Hezbollah Takes Another Step Toward Jerusalem

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March 9, 1999

Last Monday, the South Lebanon-based terrorist group Hezbollah, funded and armed by Syria and Iran, set off a roadside bomb that killed an Israeli brigadier general in command of Israel’s Lebanon operations, along with a leading Israeli journalist and two other officers.

It is easy to speak of Hezbollah, as a New York Times article recently did, in terms of its “low-level war to push Israel out of South Lebanon.” Yet Hezbollah’s own rhetoric proclaims a fuller agenda. “Another victory on the way to liberating Jerusalem and Palestine” cried Hezbollah radio the morning after the attacks, while TV clips of the funerals of Hezbollah fighters the morning after Israeli Air Force attacks featured crowds chanting, “By our blood and by our soul, we will liberate you, Palestine.”

The push to get Israel out of Lebanon is not the goal but merely the first step to a final push of Israel out of Jerusalem and out of what Hezbollah defines as “Palestine.”

Yet the threat from Hezbollah is not adequately understood, even in Israel. Some suppose that the Hezbollah program begins and ends in the Lebanon Security Zone, and that after an Israeli withdrawal, Hezbollah will be satisfied and Israel will live happily ever after.

One reason for Israelis’ lack of comprehension is that Hezbollah – like other Arab groups – flaunts its true intentions in Arabic. Few people in Israel understand Arabic, and fewer follow the pronouncements Arab leaders make to their own people. Israeli newscasts and newspapers rarely cover these statements or translate them into Hebrew, much less into languages accessible to Western journalists and policymakers.

Of those who do understand, even those who serve in Israeli or Western intelligence services, many dismiss this rhetoric as meant “for internal consumption.”

Most Israelis do not grasp that religious conviction can inspire wars of destruction. It would seem that average secular-minded Israelis do not realize that the nuances of a language and religion that mean nothing to them could be a galvanizing force to others.

This blurred perception might be traced to the early days of Zionist building, when there was inadequate attention to the growth of Arab-Muslim nationalism after World War I. Since then, anti-Zionism has been fed on stories of an imagined Arab-Muslim pseudo-Zionist nationalism and a generation passionately ready to go to war for an all-Arab Palestine.

In the 1980s, I lived in Upper Galilee, the sparsely settled northern region of Israel, where 100,000 Israeli Jews and Arabs dwell in an area within rocket range of Southern Lebanon. Residents of other regions of Israel often seem to have little communication with Israelis on the northern border and less empathy. My acquaintances in Jerusalem and Tel Aviv always seemed to view attacks on border settlements as our security problem, not theirs.

If we heed the words and intentions as well as the deeds of Hezbollah, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, Fatah and other militant Arab Muslim groups, it should be clear that no security problem is merely regional. All Israel remains the target, and no Israeli anywhere should feel complacently free from threat.

With elections scheduled for May 17, Israeli politicians compete with one another with promises to leave the unpopular battlefield of Lebanon if they are elected. Opposition candidates Ehud Barak and Yitzhak Mordecai have so promised, as has incumbent Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.

No matter the promises, a dedicated enemy is making ready to launch the march to Jerusalem. Some still ignore that agenda.

Their awakening may be rude indeed.

Am Echad: Preserving One Jewish Nation

By

Center for Near East Policy Research

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February 23, 1999

Sunday’s Mass Prayer Gathering

The Sunday, 14th February, prayer gathering of a broad cross-section of Orthodox Jews — media estimates of the crowd ranged between 250,000 to 500,000 participants — and was descibed by the Israeli media as the largest such gathering in the Israel’s history. The widespread predictions of possible violence and bloodshed proved to be utterly baseless. The gathering, which lasted more than two hours, passed without incident, and when it was over the huge crowd dispersed quietly.

The prayer vigil was called against a backdrop of escalating hostility to religious observance in Israel and the usurpation of representative government by the judicial branch, in particular the Israeli Supreme Court.

I. The World’s Most Activist Court

In the opinion of many commentators, there is no more powerful supreme court in the world than the Israeli Supreme Court. No other supreme court has assumed such responsibility for resolving all the problems of society, says Hebrew University’s Ruth Gavison, one of the directors of the Association for Civil Rights in Israel. There is no area, in the words of another leading commentator, “too political, too contentious, or too trivial to escape [the Supreme Court’s] vigilant eye.” In recent years, the Supreme Court has repeatedly entered areas in which there are no traditional legal materials to guide it: neither statute or judicial precedent.

‘The Barak Court’s judicial activism has thrust the Supreme Court into the center of many of the value conflicts that divide Israeli society, a role for which it is completely unsuited. The Supreme Court is totally unrepresentative of Israeli society. In a country in which over 50% of the population is of Middle Eastern origin, there is not one justice of Middle Eastern descent. In a country, in which 20-25% of the population is religiously observant, only one permanent member of the 15-member Court is religious. (Justice Barak and his colleagues largely control the selection of their successors, with little input from the Knesset and the executive branches.)

Not only is the Supreme Court highly unrepresentative, but it has followed an explicitly elitist vision in its value choices. In Justice Barak’s words, a judge should be guided in those cases involving broad value choices by the values of “the enlightened society in whose midst he dwells.” “The values of the enlightened society,” he has made clear, does not mean a social consensus, but only those values which are, in his words, universal — i.e., neither Jewish nor non-Jewish — progressive, and worthy of enlightened nations.

In no area involving conflicting societal values has the Court’s unrepresentative nature and its elitist vision been so keenly felt as that of religion and state. The Barak Court has consistently failed to acknowledge that the affirmation of Israel as a “Jewish state,” in both the Declaration of Independence and the Basic Laws is not meaningless verbiage. Rather Justice Barak has simply defined “Jewish” as synonymous with “democratic,” which he then defines in terms of rights, both enumerated and unenumerated.

Justice Barak’s vision, while consistent with that of a very small minority of Israeli society, which would define Israel as merely a “state of its citizens,” is far from that of Ben-Gurion and the other signatories to the Declaration of Independence, as well as the majority of citizens today.

Israel’s founders viewed the creation of the State as the fulfillment of a 2,000-year-old dream. And they recognized that Jewish identity would be the glue holding society together. To preserve a single Jewish identity, for instance, they placed all issues of personal status under the supervision of the Chief Rabbinate.

By refusing to treat the term “Jewish” as an independent source of values, the Supreme Court has left itself vulnerable to the charge, voiced most recently by former Justice Tzvi Tal that it “has completely cut itself off from the tradition of the Jewish people.” Under Justice Barak, every aspect of the fifty year status quo arrangement on matters of religion and state has been eroded, with a resulting loss of identifiable Jewish character to the State. Laws against commercial activity on the Sabbath have been undermined, the jurisdiction of the religious courts restricted, the importation of non-kosher meat permitted, and the Chief Rabbinate’s authority over conversions dramatically reduced.

The Supreme Court has ordered hearings on a suit to bar ritual circumcision in Israel. Over the ages, tens of thousands of Jews have died rather than give up circumcision, the first commandment given to the Jewish people. Yet for the Israeli Supreme Court it is not unthinkable that the first self-proclaimed “Jewish state” in nearly two millenia might outlaw ritual circumcision. Nor has the Court acknowledged that it has no authority to prevent parents from circumsizing their children.

Here are a few other examples of the Court’s appropriation of broad policymaking functions from the Knesset and the executive branch and of its creation of new rights out of whole cloth:

Two years ago, the Supreme Court overruled the decision of the Supervisor of Traffic to close a two-block stretch of Bar Ilan Street in Jerusalem on the Sabbath. Such routine decisions about the direction of traffic are never subjected to judicial review. Justice Barak then went on to appoint a commission to study the entire issue of Sabbath street closings on a national level, a remedy far beyond the narrow case in front of the Supreme Court and involving the type of policy-making normally associated with the other branches.
Last year the Supreme Court ordered Educational TV to screen a film celebrating teenage homosexuality, without citation of one statute or judicial precedent mandating such a result. The Supreme Court thereby effectively created a new right to promote one’s lifestyle on public broadcasting.

II. Delegitimization of the Religious Population

As part of an escalating campaign of delegitimization of religious Jews and religious observance, major parties have based both local and national campaigns around the slogan “Stop the Chareidim” or “Stop the Blacks.”

In response to the opening of a national religious kindergarten in Kfar Saba, signs appeared advocating “exterminating the chareidim at birth.” Yet no protest was heard. Ssimilarly Justice Barak himself did not protest when a Beersheba magistrate likened religious Jews to “huge lice” in his presence. Indeed Barak praised the speech, and only three weeks later, after complaints from religious leaders, was the magistrate reprimanded.

A leading journalist savors the idea of tying the beards of all the “weird chareidi rabbis together and setting them on fire” and another — a former Knesset member — declares his greatest national service would be to go into Mea Shearim with a submachine gun to “mow them all down,” and again there is no outcry.

In Tzoron a new religious school opened last September, with twenty first-graders. For more than a month, these little children had to run had to run a daily gauntlet of forty to sixty demonstrators, some accompanied by attack dogs, to enter the school. The school building was regularly pelted with stones, with the children inside, and defaced. These demonstrations were encouraged by Meretz leader Yossi Sarid, who came to Tzoron to urge the local population to resist the scourge of religion.

Am Echad is an umbrella organization designed to ensure an accurate portrayal of Orthodox Jews and Judaism in the media and to serve as a resource for journalists seeking a greater understanding of the Orthodox community.
Tel: (+972-2) 652-2726

Al-Ahram Weekly: Jordan Rejects Confederation with Arafat

By

Center for Near East Policy Research

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February 23, 1999

Arafat’s Ladder
by Graham Usher

Heading
“With the dust barely settled on his father’s grave, last week King Abdullah was confronted with the one issue he almost certainly would have preferred to have stayed buried, at least during the opening months of his reign”.

Excerpts

… Palestinian President Yasser Arafat revived the debate over the form of the political association between Jordan and any future Palestinian entity. “We want [King Abdullah] to know that the Palestinian National Council has agreed to a confederation with Jordan,” said Arafat. More alarming still — as far as Jordan was concerned — were the comments by PA spokesman, Nabil Abu Rdeineh, that discussions on a “confederacy” between Jordan and the Palestinians should happen sooner rather than later.

…

In 1985, the Palestinian National Council (PNC) endorsed the idea of a confederation between Jordan and any future Palestinian state. Never set out in detail, the decision had been taken in the context of a rapprochement between Arafat and King Hussein following the PLO’s eviction from Beirut in 1982. Following a souring in relations between the PLO and Jordan in 1986, however, the confederation idea, though never formally abandoned, was quietly shelved. Since then, the unspoken status quo — shared by both King Hussein and Arafat — was that the issue of a confederation should only be raised after a Palestinian state had been established “on Palestinian soil”. It is this status quo that Arafat and Rdeineh’s comments have thrown into doubt.

…

In recent weeks, the Palestinian leader has been under inordinate pressure to publicly postpone his “right” to declare unilaterally a Palestinian state when Oslo’s interim period expires on 4 May. As part of the Wye River Agreement, the US gave Israel a written pledge that it “opposes and will oppose” any unilateral declaration of Palestinian statehood. Last month, the European parliament also made it known that a “premature” Palestinian UDI would create a “complex situation” in the region. Israel’s Labour and Centre parties have also stated that a Palestinian state should be “a result of negotiations” rather than an independent Palestinian action.

The unspoken assumption behind this chorus of restraint is that any attempt by Arafat to go it alone would almost certainly help Binyamin Netanyahu’s election prospects rather than those of Ehud Barak, especially if the Israeli leader, in retaliation, carries out his threat to annex those parts of the Occupied Territories under Israel’s control. Such an action would bury whatever tenuous hopes the US and Europe have about resurrecting Oslo in the wake of the Israeli elections.

It is a scenario Arafat probably shares. His problem is that having climbed the tree of threatening a unilateral declaration of statehood on 4 May, he needs a dignified way to descend from it. By floating the confederation idea, he could mount a retreat in the name of “coordination and discussion” with Jordan rather than climbing down meekly due to American and European pressure. Should the confederation idea also receive a positive response internationally — and especially in Washington — Arafat could also claim this as another implicit recognition of a Palestinian state.

So far, the international response to his call has been led by Jordan. “As for confederation or any other future relation between Jordan and the Palestinians,” commented Jordan’s information minister, Nasser Joudeh, on 14 February, “we will cross that bridge when we come to it”. For now, “the most important thing… is that Jordan concentrates… on helping and supporting Palestinians win their full rights on Palestinian soil, meaning the establishment of their national state.”

This is a polite way of saying that confederation should stay on the shelf and that Arafat, having climbed the tree of 4 May, should not look to Amman to provide him with a ladder.

No Takers in Amman
by Khaled Dawoud

Heading
“The Jordanian government and opposition parties alike reacted angrily this week to the proposal by Palestinian President Yasser Arafat for a confederation with Jordan, Khaled Dawoud reports from Amman.”

Quotes from text
“Arafat’s proposal… would only help Israel’s declared intention of establishing Jordan as an alternative homeland for the Palestinians.” [IMRA: Israel simply has no such intention.]

“Abdul-Majid Zuneibat, supreme guide of Jordan’s main opposition group, the Muslim Brotherhood, told Al-Ahram Weekly that Arafat’s proposal at this particular junction was an invitation to Judaise Jordan and an attempt to avoid declaring an independent Palestinian state by solving his problems at Jordan’s expense. We vehemently reject this call.”

Full Text

The Jordanian government and opposition parties alike reacted angrily this week to the proposal by Palestinian President Yasser Arafat for a confederation with Jordan.

Jordanian Prime Minister Fayez Al-Tarawneh immediately declared that the topic was not up for discussion at this particular time and that there could be no talk of confederation before the creation of an independent Palestinian state was complete.

Several parliament members also issued statements expressing “dismay and surprise at Arafat’s proposal”, describing it as an attempt by the Palestinian leader to add to Jordan’s problems at a time when the country is struggling to overcome its grief at the death of King Hussein.

George Hadad, a columnist at the daily Dastour newspaper, said that not long ago the late King Hussein had publicly asked Arafat to refrain from raising this issue until the occupied Palestinian territories had been liberated. Hadad said that Arafat’s proposal, made only four days after Hussein’s death, would only help Israel’s declared intention of establishing Jordan as an alternative homeland for the Palestinians.

With the expiry date of the Oslo Agreement signed between Israel and the Palestinians approaching on 4 May without any hope of a breakthrough in the peace process, Jordanian officials and opposition groups fear that the proposed confederation may be meant as an alternative to Arafat’s threat to unilaterally declare an independent state, thus giving Israel the justification to transfer hundreds of thousands of Palestinians to Jordan. If this were to come about, it would seriously aggravate Jordan’s economic problems. The country is already suffering from a lack of economic resources and sky-rocketing unemployment.

Abdul-Majid Zuneibat, supreme guide of Jordan’s main opposition group, the Muslim Brotherhood, told Al-Ahram Weekly that Arafat’s proposal at this particular juncture was “an invitation to Judaise Jordan and an attempt to avoid declaring an independent Palestinian state by solving his problems at Jordan’s expense. We vehemently reject this call.”

Like other Jordanian commentators, Zuneibat said that Jordanians and Palestinians have been united by force of circumstances over the past decade, “but any talk of a confederation should be left until after the establishment of a Palestinian state. That way, the union would take place voluntarily between two independent nations.”

An Old Card
by Sherine Bahaa

Heading
“Yassar Arafat surprised the international community by reviving the old call for a Palestinian-Jordanian confederation. Sherine Bahaa spoke to analysts about the possible reasons behind the proposal”.

Full Text

“A confederation with Jordan” was former Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres’ answer, when asked what came next, following the signing of the 1995 interim agreement between Palestine and Israel.

Today, four years later, observers agree that a confederation remains the most likely scenario. In the words of one Arab analyst, “The current situation proves that establishing a Palestinian entity is inevitable, but it also proves this entity will not amount to an integrated state.”

Khalil Shkaki, head of the Palestinian Research Centre in Nablus, believes that a majority of Palestinians support the idea of a confederation for “historical, strategic and social reasons.” According to Shkaki, Palestinians think that some form of unity between the two populations might be useful. “It might well be asked whether a Palestinian state without some form of unity with Jordan would be viable,” Shkaki told Al-Ahram Weekly.

At a regional meeting of his mainstream Fateh faction in Hebron last Friday, Palestinian President Yasser Arafat said that the Palestine Liberation Organisation’s (PLO) parliament in exile favoured a confederacy with Jordan, if the country’s newly crowned King Abdullah approves of the idea.

“Arafat wanted to confirm earlier positions and reassure Jordanians that Palestinian policy remains unchanged despite the death of King Hussein,” said Shkaki.

The timing of Arafat’s announcement of the revival of the proposal is one considerable source of controversy. Though some analysts point to his need to find a solution before the 4 May Oslo agreement deadline which is now looming, others regard his statement as an attempt to influence, if not preempt, the Jordanian decision. Abdel-Wahab Elmessiri, an expert on Zionist affairs, inclines to the first opinion. “The confederation with Jordan would represent a way out for him,” said Elmessiri, who sees the Palestinian leader as essentially pragmatic. “Arafat’s position is very difficult. The Arab states are divided. He is confronting Israel on his own, and he has to rely on his wits to work out a solution for himself.”

Political analyst Mohamed Sid-Ahmed subscribes to the second point of view. Sid-Ahmed believes that it is the precarious nature of the regional situation which has induced Arafat to bring the confederation proposal forward once again. “There is a new power structure in Jordan, and it is a vulnerable one,” Sid-Ahmed said. He attributes this vulnerability to a number of reasons. A much-loved heir to the throne, who had held that position for 35 years, was suddenly removed, and replaced by an inexperienced young man, who now finds himself king. As Sid-Ahmed points out, it is obvious that not everybody in Jordan is pleased with Hussein’s choice of Abdullah as his successor.

Sid-Ahmed believes that Arafat saw an opportunity to raise the matter again, especially as Netanyahu has been obliged to call for early elections. “Netanyahu cornered inside the country, and the Jordanians in a weak position: this is a golden opportunity to put everybody on the defensive with a step of that sort,” he explained.

Meanwhile, the United States have unveiled a plan by President Bill Clinton which had been shelved due to the Monicagate trial. The Americans are proposing a tripartite Israeli-Palestinian-Jordanian confederation. According to US officials, the Clinton scenario would commit the three partners to a plan which would ensure stability in the region. It would also serve to reinforce the American-Jordanian relationship. An invitation has already been sent to the new Jordanian monarch, King Abdullah, to visit the US and address the Congress.

This is a scenario which does not appeal much to Elmessiri, who views the Americans as inveterate pragmatists. “They never address fundamental issues. That’s why they keep cooking up new ‘solutions’ for the Arab-Israeli conflict,” he said. “Will this mean the implementation of the 1948 UN resolutions? Can this confederation solve the problem of the refugees of 1967, or of sovereignty over the West Bank and Gaza?” Elmessiri believes that the Palestinian issue has gone beyond political endeavours and pragmatic solutions. For him, Israel was always determined to separate the land from the people, so as to achieve at least a partial fulfillment of the Zionist slogan, “A land without people, that would be modified to read, A land divorced from the people.”

He continued: “Unfortunately for Israel, the Palestinians are growing in numbers, they are highly educated and they have the support of the Arab and Islamic peoples. This leaves the Israelis with a problem which so far has no answer in the Zionist lexicon.”

However, this does not mean there are no benefits to be drawn from a three-way confederation, should it ever materialise. “It would strengthen relations between the Jordanians and the Palestinians, strengthen the new regime being set up in Jordan and also create a better bulwark against any intrigues or conspiracies that might be hatched at this juncture by people like Ariel Sharon,” Sid Ahmed commented. “Moreover, a confederation would put an end to the criticisms now emerging from within the ranks of the Palestinians of the Palestinian Authority.”

An Alliance of Equals
by Mahgoub Omar
Expert on Palestinian affairs and a columnist at Al-Ahaab newspaper

Quotes from text
“… Arafat… has forced Jordan, as represented by the new king, Abdullah, to reject the proposal, at least temprarily…. the new monarch still feels that his success depends on a domestic Palestinan majority, yet cannot be sure of this constituency’s loyalty.”

“Shimon Peres has announced that, if Labour wins the forthcoming elections, he will back the declaration of a Palestinian state, and welcome the establishment of a confederation…. Netanyahu… has refused the idea categorically.”

Full Text

The late King Hussein had proposed that Jordan join a confederation with the Palestinian authority set up after Israel’s withdrawal. The Palestinians had always opposed this suggestion; some requested that it be postponed until after Israel had withdrawn from occupied territory and a referendum on the question had been held; others refused altogether, for reasons related to the Palestinians’ experience in Jordan under Hussein. Now Arafat, by turning the tables, has forced Jordan, as represented by the new king, Abdullah, to reject the proposal, at least temporarily. It has not been long since King Hussein’s death, and the new monarch still feels that his success depends on a domestic Palestinian majority, yet cannot be sure of this constituency’s loyalty.

The rapid refusal is probably due to the fact that the effective players in Jordan — King Abdullah’s power base — are the tribes, the army and the ruling family. Former Crown Prince Hassan’s followers are also in favour of distancing the Palestinians. In any case, it is now up to the EU, and especially Britain, to make a move. The creation of a confederation, of course, would imply that a Palestinian state has been recognised — precisely Arafat’s intention.

Shimon Peres has announced that, if Labour wins the forthcoming elections, he will back the declaration of a Palestinian state, and welcome the establishment of a confederation. As for Netanyahu, he has refused the idea categorically.

Translations by
Dr. Joseph Lerner,
Co-Director IMRA (Independent Media Review & Analysis)
P.O.BOX 982 Kfar Sava
Tel: (+972-9) 760-4719
Fax: (+972-9) 741-1645
imra@netvision.net.il

Major Israeli Arab Political Party Strives to Replace Israel

By

Center for Near East Policy Research

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February 23, 1999

A review of the National Democratic Alliance party platform finds that it works for the establishment of a regime in the region that would supercede Israel (article 15). The party also acts against encouraging Arabs to serve in the army (11a) and Palestinians who help Israel (11b) and supports the return of the 1948 refugees into Israel (13).

Curiously, Minister of Communications Limor Livnat today only charged that the party rejects the Jewish character of the State of Israel (article 2) and supports the negation of the Law of Return (part of the citizenship law – article 3).

Relevant excerpts from the party platform as well as from today’s cabinet communique appear below:

National Democratic Alliance Party Platform

The following is IMRA’s unauthorized translation of excerpts from the Hebrew version of the 1996 election platform of the National Democratic Alliance party.

2. The National Democratic Alliance will struggle for changing the State of Israel into a democratic state for all of its citizens – Jews, Arabs and others…

3. In order to void all types of discrimination between citizens based on race, nationality, religion, sex, and political affiliation the National Democratic Alliance will act for the enactment of democratic legislation based on changing the citizenship laws, and insure the Arabs in Israel citizenship truly equal to that of the Jews. This based on UN charters on this matter. This law will be the legal basis for social equality and political participation in state of all its citizens.

4. The Arab Israeli citizens are a part of the Palestinian nation and the Arab people in its national and cultural identity.

5. The National Democratic Alliance will act for the recognition of the Arabs in Israel as a national-cultural minority, and will defend its right to autonomy over those matters that distinguish it from the Jewish majority in the state, and at the top – matters of education and culture. The National Democratic Alliance will act for the recognition of the minority to establish institutions, organizations and authorities that will act on a voluntary basis to handle and develop religious, educational and cultural services, preserve traditional heritage and values, matters of charity and social solidarity. The minority has the right to independently manage these institutions, with ties and participation in the central government that will be a state of all its citizens, on the basis of the interests of the general public and subject to law.

11. a. The National Democratic Alliance will act against the policy of drafting Arabs to the army, and against propaganda encouraging the draft in the Arab society and Arab schools.

b. The National Democratic Alliance will act against collaborators and against the policy of residing them in Arab villages and cities in Israel.

c. The National Democratic Alliance is committed to the matter of Palestinian and Arab political prisoners and their release from prison, and in particular those of them who are Israeli citizens.

13. The National Democratic Alliance will act to achieve a just overall and viable peace solution for the Palestinian problem on the basis of the establishment of a sovereign Palestinian state in the occupied territories since 1967 whose capital is eastern Jerusalem, the break up of the settlements established in these territories and the resolution of the refugee problem on the basis on international law and UN decisions on these matters.

14. The National Democratic Alliance will work for the full withdrawal of Israeli occupation forces from all occupied Arab territories- the Golan Heights and South Lebanon to the borders of the fourth of June 1967.

15. The National Democratic Alliance see itself a part of the strong democratic movement in the region that acts for the establishment of a democratic regime in the region on the basis of equality and agreement between the states and people without any foreign hegemony. Such a regime will be a condition for economic development, social advancement and the protection of human rights and honor.

Israel Cabinet Communique
(From the press release of the Israel Government Press Office)

At the Cabinet meeting today (Sunday), 21st February, 1999:
The Communications Minister referred to remarks in praise of Hizballah made by MK Azmi Bishara at a meeting of his National Democratic Alliance party, and to reports about the party’s platform — which allegedly rejects the Jewish character of the State and supports the negation of the Law of Return. The Attorney-General said that he will investigate the matter.

The Prime Minister clarified that MK Bishara’s remarks are serious, but that they must be viewed as representative of an extremist minority of Israeli Arabs, and not be attributed to the vast majority of this constituency — which remains loyal to the State.’

Dr. Aaron Lerner is the Co-Director IMRA (Independent Media Review & Analysis)
P.O.BOX 982 Kfar Sava
Tel: (+972-9) 760-4719
Fax: (+972-9) 741-1645
imra@netvision.net.il

Antisemitic Expression on Official Palestinian Authority Media?

By

Center for Near East Policy Research

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February 23, 1999

Palestinian Media Watch, under the direction of Itamar Marcus, has released another sampling of recent anti-Semitic incitement in the Palestinian press. These include an article in the daily Al-Hayat Al-Jadida from 18th January, 1999, which states:

“In the meantime, Israel adds additional massacres to the heritage of heavy bloodshed… Many among the historians and social science researchers delve into the interpretation of the Jewish “Israeli” psyche, and the [interpretation] of the Torah texts, in connection with the historical persecution complex and the massacres of others. However, the reality is that the massacres are a clear, political act in the blood filled history of the Zionist entity… This is not a policy of a party, faction, stream or person. This is a continuing, non-stop system, which has not changed, will not change, and which was never given up on, whether the power lay with those called ‘extremists’ of the ‘right wing’ from the Likud party and the religious streams, or with those who are classified as ‘moderates’ of the Labor party crowd and the streams which are affiliated with the left. Massacre is the basis of the State of Israel… is the core of their beliefs… Israel will never willingly stop the acts of massacre… This [stopping] is rejected from an Israeli point of view and whoever approves [it] will merit the same fate as Rabin. There is no forgetting. There is no forgiving…”
[by Tallal Slaman, Editor of Alsapir Lebanese newspaper]

A sermon by Sheikh Yussef Abu Snineh, broadcast over Voice of Palestine Radio on 15th January, 1999, included the following:

“There is no difference between the names and nicknames, and there is no difference or advantage in the increase of the Israeli parties. The Labor or the Likud, doves or hawks, or the Third Way, or the Right. They all serve the Israeli society and Zionist ideology which is based on the occupation of the land of Palestine, the expansion of the settlements and the ‘Judaization’ of the city of Jerusalem. They all are different sides of the same coin whose name is the Zionist occupation. The truth that the Muslims, East and West, must know is that our struggle over Palestine is an ideological struggle between Islam and the enemies of Islam… How long will this shame go on, how long the disgrace, oh Muslims. Has not the time arrived for the Islamic nations to rise and throw off their being controlled states and to liberate themselves of the shackles of Imperialism?”

King Hussein: A Security Asset – But No Friend

By

David Bedein

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February 15, 1999

King Hussein of Jordan will go down in history as a security asset to the US, Great Britain, and, in his final years, to the state of Israel.

That does not mean that King Hussein was committed to the better interests of the state of Israel or of the Jewish people.

One of King Hussein’s first acts as the monarch of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan in the early fifties was to oversee the razing of fifty seven synagogues in the ancient old city of Jerusalem, while giving orders to obliterate the old Jewish cemetery on the Mount of Olives.

Under King Hussein’s direction, the Intercontinental Hotel was constructed on top of the Mount of Olives Jewish cemetery, where gravestones were used as concrete slabs for the hotel’s foundation.

Meanwhile, in violation of the 1949 Jerusalem armistice agreements that were signed by King Hussein’s predecessor, his assassinated grandfather, King Abdullah, King Hussein proclaimed that no Jew would be allowed to enter, pray or reside in the old city of Jerusalem.

And another of King Hussein’s first edicts was to confine the Palestinian Arab refugee population who had fled to Jordan to the squalor of refugee camps, under the promise and premise of their “inalienable right of return” to their homes that no longer existed within Israel proper. That edict mitigated against absorbing Palestinian Arab refugees into his kingdom. They remain in “temporary” refugee camps to this day.

Meanwhile, King Hussein’s loss of the Old City of Jerusalem occurred as a direct result of Hussein’s artillery attacks on the Israeli-held western Jerusalem during the June,1967 war. The Israeli prime minister at the time, Levi Eshkol, allowed King Hussein’s artillery attack to go on for more than seven hours while he dispatched emergency communications through Israel’s foreign minister, Abba Eban, who communicated to King Hussein via the US state department that Israel wanted no war with Jordan. Israel only launched an attack on King Hussein’s Arab Legion when king Hussein refused to heed Israeli and American pleas to cease fire on western Jerusalem.

It was after the 1967 war that Israeli military intelligence revealed that captured documents from the Jordanian High Military command showed a Jordanian master plan to conquer the rest of Jerusalem from Israel and to slaughter all of its Jewish civilian inhabitants.

King Hussein’s eventual pragmatic approach to Israel did indeed bring the King to come to terms with the existance of the Jewish state and even to warn Eshkol’s successor, Golda Meir of an impending surprise attack by Syria and Egypt in 1973.

Yet King Hussein did allow the airpspace of his nation to be used by Iraqi scud missiles to land on Tel Aviv and Haifa, throughout January and February of 1991.

What has gone virtually unreported in the western media has been the anti-Jewish and anti-Israeli sentiment that has been festering in Jordan for the past five years, even after the historic 1994 peace treaty that was initialled between Jordan and Israel.

Journalists whom I have met with following their visits to Jordan have complained that their editors and producers simply did not want to run stories that would contradict the one bright light of hope in the middle east peace process.

Today, a new Jordanian King Abdullah with close ties to the Palestinian Authority will most likely continue his father’s policy of confining the majority of Jordan’s population, who are indeed Palestinian refugees, to the confines of Palestinian refugee camps… under the premise and promise of the “right of return”, where Jordanian and UN administrators of these Palestinian Arab refugee camps prepare a new generation of Palestinian Arab refugees for a war of liberation against the Jewish state.

Al-Ahram Weekly

By

Center for Near East Policy Research

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February 15, 1999

Making Anti-Terrorism Global
[IMRA: Except if Israel is the target!]
by Jailan Halawi

Heading
“Egypt’s interior minister El-Adli seized the occasion of the Arab interior ministers’ meeting in Amman to renew Egypt’s call for an international conference on terrorism. The meeting, resolving to escalate the battle against terrorism in the region, took up the call.”

Quotes from Text
“Arab interior ministers ended their 16th general assembly… with a statement rejecting ‘terrorism in all its forms.’ “

“The ministers stressed the importance of drawing a distinction between terrorism and the ‘inalienable right… to resist foreign occupation and agression by all means, including armed struggle.’ ” [IMRA: An endorsement of terrorism against Israel — even when a peace process is instituted.]

Excerpts
Arab interior ministers ended their 16th general assembly in Amman… with a statement rejecting “terrorism in all its forms”. The ministers… gave their full backing to an international conference to be held on the subject under the auspices of the United Nations. The conference had been proposed by Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak.

The ministers stressed the importance of drawing a distinction between terrorism and the “inalienable right of peoples to resist foreign occupation and aggression by all means, including armed struggle.”

The ministers promised to “provide all necessary assistance” to the Palestinian police operating in the self-rule areas in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

…

The ministers set up a technical committee to decide legal and security procedures for the enforcement of the Arab Treaty on Combating Terrorism which they signed in April.

…

Secretary-General of the Council of Arab Interior Ministers Ahmed Al-Salem, announced that eight countries had already ratified the treaty, namely: Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Algeria, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Sudan and the Palestinian Authority.

…

The ministers accepted an invitation from Algerian Interior Minister Abdullah Sallal to hold the next general assembly in Algeria.

Habitual Evasiveness
by Magdi Ahmed Ali
Cinema Director

Quotes from Text
“Governments were quick to grasp cinema’s potential impact on a predominantly illiterate audience. Films were censored to convey a ‘safe’ message.”

“… the totalitarian association of popular aspirations and government policies compromised the true value of art.”

“… art in Egypt is an archive of frustrated hopes and expectations.”

“Is there any room for creativity?”

Full Text
The Egyptian middle class took centre stage to declare its political aspirations in the middle of the last century. It asserted its eagerness to spearhead an intellectual renaissance and prepared to enter modernity. Thus was the ground set for the efflorescence of historiography and translation, and for the cinema industry’s introduction to Egypt, only a year after its appearance in the West.

Governments were quick to grasp cinema’s potential impact on a predominantly illiterate audience. Films were censored to convey a “safe” message. Films featuring unjust rulers or economic hardship were not released. Even the living conditions of the poor were not deemed suitable viewing material.

After the revolution, the public sector used art to transmit government policy — a trend still in evidence today. At the time, however, most people believed prosperity and development were just around the corner, yet the totalitarian association of popular aspirations and government policies compromised the true value of art.

We have inherited a Higher Institute of Cinema, numerous artists and a repertoire of films that escaped repression and censorship, yet art in Egypt is an archive of frustrated hopes and expectations.

An official censor has absolute power to reject a work as of its inception. Yet even he is not the ultimate censor. Institutions claiming to represent the masses, religious institutions, the press… these bodies exercise censorship too. They dance to the ruler’s tune, cling to the commonplace, and always play it sa fe. Is there any margin left for creativity?

On the Road to Civil Rights
by Zeina Khodr

Heading
“Does Lebanon’s decision to ease travel restrictions imposed on the Palestinians signal a more lenient policy towards the refugees?”

Quotes from Text
“Most Palestinians in Lebanon hold travel documents rather than passports… government has announced that the documents will be treated… as passports.”

“… the decision will come into effect after… necessary paperwork was completed and security arrangements were put in place… the decision was taken a long time ago… ” [IMRA:So why wasn’t the proposal in place?]

“The restrictions were imposed in September 1995 to stem the flow of Palestinians deported by Libya in protest against… the Oslo peace accords… “

“… the new leadership [in Lebanon] recognised that peace was not around the corner…. The previous government thought… the fate of millions of refugees… would be resolved…. They kept a tight grip on the Palestinians to ensure they wouldn’t want to stay.”

Excerpts
The decision by the Lebanese government to lift travel restrictions imposed on Palestinians living in the country has been welcomed by Palestinian groups as a step towards alleviating the hardships suffered by the refugees.

…

Most Palestinians in Lebanon hold travel documents rather than passports but the government has announced that the documents will be treated in the same way as passports.

…

The government said the decision would come into effect after the necessary paperwork was complete and security arrangements were put in place.

The decision was made days after Farouk Kaddoumi, head of the PLO’s political department, travelled to Beirut to hold talks with officials. However, a Palestinian source said Kaddoumi had not played any role in the government’s decision. “The decision was taken a long time ago but it was only given the green light now,” the source told the Weekly. “Palestinian groups have been lobbying hard for the restrictions to be lifted and the authorities realised it would be to their detriment to keep the restrictio ns in place.”

The restrictions were imposed in September 1995 to stem the flow of Palestinians deported by Libya in protest against the signing of the Oslo peace accords by Israel and the Palestinian Authority. Libyan Leader Colonel Moammar Gaddafi expelled 30,000 Pale stinian residents that year. As a result, Lebanon stipulated that Palestinians would have to apply for a visa before entering the country. This included the estimated 350,000 refugees residing in Lebanon. It was, however, almost impossible for Palestinian s living in Lebanon to be granted visas from Lebanese embassies abroad.

…

Mohammed Yassin, an official of the Palestinian Liberation Front In Lebanon, said the new leadership recognised peace was not around the corner and decided to try to improve the living conditions of the Palestinians. “The previous government thought the p eace process was reaching its final stage and the fate of millions of refugees, including those living in Lebanon, would be resolved. They kept a tight grip on the Palestinians to ensure they wouldn’t want to stay,” Yassin told the Weekly.

“The Syrians, Lebanese and Palestinians are trying to improve the relations between them, in an attempt to face the regional challenges created by the US and Israel,” Abu Fadi Raji, an official of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) i n Lebanon told the Weekly. “Further moves would help improve relations between the Palestinians and their host country. If the Palestinians were granted their civil and social rights, they would be able to play an important role in reviving the Lebanese e conomy,” he said.

A Palestinian source told the Weekly… that after the announcement to ease the travel restriction, the ban on bringing construction material into the Rachidiyeh refugee camp in Tyre was lifted, and the number of soldiers posted around camps in Sidon w as reduced. Construction work inside the camps was previously restricted and regulated by the government.

There are almost 350,000 registered Palestinians in Lebanon who are denied basic government services, such as health and education, and are banned from 75 professions. As a result, they mainly find work in the low-paid sectors. Sources said the lifting of the travel restrictions may be followed by an easing of limitations imposed on the Palestinian workforce.

The Lebanese government has long argued that granting the Palestinians civil and social rights would encourage them to stay in the country. But the Palestinians maintain that they just want to have a decent lifestyle and have no intention of resettling on Lebanese soil. There is a political consensus to deny the Palestinians the right to settle in Lebanon permanently. This largely stems from the fact that most of the Palestinians are Sunni Muslims and the country’s Christians have long feared a shift…

Constituting the Crown Prince
by Lola KeilaniHeading
“Abdullah takes over as Crown Prince… efforts to emphasise that Jordan’s future king is fit for the job.”

Quotes from Text
“Jordadnains consoled themselves with the fact that Hussein… was 18 yearts old when he was sworn in as king.”

[IMRA: Isn’t 36 a reasonable age for a new king? On the other hand, there were no real alternatives when Hussein became king.]

“… many predicted a short life span for the Jordanian state because of its lack of natural resources and politcal turmoil… characteristic of the Middle East.” [IMRA: But for much of Hussein’s reign these countries have been very stable. Also, the Israeli concern for Jordanian stability was crucial at times.]

“… Prince Abdullah has spent most of his 36 years close to his father learning the intricacies of political decision-making”

[IMRA: Abdullah spent years studying abroad and in Jordan he was deeply involved in a military career.]

“Palestinians… dislike the former Crown Prince whom they blame for ‘Jordanising’ decision making following the 1970 civil war.”

[IMRA: But distinguishing Jordan as Hashemite not “Palestinian” has been a fundamental concept of King Hussein’s. Is there any expectation of a deJordanization process in facvor of a Palestinization process that would confirm the now narrowly held Israeli claim that Jordan is Palestine?]

“… Abdullah managed to rally support from a number of Gulf States.”

[IMRA: While the general attitude is that with King Hussein out, Jordan will lose leverage in international affairs.]

Excerpts
King Hussein’s appointment… of his eldest son, Abdullah, as Jordan’s new crown prince to “comfort worried Jordanians on the future of their country”, did not completely allay concerns about the succession. Nevertheless, Jordanians consoled themselves with the fact that Hussein, the world’s longest-serving head of state, was hi mself only 18-years-old when he was sworn in as king.

“During this time, many predicted a short life span for the Jordanian state because of its lack of natural resources and the political turmoil that is so characteristic of the Middle East region. But Jordan, guided by the young king, defied these predictions and has survived,” said one political observer. “I expect nothing less from the future King Abdullah,” he added.

Some Jordanians are concerned that 36-year-old Abdullah lacks political expertise and international acumen in contrast to Hassan who has been crown prince for the last 34 years.

Others are more optimistic about the prospect of Abdullah as king. “Had the political skills of Prince Hussein been tested when he assumed the throne at the age of 18?” asked a prominent political analyst. “We mustn’t forget that Prince Abdullah has spent most of his 36 years close to his father learning the intricacies of po litical decision-making from an international statesman of legendary standing.”

Newspaper editorials and columnists are calling on Jordanians to stand united at this critical juncture, arguing that now that the succession has been decided the future of the kingdom is not up for debate.

“It is essential to close the file on the issue of succession for such talk will create internal chaos,” said the editorial of the daily Al-Dustour.

Taher Edwan, editor-in-chief of the independent Al-Arab Al-Yawm newspaper said, “In order to maintain Jordan’s stability and its political gains, national unity should prevail.”

According to political observers, the new crown prince is supported by the Jordanian army which wields considerable influence.

“The crown prince is a major-general in the army and is very much supported by both the powerful intelligence and public security establishments,” said Saleh Qalab from Al-Arab Al-Yawm. Abdullah is also backed by the Jordanian east-bank tribes, whose hundreds of tribal sheikhs converged on the palace to pledge allegiance. This coincided with a drastic deterioration in the king’s medical condition.

“The prince has established very good relations with officers, most of whom come from Jordanian tribes. He not only knows them by name but also visits them in their regions,” said one army officer.

In addition, the majority of Jordanians of Palestinian origin welcomed the king’s decision. Palestinians, for reasons dating back to the fighting between Palestinians and the Jordanian army in 1970, were hostile towards former Crown Prince Hassan. Abdullah, on the other hand, is related by marriage to a well-known Palestinia n family in Tulkarem, the Yassins.

“Palestinians support him because they dislike the former crown prince, whom they blame for ‘Jordanising’ decision-making following the 1970s civil war,” said one political observer.

On the regional front, Prince Abdullah managed to rally support from a number of Gulf states. The United Arab Emirates, on the eve of Abdullah’s appointment, announced that it is considering depositing funds at the Central Bank of Jordan to raise hard currency reserves. Saudi Arabia, through Prince Sultan Bin Abdul Aziz, expressed support for the new crown prince.

US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright’s unscheduled visit to Jordan to congratulate the new crown prince in person ended speculations that the US would favour the younger Prince Hamzeh, son of the American-born Queen Nour.

Albright said that she and the prince discussed “the issues he is facing in Jordan”, understood to mean economic difficulties and potential threats from Syria and Iraq.

…

Meanwhile, the official pictures of the former crown prince have been removed from Amman’s streets and public buildings; a million new pictures of Prince Abdullah are being printed.

Translations by
Dr. Joseph Lerner,
Co-Director IMRA (Independent Media Review & Analysis)
P.O.BOX 982 Kfar Sava
Tel: (+972-9) 760-4719
Fax: (+972-9) 741-1645
imra@netvision.net.il

Arafat From Defender to Dictator. Part one of book summary

By

Center for Near East Policy Research

-

February 2, 1999

Arafat: From Defender to Dictator
by Said Aburish
Bloomsbury Publishers, London, 1998

Born August 24, 1929 in Cairo. Named Mohammed Abdel Rahman Abdel Raouf Arafat Al Qudua Al Husseini.(Muhammed Abdel Rahman-first name, Abdel Raouf – father’s name, Al Qudaua – grandfather’s name, Al Husseini – klan name). (page 7)

1927 – The family had moved from Gaza to Cairo, after Arafat’s father gained some land from a questionable law suit. (page 9)

1933 – Arafat’s mother dies. Father cannot deal with seven children alone so he decides to send Arafat and his brother Fathi to their uncle Selim Abul Saoud, in Jerusalem. (page 11)

1937 – Father calls the two brothers back to Cairo to help take care of the rest of the children. Ever since than, Arafat disliked his father and never forgave him for making him leave Jerusalem. Once back in Cairo, in order to escape his father, Arafat started to visit the Al Akbar family. That is where Arafat got his Koran training, while he started running a neighborhood gang creating a small army of Muslims. Jews and Christians in the neighborhood were not allowed to join because Arafat’s gang needed an enemy. (pages 13 -14)

1946 – Hajj Amin Al Husseini, Mufti of Palestine arrived in Cairo from six years of exile in Nazi Germany, along ith Adul Saoud, who was of distant relation to Arafat whom he called ‘uncle.’ Also, Sheikh Hassan who was a Palestinian nationalistic leader and the Mufti’s chief assistant and personal advisor, had arrived in Cairo after the British exiled him.

At age 17, Arafat became the Sheikh’s errand boy. Yasser did everything from personally delivering important letter from the Arab Higher Committee to visiting Arab leaders; offices of the Arab League, collected money from sympathetic donors, and reported on pro – Palestinian Arab activities in Egyptian schools and universities. (pages 15 -16)

1947 – Arafat entered King Fuad I (now Cairo University) with financial backing and a push from Sheikh Hassan, always at student political meetings and Palestinian gatherings. He began buying arms and sending them the Mufti’s Arab partisans in Palestine. (page 16)

1948 – when the British left and the Arab – Israeli war broke out, Yasser and many of his classmates returned to Gaza. (page 17) He got to Palestine as a member of Al Ikhwan Al Muslimeen (Muslim Brotherhood). Being part of the Muslim Brotherhood at that time less disccounts what Arafat said about fighting alongside Abdel Kader Al Husseini -, a marytred military leader in Palestine and the Mufti’s cousin. Abdel Kader saw the Muslim Brotherhood as the opposition.

This was when Yasser adopted the name Yasser Arafat and stopped using his given names. (Yasser bin Ammar was a celebrated Muslim warrior and companion of the prophet. By calling himself by this name, Arafat enhanced his religious credentials). Later on, Arafat also used the name Abu Ammar. Being the ‘father’ of someone or something showed to be an important title in Muslim society. (page 21)

1949 – Arafat returned to Cairo with fabricated stories of his heroism in the war. (He claimed he was a special military assistant to Abdel Kader during the battle of Jerusalem, except that the Muslim Brotherhood never got to the Jerusalem area). (page 18)

Arafat believed that Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and Iraq who were all involved in the 1948 war were all struck with incompetent leadership and corruption. If they would have stayed out of the war, Arafat was sure that the Palestinians would have won. (page 19)

The Arab Higher Committee of the Mufti and the Muslim Brotherhood condemned the Arab armies for not being prepared and for the corruption of the regimes, without admitting that they were guilty of the same thing.

Arafat adopted the Higher Committee’s views of distinguishing efforts of groups like the Muslim Brothers from the failure of the Arab armies and he praised Arab fighters who belonged to popular movements and distinguished them from the governments of their countries. (page 20)

When Arafat returned to Cairo he joined 2 groups:

Egyptian Union of Students – whose aim was to treat the causes for the 1948 defeat and punish King Farouk for it. (Membership to this group was closed to Palestinian Arabs). (page 21)
Federation of Palestinian students.

Arafat’s commitment was to the Muslim Brotherhood because the Brotherhood was committed to an inclusive Islamic picture which was bigger than an Palestinian or Egyptian.

Arafat began publishing a magazine called ‘The Voice of Palestine’ which promised to fight the Zionist entity. He continued to help needy Palestinian students by using his contacts to get them into Egyptian universities. (page 23)

1950 – Arafat finished his first year of university, at age 22. (A former classmate said that he had to take the required math course 3 years in a row – making Arafat reluctant to discusshis higher education). (page 25)

1951 – Arafat was elected as chairman to the Federation of Palestinian Students. Meanwhile, he became friends with a Muslim Brotherhood card – carrier named Salah Khalaf – later close associate and became Abu Iyad of Fatah and the PLO. The Muslim Brotherhood supported his election because he incorporated their demands. (pages 23 – 24)

1952 – Egyptian army overthrew the monarchy and Gamal Abdel Nasser came into power. Meanwhile, Arafat’s father died in Gaza. Arafat did not go to his father’s funeral.

Arafat’s friends and political associates of the Muslim Brotherhood were exiled to Gaza. Arafat was not exiled, because the authorities thought that he was Egyptian.(p. 28)

When Nassar came to power, Arafat went to join the fedayeen (“self – sacrificers”) who raided Israel from the Egyptian controlled Gaza strip. (page 29)

1953 – Arafat was elected chairman of the larger General Union of Palestinian Students (GUPS) – an older organization with branches in all Arab countries. (page 23) GUPS were probably the most important Palestinian organization in the Middle East.

1953-54 Arafat applied to the University of Texas and applied to emigrate to Canada. (page 26)

1956 – Arafat finished his degree in civil engineering. He continued to chair GUPS. In August, Arafat traveled for the first time overseas to Prague to attend a meeting of the International Students’ Congress, with the executive committee of GUPS. Without telling anyone, he made his first appearance in a white Kuffiya. (1936-39, the kuffiya had been the symbol of the Palestinian Arab fighters in the failed Arab revolt against the British in Palestine). Arafat recounted how he cried on the streets of Prague when he saw Israeli Jaffa oranges being sold, which he was unable to buy in either Gaza or Cairo. (page 31)

Late 1950’s – The Muslim Brotherhood went to the Suez Canal zone to harass the British. Arafat went to the canal zone with units of the Muslim Brotherhood. (This was an all Egyptian affair. Other Arabs and Muslims did not participate). When the British troops decided to evacuate the canal area, Nassar decided to send all young men of Egypt for military training. Arafat was trained as an Egyptian army bomb disposal officer and finished the Suez campaign as a first lieutenant. (page 30)

1957 – The United States, United Nations, and the USSR wanted to stop the conflict in the canal zone between the Egyptians and the Israelis. The UN sent in UNEF forces as a buffer between the two. Arafat, disgusted by Nassar and UNEF presence, that he applied for a Saudi visa. After waiting months to obtain it, he decided to get a Kuwaiti visa instead and he got a job as a civil engineer with the Kuwaiti Ministry of Public Works.

In order for an outsider to secure employment in the Kuwait, depended on the sponsorship of an important citizen or company. Arafat had some influential friends because Arafat had a poor academic record and no real work experience, he had no real qualifications. Applicants for jobs in Kuwait were always thoroughly investigated. Kuwait chose to hire and grant residency to a man who did not have many qualifications and had a long history of political involvement, while at the time, its companies were employing people based on their qualifications, not their political involvement. Kuwait was then refusing to grant visas to members of the Arab Nationalist Movement (ANM), the pan – Arab Ba’ath party, and many more. (pages 34-35)

Arafat and many of his Muslim Brotherhood friends moved to Kuwait because Egypt was unwelcoming and most of the other Arab countries considered them dangerous. Most of Arafat’s friends secured Kuwaiti government jobs. All of Arafat’s friends from the Muslim Brortherhood in Egypt and Gaza had reunited in Kuwait. Abu Iyad, Abu Jihad, Adil Abdel Karim, Mohammed Yusuf Al Najjar, Khalid Al Amira, Abdel Fatah Lahmoud – who eventually became the founding members of Fatah, had no difficulties entering Kuwait.(35)

1959 – Arafat’s group in Kuwait began making their appeal to the Palestinian people.

Harakat Thrir Filastin, Arabic acronym reversed into Fatah – Koranic word for ‘conquest.’

They began publishing a monthly magazine, ‘Filastinuna, Nida’Al Hayat (Our Palestine, The Call of Life), shortly before they adapted the name Fatah. It was printed in Beirut without revealing the names of the editors and contributors, they only gave a PO Box number. (page 40)

The magazine was distributed in many Arab countries, yet, because of strict censorship, it did not reach Egypt and Syria. Certainly it did not reach the average Palestinian. Those who published Filistinuna, created Fatah. There is no exact date of the birth of Fatah. 1959 is commonly used. (page 40)

The magazine was edited by Abu Jihad, who had the highest educational level of the group. However, Arafat insisted on writing his own articles since he used his own money to finance the magazine. Filastinuna had a lot of passion and called for the eradication of Israel. (page 41)

Fatah called for the liberation of Palestine through an armed struggle to be carried out by the Palestinian Arabs themselves. Those Palestinians were called the Children of the Catastrophe. Fatah favored an independent Palestinian policy and wanted to arm the Palestinians in order to liberate their country. Fatah thought that liberation came before Arab unity, which in the other Arab nations, it went the other way around. Fatah’s philosophy was not to expect anything from the Arab regimes. They had two strategies for dealing with political conditions in the Middle East: condemn the West for helping to create Israel and to continue to support them. Fatah lost the connection with the Muslim Brotherhood because their ideas of an Islamic identity to the Palestinian problem and the call to Jihad, were in conflict (pages 42-43)

Arafat was still upset withother Arab governments for their lack of success in 1948. He constantly used terms such as: “Violence is the only solution” and “Liberating Palestine could only take place through the barrel of a gun.” He refused to acknowledge the efforts of the other Arab governments and made fun of them. Arafat always criticized Arab governments but he never wanted to alienate any of them. (page 42)

1960 – Arafat divided Fatah into cells and saw to it that no one cell or member was unaware to the activities of the rest. He got rid of doubters who questioned his authority and some he forced to resign. He used to strategic decisions to keep Fatah in existence: Arafat refused to join in Arab feuds and he detached the business of raising money from becoming politically dependant on the donors. (pages 47-48)

Arafat only accepted money that did not put constraints on his freedom of action. (page 48)

Arafat then became a guerrilla leader who also organized in Syria. Arafat placed Fatah above all of the other Palestinian groups including the PLO. He used Jordan, Lebanon, Gaza, and Syria as bases where he could infiltrate Israel. (page 65)

Arafat’s first target were the wealthy Palestinians who lived in oil – rich countries, the people who had an interest in promoting a conservative, independent Palestinian movement. Arafat also sought help from thousands of Palestinian professionals who were working in the Gulf. However, whoever donated did not became a member of Fatah. Arafat also received assistance from the political and powerful. The Mufti of Jerusalem, who had taken refuge in Egypt, was fearful for the success of Palestinian radical groups, so he gave money to Fatah. Arafat came in touch with members of the Kuwaiti royal family saying, that through Fatah they were increasing the chance for an armed struggle and they were contributing to Palestine. (page 49)

1961, he decided to expand his fund – raising to Qatar. At first he was unable to succeed, but he became friends with Mahmoud Abbas, who is also known as Abu Mazen of the Oslo Peace Accords. The two of them were eventually able to get large sums of unconditional contributions from the royal family in Qatar. (page 51)

After Qatar, Arafat performed the same magic touch in Libya. (page 52)

Arafat was using money received from the pro-West oil-rich Arab countries to buy arms from Communist and socialist countries. (page 56)

Arafat came in contact with Saudi Arabia’s Minister of Petroleum (Ahmad Yamani), whom Arafat was able to talk into giving Fatah a substantial amount of money. By 1965, Yamani presented Arafat to Saudi King Faisal who gave Arafat millions. (pages 58-59)

1961 – in Syria, Arafat visited Syria as a representative of Fatah. Syria had just become independent, but they still considered Palestine part of Syria. The Palestinians and the Syrians were already supporting small palestinian guerrilla groups that were conducting raids on Israel. One group was the Palestinian Liberation Front. Arafat considered Syria a safe ally because they did not have enough money to buy Arafat.(53) Furthermore, there were 150,000 Palestinian refugees in Syria who acted as potential recruits for Arafat’s Palestinian force. Syria had hosted numerous Palestinian political groups, but according. to former members of Fatah, there was not another group who could have competed with Arafat’s financial resources. In order to recruit Palestinian fighters, Arafat offered recruits 18 sterling a month. (page 54)

By 1962, Fatah had 200-300 civilian members and no fighters. Eventually, with Arafat’s bribes and salesmanship, young Palestinian refugees grabbed the chance to join Fatah. (page 55)

1962 – the success of the Algerian revolution of keeping an identity alive through reliance on Islam and the use of a guerrilla army against a stronger force, posed as a model that Arafat wanted to copy. (page 53)

By late 1962, Fatah started sending recruits to Algeria for training. Even better, in 1963, Iraq also accomodated training camps for new Fatah members. (page 55)

1963 – Fatah’s headquarters were moved to Syria. First Arafat moved, disguising himself as a lowly official driving an unsuspicious car and soon the others followed. (page 53)

1964 – Fatah began regional activities. Arafat began sending infiltrators to the West Bank with Syrian approval and help. He also sent organizers to Gaza. Others went to Beirut, which at the time was the center of Middle Eastern journalism and many Palestinian intellectuals had settled there. Lebanon also contained 200,000 Palestinian refugees. (page 56)

In May, 1964, the PLO held a conference in the Intercontinetal Hotel in Jerusalem where they issued a National covenant which committed it to the idea of an armed struggle and appointed itself the representative of the Palestinian people, the guardian of their interests in the Arab world and internationally. ‘Armed struggle’ was not part of the original program of the PLO nor its army. (Arafat did not know whether to joint the PLO or to dissolve Fatah and disappear). Arafat did not attend the Jerusalem meeting instead he sent a delegation of a dozen Fatah members, who did not participate, they just listened. At the same meeting the Palestine National Council (PNC) was composed in a parliamentary – style body which was to control the PLO. Also under the PLO, the Palestine Liberation Army was formed. (The PNC was an elitist assembly with little support among Palestinians in refugee camps and in the West Bank and Gaza). (page 57)

Arafat was hoping to be named military commander of Fatah, but his colleagues refused to appoint him. Arafat even though disappointed, took responsibility for the training of troops. Since Arafat was responsible for training camps and the trainees, he was blamed when the Palestinian guerrilla force roved to be ineffective. (page 60)

1966 – Arafat was arrested in April for trying to blow up Tapline, the line carrying Saudi oil to the Mediterranean. Arafat had fired the man who was previously appointed Military Commander, and appointed himself to the position, no one objected. However, in May, he was suspended from the position for refusing to accept the principle of collective leadership, organizing raids on his own and misuse of funds.(62)

Arafat took the defeat of 1967 and turned it to his benefit by turning himself and his group into the symbol of Palestinian resistance and Arab rejection of the loss. (page 70)

When Arafat made his way into the West Bank under Israeli control by disguising himself, he made contact with some Fatah followers. He divided the whole region into southern, central, and northern sectors (Hebron, Jerusalem, and Nablus). He told the local Fatah members to start recruitment in their areas. However, ordinary people of the West Bank were reluctant to join him. (page 72)

Furthermore, the rich and influential Palestinian leaders wanted nothing to do with him. (page 73)

They wanted to maintain the positions of power which Jordan had given them and they did not want Fatah to take charge. They did not trust Arafat or his organization, they considered him and enemy and saw King Hussein as their protector. (page 74)

After three months of failure, Arafat decided to join his colleagues who had moved from Syria to Jordan to set up camps. (page 75)

Arafat had no success with recruiting local Palestinians and thought that he could threaten the public by eliminating those who were collaborating with Israel openly and others whom he offered bribes.

At the same time, the PLO set up the Revolutionary Command Council to

[] rival guerrilla campaign. (page 73)

organization in the name of national unity only after Fatah was promised 33 seats on the Palestine National Council (out of 10 seats) and 57 seats were given to the guerrilla groups. (page 78)

1968 – After Fatah became a member of the PLO and its most important component, Arafat invited seven guerrilla groups to join him in establishing a joint command for guerrilla action against Israel. (p. 78)

Arafat was sending groups of Palestinians to train in the Egyptian military and intelligence schools. (Five hundred volunteers from the West Bank were sent to training camps in Syria, Iraq, and Algeria). (page 78)

Special emphasis was placed on the training of educated young Palestinians from Europe and other countries. (pages 78-79)

Fatah’s money raising activities in the oil-rich countries were becoming more successful than ever, while raids from Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon into Israel were increasing. (page 79)

One of the Jordanian towns, Karameh, which was located on the main road connecting the West Bank with the Jordan, was repeatedly being attacking by Israel. (page 79)

(Karameh means dignity in Arabic and its name, together with its position and the presence of the refugees, contributed to Arafat’s decision to make his headquarters there with his three hundred Fatah fighters). (pages 79-80)

After the battle for Karameh, volunteers from all over the Arab world came to Jordan to join Fatah. One thousand Egyptians appeared at to Fatah offices in their country to offer their services. Small numbers of Germans, Scandinavians, French, South Americans and nationals of other non-Arab countries also joined. (page 83)

Futhermore, donations from Arab nations increased and Arafat expanded guerrilla training facilities in Syria, Iraq, Algeria and Egypt.

Meanwhile, the French government under General Charles de Gaulle had become the first major non-Arab country to accept a permanent Fatah representative. (page 90)

In Lebanon – Arafat moved hundreds of his poorly trained fighters into Lebanon where he set up a command center in the Fakhani district of Beirut. The Palestinians were creating a ‘country’ of their own which they named Fakhani Republic after the area in Beirut which they occupied. (pages 93-94)

In 1969, help was coming from new governments of the Sudan and Libya. Donations and offers of assistance came as far away from Pakistan and Malaysia. (page 84), while Arafat started a military program to train ten-to-thirteen yearold refugee children. (page 88)

The Damascus-based Fatah leadership was uneasy about some of Arafat’s activities but they still decided to appoint him the organization’s official spokesman, meaning that every item of news carried the imprint of Al Assifa (the military wing of Fatah) had to have Arafat’s personal approval. (page 86)

Yet by 1968, after the battle of Karameh, some Arab governments increased their financial contributions and encouraged the collection of money for Fatah non-governmental organizations. Libya, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and other wealthy countries contributed unknown millions of dollars in direct assistance, and Arab businessmen everywhere competed with each other in their donations. (page 84), while Libya, Syria, Iraq, the USSR and China each sponsored specific groups within the PLO. (page 102)

Oil-rich states always provided him with financial support which went into funds controlled by Arafat personally. Once a Palestinian construction magnate gave the PLO $70 million, but to this day not even the dead man’s family knows what happened to this money. Other smaller bequests and donations also went missing. (page 195)

Through the years, Arafat lived alone in a small apartment that the Ministry of Public Works provided. His apartment always had 2 or 3 sports cars parked in front. He liked to have many at one time. He did not have a woman companion and furthermore said he was not interested at the time. During this time in Kuwait, there was a shortage of manual laborers to perform light maintenance and building work. This is how Arafat made his money, operating a network of several thousand workers who transmitted funds to him, while he had a salary of $30,000 a year and free housing. In 1997, he told Larry King “I have never received a salary (from Fatah). I am still spending the money I made in Kuwait).” Arafat liked to be seen wearing his kuffiya which he tried to shape to resemble the map of Palestine. He wore the American-style sunglasses, which he even wore indoors, and he was usually in military fatigues. In some photos he carried a stick which resembled a field marshal’s baton which acted as a symbol of his power and he used it to point to locations of heroics acts. He always wore a pendant containing a sura from the Koran around his neck. (page 82)

Arafat always liked to tell the press that he wants “the Palestinians to be like other people and have no need for him.” (page 93)

The recognition of the PLO and of his individual leadership by the world community was singular political triumph for Arafat. He loved his new status, and it showed in the way he walked and talked – the firm step, the broad smile, and the statesman like references to the ‘peace of the brave’ and ‘an end to war and conflict’. He took to speaking slowly and more deliberately, even making frequent references to his poor English. The participants in Oslo became ‘my friends’. He exhibited a sense of confidence.

Arafat realized that he needed financial advisers more than political ones. He commissioned a number of studies to determine what it would take to enliven the economies of Gaza and the West Bank. He equated the welfare of the PLO with that of the Palestinian people. The PLO’s financial situation became a major factor in determining the outcome of negotiations with Israel. (pages 262-263)

Before the Oslo process, it was moderate Palestinians and pro-West Arab governments who had tried to ‘sell’ peace to Arafat. After Oslo, he was doing the selling. Oslo was his alone and it cast him in the role of peacemaker. (page 264)

Arafat’s first concern was to gain greater Palestinian support for Oslo. The agreement had originally been rejected by guerrilla groups, Hamas, Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, Syria and Jordan, most of the leadership of the occupied territories and Palestinian intellectuals. (page 264)

Arafat was less concerned with the rest of the Arab world providing political support, and was more interested in the resumption of their financial backing – at least getting them to release tax money collected frm Palestinians working in their countries. (page 265)

With the inception of the Palestinian Authority in 1994, all disbursements of aid money were determined by Arafat, usually on the telephone. The measure of anyone’s importance was their ability to meet him and to have their picture taken with him. (page 280)

Arafat, as head of the PA, kept personal files on all the important people within the Fatah organization which became known as the black files. Arafat always tried to reason and turn people who were opposed to his policies. He would give them options, most commonly their own black file to read,which often included accusations of financial misdeeds, whoring or cowardice. The accused would usually turn around and become a loyal follower. When this occurred, Arafat would make sure that they were offered money and jobs which would make them more loyal.

Background to the Feb 4th Clinton-Arafat Summit

By

Center for Near East Policy Research

-

February 2, 1999

The scheduled February 4, 1999 summit between US President Clinton and Palestinian Authority chairman Arafat occurs after the US has implored the PA to delay its declaration of independence and statehood until after the May, 1999 Israeli elections.

What the US government offers the PA is an aid package of $400 million, while encuraging the nations of the world to contribute another $3 billion dollars.

These contributions are tied to PA compliance with the Wye Accords.

In December, 1998, US Senator Arlen Spector (R-PA), who had accompanied President Clitnon in his middle east visit, explained to me and to other members of the media in Jerusalem that if the Israeli government were to claim that the PA is indeed in violation of the accords, then the $1.2 billion in additional aid promised by the US to Israel would be placed in jeopardy. Spector explained that this is because the US is ready to award such an aid package to Israel within the context of the implementation of the Wye accords.

The logic goes that if the government of Israel claims that the PA is not implementing these accords, then there will be no allocations of US funds – not to the Palestine Authority, and not to the state of Israel. Writing in HaAretz of January 8, 1999, leading security analyst Z’ev Schiff posited that the linkage of funds with the Wye accords implementation was the reason why the Israeli government would not make a clear declaration that the PA was in violation of the accords.

What the Israeli government has done in Washington has been to act in two directions at once. On the one hand, criticizing the Palestinian Authority for slow implementation of the Wye accords, while sending a high level delegation of the Israel Ministry of Finance to press the White House and the US congress to press for post-Wye allocations to Israel and to the Palestinian Authority, acting as if the PA is indeed implementing the Wye accords.

For that reason, the government of Israel has raised no official objection to the expected proclamation of US president Clinton which will be made in the presence of Arafat that, indeed, the PA is acting in compliance with the Wye accords.

The Israeli government acts in two voices – allowing its departments of information to attack the warlike actions of the Palestinian Authority, while authorizing its fiscal representatives to behave as if the PA acts in accordance with peace accords agreed on with the state of Israel, and witnessed by the US government.

Europe May Suspend Funding to PA

By

Center for Near East Policy Research

-

February 2, 1999

The European Union has recently warned Yasser Arafat that Europe would freeze the transfer of financial assistance to the Palestinian Authority if the PA does not explain the disappearance of funds sent over the last two years.

Sources in the European Parliament in Strasbourg told Ha’aretz that the ambiguous financial statements that the PA has presented have raised serious suspicions of embezzlement by Arafat’s close associates.

The sources disclosed that the freeze will be announced next week in Frankfort when the joint Palestinian-EU committee meets. Representatives of the PA are supposed to submit a report explaining the missing funds at the meeting. The EU’s senior representative on the committee, Minister Manuel Marin, has received instructions not to be lenient this time and immediately announce a freeze in funding if suspicions of misappropriation persist.

Marin, who serves as the minister for the EU’s relations with the Mediterranean region, is one of two ministers accused of wasteful budget management by the Parliament in Strasbourg.

The spokesmen for the EU’s Mediterranean desk, Bosco Esteroulas, confirmed to Ha’aretz yesterday that the EU is considering freezing its aid to the PA, but denied that Manuel Marin promised to halt all flow of funds to the Palestinian territory: “If someone contends that a decision has been made to cut off the European allocations, then he is confusing various budgets. What we are considering, and considering very seriously, is freezing assistance to the Palestinian Authority. But we will not freeze allocations to designated projects in the autonomous area, such as the construction of hospitals, since there we know exactly where the money is going. On the other hand, it is possible we will not continue to transfer salary payments for the police, for example, or for items described as ‘administrative expenses of the Authority.'”

The spokesman refused to comment on the suspicion of embezzlement and denied that Marin is taking a new approach to Mediterranean area funding as a result of the investigation being conducted against him.

Ha’aretz has learned that the EU has transfered some 195 million euros (NIS 916 million) to the PA during the past three years, while its total budgetary commitment is considerably greater, as much as 320 million euros (NIS 1.5 billion). The bulk of this larger sum includes funds directly transfered to the PA under vague budgetary titles such as “assistance to the Palestinian government” and “assistance to democratization in the autonomy.

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Background to the Feb 4th Clinton-Arafat Summit

Europe May Suspend Funding to PA

Column from the Director