“This Morning’s End Game: What’s Next for Gaza?”

Recent reports about accelerating the return of hostages may indicate that, despite Netanyahu government’s maneuvers, we are approaching Phase B of the deal and the war’s conclusion. It’s time to consider the day after.

While Netanyahu avoids this discussion for obvious reasons, the Arab world is already preparing for it. If we don’t articulate what we want, others will decide for us. From what we can already observe, the emerging processes appear to be the same old tricks that will maintain the status quo, if not worse.

The main issue Israel must insist upon – and there’s no indication Israel is even aware of it – is transforming Gaza’s education system. Amid all the talk about UNRWA, we’ve forgotten the core dispute between UNRWA and donor nations: the UN organization’s education system that promoted conflict with Israel, wrapped in the jihadi narrative that Gazans received in UNRWA schools.

One could argue that this education system, which has indoctrinated generations of Gazans with hatred towards Israel, led to the October 7 massacre and consequently to Gaza’s destruction. The first thing Israel must strongly demand is replacing this terror-promoting education system with one that fosters peace and coexistence.

This is precisely the educational approach of two candidates poised to take roles in post-war Gaza – the UAE and Indonesia. These distinctly Muslim nations have differentiated themselves from other Islamic countries by developing education systems that emphasize individual success rather than promoting the “Jamaa” – the collective ethos that, in Gaza’s case, created a jihadi society.

The UAE and Indonesia had already begun establishing a separate aid system from UNRWA in southern Gaza, but Israel removed them, closing Rafah to leave Kerem Shalom crossing under Qatar’s exclusive control, with all the “day after” implications this entails. In other words: continuing with Hamas and UNRWA.

To understand what a Qatar-led future means, one need not look further than Syria, where Qatar works hand in hand with Turkey. Those who want Turkey in Gaza should stick with Qatar.

But there’s more. Doha is hosting the conference for the Palestinian body supposedly meant to replace Hamas in Gaza – the “Palestinian National Conference.” However, it’s headed by none other than Mustafa Barghouti, a vocal Israel critic who leads a network of NGOs in Ramallah. Using European funding, he maintains militant nationalist rhetoric, viewing any PLO “reform” as a means to enhance the fight against Israel.

Understanding the Doha conference’s true agenda requires revisiting the unresolved PLO-Hamas dispute over a national unity government – a topic currently discussed in Arab and Western diplomatic corridors, from which Israel is notably absent.

What derailed the “reconciliation talks” between the West Bank and Gaza? Hamas demanded PLO membership, which the PLO firmly rejected. The PLO demanded control over Gaza, requiring Hamas to surrender its weapons – more precisely, transfer them to PLO control – and full economic control over Gaza, which Hamas refused to accept. The keyword in understanding PLO’s position was “Tamkin” – something akin to “empowerment” in  English. The PLO demanded “Tamkin” – genuine ability to control Gaza.

We’re at the same impasse today. Recently, Abbas signed a “presidential decree” interpreted here as canceling allocations to terror families. Not exactly. The PLO established a new institution called “Tamkin,” meant to manage support for Gaza’s needy, with terror families included among Gaza’s welfare recipients. Classic Ramallah-style maneuvering.

Barghouti’s conference represents Qatar-style manipulation – its hidden agenda is to establish a new PLO with Hamas, potentially under Hamas control, essentially transferring Hamas to the West Bank.

Every day we remain outside the post-war picture and fail to ensure our Gulf allies take responsibility for Gaza, we risk losing not only Gaza but the West Bank as well.

We can’t solve the Mideast conflict with secular solutions alone, there has to be religious understanding as well. When Western media celebrates each new cease-fire between Israel and Hamas, they fundamentally misunderstand what’s actually happening.

The West, with its secular framework, views cease-fires as stepping stones toward permanent peace. But in the current conflict, we’re not dealing with a cease-fire at all – we’re dealing with a hudna, and the difference is far more than semantic.

President Trump’s Senior Adviser on Arab and Middle Eastern Affairs, Massad Boulos, and Special Envoy for the Middle East, Steve Witkoff, are poised to drive US strategy in the region. Witkoff, of course, has been active in the Gaza ceasefire agreement and has been in the spotlight with his recent trips to the region. Boulos has quietly focused on Lebanon, delivering US messages to its political leaders about Lebanon’s next government’s composition.

Regarding Lebanon, Morgan Ortagus, the Deputy Special Envoy for the Middle East, is now taking over the role once held by Amos Hochstein during the Biden administration. In her first major move since assuming this responsibility, Ortagus has wasted no time in asserting US priorities in Lebanon. On a recent visit to Lebanon on February 7, 2025, she made it clear that Hezbollah cannot be part of the government, emphasising that this is a US “red line” and that the US remains focused on ensuring Lebanon’s sovereignty. Her strong stance underscores the Trump administration’s commitment to ensuring Lebanon’s sovereignty.

Meanwhile, Steve Witkoff remains focused on more significant, overarching concerns. His focus is on high-level diplomatic and security engagement with US allies, including Israel, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and other Gulf states, as well as Egypt and Jordan, to advance a peace settlement. Also, he likely will help to manage the Iranian threat and bolster US security partnerships, as well as related military and intelligence cooperation.

While yet to take shape, Boulos’s role may centre more on building relationships with Arab leaders and societies, leveraging his Arab heritage, Arabic fluency and unique Trump family ties. These assets should not be underestimated. His success will rely on his ability to forge personal connections and navigate complex dynamics with allies and partners.

While Witkoff and Ortagus, on the one hand, and Boulos, on the other, seem like birds of different feathers, they can be successful if they flock together.

The Gaza challenge: shifting the regional landscape

President Trump’s proposal to relocate Palestinians from Gaza further complicates the region’s diplomatic landscape. The proposal has drawn strong opposition from Egypt, Jordan and other Arab states, because of the perceived risks it poses to regional stability and peace.

Saudi Arabia, in particular, has reacted swiftly and sternly to Trump’s pledge to “take over” Gaza, unequivocally rejecting the plan. The Saudi ministry of foreign affairs stated that the establishment of a Palestinian state is a “firm, unwavering position” and is non-negotiable. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman made it clear that Saudi Arabia will not establish diplomatic relations with Israel without the establishment of an independent Palestinian state, with East Jerusalem as its capital. Qatar, a key mediator in the Gaza truce, has cautioned that it is too early to discuss who should control Gaza while a fragile ceasefire remains in place.

For Boulos, who has deep connections within the Arab, Lebanese and Muslim American communities, this backlash against Trump’s Gaza plan, particularly from Saudi Arabia, poses both a challenge and an opportunity. At the appropriate time, Boulos can work with Arab and Islamic donor institutions, including, for example, the Islamic Development Bank and the private sector to plan its development assistance to, and investment in, Gaza. In an era of significantly diminishing US overseas aid, sustained strategic engagement with the region’s development and economic powerhouses will be critical.

Boulos: regional bridge builder

Boulos’s key advantages lie in his Arab heritage and close Trump family ties, his younger son, Michael Boulos, is married to Tiffany Trump; many Arabs know, and respect, familial ties, particularly when such bonds are with influential figures. Having grown up in Lebanon, and coming from a respected family there, gives him a firsthand understanding of the region’s history, politics and culture. He is known for his easygoing personal style, coming across as genuine, and as someone who listens intently to his interlocutors.

This will allow him to engage with a wide swathe of Arab leaders across sectors, in politics, commerce, business, culture, education, who may be more receptive to his outreach. He is well-positioned to become a trusted US diplomatic figure in his own right across the region with those in and outside government. If empowered, Boulos will be key to longer-term US strategic success.

Witkoff’s role: regional security and geopolitical strategy

In contrast, Steve Witkoff’s role focuses more on high-level diplomatic and security issues, with a particular emphasis on Iran and broader regional stability. Witkoff will engage directly with military leaders, intelligence agencies and government officials to address security threats, manage US-Israel relations, and foster alliances with Gulf states. His visits to Saudi Arabia and Qatar, and especially his engagements with Israeli leaders, first in Tel Aviv and recently in Washington, illustrate his lane.

Boulos can focus on building a foundation for longer-term economic, commercial, development and other cooperation, within the region and with the US Together, Boulos, Witkoff and Ortagus can make America stronger, safer and more prosperous in the region.

Boulos’s path to success: Personal ties and strategic initiatives

Boulos can prioritize establishing strategic dialogues with and between regional powers, focusing on mutual economic interests. His business background can play a key role in this, though not focused specifically on the Middle East, Boulos’s ability to initiate conversations in business circles can increase economic partnerships, commercial deals, investment opportunities and regional cooperation. Also, Boulos can facilitate greater bilateral understanding, offering US insights to Arab leaders and vice versa.

Boulos’s success will be enhanced by setting up a small team to operationalise his strategic initiatives and also to liaise with Arab and Muslim-American communities, which delivered Michigan’s electoral votes for the president last November. Boulos can promote engagement between these communities’ business leaders and associations and countries in the region.

Boulos: a new Kushner?

Massad Boulos has the potential to become the new Jared Kushner in terms of diplomatic impact. Just as Kushner played a critical role in brokering the Abraham Accords and fostering deeper engagement between the US and Arab nations, Boulos can use his personal Trump family ties and his Arab roots to open more doors for more meaningful engagement with Middle Eastern leaders.

Although Boulos lacks Kushner’s high-level political relationships, his Trump family position and ability to build rapport can allow him to establish strong relationships, and turn them into partnerships. These partnerships can complement and support broader US foreign policy objectives.

Boulos’s family loyalty, protection and addressing critics

Massad Boulos can play this role not only because of what he brings to the table, but also due to the protection that comes with family ties. President Trump has long made it clear that his family loyalty is paramount, and any efforts to undermine Boulos, whether based on his wealth, background, or political affiliations, will face pushback.

Despite negative media coverage questioning Boulos’s wealth, business dealings, background, and credibility, these criticisms are largely unfounded and are attempts to delegitimize his role. Boulos earned his position through the hard, sustained work of community engagement and campaigning around Michigan, which delivered Arab-American and Muslim-American votes in a historic way, helping push Trump to victory in Michigan. His engagement reoriented their political calculus and brought them into the president’s expanded coalition.

Any external effort to weaken his position will be met with a strong response from both the Trump family and the administration itself, ensuring that Boulos’s standing remains unshakable and his contributions continue to shape US policy in the region.

Expanding beyond Lebanon: A regional vision

While Boulos has engaged with Lebanon, his efforts should take on a broader regional focus to make a true impact. His strong ties to Lebanon provide a valuable starting point, but his diplomatic outreach must extend beyond this one country, encompassing Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and the nations involved in the Abraham Accords. As Senior Advisor on Arab and Middle Eastern Affairs, his role goes well beyond Lebanon. If Boulos remains too narrowly focused on Lebanon, he risks limiting his influence and missing opportunities to build alliances across the entire Middle East.To truly influence the region, Boulos should address broader Middle Eastern challenges, including the Iranian threat, regional instability and shifting geopolitical dynamics.

Boulos has a unique opportunity to leverage relationships across the Arab world, from the Maghreb to the Gulf, to address challenges that transcend individual nations. By focusing on the region as a whole, he can avoid limiting his influence and seize opportunities to build alliances across the Middle East. The evolving geopolitical landscape requires a broader approach, one that engages key players and promotes security, stability and prosperity across the entire region. This regional focus aligns with the broader strategic interests of the United States and its allies.

Looking ahead: a two-pronged approach to Middle East diplomacy

Boulos and Witkoff can reinforce each other’s regional roles. Boulos can engage a broad array of Arab leaders, in and out of government, with an emphasis on fostering economic and other partnerships. He can deepen existing Abraham Accords and operationalise new ones, even bringing in new countries outside the region like India, Indonesia and Malaysia. He can spearhead strategic coordination with Gulf-based donor funds, banks and foundations to support Gaza reconstruction, development and employment.

He can help to stimulate Arab and Muslim diaspora private sector engagement to contribute to and benefit from a new Middle East. This can make America more prosperous by mobilising resources and investment that the US would have shouldered significantly in decades past. It can also make America safer and more secure by improving the regional conditions that have enabled regional and international terrorism, conflict and instability.

With a clear approach and strategy, and the right staffing, Boulos can collaborate with Witkoff and Ortagus to lay the groundwork for a more peaceful, stable Middle East, making the Abraham Accords more of the regional rule than its exception.