PLC Rep Zughayar: Arafat Won’t Declare State Next May

IMRA interviewed Fatah Jerusalem Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) Ahmad Hashim Zughayar, Chairman of the PLC Jerusalem Committee, on 6th September, 1998. The English translation is via his son, Hiham Zughayar.

IMRA: Do you expect President Arafat to declare a Palestinian state next May even if the negotiations fail?

Zughayar: He says it might be. He says it is not for sure. It is possible.

IMRA: Does he think he would do it even if he thought it would mean losing a chance to have Jerusalem.

Zughayar: He says that there is no solution without taking Jerusalem over. Because, he says, Jerusalem is the most important thing in the subject.

IMRA: That’s why I was asking. Because if Arafat declares a state and he does not have control of Jerusalem at that time – then that’s it – he’s never going to see it.

Zughayar: That’s true [then translates into Arabic to his father]. He says that from now until the date he is talking about, May 1999, there still is a lot of time. During this time they are going to make a very good study of what they are going to do. What they are going to decide.

He said that they are going to do a big international study and also all over the Middle East.

IMRA: But he accepts the logic of what I am suggesting. That if you declare a state without having control of Jerusalem then you will never have Jerusalem.

Zughayar: He says that he is going to say something clearly. Anything without Jerusalem is no solution. So the main thing is Jerusalem. That’s what he said.

And he is laughing. He says that there is no way to negotiate about a body without a head.

IMRA: Again, that’s why it is a puzzle to me.

Zughayar: That’s why he is sure that nothing is going to happen. He doesn’t say it but I see it in his face. He is laughing.

IMRA: So there won’t be a declaration.

Zughayar: I don’t think so. The way he is talking to me – I don’t want to say there is no way – but he is sure that it is not going to happen.

He said that any step that the Palestinian side is going to take is going to take a very deep study of what is going to happen in the future.

Dr. Aaron Lerner,
Director IMRA (Independent Media Review & Analysis)
P.O.BOX 982 Kfar Sava
Tel: (+972-9) 760-4719
Fax: (+972-9) 741-1645
imra@netvision.net.il

PA Minister of Justice – Also Execute Land Dealers

IMRA interviewed Palestinian Authority Minister of Justice, Freih Abu Meddien, in English, on 31st August:

IMRA: Do you see yesterdays’ executions as setting a precedent for future cases or was it an exception?

Meddien: Any crime committed by murderers as what happened last week will be dealt with by the same standard.

We gave ourselves four years to take the right decision regarding capital punishment. President Arafat always refused to certify these kinds of punishment but finally we reached a red line when a lot of people – particularly those involving people from the military or police, security elements, when they are involved either via their arms or by themselves, to kill people. In this case we have to deal with this subject very accurately, very honestly, with our people. Otherwise we are going to have people taking revenge. We are going to face civil wear between the people themselves, because we are a conservative society. If we don’t do this then the people will think seriously about revenge and then this will make for bloody crimes also. So in this case we have to move and accept the judgment of the military court.

Public opinion made a great impression on this case. There were more than 22 cases up to the present time that President Arafat stopped execution of the people but now he is facing the truth.

IMRA: Do you see this applied to people involved selling land to Zionists?

Meddien: You are talking about collaborators? The main problem we are facing is criminal cases. As for collaborators we have 100 – 200 cases and up until now we don’t have any judgment against them. When we reach this stage we will think.

IMRA: What about people who are selling land to Israelis?

Meddien: According to the judgment of the law or the courts. And when the judgment is capital punishment – why not?

We should take the green light from the law. Otherwise we couldn’t give any decision for capital punishment.

IMRA: Do you see this as an opening also for people picked up by the PA who were involved in attacks against Jews?

Meddien: Actually, we are not thinking of these cases. We are thinking about internal business. Things which could lead to civil war. What I mean is that in a conservative society where there are big clans, big tribes, then when something happens this can be very dangerous for us.

IMRA: One last question. There is talk of an American proposal that the people on the Israeli list for extradition be held by the PA in a location. Is there a legal framework for doing such a thing inside the PA?

Meddien: Actually, according to the agreement, extradition should take place when Israel has fulfilled and honored everything in the Oslo and Cairo agreements. Otherwise, who could accept this part of the agreement?

Absolutely all the people on the list which Israel has sent to us are now serving in prison – either life imprisonment or twenty years or fifteen years. When they finish their sentences in our jails we are ready to transfer them to Israel.

IMRA: What about those who are now serving in the PA’s security forces who are on the list?

Meddien: We are also going to take a hard line in those cases as well.

IMRA: So those people who are on the list who are now serving in Palestinian security forces will…

Meddien: Actually we are focusing now on our own internal problems which are far away from political and security matters.

Dr. Aaron Lerner,
Director IMRA (Independent Media Review & Analysis)
P.O.BOX 982 Kfar Sava
Tel: (+972-9) 760-4719
Fax: (+972-9) 741-1645
imra@netvision.net.il

Al-Ahram: Hamas/PA Relations, Bin Laden

Dead or Alive?
by Tareq Hassan

“Some PA officials were quoted as saying…. [Hamas] was much weaker than originally thought; “as scary as a cat”, some said.”

Excerpts

Palestinian police lifted tight restrictions imposed earlier this week on the West Bank town of Jericho where Emad Awadallah, a key figure in the Hamas military wing, escaped from jail. Immediately after his reported escape, Palestinian police launched a massive manhunt, conducting house-to-house searches and imposing a curfew on Jericho. It was the first time that Palestinian police had taken such measures in a town controlled by the Palestinian Authority (PA) since the arrival of President Yasser Arafat in self-rule areas in 1994….

Awadallah, 29, is a leading figure in… the military wing of Hamas. He was arrested by Palestinian police in April and accused of killing one of Israel’s most wanted men, Hamas bomb-maker Mohieddine Al-Sharif.


While Hamas held Israel responsible for Al-Sharif’s car bomb assassination in front of his home in Gaza, the PA claimed that he was killed by Awadallah as part of an internal dispute in the militant organisation. Hamas denied the charge and claimed that elements within the PA had collaborated with Israel.


Awadallah escaped from a prison controlled by one of Arafat’s several security bodies, the Preventive Security, headed by former Intifada activist Jibril Al-Rajoub. According to PA sources, Awadallah allegedly received assistance from a prison officer with the rank of captain who was sympathetic to the militant group and its military struggle against Israel.

Hamas spokesman in Gaza Mahmoud Al-Zahhar told the Weekly that the group was considering the possibilities that Awadallah might have escaped from prison or that he might have been killed, “in which case we will hold Israel and its agents present everywhere responsible for his death.” Al-Zahhar added that killing Awadallah would help hide any evidence uncovered in the investigation of Al-Sharif’s assassination, and the possible role of Israeli agents within the PA. Awadallah was reportedly with Al-Sharif in the same house when he was killed and is considered a key witness in the investigation, Al-Zahhar said.

But the Hamas spokesman said that it was also possible that Awadallah received assistance from a PA officer in order to escape. “There are some individuals within the PA bodies who sympathise with Awadallah and who are certain that he was not involved in Al-Sharif’s killing.” He also reiterated claims by Hamas that Awadallah was tortured while in PA custody, prompting him to escape. Zahhar warned that if Awadallah’s disappearance has been the result of a conspiracy, “it would seriously endanger internal Palestinian unity.”


Some PA officials were quoted as saying that, before arriving in self-rule areas, they thought of Hamas as a monster, but later changed their mind after realising that the group was much weaker than originally thought; “as scary as a cat”, some said. Still, there are fears that the moderate elements within Hamas cannot continue to keep the hard-liners at bay, particularly if it is proven that Awadallah was killed.


If this is true, some observers believe the PA is trying to improve relations with Hamas and nullify its charges that Al-Sharif was killed by Awadallah. The PA, they say, will allow Awadallah to live in hiding as long as the militant group pledges not to carry out any suicide attacks against Israel. But until Awadallah is found, dead or alive, the many questions surrounding his mysterious escape will remain unanswered.

American Connection
by Khaled Dawoud

Excerpts

Unlike many Saudi Arabians whose support for the war against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan was purely financial, Osama Bin Laden, the son of a construction magnate, personally joined the fight, gaining a reputation for bravery. As a result he was crowned uncontested leader of the Arab-Afghans, thousands of young men from all over the Arab and Islamic world who travelled to Afghanistan to take part in the war against the Soviets. They received generous assistance from the US, Pakistan, oil-rich Arab Gulf countries and the late President Anwar El-Sadat.

His reputation for bravery has turned Bin Laden, now in his 40s, into a saint-like figure for thousands of followers. And in the few interviews he has granted Bin Laden is fond of recounting how the strength of his belief in God and the cause he was fighting for helped him survive many dangerous situations.


[A]n Egyptian veteran of the Afghan war recounted to Al-Ahram Weekly:
… “I saw this with my own two eyes. A Russian plane was flying over us, dropping bombs. Then, one of our brothers lifted a handful of sand and threw it in the direction of the plane. It fell down in flames. Angels were fighting on our side.”


“As Muslims, we believe that when we die, we go to heaven. Before a battle, God sends us saqina, tranquillity,” Bin Laden said in his interview with the Independent.

Bin Laden used his millions to buy bulldozers to blast massive tunnels in the Zazi Mountains of Bakhtiar province and build guerrilla hospitals and military warehouses. He also used the money to bring in, by his count, thousands of Egyptians, Algerians, Palestinians, Yemenis, Jordanians and Lebanese to join their Afghan Muslim “brothers” in the struggle to end Soviet occupation.


Ironically, the camp of Khost where Bin Laden is believed to be based and which was targeted by US missiles… was built with the help of the CIA, according to US intelligence sources.

… The late President Anwar El-Sadat also encouraged growing fundamentalist groups, nurtured to quell the leftist opposition in Egypt, to send fighters to Afghanistan. The outlawed Muslim Brotherhood, which controlled several professional syndicates, was particularly active in this connection. Doctors, such as Jihad leader Ayman El-Zawahri, engineers, lawyers and teachers were among the Egyptians who left for Afghanistan. There, they not only fought against the Russians but also developed the ideology of an international Islamist movement whose warriors are keen to fight for any cause they deem “Islamic,” regardless of their different nationalities and backgrounds.

As a result, after the war against the Soviets ended and the Afghan warlords turned their arms against each other in a bitter power struggle, the Arab-Afghans headed to Bosnia to fight against the Serbs in 1992 and 1993. They also took part in the fighting in Chechnya and Tajikistan against Russia and are now reportedly taking part in the ongoing battles in Kosovo between Serbs and the Muslim Albanian minority. They also fought in Somalia against US troops and are reportedly assisting fundamentalist groups on the rise in a number of African countries, particularly those neighbouring Sudan.

According to experts, the network of Arab-Afghans headed by Bin Laden has a presence in nearly all Arab countries and has extended as far as the Philippines, where they are assisting a Muslim minority fighting for self-determination.


After the Afghan war was over in 1992, Bin Laden returned home, but the Saudi government, fearing his extremist ideology, stripped him of Saudi citizenship in April 1994 for “irresponsible behaviour”.

But Bin Laden was already in Sudan, where he was given shelter by Khartoum’s fundamentalist government.

With Western pressure mounting on Khartoum, and after escaping an assassination attempt at a mosque in the capital, he was forced to leave in 1995, reportedly with 100 followers. He returned to Afghanistan where he has been living as a “guest” of the fundamentalist Taliban militia.

Since then, he has declared that the US is the Muslim world’s foremost enemy. Bin Laden believes that US troops protecting the oil-fields of his homeland since the 1991 second Gulf War are desecrating Muslim holy sites by their very presence. He also believes that American power has emasculated Arab countries, turning them into client states.


[W]hen Bin Laden announced the formation of the “International Islamic Front for Jihad against Jews and Crusaders” from his hideout in Afghanistan last February, the announcement did not cause much concern in Washington which was, in any case, more concerned at the time with Saddam Hussein’s failure to cooperate with UN weapons’ inspectors.

The US, which had earlier suggested that Iran might have been behind 1995 and 1996 Al-Khobar and Riyadh bombings in Saudi Arabia, now blames Bin Laden for the two bombings in which 23 American soldiers were killed and the Saudi dissident, through his spokesman, has accepted responsibility for “what happened in Saudi Arabia.”

Now, the US is discovering the bitter harvest of the seeds it sowed when it adopted a policy of fighting the Russians by proxy. And the “Arab-Afghans” have inevitably turned their weapons against their former sponsor.

Hostage to Expansion
by Yehya Ghanem

Excerpts

An informed Afghani source living in Islamabad told Al-Ahram Weekly that Asian republics surrounding Afghanistan, which had constituted part of the Soviet Union in the past, are fearful for a number of reasons. For one thing, the sweeping victory of the Taliban over the opposition alliance in the north has consolidated Taliban rule over vast areas stretching as far as the borders with Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan, each of which is concerned to deter the advance of the fundamentalist Islamist movement across its borders. The republics are terrified of the infiltration of extremist Afghani elements into their respective territories, and rumours are already rife about contacts between the extremist elements and the opposition militia in those republics.

“There was implicit approval by the US to allow the Taliban to expand their military operations, and to tighten their control over all parts of Afghanistan, which is specifically what the warring factions in Afghanistan had failed to do in 1992,” the source noted. “The aim was to secure the safety of the oil pipeline from the production fields in Turkmenistan, travelling from the northern to the southern borders of Afghanistan and across Pakistan to the port of Karachi.” However, US efforts to mediate between the Taliban and opposition factions, which took place last June, came to a deadlock, mainly due to the hard-line political position adopted by the Taliban, emboldened by military conquests that have brought 90 per cent of Afghani territory under their control.”

The limits of Taliban expansion Washington was willing to sanction have not, though, been respected by the movement. Russia reacted by sending messages on its own behalf to the Asian republics and to the US, insisting it was not going to tolerate an Islamic fundamentalist threat to its soft belly in the Central Asian Islamic republics.

It is against this backdrop that the US extended its offer to the Taliban, two weeks before the embassy bombings took place, offering official recognition in return for the extradition of Bin Laden to the US. Fearing that he may be sacrificed as part of a deal with the US, Bin Laden might possibly have breached his agreement with the Taliban, which allowed him to issue threats from time to time but at the same time to refrain from staging any operations on the ground.

It appears logical that extraditing Bin Laden to the US is only a first step in a process that would result in the liquidation of Arab-Afghan leaders in Afghanistan.

… Despite being a long time ally and a companion in arms of the Taliban, the financier behind several Taliban arms deals and the sponsor of development schemes in various areas under Taliban rule, the current regime seems anxious to be relieved of the burden Bin Laden represents. The Taliban may well be willing to deliver Bin Laden to the US, though in return they would expect tacit US approval for Taliban military expansion to the outskirts of the Asian republics.

Eyewitness to the Oslo “Reunion”

On August 24, I flew to the Holmenkollin Park Hotel in Oslo, Norway, to cover a hastily organized “fifth anniversary” conference that was held exactly five years to exact day and the very place where the “Oslo accords” had been agreed to by the bonafide representatives of the government of Israel and the PLO.

While the governments of Israel and Norway have indeed changed, you could walk into the lobby of the Holmenkollin Park Hotel in Oslo and see many of the people who brought you the original Oslo process still at work, even if they were no longer in government.

In the hotel lobbies that were spread over two spacious floors, you could noticeably see Shimon Peres and Uri Savir, five years ago with the top brass of the Israel Foreign Ministry and now the heads of the Peres Center for Peace in the Middle East, hob-nobbing with Arafat’s top advisor, Abu Allah, as they loudly discussed the nostalgia for the good times of five years ago.

And in another corner of the lobby, you could see the Palestine Authority chief negotiator Hanan Asfour who was quietly ensconced with Likud majority leader Meir Shitrit, a man who was sent by the current Israeli Prime Minister, Benyamin Netanyahu, to attend the conference on behalf of the Israeli head of state. Shitrit emerged from his coffee table summit with Asfour to tell the press, quite matter of factly, that the differences between Israel and the Palestine Authority were not too significant, and that another deal was in the works.

And in another corner of the lobby sat Peres’s trusted protege, MK Dr. Yossi Beillin, who was meeting with Dr. Uzi Arad, the special national security advisor to Netanyahu. Arad had just stated a few days earlier that Dr. Beillin’s idea for a delayed recognition of Palestinian Arab independence was “worthy of consideration”.

And in the downstairs auditorium at the Holmenkollin Park Hotel was a reminder of the more difficult side of the Oslo process: It was there that Norwegian statesman, Kare Kristansen, conducted a full fledged news conference for the Norwegian media, where Kristiansen showed a recent comprehensive video clip from the official PA Palestine Broadcasting Corporation, complied by the Jerusalem- based “Peace for Generations” group, whose representative, Daniel Yosef, had come from Jerusalem to join Kristansen and present a video which showed that the official programs of the Palestine Authority were airing daily television programs that egged on Arab children to a life of “Jihad” holy war to liberate all of Palestine.

Upstairs, again in the lobby, one of the chief US negotiators, Aron Miller, declared that the greatest disappointment in the Oslo process was that the Palestinians had simply not changed their “tone” in Arabic.

Kristiansen, it will be remembered, was the one member of the Nobel Peace Prize committee to resign from the committee rather than to sanction the nomination of Arafat as a Nobel Peace prize laureate.

Kristensan declared that it was strange to celebrate this anniversary, since that day commemorated Arafat’s as-yet unfulfilled commitment to cancel the covenant and constitution of the PLO whose 33 articles calls for continued war and the eventual liquidation of the state of Israel.

Kristensan went on to describe Arafat’s record: The fact that Arafat has never issued a denunciation of the murder of Jews in Arabic, the fact that Arafat has continued to give speeches that preach Jihad and the liberation of all of Palestine, along with an analysis of Arafat’s human rights policies, which have included the arrest and execution of human rights workers, independent TV producers, and a host of Palestinian dissidents

The unkindest cut of all, in the words of Kare Kristensan, was that the “decision” of August 25, 1993 to cancel the covenant was never ratified, to this day, a factor which should have nullified any reason for the commemoration of that date.

Well, there may have been another reason for the hastily called conference.

That reason may have something to do with Arafat’s personal condition.

From the first day of the Oslo process, every major and minor decision rests on Arafat.

Like him or not as a “democrat”, Arafat has been a strong leader who makes his presence felt in the Palestine Authority.

Arafat has demonstrated, time and again, that he can turn the spigot of violence and terror “on and off”, according to his will.

On the economic front, not only do all decisions go through Arafat – all moneys flow through accounts in Israel and the Palestine Authority that actually require Arafat’s personal signature. That is written quite clearly in the Oslo accords.

The Oslo process dependence on Arafat was made most clear when Kjell Magne Bondevick, the Prime Minister of Norway confided in the press on the morning of the commemorative event that the success of the process is dependent on strong and personal support for Yassir Arafat. Only a few months ago, German Chancellor Helmut Kohl summoned Netanyahu to Bonn with precisely the same message.

After a festive meal at the Holmenkollin Park Hotel, a crowd of diplomats and dignitaries gathered at Norway’s famous “Nobel Institute”, where the Nobel Prize is bequeathed each year, and where Arafat, Peres and Rabin had received their award four years ago – an event that I had also come to Oslo to cover.

This was an unusual occasion – to honor Nobel laureates for a second time

After the crowd had gathered, Arafat walked in the room, holding on to Shimon Peres. Arafat was asked to speak first. Since I have covered and chronicled Arafat’s speeches over the past five years, I was expecting another dose of Arafat’s accomplished oratory, however reconciliatory it would be in light of the venue. Yet Arafat spoke in a hushed tone, in Arabic, reading from a prepared text and asking his aide, Saeb Erakat, to translate every few minutes.

Arafat simply stressed Palestinian nationalism and added a few thoughts about “education for peace”.

Peres followed suit with a call to peace, as did Meir Shitrit and US diplomat Dennis Ross, after which the conference adjourned for the panelists to meet just with the press.

During the informal break in events, as Arafat walked by me, I approached him with my microcassette and proverbial reporter’s pad, asking Arafat if he would make a statement in Arabic about the recent murder of Rabbi Shlomo Raanan in Hebron, since no statement had yet been issued from any official PA source on this matter.

Arafat placed a very jittery hand on my elbow. His lips were stammering. His legs were not steady. His eyes were bloodshot. His face was gaunt. Only eighteen months ago, when I had accompanied a delegation of Judea residents to meet him – he now seemed two thirds the weight he used to be. He could not hear me, even though I was speaking to him from point-blank range. He squinted, barely able to see me. Arafat stopped in his tracks, trying to focus on my question. Then his security man pushed Arafat ahead towards the toilet.

I had seen Arafat at a public presentation in Ramallah only a few months ago. He did not look or act like this. Perhaps Arafat had suffered some kind of stroke.

When Arafat returned to the hall, he sat at a press conference table next to Erakat, together with Ross, Peres and Shitrit, opposite about twenty. Arafat could not hear the questions from only a few feet away. Erekat communicated them to him. I, for one, asked about the Palestine Broadcasting Authority children’s programs that are televised each day on the official PA TV station, operating from Arafat’s own studio. I asked if these programs that promoted violence were the “education for peace” that he advocated.

Arafat responded by saying that there were 840,000 Palestinian children going to school in the Palestine Authority, and that the Jordanian and Egyptian curriculum would soon be changed.

I again asked Arafat whether the children’s TV programs on PA TV represented the kind of programs that would become the Palestinian educational curriculum. Eraket then whispered in Arafat’s ear. Arafat then said that he has issued orders for an investigation of the PBC TV children’s club program. Erakat then said that he was hearing about this program from many of his Jewish friends and that he had “told Arafat” to ask for an investigation of the matter.

What shocked the press in Oslo was that Arafat was no longer functioning.

Having been trained in medical social work and having watched my own father suffer through a series of mini-strokes for three years before his death, I do not have to be a medical expert to know that the Palestinian national movement that has been oriented around Yassir Arafat for a generation must now foster a new modus operandus.

What the press witnessed in Arafat’s behavior in Oslo is what European, American, Israeli and Palestinian leaders have also seen. The cat is out of the bag. Arafat is on the way out. Even if he continues to live, he is no longer a functional leader.

Writing in the summer 1998 issue of Foreign Affairs, a leading Palestinian researcher writes that Arafat’s deterioration of health may bring about a Hamas take-over of the Palestine Authority.

And what feeds Moslem fundamentalism more than any other factor remains the allegation of corruption. From the Jewish-Moslem dialogue group that I attend, I have learned from Moslem colleagues that when a public entity is accused of stealing funds, it is like stealing from Allah (God)

Yet at a time when the US and some circles in the west face a new battle with Moslem fundamentalism, from Kenya to Afghanistan, the last thing that the US and the EU want to see now is a Hamas-led Palestinian entity.

It would be fair to say that the reason for a hastily convened summit in Oslo this week was to prepare for a post-Arafat period in the peace process, while giving Arafat an honorable send-off at the Nobel Insitute in Oslo.

It would seem that the relationships that were again fostered in Oslo will again form the basis of the next step in the middle east peace process.

The Incidental Fruit of Oslo

Excerpts

The Oslo Accords dealt a crippling blow to the foundations of the global consensus which defined the prerequisites for a just and durable peace during the 1970s and 80s{IMREA comment: A fantastic fabrication!}– that peace was predicated on the right of the Palestinian people to establish their own independent state alongside Israel. That peace was to occur after Israel completed its withdrawal from the Occupied Territories in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 242, and after the Palestinians recognised Israel’s existence and sovereignty in the largest part of their own national patrimony.


Negotiations between Israel and the PA are like encounters between the elephant and the fly. The current stalemate will continue to be fueled by divisions inside Israel, which now centre not on whether Oslo will end the occupation and restore a measure of normality to Israelis and Palestinians, but on the most efficient and least disruptive approach to preserving the status-quo under a more benign label. The method of repackaging the occupation is what really divided Rabin from Netanyahu, a fact that has not been lost on a sizable sector of the Palestinian community, inside and outside Palestine. While some comprehend it well, others feel it instinctively, irrespective of Arafat’s constant expressions of nostalgia for and repeated devotion to Rabin’s legacy.

Arafat has placed himself in the untenable position of being unable to deliver to either Israel and the US or to his own constituents, who were ready to scale down their aspirations but not surrender their rights. His denunciations of terror and vows to eradicate violence, repeatedly urged by the US and Israel, are seen in the Palestinian street as an ominous attack on civil liberties. Moreover, his assumption of responsibility for Israel’s security is becoming increasingly incontrovertible when that security keeps on assuming dimensions which negate Palestinian rights — water security, settlements security and demographic security, which negates the rights of refugees.

All of these factors confirm and prolong the stalemate. Oslo was not designed as a normal traditional agreement. It has now become a guarantor of disagreement and the legitimiser of the status quo. The Palestinians have no other choice but to struggle for equal rights and equal dignity. Not only had Oslo foreclosed on their option of a separate and sovereign existence; it has also denied them the right to struggle for that existence, inasmuch as most variants of the struggle are bound to be classified as either terrorism, lack of reciprocity, failure to abide by commitments or acting against peace.


The process which began in Oslo will reach nowhere because the nature of the Israeli state precludes genuine coexistence with the Palestinian people on equal basis. As long as the Zionist ideology of acquiring the land without the people prevails, a negotiated settlement based on the right of the two people to dignity and self-determination will continue to be elusive. Binyamin Netanyahu did not repudiate Rabin’s strategy; he only rejected his tactics.


Any forward movement beyond the present no peace/no war situation would require a debate of Zionist ideology and history, in which difficult questions, suppressed since the establishment of Israel, would surface. At the heart of the debate would be the main Zionist narrative and its negative portrayal of Arabs, distortion of history and the requirements of peace. Already, we are told, a post-Zionist debate is taking place inside Israel. The question is how extensively has it been followed by the general public. Political Scientist Ilan Pappe has written a series of studies on this post-Zionist critique and its manifestations in various Israeli cultural products, including films, plays, music, novels and short stories as well as in scholarly discourse. Pappe’s writings reveal how intertwined the lives of Israelis and Palestinians have become. There is an implication in his work that Israel cannot prosper as an isolated Western outpost in the region:

A democratic pluralist Israel as a part of the Mediterranean is also an Israel with many historical narratives. Such an Israel has a chance of a common future. The question of whether Zionism is a movement of national plundering or a movement of a persecuted people acting according to a human ethic, seeking compromise and peace is being increasingly raised by Israeli intellectuals. The historian Benny Morris framed the question in terms of the accuracy of the “Zionist ethos claims that we came to this land not to exploit the natives and expel them, and not to occupy them by force.”

Only when this kind of critique is broadened to include the mainstream and penetrate the consciousness of the average Israeli will the so-called peace process begin to assume some hopefuldimensions. Only when the Palestinians decide to rediscover their democratic secular state framework and begin to adapt it to the present realities will hopes for real peace be rekindled. Call it a bi-national solution, a federal system or a cantonal system on the Swiss model, the common denominators will have to be equal rights, equal citizenship, plurality, coexistence and common humanity. That requires a de-Zionised Israel and a normal polity which exists for its own citizens, devoid of any privileges based on religion, ethnicity, race or gender.

The writer is member of the Palestine National Council and Chancellor Professor of Political Science, University of Massachusetts, Dartmouth.

U.S. Tried to Halt Several Searches

The Clinton administration has intervened repeatedly since last fall to delay or prevent intrusive weapons inspections in Iraq by United Nations teams, according to American and diplomatic accounts.

The interventions included at least six occasions, beginning in November 1997, in which Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright or other top administration officials sought — with success in each case but one — to persuade chief U.N. inspector Richard Butler to rescind orders for surprise searches for weapons of mass destruction or to remove a controversial inspector from Iraq. In March, according to sources, the United States and the United Kingdom put an end to the U.N. Special Commission’s most successful new inspection technique by withdrawing one critical form of intelligence support — including information, equipment and personnel — they had provided to the U.N. inspectors until then.

Since the first report surfaced earlier this month of the administration’s efforts to restrain the special commission, Albright has complained angrily to associates that she was portrayed as unprincipled or soft on Iraq. In private conversations, according to accounts of those present, she argued that the administration sought only to control the pace of confrontation with Iraq to create the best conditions in which to prevail.

What has not been disclosed before is the extent to which overt U.S. support for the inspectors was accompanied, as Washington and the special commission grew more isolated diplomatically, by increasing American efforts to prevent the inspectors from exceeding the administration’s diminishing capacity to protect them.

The resulting U.S. efforts to restrain weapons searches conflicted with robust public rhetoric in support of the special commission’s right to make what Albright often called “unfettered, unconditional inspections” of any site in Iraq, at any time. They also coincided, sometimes to the day, with explicit military threats by American officials against Iraq should it turn the inspectors aside.

Undersecretary of State Thomas Pickering said in a telephone interview last night that any mere list of U.S. interventions to restrain the special commission “misses reams of context and a great deal of what was happening in and around the process that clearly informed our decisions.” Among them he cited “the shape of UNSCOM’s support at any given point in the Security Council, which has been eroding badly.”

“The United States over the years in my view has an unparalleled, second-to- none record in supporting UNSCOM, and that means providing equipment, personnel and support for it, and in the Security Council at each turn… [putting] the major effort on the line in each and every resolution, and each and every circumstance, including on a number of occasions deploying military forces,” he added.

In an interview yesterday morning, Butler deflected direct questions about specific American attempts to influence the commission’s work, but acknowledged unspecified instances of intervention in his operational decisions from foreign capitals, including Washington.

“I have received representations about how I should conduct this work, sometimes with quite specific aspects, including the identity of the chief inspector, from multiple sources,” he said. “Representations of views on such subjects by the United States were certainly not the only ones I received. A number of members of the Security Council have views on the same subjects and felt happy in coming to me with those views, and sometimes expressing them very strongly. I’ve sometimes felt strongly in the sense that I was being threatened.”

Later, in reply to a two-page letter providing fuller details of this article, Butler faxed a statement that “as a matter of sound policy, I am unable to comment” further.

U.S. efforts to restrain the most provocative of Butler’s inspections began on Nov. 22 last year, shortly after Iraq touched off the most serious crisis since the Security Council demanded its disarmament in Resolution 687 of April 1991, according to accounts by individuals with first-hand knowledge of the events and according to supporting documents.

The previous month Iraq had expelled all American nationals on UNSCOM inspection teams. The Clinton administration, though well aware of what it called “sanctions fatigue” among its allies, was stunned nonetheless by the weakness of the Security Council’s reply: On Nov. 12, in Resolution 1137, the council voted only to limit international travel by a handful of Iraqi officials.

For a brief period, Iraq allowed inspectors to return, and Butler dispatched a team that arrived in Baghdad on Nov. 21 and 22.

Butler had signed confidential orders for a no-notice inspection on Nov. 23 of the former headquarters of the 3rd Battalion of Iraq’s Special Republican Guard, which the U.N. panel believed to be central to Iraqi efforts to conceal forbidden arms. Following a standard procedure that neither UNSCOM nor Washington officially acknowledges, Butler’s senior staff briefed a liaison officer from the Central Intelligence Agency, based at the U.S. mission to the United Nations, on the intended target, sources said.

Albright telephoned Butler less than 24 hours before the surprise search was to take place, sources said. She urged him to delay the operation, arguing that it would precipitate a crisis before the military or diplomatic groundwork had been laid.

Around midnight at the Baghdad Monitoring and Verification Center, the UNSCOM headquarters in Iraq, the special weapons team received new orders from Butler aborting its mission. Soon afterward, Butler issued guidance to his senior staff ruling out new inspections until further notice at Iraq’s Special Security Organization, Special Republican Guard, Republican Guard or any other site designated “sensitive” by the Baghdad government.

In a pattern that would be repeated in the year to come, some inspectors and their advocates in Washington chafed at the restraints.

To keep ahead of the inspectors, Iraq has developed a standard procedure in which it moves forbidden weapons components and the documents describing them every 30 days, and it conducts drills to evacuate or destroy evidence on 15 minutes’ notice, sources said.

It has proved difficult for inspectors to move as quickly. They typically must go through several stages: developing and analyzing intelligence leads from defectors, satellite and reconnaissance photographs and the results of other collection efforts; planning an inspection in operational detail to foil Iraqi counterintelligence efforts; assembling a team of specialists, some of them borrowed from sympathetic governments, and deploying the team to Baghdad.

Because the leads are perishable, inspectors regard any delay in exploiting them as tantamount to abandoning a target.

On Dec. 16, after four days of unfruitful talks with the Baghdad government, Butler flew to Bahrain and signed written orders — known formally as Notices of Inspection Site — for an aggressive program of surprise inspections. In one of the orders, the team designated as UNSCOM 218 was ordered to make a surprise visit on Dec. 20 to a site known as Jabal Makhul High Security Area, a system of underground conduits in a presidential palace north of Tikrit where the commission believed Iraq was hiding boxes of incriminating documents. In another, the team was directed to go on Dec. 23 to the headquarters of the Special Security Organization (SSO) in Baghdad.

As Butler returned to New York, the leader of UNSCOM 218, Scott Ritter, left Bahrain for Baghdad. On Dec. 18, he did the first of his no-notice inspections — to a complex of SSO villas in Habaniyeh — and was met with outrage by Iraqi officials.

At about that time, the U.S. government began pressing Butler to cancel the rest of the intrusive inspections, according to officials. The Clinton administration cited an ongoing, but as yet insufficient, military buildup in the region and diplomatic efforts that were still at an early stage.

Later on Dec. 18, Butler telephoned Ritter, using a secure telephone, and rescinded his remaining inspection orders.

The following month, when Ritter returned with a subsequent team, UNSCOM 227, Iraq again halted the commission’s work on Jan. 12. It accused the commission, and Ritter in particular, of “fabricating lies, deliberately prolonging the work, and submitting false reports to the Security Council.”

Butler had signed new orders to search the SSO headquarters on Jan. 16, along with the offices of Presidential Secretary Abed Hamid Mahmoud, a close aide to Iraqi President Saddam Hussein suspected of coordinating activities to conceal weapons programs. But on Jan. 15, U.S. Ambassador Bill Richardson called Butler to his office across Manhattan’s First Avenue and asked him — without explanation — to withdraw Ritter from Iraq.

Butler complied immediately. Ritter left Baghdad ahead of schedule, but read a statement drafted for him in New York and Washington portraying his departure as routine. He ad-libbed one line: “We will be back.”

After an American military and diplomatic buildup, Iraq agreed on Feb. 23 to unrestricted access for inspectors and a new set of special procedures at eight so-called presidential sites. U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan, who negotiated the deal with Saddam Hussein and Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz, urged Butler not to send Ritter — as he planned — in the first inspections testing that agreement.

Albright telephoned Butler around that time, sources said, with similar advice, describing Ritter as a lightning rod and asking whether he might be held back in New York or direct the searches from Bahrain. Butler dispatched him anyway, and Albright telephoned again March 2 with a more forceful restatement of the U.S. objection. If Iraq was going to balk it should be seen as rejecting the inspection, not the inspector, she argued.

The same day, the Security Council passed the American-drafted resolution promising “severest consequences” if Iraq failed to keep its promises of Feb. 23. The following day, Assistant Secretary of State James P. Rubin said the resolution meant that “military force will ensue” immediately if Iraq came into breach.

At around the same time on March 3, Butler relieved Ritter of command and ordered him to appoint a new chief inspector. But after Ritter’s four senior subordinates sent Butler an “eyes only” fax protesting the decision, Butler reversed himself.

Later that month, the United States and Britain withdrew crucial elements of the intelligence support that allowed the special commission to observe Iraqi concealment efforts as they happened during surprise inspections.

In June, after a fallow period for the commission, Butler dispatched lieutenants to London and Washington to brief officials on seven proposed inspection targets in two major categories: the SSO and Mahmoud’s secretarial office. The inspections were set for July 20.

On July 15, British official Derek Plumbly and Peter Burleigh, the second ranking U.S. delegate at the United Nations, questioned Butler about the timing. One central argument was that Iraq’s agreed “schedule of work” with UNSCOM gave it an appearance of compliance that would make aggressive new inspections look provocative, sources said.

But the following month, the Clinton administration argued roughly the opposite case: that Iraq’s open defiance beginning Aug. 3 meant that Butler should lay low. Butler had authorized an Aug. 6 inspection of a site believed to contain sensitive ballistic missile components and another housing documents. In an Aug. 4 telephone call to Butler — for which he had to be summoned to a secure line at the U.S. Embassy in Bahrain — Albright argued that pursuit of those leads would make Butler the issue again when Saddam Hussein was misbehaving.

Butler postponed the inspections for three days, to Aug. 9, and aborted them altogether after a second high-level U.S. intervention on Aug. 7.

James Foley, Albright’s acting spokesman, said last night that “it’s not for nothing that Saddam Hussein has called Secretary Albright a snake and a witch, among other things. He knows that the United States is the strongest backer of UNSCOM in the Security Council, and he knows she is a forceful advocate of standing up to him through diplomatic and military means.”

Another Albright associate, who discussed the matter with her, said “she saw herself as trying to control the pace of any confrontation with Iraq so that it would remain manageable.”

“Madeleine was very sensible, very realistic in avoiding a crisis with Iraq,” said a high-ranking foreign diplomat who knows her well. “The Americans know the Russians, Chinese and French do not want war, so it is a sensible move.”

Palestine Authority Officials Comment on American Attacks

Following are two recent references by senior Palestinian officials to the US missile strikes against Sudan and Afghanistan:

24th August, 1998 interview on Israel Army radio with Sufian Abu Zaida, head of the PA’s Israel desk

“Question: Tell me, does the Palestinian Authority support the American action against targets in Sudan and Afghanistan?

Sufian Abu Zaida: Of course not. Of course not…. We do not agree and we shall not agree. I do not think it would be right for us to agree with the American attack on Afghanistan and Sudan. It would be a disgrace if a Palestinian or an Arab were to agree to this, since there was no proof. The United States can not be both the guardian of law in the world and the one who enforces it.

Question:… So you come and say that we can not totally rely on American intelligence?

Sufian Abu Zaida: That is the answer. That is the answer – to kill Sudanese and Afghan civilians – that is the answer? Let us say that Bin Laden is a terrorist, let’s assume that he is a terrorist and that he did it. So Clinton is also a terrorist who kills Afghan and Sudanese innocents. That is the answer?!”

Interview on 21st August, 1998 with Secretary-General of the PA Cabinet Ahmad Abd al-Rahman on the official PA radio station the Voice of Palestine

“These air operations against a sovereign country like Sudan and also against a sovereign country like Afghanistan are a serious precedent in international relations. It is an aggression against the sovereignty of these countries…. I say that this precedent might open the door to the return of the law of the jungle governing relations among countries… We view these efforts as harmful to peace efforts, to stability in the Middle East. They also show that some quarters in the US administration might be more inclined to adopt the policy of force instead of the policy of settling issues peacefully.”

Does the United States Intend to Pursue Terrorists Who Murder Its Citizens . . . Or Doesn’t It?

Since the terrorist bombings at the U.S. Embassies in Nairobi, Kenya mad Dar-Es-Salaam, Tanzania, President Clinton and officials of his administration have been vehemently proclaiming that terrorists who murder U.S. citizens will be pursued to the ends of the earth.

This pledge was similar to the platform Clinton had presented to an anti-terrorism summit meeting of world leaders held at Sharm El-Sheik in March 1996. I covered that conference that was hastily organized after Palestinian bus bombings in Jerusalem and Tel Aviv took the lives of more than seventy people and threatened to scuttle the peace process.

Indeed, rather than in mere rhetoric, what effort did the Clinton administration make to “bring to justice” the terrorist-murders of American citizens who were among those who were murdered in terror attacks that were perpetrated by Palestinians:

Leon Klinghoffer, 76, a U.S. citizen, was a passenger aboard the Italian cruise ship “Achille Lauro” when it was hijacked by Arab terrorists in 1985. Mr Klinghoffer, who had been disabled by a stroke, was in a wheelchair. The terrorists, under the command of Abu Abbas, shot him and threw his body overboard still in the wheelchair. The PLO spokesman at the United Nations suggested that Mrs. Klinghoffer had murdered her crippled husband for the insurance money.

Abu Abbas himself has most recently been awarded asylum under the personal protection of Palestine Authority chairman Yassir Arafat, without the slightest protest from the US, even though he is still wanted for murder by the United States and Italy

Upon his arrival to Gaza, Abbas gave an interview to Reuters in which he explained that he ordered Klinghoffer to be shot because, even confined to a wheelchair, he was “making trouble” for the terrorist-hijackers.

Nachshon Wachsman, 19, a U.S. citizen, was kidnapped by Hamas in 1994, held hostage and finally killed. President Clinton met his parents, U.S. citizens Yehuda and Esther Wachsman, at Nachshon’s grave on Mt. Herzl, on the day after the anti-terrorism summit in Sharm El Sheikh. Clinton placed a stone, as is the Jewish custom, at Nachshon’s graveside. When the President asked Esther Wachsman what he could do to comfort her at this time of mourning, and she replied that wanted to know about U.S. government pursuit of Muhammad Deif, the Hamas leader who had planned the kidnapping and death of her son.

Clinton replied that the arrest of Deif and his transfer to U.S. custody was the highest priority of the U.S. government, and that Deif was a most-wanted criminal by the U.S. legal authorities.

Deif was also free in Gaza, under the control of the Palestine Authority, and President Clinton stated that Israel should not proceed with the surrender of Hebron to the PA until Arafat surrendered Deif.

Four months later, the head of the PA police force in Gaza informed Yehuda Wachsman that there were strict orders from Arafat not to arrest Deif.

Muhammad Deif is still free in Gaza. There is no record that Clinton or the U.S. State Department has ever called upon Arafat to arrest Deif or to hand him over ro stand trial in Gaza, Israel or the US.

When a journalist asked US Secretary of State Madeline Albright about this, she said that she had never heard of Deif.

Alisa Flatow, 20, a U.S. citizen, was studying in Israel when she was one of seven people murdered in the bombing of a bus by Islamic Jihad terrorists in 1995. President Clinton assured her father, Stephen M. Flatow, that he would fulfill his obligation to the slain American girl by pursuing the arrest and conviction of the murderers.

Today, however, Steve Flatow has trouble getting any information from the Clinton administration concerning the whereabouts of his daughter’s killers.

Yet Nabil Sharihi, accused by Israel and even by the Palestine Authority of taking part in this terror attack, was detained only briefly by the PA, not put on trial, not in the Palestine Aurhoity, not in Israel and not in the United States.

Meanwhile, the AP reported that he had been set free by the PA

Joan Davenny, 45, a U.S. citizen, was a school-teacher in Connecticut. She was on a visit to Israel when she was one of six people murdered in the bombing of a bus in Jerusalem by Hamas terrorists in 1995.

Abd al-Majid Dudin, accused by Israel of participation in preparing this act of terrorism, is living within the PA.

Israeli requests to the Palestine Authority for his arrest have been ignored.

The US has made no such request.

David Boim, U.S. citizen, was murdered in 1996, shot by two Arab terrorists while he was waiting for a school bus. He was 17 years old.

His parents, Stanley and Joyce Boim, both U.S. citizens, were assured by U.S. ambassador Martin Indyk that Imjad HaNawi, one of the killers, had been arrested by Arafat’s police, but the PA would not confirm this.

Indyk also said that the PA police were in pursuit of the second killer.

The PA also denied this.

Imjad HaNawi was not arrested by Arafat’s police until February 1998, after Joyce Boim had made four visits to Capitol Hill.

HaNawi was convicted in a Palestinian court of law as a accmplice in the murder of David Boim, and sentenced to ten years of hard labor.

However, the U.S. consulate in Jerusalem cannot confirm whether HaNawi is still in jail or not.

Matthew Eisenfeld, U.S. citizen, was a theology student when he was murdered in a Hamas bombing of a Jerusalem bus in 1996. He was then 25 years old. Sara Duker, U.S. citizen, was murdered in that same terrorist bombing. She was then 22 years old, and engaged to be married to Matthew Eisenfeld.

Nafez Sabih, believed to have taken part in the preparation of this terrorist bomb, has taken refuge within territory controlled by the Palestine Authority. Israeli requests to the Palestine Authority for his arrest have been ignored.

The US has made no such request.

Yael Botwin, U.S. citizen, age 14 was among the four teenagers murdered in an Arab-terrorist attack in Jerusalem in September, 1997. The perpetrator of that attack was the second of the two men who had murdered David Boim.

The question remains: As a matter of policy, is the Clinton Administration really prepared to take action against terrorist-murderers of U.S. citizens, even when the identities and whereabouts of these killers of U.S. citizens are known to the US government.

So far, the Clinton record has registered no official protest against those who have sheltered and harbored those who have murdered American citizens.

It would seem that President Bill Clinton is committed to pursing terrorists to the end of a soundbyte.

Al-Ahram: Terrorism, Ngo’s, Arafat’s New Cabinet

Fertile Ground
Salama Ahmed Salama

Excerpts

The success of international terrorism in breaking through seemingly impenetrable security barriers and outwitting advanced intelligence techniques in the Nairobi and Dar es Salaam bombings lays bare a new fact. A far more complex form of terrorism has begun to flourish, spurred on to ever more horrifying peaks by US policy.


The task of mapping international terrorism — its sources of funding, policy and executive branches, international routes and arms suppliers — has become the major focus of intelligence services, governments and many think-tanks in the West. These institutions have targeted Islamism as their archenemy and braced themselves to destroy it, instead of reconsidering their own policies, which have created the ideal global arena in which terrorism can thrive and attract ever greater numbers of “fanatics” and “extremists” who believe in very different things, and whose only common ground may be their dispossession and desperation.

The gravity of the Middle East crisis, which has exacerbated Arab feelings of incapacity to breaking point, Israeli intransigence, US double standards, the indifference of the international community, and the humiliation of the Palestinians are not the only factors nurturing terrorism. The systematic and organised humiliation and mass murder of the Iraqi people are also unprecedented in the history of modern warfare. The West’s attitude toward Iraq is provoking hostility and hatred of the US and the West in general, generating an urge for retaliation among a large and diverse array of factions. Terrorism is feeding off this hostility. The attacks on US troops and US interests in the Gulf were only the most visible expression of a generalised sense of outrage at the US’s massive presence there. Arabs and Muslims have had enough.

President Mubarak’s repeated warnings that the present state of affairs in the Middle East can be more destructive than an all-out war seem to have been proven accurate.

The environment created by the West is spawning seemingly limitless violence.


US endeavours to assassinate Saddam Hussein, organise acts of sabotage and overthrow the regime in Baghdad violate international law and supply terrorist movements with justification to engage in extreme violence. The events taking place every day in Kosovo constitute systematic and premeditated ethnic cleansing.

The Serbs are slowly but surely eliminating the Albanian Muslims. The operations which have been going on for months under the auspices of NATO are yet another episode in the Bosnian tragedy….

The US can indeed track down and punish the men who plan terrorist operations, but flagrantly unjust and biased US policies will continue to provide the ideal environment for terrorism to flourish. As for us, we will pay the price for whatever Bin Laden — or “Bin Clinton” — chooses to do.

Book Review
by Mahmoud El-Wardani

Full Text

Qissat Al-Gam’iyat Al-Ghayr Hukoumiya… Tamwil wa Tatbi’e (The Story of NGOs: Funding and Normalisation), Sanaa El-Masri. Cairo: Dar Sina Lil-Nashr, 1998

The noble intentions of NGOs aside, their proliferation in Egypt since the early ’90s and the plethora of international agencies and organisations funding them give one pause for thought. Delving into the phenomenon, Sanaa El-Masri has conducted interviews, gathered statistics and sifted with a thin comb through reams of leaflets and reports issued by NGOs. Demonstrating that there is no such thing as a free lunch, El-Masri skillfully traces the strings attached to donations and funds in return for which NGOs (the vast majority of whose members come from the opposition) are expected to deliver detailed, extremely revealing reports. Despite its grim conclusions, the book also makes for an entertaining read, thanks to El-Masri’s witty accounts of the goings-on in NGO meetings and their no-expense-spared five-star hotel settings.

EDITORIAL: “Cause and Effect”

Full Text

The synchronised bombings of the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania last Friday are, in essence, a declaration of war on the primary advocate and executor of the New World Order. The choice of targets, the magnitude of the attacks (which left some 200 dead and 5,000 wounded), the precision of the operation and the solemn vows of retribution by Washington all indicate that the war will be widespread, vicious and protracted.

Nairobi and Dar es Salaam were the last places one would have expected to be the stage of a massive terrorist attack. But then, that is probably the very reason the terrorists targeted them. As the two capitals have never been known to harbour extremist organisations or to suffer from the plague of terrorism, security there was not at its tightest. This must have facilitated the logistics considerably.

In the absence of either a definitive claim of responsibility or official accusations from the US, Kenya or Tanzania, speculation has been rife as to the identity of those who planned and carried out the attacks. Islamist organisations, however — any or all of over half a dozen groups, acting singly or collectively — are the prime suspects for the moment.

The suspicion is well-grounded. Six such groups banded together last February and formed the so-called Islamic Front for Jihad (struggle) Against the Jews and the Crusaders — meaning Israel and, principally, the United States. The front’s founding statement included a fatwa (religious opinion) according to which Muslims are duty-bound “to kill Americans and seize their assets wherever they can be found”. The front included the Jihad Organisation, which has a record of violent activity inside Egypt, including the 1981 assassination of President Anwar El-Sadat. This group issued a threat against the Americans a few days before the East African bombings.

All of this means that the United States and its allies, notably Israel, are up against an highly professional organisation with a wide sphere of influence. All the Pentagon’s power may help in fighting terrorism, but it will never be fully effective as long as discontent and the will to resist persist. A better approach would be policy shifts in favour of the oppressed, such as the Palestinians, and away from Israel.

Rejecting Arafat’s “Formula”
Former Minister of Agriculture (PA), interviewed by Sherine Bahaa

Full Text

Why did it take Arafat a whole year to shuffle his cabinet despite repeated demands by the Palestinian Legislative Council?

Palestinians have been waiting this year to find real change whereby officials accused of corruption more than a year ago would be reprimanded and punished. In fact, people really thought that those corrupt officials will be referred to court.

Yet those people were reinstated in their positions. This led to deepening frustration and disappointment among the Palestinians. This was done in a way which would undermine the future of Palestinian democracy.

Do you think that the new cabinet will live up to Palestinian expectations?

If this government can guarantee the salaries of the old and new ministers (a total of 32), this will be an achievement in itself. I cannot understand the absence of a solid council of ministers who are really devoted to their cause, with determination to build their institutions, to build the bases towards sustainable development.

I am afraid this government is not the right choice for all these challenges.

What were the reasons behind your immediate resignation?

On 26 June, when the budget was submitted to the Legislative Council, I rejected it for a number of reasons. First, the absence of an institution called the cabinet and as such the absence of any institution which could really set priorities and draw conclusions on how we could really challenge and confront the expansionist policies of [Israeli Prime Minister] Mr Netanyahu.

Second, corruption and the formation of Mafia-type pockets within the system, wherein government positions are abused for the sake of personal profit. Third, the lack of respect for human rights. Fourth, the absence of any clear planning and division of responsibilities.

This was my position before knowing whether or not I was going to be included in the new cabinet. To be a minister under these restraints and problems is very difficult.

For the past three years, we have really failed to put an end to corruption or the lack of respect for human rights. I felt that I could not again be a part of this formula.

More of the Same
by Graham Usher and Tarek Hassan

Excerpts

A full year after 18 of the 21 ministers of the Palestinian Authority (PA) tendered their resignations, Yasser Arafat last week got round to presenting his “reshuffled” cabinet to the elected Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC). The unveiling was greeted with relief by a few hounded ministers, outrage by many PLC members and absolute cynicism by the majority of Palestinians.

The call for a new government had followed a special PLC investigation into mismanagement across the PA ministries.

Published in July 1997, the report exposed a misuse of public funds to the tune of $326 million out of the PA’s overall budget of $800 million and, in the cases of three ministers, evidence of criminal corruption. It recommended that the three ministers concerned be put on trial. It also called on Arafat to replace his existing executive with a new one made up of “technocrats and experts” authorised not only to clean up the PA’s act, but also to ensure respect of the separation of powers required for any genuinely independent legislature and judiciary.

Arafat’s response to these demands can only be described as one of contempt. The new executive not only retains the three accused ministers in their posts, but, far from streamlining in the name of efficiency, inflates it from 22 ministries to 30, adding eight new “state” ministers without portfolios.


In his speech commending the new government to the PLC, Arafat said its role would be to “build Palestinian institutions, reinforce law and order and the foundations of an independent judiciary”. Many PLC members took this as so much moonshine.


Ashrawi declined Arafat’s offer of the Ministry of Tourism. “I cannot be part of this cabinet,” she said on 6 August. “It reflects neither the attitudes nor the structural, procedural and personal reforms that are needed.” Ashrawi was joined in her resignation by Abdel-Jawad Saleh, former agriculture minister.

Saleh, who was made a state minister without portfolio in the cabinet, accused Arafat of running a “school for corruption” in which “effective ministers are kicked out and corrupt ones are retained”.


Nor was the discontent confined to “independents” like Ashrawi and Saleh. In an acrimonious PLC debate on the new government on 8 and 9 August, many members from Arafat’s own Fatah movement vented their anger at their leader’s new dispensation. Fatah member for Nablus, Hussam Khader, mused that Arafat should no longer be referred to as the PA’s “Rais” (president) but rather as “god of the Palestinian people”.


Alarmed by the possibility of a split in Fatah’s ranks, Arafat was quick to take preventive action. On 6 August, he convened the movement’s highest decision-making body, the Central Committee (FCC), and, the next day, followed up with a “special” meeting of PLC members. Sources say that at this session Arafat resorted to a mixture of personal pleading, calls for national unity and implied threats of force to haul his truculent followers into line.

As so often in the past, these methods worked. On 9 August, the PLC approved the new government by 55 votes to 28, a majority ensured by virtue of the fact that affiliates make up 64 of the PLC’s 87 members.


The vote certainly marked the temporary end of a struggle between two currents within Palestinian nationalism that has been simmering ever since the PLC was elected in January 1996. This tussle has been less about the merits and demerits of the Oslo process than over the vision and content of any future Palestinian polity.


For Arafat and many of the PLO functionaries who returned with him from Tunis, however, issues like democracy, accountability and law are wholly secondary to the “main” struggle against Israel. For them, the only response to the crisis is the establishment of a “national unity” leadership, with “unity” measured in terms of fidelity to the leader rather than by suitability or competence to do the job.


With the countdown to a unilateral declaration of Palestinian statehood now only nine months away, Arafat appears to be relying on the leadership methods he forged during earlier national crises such as Black September and the siege of Beirut.

The problem is that such methods ended in defeat in Lebanon and squandered the political opportunities thrown up by the mass, popular and potentially democratic struggle released by Intifada. For many PLC members — especially those who were formed by the uprising — the saddest aspect of the cabinet reshuffle was that it proved that, 30 years after he took over the helm of the Palestinian national movement, Arafat has neither forgotten anything nor learned anything.

Underlining that as far as he was concerned the issue of the new cabinet has been closed, Arafat left for South Africa on an official visit.

[The Debate] Before The House of Representatives on 5th August, 1998

Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, and Judiciary, and related agencies appropriations act, 1999 (House of Representatives – August 5, 1998)

Mr Saxton: Mr Chairman, I offer an amendment.

The Chairman: The Clerk will designate the amendment.

The text of the amendment is as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr Saxton:

At the end of the bill, insert after the last section (preceding the short title) the following:

Title IX–Additional General Provisions
Sec. 901. None of the funds appropriated or otherwise made available in this Act may be used by the United States to intervene against a claim for attachment in aid of execution, or execution, of property of a foreign state upon a judgment relating to a claim brought under section 1605(a)(7) of title 28, United States Code.

The Chairman: Pursuant to the order of the House of today, the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr Saxton) and a Member opposed will each control 5 minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr Saxton) for 5 minutes.

Mr Saxton: Mr Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

This amendment is known as the International Terrorist Must Pay amendment. In 1996, the Congress passed and the President signed the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996. This Act allowed victims of State-sponsored terrorism to sue foreign governments in Federal court for damages arising from terrorism.

In 1995, a young New Jersey woman named Alysa Flatow was killed in Israel by a suicide bomber from the Islamic Jihad, a terrorist operation financed by and sponsored by Iran. Her family sued under the aforementioned statutes and proved that Iran had financed the activities of the Islamic Jihad, and received a judgment of $247 million in damages.

Needless to say, Iran did not voluntarily step forward to pay the judgment. As a result, the Flatows sought to locate Iranian-owned property in the United States. Recently they located three properties in Washington, D.C. owned by the Iranian government. They proceeded to go to court to have the court attach the properties for subsequent sale.

The court issued the writs of attachment, and the Federal Marshals were ordered to serve Iran with the papers. The State Department at that time stepped in and raised objections to the sale, in effect taking the side of Iran, and asked the Justice Department to intervene on the side of Iran.

The Justice Department subsequently made an appearance in the trial and argued that the property should not be seized, their argument being that it would allow the seizure of Iranian assets. Of course, if their argument holds, this would defeat the purpose of the bill that Members on both sides of the aisle voted in favor of in 1996, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996. Iran therefore would be allowed to continue to finance terrorist activity without a price to pay. This amendment finalizes the process and creates a price for international terrorism.

Mr Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr Obey: Mr Chairman, I do not really want to oppose the amendment, but I ask unanimous consent to claim the time so we can explain why we are accepting it.

The Chairman: Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Wisconsin?

There was no objection.

The Chairman: The gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr Obey) will control the time.

[Time: 21:30]

Mr Obey: Mr Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

It is my understanding that the committee intends to accept this amendment on both sides. I would simply like to say that, as some Members may remember, this matter was brought up before the House once before several weeks ago on a previous appropriation bill. It was then offered in a form which was technically not germane to the bill and was subject to a point of order.

We felt that the Congress had not had sufficient time to examine the amendment and to understand its implications in terms of the administration’s ability to negotiate and to conduct foreign policy. So we were concerned at that time.

We have now learned a bit more about the status of the law. There are still, frankly, some questions about the advisability of going exactly this route, but, frankly, the State Department has not been as clear as we would like in laying out what other options might be available.

So under these circumstances, I think it is advisable for the committee to accept the amendment with the understanding that it will need to be worked on in conference to make certain that it is consistent with U.S. national interests.

Mr Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from New York (Mr Engel).

Mr Engel: Mr Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding me the time.

I rise in strong support of the amendment of the gentleman from New Jersey. This will help American victims of terrorism collect on judgments they have been awarded against state sponsors of terrorism.

As the gentleman from New Jersey pointed out, the Flatow family has gotten a judgment against the government of Iran, which sponsors terrorism. It is absolutely obscene that we would be in a position of taking the side of Iran. Iran must understand, as an outlaw nation, that we will never stop in trying to combat terrorism. This is certainly justice for the Flatow family.

By allowing this seizure of Iranian assets, this is something that teaches Iran, hits them where it hurts and let us them understand, again, that we will not accept state-sponsored terrorism.

It is ludicrous that the State Department had opposed this. Iran must pay a price for the continuing support of terrorism. I compliment my friend from New Jersey.

Mr Obey: Mr Chairman, I would simply say that there are some questions, also, the State Department has with respect to who should be ahead of whom in being able to make claims against countries like Iran.

Mr Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr Menendez).

(Mr Menendez asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

[Page: H7268] Mr Menendez: Mr Chairman, I want to rise in strong support of the Saxton amendment.

We clearly gave the right to victims of terrorists to sue foreign entities for compensation as a Congress. That is what the Congress passed in the law. And it is right for us to do so, to give a victim with a court-ordered judgment, to be allowed to enforce that judgment against any and all assets of a country in the United States.

It is offensive, in my view, that any department or entity of the United States Government would actively seek to inhibit such a judgment. This amendment would allow the family of Alysa Flatow, who is someone who in fact died at the age of 20, a resident of the State of New Jersey, a young, vibrant woman who had a lifetime of opportunity ahead of her. Her life was cut short and her family devastated by a bomb which exploded on the bus she was traveling on in Gaza. She was absolutely innocent.

They have a court-ordered judgment. The judge actually gave them a writ to go ahead against property. We should not be interfering. We should be standing up on behalf of the rights of United States citizens to be able to pursue such a judgment.

Mr Saxton: Mr Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr Pascrell) who represents the Flatow family.

Mr Pascrell: Mr Chairman, Alysa Flatow was a student at Brandeis University. She was a woman of great character, both in life and in death. Those who received her organs can attest to the kind of woman she was. Her heart was successfully transplanted to a 56-year-old man who had been waiting for a year. Her liver was donated to a 23-year-old man; her lungs, pancreas and kidneys to four different patients. Her corneas were donated to an eye bank.

New Jersey will not forget Alysa Flatow or the struggle and trauma her family have gone through as a result of this heinous act and this senseless loss of a promising young woman.

Mr Chairman, we have had enough victims. We do not need to victimize the family any longer. Personally, I have had enough of negotiating leverage, quote unquote. It is time that we stood and stood tall for the Flatow family.

Mr Saxton: Mr Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr Fox).

(Mr Fox of Pennsylvania asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr Fox of Pennsylvania. Mr Chairman, I rise in support of the Saxton amendment.

Mr Saxton: Mr Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr Andrews).

(Mr Andrews asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr Andrews: Mr Chairman, I rise in strong support of the amendment offered by the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr Saxton). I congratulate him for it.

The life of Alysa Flatow was only 20 years long, and I am sure that her family feels a pain that is beyond description. But I am also sure that we can do something collectively here tonight that will help her life have even more meaning than it has already had.

We can change the law of our country and say to terrorists, whether in Iran or around the world, that in this country you will be held accountable. If you appear before our courts and you are adjudicated guilty, you cannot find a loophole or an escape.

This is a legacy that this young woman’s life can leave for generations to come that if, God forbid, if someone else is a victim of terrorism, those terrorists can and will be held accountable in a U.S. court of law.

I urge the amendment’s adoption.

Mr Saxton: Mr Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Kentucky (Mr Rogers).

Mr Rogers: Mr Chairman, we have no objection to the amendment. As the gentleman from Wisconsin indicated, this needs to be discussed at some point before and during conference to be sure we are consistent on our policy. But we have no objection to this amendment and congratulate the gentleman.

Mr Obey: Mr Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr Saxton: Mr Chairman, I thank very much the chairman and the ranking member and all those who have spoken in favor of this amendment tonight.

Mr Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.

The Chairman: The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr Saxton).

The amendment was agreed to.