Four years ago, following the September 1996 opening of the Hasmonean Tunnel in Jerusalem, Palestinians policemen and Israeli soldiers exchanged heavy fire throughout the West Bank and Gaza Strip leaving 69 Palestinians and 14 Israelis dead, and more than 1,200 people wounded. The “September riots,” as they were called, invited a reality check by the Palestinian security services (PSS). While pursuing peace, the Palestinians have been planning and preparing for possibility of a next round of violence. Their security forces have improved their tactical sophistication, introduced new training methods and obtained new weapons and equipment. But after two weeks in October this year of intensive fighting against the Israel Defense Force (IDF) one may be puzzled by how poorly Palestinian policemen, so far, fared in combat.

Progress since September 1996

Being more than a regular police force and short of being an army, the twelve branches of the 40,000-strong PSS have been investing great efforts in order to learn the lessons from the previous major clash with the IDF. New weapons and tactics have been introduced, and training has improved considerably with Palestinian company and battalion commanders receiving professional training in Egypt, Yemen, Algeria, and Pakistan as commanders of combat units. Since 1999, the PSS have been training larger and larger formations, up to a battalion, in different combat scenarios including mock attacks on IDF posts and Jewish settlements. In the first half of 2000 alone, no fewer than six battalions held full-scale exercises in the Gaza Strip. In the attempt to increase the number of Israeli casualties in case of a war, the Palestinians recruited a large number of snipers equipped with telescopic sights for their M-16 and AK-47 rifles. In addition, it has been reported that some of the Palestinian security apparatuses obtained weapons prohibited by the Oslo agreements such as anti-tank missiles, shoulder launched anti-aircraft missiles, light mortars, and hand grenades.

Assessment of current PSS performance

Despite claims that the violence in the West Bank and Gaza Strip was pre-planned and tightly orchestrated by Yasser Arafat and his generals, the response and performance of the PSS show otherwise. Due to either lack of will or incompetence, Palestinian policemen failed to control the Palestinian masses that demonstrated against Israel in the friction points such as Nezarim Junction, Nablus, Ramallah, Bethlehem and Hebron. Two incidents from the past two weeks–the first being the destruction of the Jewish holy site Joseph Tomb in Nablus and the attack on the Palestinian police station in Ramallah where two Israeli soldiers were held by the police–showed lack of resolve of the Palestinian police in dealing with a rioting mob. In some other incidents Palestinian policemen took off their uniforms, joined the demonstrates and opened fire at IDF troops. This conduct is not only a result of lack of discipline and a fierce nationalism on the part of the policemen. The PSS lacks necessary equipment such as, shields, helmets, clubs, armored vehicles, tear gas and other non-lethal weapons to contain massive demonstrations.

Despite the heavy volume of fire exchanged between Palestinian policemen and the IDF and despite the long training they have undergone, Palestinian policemen failed to reach high level of marksmanship and proficiency with their weapons. Unlike the September riots in which PSS officers succeeded in killing 14 Israeli soldiers including some senior officers, in October 2000 not one Israeli soldier has been killed in combat with Palestinian police officers. By and large, Palestinian fire was sporadic and inaccurate. The sniper units which concerned the IDF have, so far, been proven to lack the necessary readiness.

Inherent Problems

The main problem in the operations of the PSS is lack of coordination. Since the establishment of the PSS in 1994, Arafat has built his security forces in such a way that only he can arbitrate among the different forces. This system of command ensured in time of peace that none of the security forces becomes powerful enough to pose a threat to his leadership. The competition and tense relations that have developed between the security chiefs are hardly conducive for the creation of general-staff-like body to oversee and coordinate the operations of the security apparatuses. As a result, coordination between the forces is poor, security chiefs do not feel accountable to agreements made with their colleagues, and at times even use the existing chaos to undermine each other. For example, prior to Ariel Sharon’s visit in Temple Mount the head of the Palestinian Preventive Security in the West Bank Jibril Rajoub assured Israel that the visit would not cause unrest. This guarantee was not upheld by the West Bank’s head of General intelligence Tawfic Tirawi who reportedly orchestrated the anti-Israeli demonstrations which took place after the visit.

Further, as violence broke out, Arafat, the commander-in-chief of all Palestinian forces, chose to travel abroad rather than manage the crisis from his command post in Gaza. The system of command and control that is so characterized by Arafat’s centralist style of command was doomed to collapse in his absence.

The Palestinians’ weak command and control system may undermine their capability to engage in a long, protracted war against Israel. the disunity between the services and the absence of general-staff-like body prevents effective control over the levels of supplies, manpower and ammunition, all essential for the war effort.

Another problem the PSS face is the growing power of the Tanzim, the armed wing of Fatah, headed by Marwan Barghouti (see Peace Watch # 284).

Armed Tanzim activists tend to brush off the uniformed policemen and disobey their instructions. Palestinian policemen are reluctant to confront the militia which has grown to become the most visible and active armed body of the PA. Arafat, on his side, prefers to yield leading role of his armed intifada to the popular, plain clothed Tanzim activists. This enables him to present the Palestinian struggle as an authentic popular uprising. As a result, the units of the Palestinian police are prevented from exercising the power and authority granted to them by the Oslo agreement and the PA.

Conclusion

As the crisis in the West Bank and Gaza Strip seems to be escalating and more means of violence are gradually introduced, it is still unclear whether the weakness of the Palestinian police is due to low military effectiveness or a result of a calculated decision by Arafat to spare, at least for the moment, his uniformed armed forces from the fray. If the answer is the former, Arafat has surely noticed the weakness of his security services and is likely to continue to rely heavily on the loyalty and enthusiasm of the Tanzim as his main tool of war. Alternatively, Arafat could have chosen to keep the lion share of his security forces disengaged from the fighting and put them into action if and when an all-out-war with Israel is declared. This could explain why the PA has not used so far any of the anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons it is reported to have despite the fact that Israel has employed similar kinds of weapons against Palestinian targets. It could also explain why the Palestinian police has not launched organized attacks against Israeli targets despite their proven capability to do so.

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