If I forget you

This week marks Yom Yerushalayim—the 59th anniversary of the liberation of Jerusalem. Despite centuries of exile and dispersal to every corner of the globe, the Jewish people never relinquished their connection to their historical capital. Throughout periods of prosperity and, more frequently, times of intense persecution, the yearning to return to the Holy Land and the Holy City remained a constant, defining thread of Jewish identity.

A Vow Through the Ages

Psalm 137, composed during the Babylonian exile, captures the profound determination of the Jewish people to one day return and rebuild their center of gravity: “If I forget you, Oh Jerusalem, let my right hand forget her cunning/skill. If I do not remember you, let my tongue cleave to the roof of my mouth.”

This commitment was woven into the fabric of daily life, famously recited under the chuppah during every wedding ceremony. It is a vow that sustained countless generations, keeping the hope for ultimate redemption alive. Every year on Tisha B’Av, Jewish communities gather to mourn the destruction of the Temples and pray for the restoration of sovereignty over Jerusalem.

From Independence to Liberation

The miracle of 1948, when the Jewish State was proclaimed, seemed to signal the end of two millennia of exile. However, independence was immediately challenged by invading Arab armies. The resulting armistice left the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan in control of Judea, Samaria, and eastern Jerusalem. During this period, the international community remained largely silent while Jordan engaged in the ethnic cleansing of Jewish institutions and the desecration of sacred sites like the Mount of Olives cemetery.

It was only in 1967, when Israel liberated Jerusalem and restored freedom of worship for all faiths, that the international community—including the UN—began to direct intense censure at the Jewish State. This hypocrisy remains a defining feature of the discourse today, as many nations refuse to recognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel, preferring to hide behind the fiction that the city’s status awaits a “final peace agreement.”

The Historical Reality

For those who remember the tension of 1967, the reality was a battle for survival against an impending threat of annihilation. When Jordan chose to join the war against Israel, they lost control of the territories they had been occupying illegally. It is a vital historical fact that, prior to the liberation, the “Palestinian” identity as a national entity had not been established, and the areas in question were not part of any sovereign Arab state.

Today, Yom Yerushalayim serves as a necessary reminder of these events, particularly in an era of revisionist history. While Israel ensures freedom of worship for all, the narrative remains heavily skewed, with the celebration of Jerusalem’s reunification frequently mischaracterized as provocative.

Looking Toward the Future

Jerusalem has never served as the capital of any other nation in history; it was only under Jewish sovereignty that it truly flourished as a national center. Despite this, many in the Diaspora treat the anniversary of its liberation as a minor event rather than a national holiday. If the Jewish people do not prioritize the remembrance of Jerusalem, they invite the further spread of the false narratives currently championed by their adversaries.

As we observe this anniversary, it is time to reaffirm the connection to our eternal capital and ensure that the significance of this day is passed on to future generations.

Chag Yom Yerushalayim Sameach.

Michael Kuttner is a Jewish New Zealander who for many years was actively involved with various community organisations connected to Judaism and Israel. He now lives in Israel and is J-Wire’s correspondent in the region.

Times Columnist Kristof’s Father Fought on Nazi Side in World War II

A Complicated Family Legacy

New York Times columnist Nicholas Kristof, whose recent article accusing Israel of using dogs and carrots to rape Palestinian prisoners has been denounced by the Israeli foreign ministry as “Hamas propaganda” and a “baseless blood libel,” faces renewed scrutiny regarding his own family history. In his 2024 memoir, Chasing Hope, Kristof writes, “When I was growing up and other kids talked about their dads heroically battling the Nazis, I kept quiet. I didn’t want to admit that my father had actually fought for a year on the same side as the Nazis.”

Kristof’s father also wrote a letter to the editor of the Times in 1989 defending Paul Touvier, the intelligence chief of a pro-Nazi militia in Vichy France who was convicted of killing seven Jewish hostages. In the letter, his father argued that in World War II, it was often difficult to distinguish between “friend and enemy” and that “to do good, you often had to do evil too.”

Discrepancies in the Historical Record

Immigration documents obtained by the Washington Free Beacon reveal significant inconsistencies in the accounts Kristof has provided to Times readers regarding his father’s past, including his name, nationality, year of arrival, and age upon entering the United States. While such variations can occur in immigrant stories, critics argue that the columnist’s frequent, often sanitized accounts of his father—frequently omitting his service in an army allied with Hitler—stand in stark contrast to his own professional standards for factual reporting.

For instance, Kristof has claimed his father arrived in 1951, yet records indicate an arrival in 1952. His family-owned winery website depicts the father as having spied for the Allies, a claim that clashes with the reality of his documented service in the Romanian military during its alliance with Nazi Germany. These narratives have been recycled across multiple New York Times columns, videos, and even a Harvard Business School case study, often without acknowledging the broader historical context of the Holocaust in Romania, where hundreds of thousands of Jews were murdered.

The Search for Truth

Despite his career spent reporting on humanitarian crises, Kristof’s own accounts of his father’s origins—vacillating between Romanian, Polish, and Armenian identities—have drawn skepticism. When asked for evidence regarding his father’s alleged anti-Nazi activities, a Times spokesman dismissed the inquiries as “dangerous, inflammatory and most of all false insinuations,” while reiterating the family’s Armenian heritage.

The broader historical record remains haunting. As noted by the International Commission on the Holocaust in Romania, the country bears responsibility for the deaths of more Jews than any nation other than Germany itself. Nearby areas where Kristof’s father lived were centers of Jewish culture that were devastated during the war. Yet, in his personal reflections on his father’s hometown, Kristof has displayed little curiosity regarding the fate of the Jewish communities that were eradicated in that same region.

A Lingering Shadow

Kristof has often spoken of his “tortuous family history” and how it shaped his reporting. He acknowledges in his memoir that he would “regularly wake in the dark” to the sound of his father screaming from nightmares—a trauma that preceded his father’s 2010 suicide. As the columnist faces intense criticism for his recent work on Israel, these revelations about his father’s wartime service and his own repeated sanitization of that history have sparked a wider debate about accountability, credibility, and the nature of the “blood libel” accusations currently leveled against him.

Israel to establish IDF museum at former UNRWA Jerusalem headquarters

Israel to Establish IDF Museum at Former UNRWA Jerusalem Headquarters

The Israeli Cabinet is expected to approve plans next week to establish an Israel Defense Forces (IDF) museum at the Jerusalem compound formerly occupied by the U.N. Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA).

Centralizing Military and Defense Operations

Beyond the museum, the site is slated to house significant military infrastructure. The army’s recruitment center in the capital, currently located in the Romema neighborhood, is expected to relocate to the new compound. Additionally, a bureau for the defense minister is planned for the site, according to reports from Ynet. The government is scheduled to finalize the measure on May 17, coinciding with the observation of Jerusalem Day.

The Closure of UNRWA in Israel

This development follows the Knesset’s passage of legislation on Oct. 28, 2024, which effectively banned UNRWA from operating within Israel. The move was a direct response to the agency’s complicity in the Hamas-led massacre on Oct. 7, 2023. Despite significant diplomatic pressure from the United States and other international stakeholders to maintain the agency’s presence, Israel proceeded with the legislation.

The law officially took effect on Jan. 30, 2025, triggering the immediate closure of the agency’s primary offices in the Ma’alot Dafna and Kafr Aqab neighborhoods of northeastern Jerusalem. Shortly thereafter, Israeli authorities initiated the demolition of the headquarters.

State Ownership and Future Land Use

Foreign Ministry spokesperson Oren Marmorstein previously confirmed that the Jewish state maintains ownership of the compound, which is currently under the administration of the Israel Land Authority. Once the new IDF recruitment center in the northeastern compound is fully operational, the current facility in the Romema neighborhood is slated to be returned to the Israel Land Authority for future use.

The secret mission to rescue the UN’s vital Palestinian refugee archive

Palestinians wait in line to cast their vote at the first Palestinian general election in Gaza in January 1996. The election was held under international supervision in January. © 1996 UNRWA Photo by Munir Nasr

East Jerusalem to Amman should have been an easy trip: a short drive down to the Dead Sea, across the border checkpoint and swiftly on to the Jordanian capital.

But in the early summer of 2024, the distance appeared an almost insurmountable obstacle to humanitarian workers from Unrwa (the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees), as they sought to safeguard huge quantities of archival documents vitally important to decades of recent Palestinian history.

A 10-month operation to save the archives kept by Unrwa in Gaza and East Jerusalem was reaching its final stages. The effort had been highly sensitive and sometimes dangerous. It had already involved dozens of Unrwa staff in at least four different countries, risky trips to rescue documents under bombardment, officials carefully carrying unmarked envelopes into Egypt, and precious boxes airlifted to safety in military planes.

But now time was running out. Unrwa’s sprawling compound in East Jerusalem had become the focus of a concerted Israeli effort to expel the agency, and a target of rightwing groups.

The significance of the Unrwa archives, much of which detailed Palestinians’ experiences as they fled or were forced from their homes during the wars that led to the foundation of Israel in 1948, was clear.

“Their destruction would have been catastrophic … If there is ever a just and durable solution to this conflict, then this is the only evidence people can use to show there were once Palestinians living in a particular place,” said Roger Hearn, a senior Unrwa official who oversaw the operation

Such clandestine efforts were never supposed to be the task of Unrwa, which was founded in 1949 to provide healthcare, food and education to about 750,000 Palestinian refugees.

At the start of the war in Gaza, which followed the surprise Hamas attack on Israel that killed 1,200 people, mostly civilians, the organisation’s archives were spread across the countries where it works in the Middle East. In dusty boxes in the Unrwa compound in Gaza City were the original registration cards of Palestinian refugees who had sought safety in Gaza in 1948, as well as birth, marriage and death certificates dating back generations. These might allow Palestinians whose ancestors had been forced to leave their homes to trace family origins in what became Israel.

Despite previous efforts to scan the documents, hundreds of thousands of historical records

Jean-Pierre Filiu, a professor of Middle East Studies at Sciences Po in Paris, who visited Gaza during the war, described the documents as “crucial to the Palestinian experience”.

“There are testimonies of how people were forced to flee in 1948, where they came from, where their property was, what was destroyed. Two hundred thousand came to Gaza in between 1948 and 1949, from all over Palestine,” Filiu said.

For decades, Israel has been hostile to Unrwa, blaming the agency for keeping alive Palestinian hopes of a return to their original homes by granting refugee status to the descendants of those originally displaced. Israel has also frequently accused Unrwa of using text books in its schools that promote anti-Israel and antisemitic views.

After the 2023 Hamas raid, Israel alleged that Unrwa staff in Gaza had taken part in the attack. The agency later fired nine of its employees after an investigation.

The first stage of the document rescue operation was dramatic – and risky.

Days after its forces invaded Gaza, Israel ordered the evacuation of Unrwa’s offices in Gaza City. International staff left within hours, unable to take the vital archives with them.

“There was a real risk that the Israelis would move in and destroy them, or they would just be destroyed in a fire or an explosion or whatever,” said Sam Rose, the acting director of Unrwa affairs in Gaza.

Just months earlier, Unrwa’s digital registration system had to be temporarily shutdown after being hacked, and there was widespread anxiety too that another cyber-attack could wipe servers of the records that had already been scanned.

“There was this very dangerous period where we were getting many, many [cyber]attacks every day and genuinely thought we could see both the originals destroyed and any digital copies we had made. Then everything would have been gone for good,” Hearn said.

Despite continuing airstrikes and shelling in some of the most deadly attacks of Israel’s relentless offensive, which killed more than 70,000 people, mostly civilians, a small team of Unrwa officials drove rented pickup trucks back to the organisation’s sprawling compound in Gaza City. They made three trips to bring the documents south to a food warehouse in Rafah, on the border with Egypt.

But Cairo would not allow the archives out of Gaza unless Israel was consulted. Unrwa officials were certain that Israeli officials, who had imposed an almost total blockade on Gaza, would immediately understand the significance of the documents, and seize them or refuse to let them through. In 1982, when Israel invaded Lebanon, its military removed the archives of the Palestinian Liberation Organisation from offices in Beirut.

Instead, Unrwa officials with international passports were tasked with getting the archives out unobserved.

“If anyone was stopped at the border, they just said they were carrying paperwork. There was mountains [of documents] to take out. Everyone was carrying stuff with them,” said Rose.

Over the next six months, the documents were collated in Egypt and then transported by a Jordanian charity using the kingdom’s military planes as they returned to Amman after delivering aid for Gaza. The final cargo was on its way just two weeks before Israeli tanks moved to seize Rafah in May 2024, definitively blocking the way out.

But this still left another set of equally significant documents in Unrwa’s East Jerusalem compound that also needed urgent rescue.

Within weeks of the beginning of the two-year war, Israel had intensified its accusations that Unrwa was collaborating with Hamas, and launched a campaign of obstruction and harassment of the agency. By early 2024, the East Jerusalem compound was the target of protests and a series of arson attacks that caused extensive damage. Moves to expel Unrwa were gathering pace.

“In East Jerusalem, we had months of warnings that we would lose access [to our offices],” Rose said.

Efforts to persuade friendly diplomatic missions to store the archives were unsuccessful. So, with time running out, these too were removed by staff members and secretly transferred over several months, eventually reaching Unrwa offices in Jordan. In January 2025, new Israeli laws barred the agency from Israel and Israeli-occupied Palestine.

In Amman, a new and extensive effort was launched to digitise the documents. Funded primarily by Luxembourg, more than 50 Unrwa staff worked in a crowded, cramped basement to scan by hand large numbers of postcard-sized original refugee registration documents as well as millions of other items.

“Now [the archives] are out of Palestine, but at least they are protected,” Filiu said.

With almost 30m documents now digitised, Unrwa aims to be able to provide every Palestinian refugee with their family tree and all supporting documents, as well as to build maps showing patterns of displacement in 1948. The archives will also provide a better understanding of the much-disputed events around the expulsion and flight of about 750,000 Palestinians at that time. Officials estimate the task could take another two years.

Dr Anne Irfan, a historian of the modern Middle East at University College London and author of the recently published A Short History of the Gaza Strip, said the documents provided a vital record of Palestinian national history.

“The Palestinians are a stateless people and without a fully unified national archive … so the Unrwa archive has a particular significance for them,” Irfan said.

The digitised archives open up multiple avenues of inquiry into the experience of Palestinian refugees, the role of the UN and international community, and core elements of Middle Eastern politics over the last 80 years, Irfan told the Guardian.

“It is highly contested history, and history that has potentially very real ramifications for the present.”

‘Gang rape, forced stripping and humiliation’: New report documents 10,000 findings on Oct. 7 sexual crimes

Spanning roughly 250 pages, with hundreds of footnotes and references to more than 10,000 documented items, a new report lays out what it describes as a systematic pattern of sexual violence, humiliation and abuse committed by terrorists and civilians who infiltrated from Gaza during the Oct. 7 massacre and throughout the captivity of hostages held in Gaza.

The report, excerpts of which are being published Tuesday for the first time in ynet and Yedioth Ahronoth, details testimony, video documentation and forensic findings pointing to sexual and gender-based crimes at massacre sites, military bases and during the transport and captivity of hostages in Gaza. It identifies recurring patterns indicating that these were not isolated incidents, but acts that were “documented, celebrated and systematically disseminated in order to intensify fear and trauma.”

The report, the product of more than two years of work, was compiled by members of the Civil Commission on Oct. 7 Crimes by Hamas Against Women, Children and Families. The civil society organization was established shortly after the outbreak of the war.

“We understood that we needed to create evidentiary documentation at standards that could not be denied,” said Dr. Cochav Elkayam-Levy, who heads the commission.

Some of the findings are based on documentation and testimony from teams involved in identifying bodies at the Shura military base, as well as opinions from pathologists who examined evidence from the day of the attack. These were supplemented by detailed testimony from some of the hostages who returned from Gaza.

At the center of the report is a digital archive cataloging and documenting thousands of videos, photographs and testimonies from survivors, rescue forces and relatives relating to the sexual and gender-based crimes committed by the attackers, who used victims’ bodies to intensify humiliation and terror.

Alongside testimony published in the media and through various documentation initiatives, the commission’s database also includes about 400 testimonies collected independently.

“We wanted the testimony to serve legal purposes, while ensuring the interviews were sensitive to the interviewees’ trauma,” said commission CEO attorney Merav Israeli-Amarant. “After we began reviewing the materials that started flowing in, we understood that our mission was to build an archive of war crimes.”

A secure digital archive was subsequently established, inaccessible to the public, containing all documented findings collected on the issue, many of which were initially circulated on social media before later being removed. Without organized documentation, Israeli-Amerant said, “they will disappear and be erased.”

‘To maximize humiliation’

Efforts to document Hamas’ sexual crimes and raise international awareness began in the first days after the war broke out, initially as a spontaneous initiative by researchers and activists in the field, and later through various organizations and projects. The report published Tuesday is another link in that chain, though its scope and the archive underlying it may provide a foundation for future research.

The report presents testimony and findings according to the locations of the attacks: the Nova music festival; Route 232 and surrounding areas; kibbutzim; military bases; and the abuse of hostages en route to and inside Gaza.

Researchers identified 13 patterns of sexual and gender-based assault, including rape and gang rape, assault before and during murder, forced stripping, threats of forced marriage and assaults committed in front of victims’ relatives. According to the report, these patterns recurred across multiple locations, indicating that the use of such practices was intentional, widespread and systematic, “carried out with particular cruelty in order to maximize the pain, humiliation and suffering of the victims.”

The report also states that assaults were filmed and distributed on social media to amplify the atrocities.

Alongside the historical purpose of preserving the material for future generations and potentially supporting future legal cases against perpetrators, the researchers say they seek another goal: official recognition by parliaments and international institutions that these crimes occurred.

“No prosecution will reflect the depth and breadth of what happened,” Elkayam-Levy said. Still, Israeli-Amarant added, “institutional international recognition creates the beginning of justice.”

The mission has only begun

Efforts to amplify the voices of victims of atrocities and sexual crimes began shortly after the massacre. What started as an ad hoc initiative by researchers in gender studies and international law later evolved into the establishment of the commission, a civil society organization that undertook an ambitious mission: to collect evidence as comprehensively as possible, cross-check and verify it wherever possible and identify patterns of abuse.

Attempts to document the scale of sexual violence at massacre sites face an inherent difficulty: many victims were murdered, and in numerous cases bodies were burned or completely destroyed. Nevertheless, testimony from rescue personnel, analysis of photos and videos and accumulated witness accounts combine to form what the report describes as a clear and disturbing picture: severe sexual violence and deliberate mutilation of victims’ bodies — women and men alike — accompanied the massacres.

“Additional information may emerge over time,” the report states, “as survivors and rescue personnel find the words and trust needed to share their experiences.”

In other words, the mission of documentation and research is not over — it is only beginning.

While victims who were killed cannot testify, the section devoted to hostages includes extensive and explicit testimony regarding sexual assault, sexual humiliation, forced stripping and public exposure.

The report divides testimony according to stages of abuse during the kidnapping. Victims were often abducted in short pajamas or underwear. “She didn’t even have time to put on pants,” a mother abducted with her children from their kibbutz home told the commission. Another hostage testified: “That’s how they took me, almost naked, half asleep.”

Another recurring pattern during the kidnappings was terror inflicted within the family unit: abductors murdered relatives in front of family members who were later taken to Gaza. In many cases, the attackers documented and distributed footage of the kidnappings and, according to numerous testimonies, women appeared naked, beaten and humiliated.

“In some cases,” the report states, “victims’ bodies were abducted, desecrated and displayed publicly” — an act indicating the deliberate use of sexual humiliation to terrorize victims, their families and the broader public.

This was the case in footage of the late Shani Louk, who was filmed wounded and partially naked in the streets of Gaza. Additional videos documenting kidnappings showed women being dragged by their hair, injured and humiliated during their abduction.

Ofelia Roitman, who was abducted from her home in Kibbutz Nir Oz and released in the first hostage deal, told the commission she was forcibly stripped on the orders of a doctor upon arriving at a tunnel in Gaza.

“I was left with nothing, but I thought that at any moment they would beat me or do something to me,” she testified. “I thought about it for a moment, but then one of them came and put a robe on me.”

The report concludes that “the testimonies, footage and materials reviewed by the commission establish a clear and consistent pattern of sexual and gender-based violence and deliberate humiliation during and after the abduction of hostages on Oct. 7. Examination of the materials reveals clear recurring patterns indicating that sexual and gender-based violence was an integral part of the kidnappings themselves.”

A constant threat of rape

The sexual violence, according to the report, did not stop during captivity.

“Captors routinely threatened rape and forced marriage, and in some cases forced victims to engage in or witness sexual acts and torture involving others, including family members,” the report states. “Sexual assaults occurred routinely and systematically in homes, tunnels and other locations.”

About six months ago, former hostage Romi Gonen described in an interview with the Israeli television program “Uvda” sexual assaults she endured in captivity.

“I go into the shower and he allows himself to come in because he’s the medic and he’s there to help me shower, and I’m wounded and I have no power over them,” she said in remarks quoted by the report. “And I’m in a situation where there’s nothing I can do.”

The sexual abuse was not limited to women. The report cites an interview given by Guy Gilboa-Dalal to Channel 12 News in which he described sexual abuse by a terrorist.

“He came up behind me, started touching my whole body, and I froze in that moment,” Gilboa-Dalal said. “He really started touching me and kissing the back of my neck, kissing my back.”

His testimony joins additional accounts from male hostages who returned from captivity. In one particularly severe testimony, two relatives reportedly were forced to perform sexual acts on one another. Their identities were not disclosed.

“The fact that men were also subjected to sexual violence does not diminish the gendered nature of these crimes,” the report states. “Courts view sexual violence as gender-based violence not because only women are targeted, but because sexual abuse is often used as a tool to control victims.”

‘Not isolated acts’

In July, the Dinah Project published a full report portraying Hamas’ sexual violence during the massacre and captivity as a systematic, intentional and premeditated weapon of war. Like the Civil Commission report, the Dinah Project included layers of survivor testimony, forensic and digital evidence and field reports.

It was preceded by a 2024 report by Pramila Patten, the U.N. secretary-general’s special representative on sexual violence in conflict, presenting evidence — largely circumstantial — that sexual violence was used during the Oct. 7 attack.

Shortly before that, the Association of Rape Crisis Centers in Israel also published a report mapping the various sites of abuse and the main patterns of assault known at the time. Alongside these initiatives, additional research projects on the subject continue to operate.

The Civil Commission report is exceptional in both scope and ambition in documenting testimony and findings from the massacre and the period of captivity.

In the introduction, the authors state that the report “provides the first systematic documentation of these crimes” and therefore “identifies recurring patterns of sexual violence across different locations and stages of the attack. The report demonstrates that these crimes followed identifiable patterns and methods and were not isolated acts.”

Ankara’s Crossroads: Rearmament, Risk, and the Prospect of War with Israel

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Talk of war in the Middle East abounds on social media, but not just about the one with Iran. A small, but significant, portion of this chatter relates to a conflict that has not begun. For more than a year now, pundits and politicians have warned of a potential clash between Israel and Turkey. Driving this hypothetical confrontation are a series of issues related to Syria, the Palestinian territories, and regional security as a whole. In December 2025, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu indirectly charged Ankara with wanting to reestablish Ottoman imperial rule over the Levant. To that, he declared, Turks “ should not even think about it.” Officials in President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s Turkey have steered a more neutral course on the prospect of an Israeli contingency. On nightly television, however, commentators have not shied from the prospect of fighting of the Israel Defense Forces. Especially cavalier pundits have asserted that Turkish forces likely would seize Israel’s capital inside of 72 hours.

The fight now raging over Iran has raised temperatures further. Former Prime Minister Naftali Bennett’s warning that Turkey constitutes a new threat akin to the Islamic Republic of Iran touched off a firestorm of reaction. Pro-Israeli voices in America have supported this sentiment. Turkey, in the words of one prominent critic, is potentially “ an enemy as dangerous as the Islamic Republic” if left unchecked as a power. To date, Turkish officials have refused to return direct fire. While denouncing the Israeli-U.S. offensive against Iran, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has offered only vague promises of Turkish resolve. “ Turkey is no longer the old Turkey,” he declared on the social platform X (formerly Twitter), adding “Everyone should do their calculations accordingly …”

There are several potential settings for an Israeli-Turkish conflict. The bombing of an airbase near Palmyra last year, as well as Israeli expressions of support for Kurdish militants, suggest that Syria may provide the most likely battleground between the two countries. Acts of subterfuge inside Israel or Turkey may also provide a potential spark leading to armed conflict. Yet odds of an immediate Turkish-Israeli war remain low — at least in the estimation of some probability markets. Indeed, the fluidity of the current crisis makes forecasting a future standoff between Turkey and Israel difficult. It may be more appropriate to ask what factors could prompt such a conflict. One possible contingency may arise from a looming crisis confronting Turkey’s military. As it continues a multi-decade effort to overhaul and modernize the country’s armed forces, Ankara must now answer a critical, yet delicate, question: Should Turkey actively prepare to fight Israel? Responding to this question may compel Erdoğan to rethink aspects of his military modernization agenda. Should his defense priorities change, he may hasten the outbreak of war with Israel regardless of whether he desires one or not.

Turkey’s Defense Industry at the Crossroads

Despite continued drumbeat of heated rhetoric, there are indications that both Turkey and Israel have worked to minimize the possibility of a direct confrontation. After Israeli warplanes attacked a prospective Turkish airbase in Syria last March, the two sides reportedly agreed to establish a deconfliction hotline in the hopes of preempting further violence. In January of this year, Turkey took heart after Israel refused to impede Syria’s offensive against autonomous Kurdish forces in the northeast. With Israel now embroiled in a conflict with both Iran and Hizballah, observers in Ankara remain confident that no war with Israel is imminent. Conflicting perceptions over the strength and intent of Turkey’s growing defense industry, however, continue to stoke uneasiness in both Israel and Turkey.

International awareness of Turkey’s growing defense sector has risen steadily over the last decade. Indications of Ankara’s efforts to foster its arms industry span from the use of Turkish drones in Ukraine to a slew of weapons deals in sub-Saharan Africa and Asia. Domestic audiences could point to the launching of new warships and the testing of fixed-wing aircraft as still further evidence of a brighter Turkish future. The country’s media has championed each of these developments as signs that the Turkish military is built for the present and future. Naysayers are virtually absent in print or on Turkish television. To the contrary, pundits regularly boast of the superiority of Turkey’s arsenal, even when compared to the likes of the Israel Defense Forces.

A closer look reveals a starkly different picture. A significant number of military systems touted in Turkish media remain in development. This list includes the Kaan, Turkey’s much heralded fifth-generation fighter aircraft; the Kizilelma, a fixed-wing drone; and the Cenk and Tayfun, two recently tested mid-range ballistic missiles. Equally telling is the saga of the Altay main battle tank. Despite plans for prototype production as far back as 2007, manufacturers didn’t announce the start of serial production until late 2025. Media sources state that the Turkish army possesses as few as three tanks in service. Among the more modern platforms currently in service, it is likely none may be of great use against a near peer adversary like the Israeli military. Despite initial plaudits, the Ukrainian military now makes little use of the TB-2 Bayraktar, Turkey’s much vaunted drone system. Most worrying, perhaps, is the current state of the country’s air defenses. Despite promises to field a comprehensive anti-air system dubbed Steel Dome, Ankara still appears to rely upon NATO assets to provide Turkey a degree of protection from air attack. Erdoğan’s domestic critics took note of this fact recently after NATO forces intercepted four Iranian missiles over Turkish soil in March.

When Ankara’s modernization efforts first began, relatively modest security priorities influenced Turkey’s agenda. Early investments in drone technology, for example, reflected a desire to improve how the military countered insurgents — particularly those linked to the Kurdish Workers’ Party. Developing cheaper locally crafted weaponry has also offset or replaced the higher costs of foreign military purchases previously made by the Turkish military. It is likely Erdoğan long discounted the possibility of a confrontation with Israel. In the wake of campaigns against Gaza and Lebanon, his sentiments changed. “ We must be very strong so that Israel cannot do these things to Palestine,” he told an audience in 2024. “Just as we entered Karabakh and just as we entered Libya, we will do exactly the same to [Israel].” It was for this reason, he continued, that Turkey’s developing defense sector was so important. “There is nothing stopping us from doing so. We just need to be strong enough to take these steps.”

How or whether Ankara is planning for any kind of Israel contingency is not clear. For generations, the National Security Politics Document — Turkey’s official national security strategy — was a state secret kept from the public. Media reports in 2024 declared that the country’s National Security Council completed a four-year interagency review of Turkish security imperatives. An official summary of the document references Israel as a barrier “ to ensuring regional stability,” particularly in regions such as Syria and Gaza. The full contents of the document, to date, remain unpublished.

Prepare to Fight or Not?

What Erdoğan says publicly offers only a basic picture of how he perceives Turkey’s rivals and adversaries. His recent record of statements, unfortunately, has added little in the way of sharpness or clarity. Beyond declaring that the new Turkey is stronger than the old, Erdoğan tends to refrain from dubbing neighboring states as enemies. Rarer still have been his explicit threats of military action. Arguably, his most explicit and extraordinary expressions of belligerence have been directed at Greece. Nothing, he once vowed, could stop Turkey from invading Greek territory in the middle of the night. On other occasions, he has subtly boasted of his ability to launch ballistic missiles at Athens.

Erdoğan clearly finds himself in a very different predicament in the case of Israel. He has demonstrated little restraint in denouncing Israeli policies, going so far as to call upon God to “ destroy and devastate Zionist Israel.” Yet he has refused to countenance calls from his own coalition partners to intervene militarily on behalf of Palestinians in Gaza. Though he has remained aloof to Israeli statements directed at Turkey, Erdoğan clearly faces a difficult choice: Does he ignore the rhetoric and hope relations with Israel remain manageable? Or does he direct his ministers to prepare for armed hostilities?

There is good reason for Erdoğan to choose the former. Israel faces its own sticky situation when it comes to confronting Turkey militarily. As a NATO member and close ally of the United States, Turkey has significant international support it can call upon. Moreover, in the wake of successive wars on multiple fronts, it is possible that Israel may lack the political will — let alone the material and financial resources — to take on Turkey. Domestic uncertainty also reigns in Israel. At some point, Netanyahu’s hold on power will break, leading to a new administration with different ideas about Turkey. All these factors may allow Erdoğan to sleep more easily at night.

But if Erdoğan reasons that preparing for a military confrontation with Israel is warranted, a great deal of work and uncertainty lie ahead. He first must consider the serious shortcomings facing his military as of today. The backbone of the country’s air force, its fleet of F-16s, requires significant material upgrades that are not forthcoming due to American sanctions. Recently purchased Eurofighters from Qatar and the United Kingdom may help ameliorate the problem, yet the fighters still haven’t arrived. How Turkish pilots will be trained, and the aircraft kitted out with arms, are also matters that will take time to fully work out. Turkey possesses noticeable advantages when it comes to the size of its naval and ground forces. Yet if Israel’s battle-tested squadrons of F-35s do command the skies, Turkish sailors and soldiers may find themselves greatly disadvantaged.

Turkey and the Lessons of the Iran War

Depending on the circumstances, Ankara may not go to war with the army it has today. A sufficient amount of time — and a bit of luck — may allow certain upgraded platforms to be finished and brought into service. Yet integrating aircraft like the Kaan or missiles like the Tayfun into the armed forces may be easier said than done. Training air and missile crews, building new facilities, and devising their use in coordination with other branches of the military will also demand time and patience. Then there is a question of resources and scale. Given what the world has witnessed during the air war over Iran, officials in Ankara must now consider on what systems they should invest most of their resources. Put another way, just how many new planes, missiles, and other systems do they need and why?

Media and think tank attention in Turkey suggests that air defense will be the source of considerable attention in the months and years ahead. Even before the Iran war began, a variety of Turkish outlets emphasized Steel Dome’s critical importance. When an Israeli news site declared Turkish air defenses “ a dangerous development,” commentators in Turkey nodded approvingly. Yet even the most jingoist appraisal of the system admits that Steel Dome’s full implementation will not be complete until 2030. The Israeli-U.S. war against Iran may compel Erdoğan to push for an even faster timeline.

Ankara’s own ballistic missile program attracts an equal amount of discussion in Turkey today. Like Steel Dome, newspaper and television reports speak glowingly of Israeli anxiety amid recent tests of systems like the Tayfun and the longer range, Cenk. With Turkish news networks regularly broadcasting videos of successful Iranian attacks on Israeli targets, some analysts have noted government plans to begin mass production of its new missiles this year. Just how many missiles the Turkish arms industry produces, however, likely constitutes only one question Ankara must consider. Where to house and how to deploy these assets will be issues likely addressed in light of lessons learned from Iran.

The early May opening of Istanbul’s annual International Defence and Aerospace Fair led to still more questions about Turkey’s security agenda with the surprise unveiling of Yildirimhan, the country’s first intercontinental ballistic missile. Developers billed the missile as capable of striking targets at a range of 6,000 kilometers with a payload of up to 3,000 kilograms. Yildirimhan’s debut prompted a familiar chorus of cheers among senior Turkish leaders and pundits. One cable network repeatedly aired clips of Israeli commentators reacting gravely to the missile’s destructive potential. Some Turkish experts, however, question the utility and intent of such a weapon. Why, one analyst asked, did Turkey need a missile with such range? If it is meant to deter war with states beyond Israel, what other potential targets did Yildirimhan’s developers have in mind? One video released by the Turkish Ministry of Defense infers that the United States may be one possible target. The clip, which was uploaded to social media and replayed on cable news, shows the missile pelting civilian and military targets along the American eastern seaboard.

The continued development of Turkish missile capabilities, including long-range weapons, also begs important questions regarding the cost and financing of the country’s new weaponry. The National Assembly in Ankara recently awarded the country’s Ministry of Defense a 30 percent increase in funds in contrast to the previous year. Exactly how Turkey allocates this money among the services, particularly in terms of acquisitions, very much remains a black box. A more important factor, perhaps, is the effect rising inflation may have on Ankara’s spending power. With Turkey’s current inflation rate hovering around 30 percent, the impact of this budget increase likely will diminish over the course of the year ahead. Shouldering larger infusions of cash into the defense sector may constitute a still greater challenge.

Damned If You Do….

Accelerated investment into these and other elements of the Turkish armed forces requires Erdoğan to accept a critical degree of risk. Warranted or not, boosting defense spending and allocating further attention to new weapons systems undoubtedly will heighten Israeli concerns. Expanding the scale of Turkish defense production — especially of drones, aircraft, and ballistic missiles — may further Tel Aviv’s belief that Ankara is preparing for war. Committing to such an ambitious rearmament program likely would undermine any diplomatic or public efforts aimed at soothing Israeli anxieties. Rather than deter, such steps may press Israel to make equally proactive measures in anticipation of a potential Turkish conflict. Israeli leaders likely will have drawn their own lessons when it comes to their experiences fighting Iran, lessons that may lead to an intensification of the arms race to come. As a result, chances for an Israeli-Turkish détente may dwindle.

Erdoğan may yet place his faith in diplomacy and serendipity. Israel, he could decide, stands to lose as much, if not more, if war breaks out. His own domestic considerations, however, may pull Erdoğan in the opposite direction. Presidential elections are currently scheduled for May 2028. As of now, the country’s constitution bars him from running. Regardless of whether he finds a way to circumvent this constraint, the stakes in this contest are immense. On the line is more than his political future. Erdoğan’s legacy and the continued rule of his Justice and Development Party are both potentially in jeopardy. Looking weak in the face of an Israeli challenge, in this light, may not be an option.

Ryan Gingeras is a professor in the Institute for Regional and International Studies at the Naval Postgraduate School and is an expert on Turkish, Balkan, and Middle Eastern history. He is the author of numerous books on the history of Turkey and the Ottoman Empire. His most recent book is Mafia: A Global History . The views expressed here are not those of the Naval Postgraduate School, the U.S. Navy, the Department of Defense, or any part of the U.S. government.

MAY 2026 UPDATE Disappearance of Haymanut Kasau: hierarchy, chronology, and failures of responsibility

On 25 February 2024, nine‑year‑old Haymanut Kasau disappeared from the Jewish Agency absorption center in Safed after going out to distribute election flyers, and as of early 2026 the State of Israel has not determined what happened to her. This prolonged failure is not only a tragic investigative shortcoming; it exposes systemic weaknesses and responsibility gaps across police, ministries, and parliamentary oversight.

  1. National‑level authorities: government, security agencies, police HQ

At the top of the hierarchy stands the Israeli government and security apparatus. Politically, the Prime Minister only became visibly engaged very late: reports note a meeting with the family roughly two years after the disappearance, followed by an announcement that the internal security service (Shin Bet) would be authorized to assist the search. Operationally, this means that for almost two years, the case remained essentially a police matter, despite early calls from the family and MKs to treat it as an abduction of national importance. The failure at this level lies in the delay in escalating the case to the highest investigative and intelligence capabilities, not in the lack of such tools.

Within the police hierarchy, Superintendent Shmuel Lerman, head of the national Missing & Impostors unit, represented headquarters in Knesset hearings and became the symbol of the institutional response. In November 2024, when confronted with the Kiryat Malakhi balcony testimony, he confirmed only that “a testimony was taken” and that “additional directions are being examined.” He provided no concrete timetable, operational detail, or measurable commitments, even as MKs criticized the fact that weeks and months pass before fresh intelligence is processed. A senior police source later admitted openly that “in the final analysis we have failed so far in the mission,” while insisting that “every rumour and shred of gossip” had been checked. That admission is important, but it does not repair the core failure: headquarters did not turn repeated warnings from the family and Knesset into an early, clearly defined, time‑bound escalation plan.

The eventual transfer of the file to Lahav 433, the elite national crime unit, came only in December 2025—about 21 months after the disappearance—following a status meeting between the Police Commissioner and the Northern District. The commissioner then announced that Lahav 433 would re‑examine all material collected by the Northern District, but this was described as a new beginning rather than a continuation of a high‑priority national investigation. The need to “start over” so late is itself evidence that earlier work had not been consolidated at the appropriate level. The decision to bring in the Shin Bet only in February 2026—two years after the fact—compounds this delay and suggests that the government and police HQ did not initially internalize the possibility of a sophisticated kidnapping or organized‑crime scenario.

  1. Regional and local police: Northern District, Safed sub‑district, Kinneret crime unit

Below headquarters, responsibility lay with the Northern District and local investigative units. From the outset, Safed police treated the case as a high‑effort missing child investigation: searches started the night she was reported missing; a helicopter was eventually deployed; over 1,800 volunteers joined combing operations; and a dog unit searched the absorption center building and surroundings. Yet crucial hours were lost: a helicopter was only sent about 40 hours after the disappearance, with police later explaining they had to wait for IDF air‑authorization during wartime conditions. This may be procedurally understandable, but for a nine‑year‑old missing in a mountainous area, it is operationally disastrous and represents an early failure of prioritization.

Chief Inspector Amir Samnia of the Kinneret crime‑fighting unit appears as the regional operational figure responsible for the case when he reported to the Knesset Aliyah & Absorption Committee. Regarding the Kiryat Malakhi witness, he stated that when a local officer reached the witness’s home, the man was found injured and later hospitalized at Beilinson Hospital, and that a statement had been taken. However, there is no public record of a comprehensive search operation in that neighbourhood tied specifically to the balcony claim: no documented canvass of nearby apartments, no published details of CCTV pulls around the time and location, no evidence of a rapid “freeze” of that address as a potential holding site. Even allowing for secrecy in ongoing investigations, the complete absence of any described concrete action beyond “we took a testimony and examined directions” strongly suggests that this lead was not maximized in a timely manner.

Similarly, another powerful lead emerged about six months after the disappearance: the testimony of a friend of Haymanut who told her parents and then MKs that “a man with peyot (side‑curls) grabbed Haymanut, put her on his back, and ran” and that this man tried to abduct her as well. Police responded in the media that this version “was checked and ruled out,” without explaining which investigative checks were performed— such as line‑ups, child‑friendly forensic interviews with independent experts, checks against known suspects, or targeted searches in relevant religious communities. For a case that might involve a serial abductor, the failure to transparently detail thorough testing of the only direct child eyewitness is a serious red flag. Whether the police work was actually poor or merely poorly communicated, the public and parliamentary record shows an investigative culture that answers criticism with generic assurances rather than with verifiable methodological rigor.

The Northern District also received criticism for the overall tempo of intelligence processing. In an April 2025 Ynet investigation, a senior officer described an elaborate system in which every rumour and testimony is re‑checked by alternative “examiner” teams from other districts and even by police‑college trainees, precisely to avoid missing a critical link. Yet in the same article, the case is still at a standstill: no suspect, no body, and no decisive scenario. The existence of multiple re‑review layers, combined with no result, is itself an indication that the early, local investigative stages may have failed to capture and exploit time‑sensitive leads such as vehicle movements, cell‑tower data, and witness memories before they degraded.

  1. Ministries and quasi‑state bodies: Aliyah & Integration Ministry, Jewish Agency

The Ministry of Aliyah & Integration and the Jewish Agency sit in a more indirect but still important tier of responsibility. The Jewish Agency runs the Safed absorption center where the child lived, coordinated with the family, and offered a large reward for information—raising it over time to hundreds of thousands of shekels. The ministry, for its part, issued statements of concern and worked with the Agency but did not lead the investigation. Their main failure, as highlighted by activists and later by the Knesset committee, is not operational but structural: the absorption center, home to a vulnerable, recently arrived Ethiopian family, lacked an adequate layered security and child‑protection regime—door controls, CCTV coverage beyond immediate entrances, and clear protocols for minors going out to distribute flyers on election day. This did not cause the disappearance, but it created the environment in which a high‑risk situation could emerge without immediate detection.

  1. Parliamentary oversight: MK Oded Forer and the Aliyah & Absorption Committee

MK Oded Forer, as chair of the Knesset Aliyah, Absorption and Diaspora Affairs Committee, became the key oversight figure. In August and November 2024 he held hearings on the case, heard the father’s disclosures about the “man with peyot” testimony and the Kiryat Malakhi balcony witness, and called the handling of the case a scandal. He demanded the creation of a commission of inquiry headed by a judge and ordered follow‑up sessions specifically to track how leads like the Kiryat Malakhi evidence were being pursued. In this sense, Forer used the tools at his disposal to highlight the failures.

Yet structurally, the committee did not manage to translate its criticism into binding operational change. No judicial commission was established in 2024–2025; the case was not moved to Lahav 433 or backed by Shin Bet until more than a year after the first Knesset hearings. Forer’s failure is thus one of limited efficacy: he articulated the problem clearly but did not succeed in compelling the executive to act at the necessary level and speed.

  1. Private investigator and civil society: Judith Khalifa and the Kiryat Malakhi witness

At the bottom of the formal hierarchy but central in practice stand the family, private investigator Judith Khalifa, and the Kiryat Malakhi witness. Khalifa’s office brought forward two critical pieces of information from that witness: first, that he overheard men discussing “what was done with the girl,” and later that he saw a girl on a balcony in Kiryat Malakhi throwing or splashing water and shouting, “I am Haymanut Kasau.” These details were passed promptly to the police, but according to the father and Khalifa, it took about two weeks for officers to reach the witness—by which time he was already injured and ultimately hospitalized at Beilinson. Khalifa justifiably argued in the Knesset that if the case had been formally defined as a kidnapping, police would have had more legal and practical tools to act quickly on that lead, including phone‑location measures and a more aggressive search grid.

Khalifa’s limitations are less about wrongdoing and more about structural weakness: as a private actor, she cannot compel state agencies to prioritize a lead. Later, Ynet reported that the same witness was considered by relatives and police to be unreliable, “someone who tends to invent stories,” and that even rumors he had been poisoned were checked and medically disproved. That may be an accurate assessment of his reliability; however, in a context where no other strong post‑disappearance sighting exists, the combination of delay, his subsequent hospitalization, and the lack of a clearly documented search operation around the balcony address leaves a persistent sense of a lost opportunity. The system failed to treat this as a potentially critical time‑sensitive lead until it was largely stale.

In sum, the failure to find Haymanut Kasau so far appears less as the result of a single intentional act of sabotage and more as the cumulative effect of delayed escalation, procedural thinking, weak inter‑agency prioritization, and a reluctance to fully re‑orient the investigation around the strongest abduction scenarios. At every level—government escalation, police HQ strategy, regional operational follow‑up, ministerial environment, parliamentary enforcement, and private‑public interface—decisions that might have been defensible in isolation combine into a chronology that left critical leads under‑exploited and allowed time to erode the chances of saving a nine‑year‑old girl.

 

  • The 40‑hour helicopter lagas an early operational delay.
  • Police did not collect CCTV footage promptly from the absorption centre and the surrounding streets. As a result, some footage was no longer available by the time investigators requested it, a delay representing institutional neglect.
  • The lack of transparent methodological workon the “man with peyot” testimony as a form of dismissal.
  • The two‑week delayin reaching the Kiryat Malakhi witness and the absence of visible, intensive operations around that balcony as a combined delay‑plus‑downgrade.
  • The non‑use or non‑redeployment of dog unitsto the Kiryat Malakhi area despite a concrete sighting claim.
  • The 21‑month waitto transfer to Lahav 433 and the two‑year wait for Shin Bet involvement as strategic, high‑level delays in escalation.

Put together, these points support a thesis of systemic, repeated “slow‑walking” and premature downgrading of abduction‑oriented leads.

 

Leads from independent sources, which were not followed thoroughly:

1.     Yossi Eli’s investigation

  1. What Yossi Eli’s investigation shows (TikTok/TV piece)

Yossi Eli’s investigation “The disappearance failure of Haymanot is exposed: the suspect car and the CCTV” is a TV report.[13tv.co]​[youtube]​

  1. CCTV timeline on the night she disappeared
  • There are six CCTV cameras in the absorption center in Safed where Haymanot lived.
  • 18:53 – Haymanot leaves the absorption center and walks to the yard with a friend.
  • 18:56 – She is filmed playing with her friends.
  • 19:00 – A boy from the center brings leaflets; he, Haymanot and a friend go back inside together. This is the last time she appears on camera.

After 19:00 she is never seen again on any camera.[13tv.co]​

  1. The suspect Ford next to the absorption center
  • About three weeks after Haymanot disappeared, a volunteer named Doron finds a Ford car parked next to the absorption center.
  • He notices several very suspicious things:
    • The car has been painted with a brush.
    • The front wheels are off‑road/“terrain” wheels, the rear wheels are normal – two wheels were changed.
    • The headlights were replaced.
    • The rear door is physically screwed shut from the outside with metal screws and a plate.

In the investigation, the private investigator literally says about this car: “Look, the door is closed with screws from the outside… this is a kidnapping car.”

  1. Earlier attempted abduction in a light‑blue car
  • A 9‑year‑old friend of Haymanot tells the investigators: a light‑blue car previously stopped next to them.
  • The driver was religious, with a beard and a large hat, and could not run well.
  • He shouted at the girls to enter the car and said: “Get in or I will take you.”
  • The girls refused and ran away.

This story explains why the Ford, which was originally light blue and then repainted, is seen by the investigators as deeply suspicious.

  1. How the investigation describes the police failures
  • Yossi Eli’s piece says the car “slipped under the nose of the police” for a long time.
  • Doron reports the car to the police; he “raises all the red flags” for them.
  • The investigation shows that police even filmed the same Ford a month earlier during mounted searches (police on horses) near the absorption center, but the car was not seized or fully forensically examined at that time.
  • Only after the TV investigation airs does the police summon the owner for questioning and decide to check the car for fingerprints and DNA – and even then, the investigators say it is probably too late to get good evidence from it.
  1. Police official response (as shown in the TV item)

At the end of the TV investigation, Channel 13 shows the official written response of the Israel Police:[13tv.co]​[youtube]​

  • They say the search for Haymanot started at about 08:30 the next morning, that the event was reported at 10:01, and that police arrived at 10:15.
  • They say the girl’s testimony about the earlier attempted abduction was examined thoroughly and rejected, in light of other evidence.
  • They say the suspect car was checked already in the first days, the car holder gave a detailed statement, and his involvement was ruled out.
  • They add that dozens of people seen on CCTV were identified, and that people presented in the report as possible suspects were in fact civilians who came to help in the search.
  • The lawyer of the car owner says his client has nothing to do with the case and accuses the journalists of negligence.
  1. What the follow‑up article says (“After the investigation: the suspect car will be seized”)[13tv.co]​

It adds one new, clear fact:

  • After Yossi Eli’s televised investigation, the Nazareth Magistrate’s Court approved the police request to seize (confiscate) the suspect Ford for examination.

The article then repeats the same main points from the investigation:

  • The Ford was found about three weeks after the disappearance, right next to the absorption center in Safed.
  • It had been repainted with a brush; two wheels and the front headlights were changed; the rear door was screwed shut from the outside.
  • A friend of Haymanot told police about the earlier encounter with a light‑blue car whose driver tried to force them to get in.
  • The same police response is quoted again: the car was already checked earlier, the owner was questioned, and his involvement was ruled out.
  1. One‑sentence overall meaning
  • Yossi Eli’s investigation (also in TikTok form) shows CCTV from the night Haymanot disappeared and a highly suspicious Ford near the scene; it argues that the police reacted too slowly and did not seriously act on this car and on a prior attempted abduction in a light‑blue car.
  • The follow‑up article reports that only after this investigation did a court allow police to formally seize the suspect Ford, while the police publicly insist that they had checked the car and the driver already and found no connection.

2.      Kidnapping attempt in Beersheva

Haymanut’s friend was the victim in a serious attempted kidnapping in Beersheba; this man was briefly treated as a major suspect in Haymanut’s abduction, but police later announced there is no evidentiary link between the two cases. [mako.co.il][ynet.co.il]

  1. Who is the Beersheba victim and what happened
  • The girl in the Beersheba incident is Haymanut’s friend from the Safed absorption center; her family later moved from Safed to Beersheba.
  • According to reports, she recognized in Beersheba the same man she had known from Safed, a neighbour and friend of her parents.

What the attempt in Beersheba looked like (from CCTV and her testimony):

  • The suspect, a 63‑year‑old man from Beersheba, comes to her home or apartment building and enters the flat.
  • He asks for water, then, according to the girl, touches her, hugs her, locks the door and grabs her hand so she cannot leave.
  • She manages to escape, screams, and goes to a neighbor who calls the police.

In an interview, she says about him: “I knew him from Safed, everyone knows him there,” and states that he tried to pull her and take her out of the house.

  1. Her previous testimony about Haymanut’s disappearance
  • This same girl had already given a statement to police in the Haymanut case while they still lived in Safed.
  • In that statement, she said that on the day of Haymanut’s disappearance or close to it, the two girls were in a playground near the absorption center in Safed.
  • According to her, two men with ultra‑Orthodox appearance and tzitzit came there; she says she stepped away briefly, and when she returned, Haymanut was gone.
  • Other versions reported in the media (and in earlier Channel 13 material) say she connected at least one man she saw in Safed with the same man she later saw in Beersheba.

Thus, from the investigators’ point of view, this girl created a bridge between:

  1. a suspect man connected to Safed and her family;
  2. the disappearance of Haymanut;
  3. a new, filmed attempted kidnapping in Beersheba.
  4. How the Beersheba case was investigated and why it became a lead
  • After the Beersheba attempt was publicized, police announced they were checking a possible link between this case and the disappearance of Haymanut.
  • The case was assigned to Lahav 433, the national major‑crimes unit, reflecting that it was treated as a high‑priority and potentially strategic lead.
  • The suspect was arrested, and the Rishon LeZion Magistrate’s Court extended his detention several times.
  • In hearings, the police and prosecution argued that there was reasonable suspicion that he was not only responsible for the indecent assault/attempted kidnapping in Beersheba, but possibly also involved in Haymanut’s abduction from Safed about 1.5–2 years earlier.
  1. How and why the link was ruled out
  • As the investigation progressed, police told the court that no direct evidence was found tying this suspect to Haymanut’s disappearance.
  • According to Israeli media and a Jerusalem Post summary, police eventually stated that the evidentiary link between the Beersheba suspect and the Safed case had “significantly weakened.”
  • A representative of the police told the Rishon LeZion Magistrate’s Court that his suspected involvement in the Haymanut case was ruled out, even as they continued to investigate him for the Beersheba assault/attempted kidnapping.
  • Reasons given in open sources are generic: absence of supporting forensic or corroborating evidence and inconsistencies between initial suspicions and what was actually found in checks of his movements, phone data, and other intelligence (exact technical details are under gag order).
  • The court accepted clearing him in relation to Haymanut but kept him in custody for the Beersheba case based on strong evidence of indecent acts and assault and fear of obstruction of justice.
  1. Geography: Kiryat Gat, Beersheba, and “southward leads”
  • Safed (Tzfat) is in the north. From there, many investigative and media speculations looked at possible southbound movement if a kidnapper drove with a vehicle.
  • Kiryat Gat lies on Route 40 between the center and the south of Israel; Beersheba is further south on the same axis (Route 40 / Route 6 connections). Driving distance between Kiryat Gat and Beersheba is about 30–35 km, roughly 20–25 minutes by car under normal conditions.
  • In various discussions of “southern leads,” commentators and investigators noted:
    • If an abducted child were transported from the north toward the south, the Kiryat Gat–Beersheba corridor is a natural line of movement.
    • The fact that a key witness from Safed later relocated to Beersheba, and that a serious attempted kidnapping occurred there, seemed to support the idea that attention should not focus only on the north, but also on migration and mobility patterns of potential suspects and community members (Safed → southern towns, including Beersheba).

From Tehran to Tampa: Iranian Proxy Networks Operating Through Florida’s 501(c)(3) Sector

As the United States confronts Iran’s expanding proxy architecture across the Middle East, this report documents a dimension of that challenge that has received insufficient regulatory attention: the degree to which U.S.-based civil-society infrastructure has been used to platform, sustain, and confer legitimacy upon individuals tied to Iranian-backed proxy organizations operating domestically.

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Syria’s Accommodation of Foreign Jihadists Backfires

The Syrian government’s effort to integrate foreign fighters into its armed forces may be unraveling.

On May 5, Syrian authorities arrested 16 Uzbek fighters following a standoff with armed members of the Uzbek community in the northwestern province of Idlib. The confrontation erupted after Syrian security forces detained an Uzbek fighter in the Syrian army for looting, prompting dozens of Uzbek militants to surround the security headquarters in Idlib. Clashes also erupted between government forces and Uzbek fighters in the Idlib village of Kafraya. Uzbek jihadists, most notably members of Katibat al-Tawhid wal-Jihad (Battalion of Monotheism and Jihad), a U.S.- designated terrorist organization, have preserved their extremist affiliations and demonstrated questionable loyalty despite the accommodating stance of the government in Damascus.

Most of the foreign fighters were part of the jihadist coalition under the leadership of Ahmad al-Sharaa that ousted the Bashar al-Assad regime. Now president, Sharaa previously led Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), a force that emerged from al-Qaeda’s branch in Syria. After taking power, Sharaa rapidly integrated thousands of foreign fighters into the country’s new armed forces. Syrian defense ministry sources told Reuters last year that Sharaa defended this approach to Western skeptics on the grounds that excluding the foreign fighters would drive them back to al-Qaeda or the Islamic State.

Idlib Clashes Not a One-Off

The showdown in Idlib was only one of many clashes between the state and foreign jihadists. In October 2025, Syrian government forces launched an operation in the Harem camp near Idlib against foreign jihadists from Firqat al-Ghuraba (Foreigners Brigade), led by Omar Omsen, a U.S.- designated terrorist wanted by France for recruiting French nationals to fight in Syria. The clashes reportedly erupted after members of the group kidnapped a French girl in the camp and planned to extort her mother, which prompted Syrian forces to intervene. In response, Omsen called on foreign fighters across Syria to mobilize against the government.

Firqat al-Ghuraba has established a parallel policing system within its camp, holding trials and issuing sentences outside the authority of the Syrian state.

U.S.-Designated Terrorist Groups Remain in Syrian Army

The Syrian government originally sought to institutionalize the foreign groups by integrating segments of them into the military and security apparatus in an attempt to impose greater discipline through state control.

However, the ideological extremism of some of these factions — and their alleged involvement in massacres against religious minorities — has exposed the serious risks of this policy.

For example, Damascus integrated the Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP), a Uyghur jihadist group, into the Syrian army’s 84th Division, a unit reportedly composed largely of foreign fighters. TIP maintained longstanding ties to al-Qaeda, fighting alongside the group in Afghanistan before 2001, while its current emir, Abdul Haq al-Turkistani, sits on al-Qaeda’s Shura Council. In 2015, TIP fighters desecrated churches in Jisr al-Shughur in Idlib.

Another faction integrated into the 84th Division is Liwa al-Muhajireen wal-Ansar (Brigade of Emigrants and Supporters), a U.S.- designated Salafi-jihadist group comprising fighters from Arab countries as well as the North Caucasus. Sharaa promoted to the rank of colonel its commander, Dhu al-Qarnayn Zanour Abdul Hameed, who now serves as a commander within the 84th Division.

U.S. Should Use Leverage of Review Process To Press for Change

“Tell all foreign terrorists to leave Syria,” the White House press secretary posted last year following President Donald Trump’s first meeting with Sharaa. Trump had praised Sharaa and committed to lifting sanctions on Syria to facilitate its recovery. Trump demanded no formal concessions in return, but the White House made clear its reservations about Syria integrating jihadists.

Despite these concerns, Washington has never made progress in U.S.-Syrian relations conditional on Sharaa addressing the problem. The United States still retains leverage through Syria’s designation since 1979 as a State Sponsor of Terrorism (SST), a status Washington has been reviewing since December 2025. The United States should use the leverage provided by the SST review process to pressure Damascus to remove or demote foreign fighters within its security forces, particularly members of U.S.-designated terrorist organizations serving in the Syrian army. Additionally, Washington should press Damascus to refrain from deploying these factions to sensitive areas where sectarian tensions remain acute.

Ahmad Sharawi is a senior research analyst at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD). For more analysis from Ahmad and FDD, please subscribe HERE . Follow FDD on X @FDD . Follow Ahmad on X @AhmadA_Sharawi . FDD is a Washington, DC-based, nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.

 

An End to Israel Diplomatic Passivity

Israel has  finally formed a National Public Diplomacy Directorate, to address Israel’s standing in the public domain, where trashing of Israel has become the norm.

This initiative brings to mind the efforts of the writer Amos Kenan in 1969, just before my first year in Israel. Kenan inspired my work at the time.

Read what Amos Kenan had to say in 1969 and apply it to Israel of 2026.

His “letter to all good people”, inspired a new generation of Jews , in Israel and abroad,  to stand up for the integrity of the Jewish State .

https://israelbehindthenews.com/2015/09/18/a-man-who-inspired-davd-bedein-a-letter-to-the-all-good-people-from-amos-kenan-an-israeli-writer-who-died-in-august-2009/

Indeed, this is the  time for anyone who identifies with the integrity of people and state of israel to end Israel diplomatic passivity.

In that context, the  time has come to show zero tolerance for  the 2015 Palestinian statute which provides a salary for life for anyone who murders a Jew.

The time has come to demand that anyone who transfers funds as an incentive to convicted murderers be prosecuted as an accomplice to murder.

And that anyone in Palestinian leadership who gives the order to pay murderers be indicted for war crimes.

And then there is Qatar, a  genocidal threat to Jews, regardless of its strategic alliance with the US.

Qatar pours billions into a  well oiled machine of anti semitic cottage industry on every campus,

Thanks to QATAR, generations of academics  have bought into the Goebells notion that “a lie repeated often enough becomes believable.

The lethal power of what in Hebrew is known as lashon hara cannot be underestimated. 

All this begs the question: How can Jews convince US President Trump to distance himself from Qatar?

Well,  the most public personality who today has become an expert on  lashon hara is none other than Ivanka Trump,a convert to Judaism who is the daughter of the president.

Take a look at ivanka’s writings on the subject

The, time has come to ask Ivanka to give a lesson on lashon hara in the white house

Ivanka would focus on the Hebrew adage HAIM VEHAMAAVET BYAD HALASHON, translated as “the power of life and death is in the tongue”.

Share that with the president and try to shake him from Qatar

See the knowledge and passions of Ivanka in this regard https://tinyurl.com/5xzzcuf5