The “Prisoner’s Document: Basis of the Abbas Referendum

The so-called “prisoners’ document,” which is aimed at cooperation between the PLO and Hamas, does not read like document for peace and reconciliation between Israel and Palestinian Arab people.

The document was drawn up in May 2006 at the Hadarim prison by representatives of the Palestinian prisoners, Marwan Barghouti (Fatah), Abed el-Halek el-Natshe (Hamas), Mustapha Badarne (Democratic Front), Abd el-Rahim Maluch (Popular Front), and Bassam e-Said (Islamic Jihad). The beauty of the document, from the Palestinian point of view, is that it does not recognize Israel, it does not even recognize the three conditions of the international community for recognition of Hamas, explicit recognition of Israel, acceptance of the agreements signed with Israel, and cessation of terrorism.

Suppose Abu Mazen persuades Hamas to accept the prisoners’ initiative, or submits the issue, as he wishes, to a referendum, and wins. In what situation will the State of Israel be then? In Jerusalem a prognosis is being made but for some reason it has not yet been backed by the country’s leadership. That prognosis is that in such a case Israel will be in a very difficult political situation. Everybody knows that as soon as Hamas accepts the document, this will be interpreted in the world as meaning that Hamas has recognized Israel, and from that moment Hamas will be recognized as a legitimate factor. This is in spite of the fact that the document contains elements which are very problematical for Israel.

They begin with the first article: “The Palestinian people in its homeland and in the diaspora is striving to liberate its land and to realize its rights to freedom, independence and return, self-determination, including its right to establish an independent state, with beloved Jerusalem as its capital, on all the territories of 1967, to ensure the right of return for the refugees and to liberate all the prisoners. This is based on the historic right of our people to the land of our forefathers, on United Nations conventions, on international law and on decisions of the United Nations.” All the problematical landmines are packed into one article: the right of return, withdrawal to the 1967 borders, and Jerusalem as the capital of the Palestinian state.

Article 2 states: “The national interest makes it obligatory to establish a new national council before the end of 2006, so that representation of all the factors and factions, national and Islamic parties and groups in our people, in every place, all the sectors, institutions and personalities, will be ensured. This will be on a proportional basis and according to presence in the struggle, politics, society and public life. The PLO must be preserved as a broad front-line framework, as an all-inclusive national coalition, as a national framework which unites all the Palestinians in the homeland and the diaspora and as a supreme source of political authority.” Here is another landmine: Israel has recognized the PLO and will receive Hamas as a member organization in the PLO.

There is a practical sequel to this in article 6, which states that “a national unity government should be established, so that participation of all the factions in the Palestinian Legislative Council will be ensured, in particular the Fatah and Hamas movements.” Anyone who tries to draw a distinction between Abu Mazen and Ismail Haniya will find them in a government coalition if the prisoners document is accepted.

Article 3 states: “The Palestinian people has the right to resistance and to persevere in the choice of resistance by all means. Resistance should be focused in the territories captured in 1967, alongside political and diplomatic activity and conduct of negotiations, and continuation of the public and popular resistance to the occupation in all its forms, its presence and its policy. Attention should be devoted to expansion of participation of a variety of groups, sides, sectors and the public of our people in this popular resistance.” These 50 words can be summed up in two words: the terrorism will continue [two words in Hebrew].

That was a brief summary of the 18 articles in the prisoners’ document. Abu Mazen, for his part, insists on holding a referendum to gain acceptance for the document. An analysis of the steps which he has taken reveals a great deal of logic in his position, and in that of Hamas, according to its lights. After Olmert’s visit to the United States and the public undertaking which he gave to President Bush that he would renew the negotiations with Abu Mazen, the latter perceived the possibility of renewing the talks with Israel, but he feared – with justification – that Hamas would torpedo the negotiations on every issue placed on the table, or would force him to submit any agreement which he reached with Israel to the government – the Hamas government.

Consequently, Abu Mazen adopted an ostensibly neutral initiative, which nobody could oppose: “the prisoners’ document,” the document prepared by those who had personally sacrificed their freedom in the cause of the Palestinian struggle.

Why then does Hamas reject the document? Because it is perceived as an initiative of Abu Mazen, and in the arm-wrestling of the Palestinian leadership, Hamas fears that accepting Abu Mazen’s idea will be interpreted by the Palestinian public as weakness on the part of Hamas.