Over the past few days, V.O.P. has been adopting a two-tier information policy regarding the election of Ariel Sharon both before and after the election.

Before the Election

On the one hand, the PA took no official position on the contest between Sharon and Ehud Barak.

On the other hand, Senior PA officials such as Yasser Abd-Rabbo and Saeb Erikat focused on the dangers of Sharon’s potential election, and the Voice of Palestine ran detailed profiles calling Sharon a mass murderer whose intent was prosecuting endless war against the Arabs.

On the one hand, the PA took no stand against the planned boycott or organized blank-ballot led by the Israeli Islamic movement and various Israeli Arab political parties, respectively.

On the other hand, the PA and the Voice of Palestine missed few opportunities to suggest strongly that the election-especially of Sharon-would have a pivotal impact on the “peace process” and on the “struggle to achieve our national goals.”

Why did the PA adopt a two-tier policy before the election?

Perhaps for three reasons:

  • It did not want to be accused of interfering in Israeli affairs, especially when trying to help Barak would only have backfired anyway;
  • It did not try to make a frontal effort to overcome Israeli Arab boycott and blank ballot plans because it was likely to fail, and there is almost nothing Yasser Arafat hates more than to be shown to be suffering temporary political impotence among his own people;
  • The poll figures in Israel (which once again showed a pro-Left bias beyond the purported statistical error-the 18-point poll edge will become a 26 or 27-point official margin of victory after soldiers’ ballots are counted) made it unrealistic for Arafat to risk any more of his political capital by supporting a sure loser (Barak) and unnecessarily angering a sure winner (Sharon).

After the Election

On the one hand, PA President Yasser Arafat is taking a “we-respect the-choice-of-the-Israeli-people” tone.
On the other hand, Arafat’s top minister and advisors are saying that the Israeli election means nothing and that Sharon must implement even unsigned Barak-Arafat understandings.

On the one hand, Arafat and his advisor Nabil Abu-Irdeineh insist that they want peace.
On the other hand, Arafat’s top ministers and field officials-Saeb Erikat, Nabil Sha’ath, Yasser Abd-Rabbo and Marwan Barghouti-say the “Independence Intifada” will not only not stop but actually escalate until the Palestinians achieve total Israeli withdrawal to the 1967 frontiers, including first and foremost Jerusalem, dismantling of all settlements, and “the return of the refugees to their homes.”

On the one hand, Arafat says he wants comprehensive peace-“salaam kamil wa-shamil.”
On the other hand, Arafat and his top officials make it clear that they will not accept any interim settlements or staged withdrawals or phased agreements, and they will be ready to increase violence that will endanger regional stability. They hint broadly at effects on oil prices and a regional war.

On the one hand, they insist that they never accepted the Clinton proposals for an Israeli-Palestinian settlement.
On the other hand, they insist on the Clinton proposals as the starting point for further Israeli concessions. On the one hand, they call for an increased American role to push Israel into compliance.

On the other hand, they insist and invite the European community, Russia and the United Nations (especially Kofi Anan and Mary Robinson) to impose a settlement on Israel and to investigate, try, convict and punish (NOTE: Arafat and his Justice Minister Freih Abu-Medein are willing to skip straight to the punishment phase) Israeli war criminals.

Conclusions

Does this mean that war or even unending Palestinian-Israeli confrontations are inevitable?

Not necessarily.

Despite the fact that Arafat’s popularity actually rose with the rise in violence, the Palestinian-Israeli War of Attrition has caused severe internal crisis in the Palestinian camp.

There is a possibility that a new balance of power, a new balance of deterrence/aspirations may be struck between Arafat and Sharon, especially if Sharon is able to consolidate his government.

But this will require Sharon overcoming tremendous obstacles, and it will also require Arafat to lessen the expectations of his people, while re-educating them to the idea that “cooperation with Israel” is not something for which one will face a firing squad.

In preparation for his PhD at Bar Ilan University, Michael Widlanski has been following the official media of the nascent Palestinian Authority for the past five years.

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