Yasser Arafat has many faces. He is prone to sudden outbursts of anger, he weeps uncontrollably, sometimes makes violent threats, sometimes gets carried away giving compliments, sometimes goes deep into his shell. When he wants to relieve stress, he pops animated children”s movies or old westerns into the VCR.

When he was a child, he would divide all of the neighborhood children into groups, lead them on marches, and would beat with a stick those who disobeyed his orders. If psychologists can be believed, then since his mother’s death when he was four years old, Arafat has consistently suppressed his feelings, has avoided intimate relationships, and has lived a life pursued by feelings of betrayal.

On more than one occasion in the past, his personality has been analyzed by reputable psychological and psychiatric clinics in the West, most of whom were working for intelligence organizations. Childhood experiences, traumas, scars, the cultural milestones of his life, the small and large perversions and satisfactions — these were all combined to form a psychological profile, and the psychologists believed that they could understand his motives and the way he thinks.

Over the past few months, the broadest psychological analysis of Arafat ever done has been carried out, based on thousands of pieces of biographical information, studies of his leadership and his personality, from his early childhood until the present day. This time, faced with the violent conflict and the diplomatic freeze, the researchers were asked not only to put together a portrait, but to reach operational conclusions and make recommendations and look at the possibilities of success in future negotiations with the PA under his leadership. They were also asked to put together a “Do/Don’t” list for Israeli leaders who come in contact with Arafat.

The project was initiated by two men. The first, Dr. Shaul Kimhi, considered the pioneer of political psychology in Israel, has achieved wide international recognition. Kimhi served for years as special adviser to IDF Intelligence and as a clinical psychologist in the service of the intelligence community, even receiving the Intelligence branch’s Commander’s Prize for creative thinking. The second man behind the project is reserve Col. Shmuel Even, a doctor of economics and an adviser on strategy and administration, and a member of the Jaffee Center for Strategic Research at Tel Aviv University. Even served as a senior officer in IDF Intelligence and was involved in the research division’s national intelligence assessments at the time of the Oslo accord. [… ] Regarding the connection between the research and his current profession, Even says, “Arafat affects the dollar rate here more than the governor of the Bank of Israel… “

Prepared to Suffer Casualties

The conclusion that stands out most in the report is an extremely harsh criticism of the unilateral separation plan. According to the researchers, this will only encourage Arafat to continue the armed conflict. If and when Israel carries out such a plan, meaning a withdrawal from most of the territories under its control without an agreement, the researchers claim that Arafat would see himself as responsible for causing Israel a crushing military defeat, the likes of which has not been seen in the history of the Arab nation. “As voices in Israel calling for a unilateral withdrawal grow louder, and as a lesson learned from the success of Hizbullah in bringing about the IDF’s withdrawal from South Lebanon, they write, it strengthens Arafat’s belief that the Intifada is the way to apply pressure on Israel in order to improve his standing in negotiations, and the tool that will cause Israel to unilaterally withdraw without an agreement… “

The researchers write, “Arafat will choose the path of negotiations only if he sees that nothing can be achieved by the continuation of the violent conflict, and so he should not be allowed to make any political achievements as a result of violence.[… ]” They also write that unilateral separation will strengthen the opposition movements in the Arab world and will decrease the Arab world’s motivation to reach peace agreements with Israel in the future.

“The things we wrote about unilateral separation are not a political statement or recommendation”, says Dr. Kimhi. “We did not draft this recommendation by taking into consideration all of the factors that exist in the region. We related only to one factor, Arafat, on a personal level”.

Alongside their treatment of the unilateral withdrawal proposal, the researchers also make a series of recommendations regarding Israel’s handling of the violent conflict in the territories. Massive Israeli military pressure on the Palestinian Authority, they say, will not affect Arafat, and will not cause him to make his positions more flexible. On the contrary, in crisis situations and under siege, Arafat feels his best, tends to take chances and is willing to suffer casualties. He feels great satisfaction when fighting a force larger than himself. In such moments, he shows an unmistakable unwillingness to compromise. Pinpoint military actions, on the other hand, are more effective, in their opinion, because they upset Arafat’s feeling of control of the situation. Economic pressure on the population, such as closures and cutting off water and electricity, will also have no effect on Arafat, according to the researchers. On the contrary, such pressure even causes a certain satisfaction, because it serves him in Arab world and Western public opinion and allows him to display the distress of the Palestinian population.

If so, what kinds of pressure do affect him? Stopping the flow of tax money that Israel collects and funnels directly into PA coffers, and stopping foreign aid, say the researchers, will have an effect”. Mubarak Yes, Assad No

Among their other recommendations, the researchers say that Arafat should not be presented with ultimatums, certainly not in public. Arafat believes with all his heart that such steps are meant to embarrass him. The researchers recommend that Israel treat him with respect and make various gestures to him in connection with his personal standing, as these affect his mood more than anything else. Instead of ultimatums, the researchers say that a business approach should be used, an equation that would say, “Give us X and you’ll get Y.” According to the report, American pressure does have an effect on Arafat, but will not bring about a change in his position in any of the main areas of conflict such as the future of Jerusalem or the right of return. Mubarak, though, is capable of influencing him. Bashar Assad and King Abdullah, on the other hand, have hardly any influence. [… ]

Amazing Patience

Past research reports established that Arafat is a capricious leader who reacts to events instinctively and emotionally and is willing to be flexible only when pushed to the brink of the chasm. The new research, however, says that Arafat has all of the characteristics of a leader capable of broad strategic thinking and who makes long-term plans: He defines his vision, sets clear goals, identifies the “players” in the arena, sets “red lines” and sticks to them throughout the years, uses all of the tools that can be used to achieve his goals, and chooses a path of action by identifying its relative advantages.

Most people that write about him claim that he does not have any strategy. We think he does,” says Dr. Kimhi. “He is calculating, he always checks which way the wind is blowing, and he has clear goals in the long-term. He is always looking at the peak, even if his tactics are ridden with contradictions and impulsive behavior. Even if he always walks a fine line and sometimes crosses it, overturns the tables and is not afraid of moves that could endanger the accomplishments that he made in negotiations, these are calculated moves. They are a result of his basic assumptions, for example, that time is on the side of the Palestinians. Arafat is a man with amazing patience.” [… ]

Arafat, who is depicted in the research report as a calculating leader with an outstanding strategic sense, is on the other hand also a man who suffers from emotional instability. For example, he demands extreme appreciation from those around him, shows signs of megalomania and has a real emotional need to display superiority and excellence. When he says, “I am the most important man in the Middle East,” he means it. Arafat suffers from over-sensitivity to criticism, according to the researchers, and he has a tendency towards angry outbursts. He is depicted as someone obsessed with independence. His wife Suha once recounted that he darns his own socks and sews his own buttons. When, on one occasion, she offered to do it for him, he said, “Never”. He cannot accept the authority of others.

Arafat is also obsessively suspicious, in constant need of stimulation, and finds it difficult to enjoy moments of quiet and periods of calm. [… ] His constant trips abroad show, according to the researchers, obsessive activity, which has accompanied him ever since he was a hyperactive child.

In the professional jargon of the world of psychology, the report establishes that he shows characteristics of paranoia, narcissism, and a borderline personality disorder. “Yes, he has characteristics of a personality disorder”,says Dr. Kimhi, “but he is certainly sane, and the various disorders do not seriously affect his behavior. He is a sane man, but very different from what we are familiar with”.

“He is mainly a one-dimensional man”,the researches define Arafat. He has never read a novel in his life, never taken a walk in nature, has not been to the theater in years. He has no friend, no buddy, and has no need for one. His emotional world is deficient. The researches say Arafat fills his emotional lacks by devoting his entire life to one thing, the Palestinian struggle, and suppressing all the rest. “That is why he does not suffer from loneliness” Kimhi says.

The research also highlight Arafat’s theatrical abilities. “He is capable, on the same day, of being president, commander, terrorist, victim and peace-maker. He can change roles in the blink of an eye. On some of the times he’s broken out in tears, these were planned outbursts. It’s hard to know what to do, on the most basic level, when he sits with Israeli journalists and sheds tears and talks about peace, and two hours later gives an aide an order to make sure the fires bugs.

“Arafat is most of all not a credible person and his word cannot be trusted”,according to the report. “He has no emotional problem with lying, and it doesn’t bother him to lie. At the same time, he is sure that everyone around him is lying to him… He is very sensitive about his place in history, and spends time thinking about how he will be remembered and what will be written about him and about his leadership…

In general, many psychological assessments have to do with the death of Arafat’s mother. Researchers theorize and connect this traumatic event to the fact that this man grew up suffering from many emotional losses, and very little emotional support. The death, they say, caused in him an extreme suppression of emotions, as well as a reduced ability to make intimate connections, and a difficulty in understanding and empathizing with the other side.

He learned from a very early age that he could rely only on himself. This fight for survival developed in him a great suspicion of people on the one hand, and an unending need to demonstrate to those around him how much more successful he is than them. This need is accompanied by much belligerency, since already as a youth, he began his involvement in underground activity and stood out as a leader of Palestinian students in Cairo. He lives with the sense of being a victim, has lived all of his life as a leader running for his life and in a constant fight for survival. He is not built, write the three researchers, for a sharp transition to a life of peace and cooperation.

And there is also some surprise gossip in the article: Regarding rumors that the PA chairman is a homosexual, the researchers write: It is likely that these rumors are not grounded in reality. Had intelligence information indicated a different reality, there is no doubt that the authors would have been aware of it.

This article appeared in Yedioth Ahronoth on November 30, 2001

RELATED ARTICLESMORE FROM AUTHOR