but I gave her food three times a day, and the same nurse gave her to me every day, and one day….”

Chairman Cohen: “You’re saying that it was about at the end of a six-month period that she was taken to the hospital”

Margalit: “Yes, she was taken to the hospital, the one that wasn’t too far from the baby home, about 200 meters away from it”

Chairman Cohen: “In Rosh-HaAyin”

Margalit: “In Rosh-HaAyin… and I was still always at the window, looking at her. One day, I came to the hospital, and they let me into the hospital. This was the first time they let me into the hospital. Three doctors were standing next to me, asking me where her father is. I told them I came divorced, and I was just with my girl and my family. My child was in my hands then. After a while, they took her from me, and I left. After I left, my child was taken to the baby home. After a while, one day I came, as every other day, and she wasn’t there that morning. I fed her dinner the night before. She wasn’t there. I asked a nurse… she didn’t know. I told her that she gave her to me all the time, but she still didn’t know. She didn’t know. I went crazy. Nothing. I went to the mayor’s secretary, Bedihi, and I yelled there and cried, and he threw me out, and said he didn’t know. At the end he saw I was so disturbed by it that he sent me to the Petah-Tiqvah police station. The Petah-Tiqva police sent me to all kinds of places, to the Hospital, to WIZO, to everywhere they sent me… I went. I would work two or three days, save up the money for travel, and go. I never found her. Not at Bet-Lid, not at Ein-Shemer, and not at Rosh HaAyin, nowhere. Everywhere I went, I couldn’t find her. And her file at Rosh-HaAyin said she was still alive. After the Six-Day War [’67] I received a letter from the Petah-Tikvah Police, asking that I go to the station. I went, and the person there read the file and all. I told him my daughter wasn’t dead, she’s alive. He read the letter and told me that she went from the hospital to the baby-home, and from there they don’t know where she went. I told him I don’t know, but I’m not giving up, I want my girl from wherever she is. He told me that they should take all those nurses and doctors to prison, and that she’s still alive. From that time on, I got no answer….”

This testimony shows that even the police at the time were aware of the crimes being committed. Margalit’s testimony goes on as she describes cases of families she knows that had children taken as well.

The next time the committee heard Margalit Omessei was after her reunion with Tzila Levine. Tzila, Margalit and their family came to testify before the committee and members of the press.

Even foreign press took an interest in this case, so it was not surprising that when the official committee heard Mrs. Levine and Mrs. Omessei I was able to spot cameras and reporters from networks like ABC news, Fox news and Sky news, just to name a few.

Tzila’s attorney, Rammy Tzuberi, came to the committee, to represent Margalit and Tzila. The committee began by hearing a detailed account of Tzila’s search for her parents, and went on with the details of their reunion. Tzila also spoke of what her adopting parents had told her while they were still alive, about how they chose her from the many children in the doctor’s home; how she stood there in her crib, laughing and raising her arms up high, which is when her adopting father, Mordechai Rozenstock, decided to take her. The emotional tension in the room that day was overwhelming. None of the people present could help crying, walking over to congratulate Margalit and Tzila for being reunited after nearly fifty years, and hoping in their hearts to see more of these reunions. I was introduced to Margalit and Tzila by an elderly Yemenite I have been in close touch with regarding research. He’s worked on the case extensively himself, and wishes to remain anonymous. He’s known Margalit for a long time. Although this was the first time I met Margalit, I’ve seen her in almost every rally and convention on the topic since then.

However, at the time I was still afraid of cover-up methods being applied. I told a few people including individuals from Mishkan Ohalim, prominent journalists, and Sampson Giat’s wife, Jackie, who was also present, that I believed that since the committee had been involved in previous cover-ups, it would cover this up as well. I speculated that the committee would demand another DNA test, and even speculated it would appoint Dr. Yehuda Hiss, head of the Institute for Forensic Medicine in Abu-Kabir, to do these tests. I then said I believed they would wait for Tzila to return to the United States (I said maybe a month or so) to give the false results. I said that I believed they would lie about the results, saying that Tzila and Margalit were not mother and daughter after all. I was told that no-one would dare contradict such a solid, proven test as the one conducted by a prominent geneticist of the Hebrew University… “Noone will believe it.” I mentioned this possibility during a committee recess. The state attorney, Drora Nachmani-Roth then began to raise questions, after presenting a document showing that Tzila was adopted in November 1948, while Margalit Omessei immigrated to Israel in 1949.

This is despite the fact that Tzila was not able to find any documents regarding her adoption. Attorney Tzuberi attempted to answer this strange inconsistency by suggesting that Margalit could have made a mistake regarding the date of immigration, since she was then barely familiar with the non-Jewish calendar. Tzuberi had a hard time trying to suggest that the document was forged. So many other documents were forged at the time, such as death certificates, birth certificates, and many more. In the first article in this series, I wrote of a cache of pre-signed blank birth and death certificates found by a government official, Yehudit Hivner. According to Ms. Hivner’s testimony, these documents contained no dates, or any entries other than a signature and a stamp. This would allow the filling in of any and all details about a child, even a falsified birth date.

On September 14th 1997 Tzila Levine returned to her family in the United States. It was less than a month later, on the 9th of October 1997, that I woke up to hear on the radio how the worst of my predictions had come true, almost word-for-word.

Kol Israel Radio reported that morning:

“Yemenite born Tzila Levine is not the lost daughter of Margalit Omessei. New DNA tests prove there is no common genetic pattern between the two. Medical experts say the genetic tests carried out at the Abu Kabir Forensic Institute are the newest techniques and refute earlier results.”

Attorney Tzuberi made sure to let the public know of Dr. Hiss’ breach of agreement. Hiss and the family of Omessei and Levine had a signed agreement that the results of the testing will be given only to Tzuberi and the family. However, Tzuberi got no notice of the results, and only found out about them by reading them in the media after they were publicized by the spokesman for the Abu Kabir Institute.

Arutz 7 Radio reported:

“Tzila Levine, who claims she is the daughter of Yemenite Jew Margalit Omessei, but separated from her fifty years ago while a baby, has questioned the validity of Ministry of Health tests which are said to have proved she is not Margalit’s daughter after all. An earlier DNA test had said that she was.

“‘I was disappointed with the results’ Tzila told radio station Arutz 7 today, “but not at all surprised. It was made clear to us that the methodology used by this institute would be able to be interpreted differently by different chemists, and we therefore asked that testing procedure be stopped.

“Tzila said the Institute which tested her broke a signed agreement not to publicize the results and that if they could not keep their word, she had no reason to believe in the accuracy of the tests.

“She also said she did not trust the Ministry of Health which stood by as hundreds of children ‘disappeared’ fifty years ago…. I rather believe the results of the previous testing, which was carried out twice, and which found that we are in fact mother and daughter.’

“Tzila said that after spending a total of nine days together, both she and Margalit were absolutely certain they were mother and daughter.”

On that day, I was contacted by a few journalists, amazed by the accuracy of my “prediction”. Frankly, so was I. I was even right about the time I said they’d publicize the results.

On 22nd November, 1997, an article was published in the Maariv Israeli mainstream newspaper. This article was written by Michal Kapra, and was based on an interview with Dr. Hassan Hatib, still standing by the results of his first tests. A few important details were given in this article. One, that after the results of Dr. Hiss’ tests, Hatib conducted another series of tests, using the blood from the same samples that Hiss used in the labs of the Forensic Institute. These tests showed again, that Margalit Omessei and Tzila Levine are, indeed, mother and daughter.

Another important fact is that Dr. Hatib was not able to receive Hiss’ results from the Institute. The results were never shown to anyone, and only a final conclusion was issued by the Institute. Never were the test results shown to Dr. Hatib, to attorney Tzuberi, to the government committee… to no one.

One other important thing that Hatib mentioned is that Dr. Hiss used a mitochondrial DNA test, while he himself used chromosomichal DNA. Hatib mentions that there is a scientific problem dealing with mitochondrial DNA, since it is unstable and mutates over the years, which is why it’s not used in tests to determine family relation. He also mentions that this DNA goes through immense changes after the age of 40. In this article, Hatib is backed up on this point by Professor Adam Friedman, of the Haddassa Ein-Karem Hospital. Professor Friedman is considered by many to be the most prominent geneticist in the State of Israel. Professor Friedman also says that the chromosomichal DNA tests are far more reliable. He mentions the problems that arise with the changes that occur in mitochondrial DNA.

Later on, in response to this, a claim was issued by the Forensic labs that they then conducted a second series of tests, in chromosomichal DNA, which showed again, that Mrs. Levine and Mrs. Omessei are not mother and daughter. This is not to say they took another blood sample for these tests, or that these results were publicized either. It is crucial to remember that no records or results of the tests were given to anyone by the Forensic labs… just their final conclusion.

Margalit Omessei and Tzila Levine are convinced they are mother and daughter, as is the rest of their family. This became most clear to me after I paid a visit to Margalit last month. I also found out from Margalit that Tzila is now writing a book on the story of her reunion with her family.

However, even more importantly, Sampson Giat is continuing his efforts to reunite more families of the stolen children. He has issued many letters and press releases, as well as interviews to TV networks, and is doing what he can to reunite as many families as possible. Mr. Giat has conducted the most extensive and professional work on this issue. If anyone would like to contact Sampson Giat, to assist him, to receive information, or just to show support for the cause, he can be contacted at:
305 Seventh Avenue, 11th Floor New York, NY 10001
Tel/Fax: (212) 633-8453
Or by Email, at YemFed@AOL.com

E-mail of author: yam@netvision.net.il

Official Fatah Editorial – Preparing for State

The following is the complete and unedited text of an editorial on the official Fatah Website 15th September, 1998, http://www.fateh.org/e_editor/98/150998.htm

President Clinton has sworn that he will remain committed to the peace process in the Middle East. He has promised that the US Administration will remain involved and that nothing will weaken US resolve to do everything possible to push the peace process forward.

Since we have no recourse other than to place our trust in President Clinton, we look forward to the enactment of this promise, hoping that it will not be sucked down into the vortex of the Starr report on the Clinton-Lewinsky affair.

The first thing that President Clinton should do is to terminate Dennis Ross as the US peace envoy in the Middle East. Ross’ behavior advertises the existence of double standards. Ross is not an honest peace broker. To the Palestinians, he is persona non grata, a spokesman for Zionist oppression, under imperialistic influences, who acts against an occupied people fighting for freedom. Ross seems to take pleasure in his efforts to take 3% from the body of the victim, giving no thought to the blood that will be shed in the process.

President Arafat has realized that Dennis Ross is satisfied with wasting our time without helping us to reach an agreement with the Israelis. Like windmills attached to no power-producing source, Ross’ trips spin and spin, to no avail. For this reason, President Arafat has asked President Clinton to send Ms. Albright to the area, in the hopes that she will be better able to represent US interests. Ms. Albright, at least, does not seem quite so likely as Ross to speak for the interests of the Zionist Likud lobby within the US Administration.

Until Clinton honors his pledge and exerts the necessary pressure on the Israeli side, which has so far failed to honor the peace agreements, Palestinians should maintain their current position. They should refuse to make any more concessions. Otherwise, Israel will be in a stronger position to kill off the Palestinian dream of establishing the Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital. The establishment of this state will be a strong foundation for peace in the Middle East and, by easing tensions and freeing energies and resources both here and abroad, will contribute to peace world-wide.

Nearly two years have passed, in which we have experienced “much ado about nothing”, as Israeli and US negotiators have attempted to undermine the terms of reference of the Oslo Accord — to negate UN Resolutions 242 and 338, along with the principle of “land for peace”, as phrased in “notes for the record” in the Hebron Protocol. To nullify these terms of reference is to put an end to the legal basis of the Oslo agreement and to deny the legitimacy of the Palestinian demand for the return of our land.

A review of Israeli contempt for deadlines shows that this in fact is what is happening. From Rubin and Peres down to Netenyahu, Israeli leaders have shown their disrespect for a negotiated political settlement, including the schedules agreed upon for this work. One can’t help but wonder will happen on the date of May 4, 1999, the day agreed on in the Oslo Accord for the end of the interim stage of negotiations. By the end of this stage, the two parties are to have fulfilled the obligations each assumed in the framework of the agreement. Now Israeli leaders have begun to say that “dates are not sacred.” Are we to understand from this that agreements are not sacred, and that the Israelis are announcing their failure to honor their commitments? Palestinians fear that the date will arrive for the end of negotiations without any agreements having been made.

So should the Palestinians surrender? Should we accept a two-year extension of the negotiating period, as Israeli Labor Party ideologists have suggested?

The Fateh Central Committee has discussed in depth the current situation. They reaffirm that a unified Palestinian position is a necessity to ensure our credibility and the maintenance of a strong front.

This time, when we declare a Palestinian state, as we live within the liberated parts of our homeland, our position is different from the declaration of independence made when we were in the Diaspora. Now, the fact that we have existing executive, judicial and legislative institutions puts teeth into our declaration. Next year’s declaration of independence represents a move from self-rule to the creation of a truly sovereign state.

We understand that achievement of our sovereignty depends to some measure on the world’s willingness to recognize the state of Palestine. Thus we have work to do, in order to ensure that we will obtain the recognition we need from Europe and the rest of the world. Already, the non-aligned countries, all 114 of them, who met recently in South Africa, have expressed their readiness to recognize the new Palestinian state.

When Palestine is recognized by the nations of the world as an independent state, and what Israel views now as disputed land becomes our nation, Netenyahu and the Likud Party will be forced to act responsibly before the eyes of the world. No longer will Shamir’s philosophy of wading through ten years of negotiation before yielding one inch of land be allowed to govern Israel’s actions.

The PLO must play a leading role within the liberated PNA territories and take the lead, as well, within the Diaspora, in the attempt to mobilize the Palestinian people for the coming struggle. Both within the West Bank and Gaza and outside, the PLO must activate all Palestinian institutions and to ensure national unity by involving non-PLO parties such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad. The PLO, its Executive Committee, and President Arafat, as head of that committee, form an administration that should use all available resources, including Fateh, the movement which can turn dreams into realities.

Among us, the declaration of the Palestinian state should not unravel into a yes/no discussion, but must focus on the specific ways in which we will work to realize our independence — without, however, degenerating into internal arguments over minute tactical details.

Finally, any interim agreement should include Palestinian insistence on unconditional Israeli acceptance of the US initiative now being considered. Any interim agreement should also contain the following:

  1. an explicit pledge on Israel’s part to halt settlement construction;
  2. no prohibition of the Palestinian right to declare a state on May 4, 1999; and
  3. commitment on Israel’s part to carry out the third troop redeployment, as well as any other interim steps agreed upon in the Oslo Accord, before final status negotiations are begun.

Revolution until victory!