July 1, 2010

Tally Helfont is an FPRI research fellow. Her research
focuses on Middle East-related issues and radical Islamic
movements. She also instructs training courses on behalf of
K3 Enterprises in Civil Information Management to U.S.
Military Civil Affairs Units and Human Terrain Teams
assigned to Iraq and Afghanistan.

THE MAVI MARMARA INCIDENT, RAFAH, AND EGYPT’S STEEL WALL

by Tally Helfont

The Gaza Strip has represented a potentially strategic
threat on both the local and regional levels for the past
several years. During this time, various steps have been
taken by Israel, Egypt, the United States, and the European
Union to try to mitigate the considerable challenge posed by
Gaza, though with very limited success. However, one recent
measure initiated by the Egyptian government — the building
of a steel wall underneath the Egyptian-Gazan border —
stands a chance of making a decisive change on the ground.
Cairo began constructing an underground border barrier in
December 2009 in order to halt the smuggling of illegal
weapons and other contraband via the Hamas-run underground
tunnel network. This wall, however, is also emblematic of a
new fault line that has emerged between competing sides in
the Middle East, pitting the Palestinian Authority, Egypt,
Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Israel, and the United States against
Hamas, Hezbollah, Syria, Iran, and in certain instances,
Turkey.

(For more on this, see Tally Helfont, “Egypt’s Wall with
Gaza and the Emergence of a New Middle East Alignment,”
Orbis, Vol. 54, No. 3, (Summer 2010), available at:
http://www.fpri.org/orbis/5403/helfont.egyptandgaza.pdf )

This fault-line was further illustrated by the recent Gaza-
bound flotilla incident. On May 30th, a six-ship flotilla
carrying 700 activists from 38 countries and 10,000 tons of
humanitarian aid attempted to break the Israeli blockade of
Gaza. After the flotilla refused to unload its cargo at the
port of Ashdod for inspection prior to delivery, Israeli
navy boats intercepted the flotilla approximately 80 to 100
miles from the Israeli coast on May 31st. Naval commandos
attempted to take peaceful control of the ships, but were
unsuccessful in the case of the MV Mavi Marmara, a vessel
owned and operated by a Turkish NGO. This particular
confrontation ended in bloodshed with nine activists killed
and several Israeli commandos badly injured.[1] While the
details, surveillance footage, and accounts of this raid are
highly disputed, international pressure and attention have
focused on Israeli policy. But what about Egypt?

The flotilla’s impact on Cairo must be measured along three
lines: a) the Rafah border crossing, b) the status of the
underground steel wall that Egypt has continued constructing
under this border, and c) Egypt’s position vis-…-vis
Turkey’s actions and Israel’s response.

1) The Rafah crossing. As far as the first item is
concerned, it should be noted that, more than anything else,
the flotilla incident has focused the world’s attention on
the untenable situation in Gaza in a way that Hamas and
Fatah combined have been unable to do in the past few years.
International calls have been made on every level to lift
the blockade on Gaza, some of which point the finger only at
Israel and others which point to both Israel and Egypt. In
response, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak gave instructions
“to open the Rafah terminal to bring humanitarian and
necessary medical aid to the Gaza Strip, and receive wounded
and sick humanitarian cases that require crossing into
Egyptian territory.” Sources in the government explained
that the decision was “within the framework of Egypt’s move
to lift the suffering of the Palestinian people in the Gaza
Strip” and that the crossing would remain open
“indefinitely.”[2] However, Egypt has yet to fully permit
free passage of Palestinians into its territory. Likewise,
convoys of supplies and aid that were dispatched from all
over Egypt, in part to test whether Mubarak’s words were
accompanied by actual changes on the ground, experienced
significant difficulties in getting their supplies to Gaza.
According to several accounts in the Egyptian press, while
medical aid was able to get to its intended recipients with
what can be considered a normal amount of scrutiny and
delay, construction materials and food have been unable to
get through Egyptian checkpoints. Organizers of some of
these convoys have said in the Egyptian press that they
attempted to test the seriousness of the decision to open
the Rafah border crossing but “_ know now that the border is
closed.”[3] Taking into consideration that Egypt allowed
select humanitarian aid to enter Gaza even before the
flotilla incident, the situation on the ground remains
largely the same.

2) The steel wall. The construction began in early
December 2009 and, while it was originally slated to be
completed sometime in 2011, recent statements by Egyptian
government officials have moved the date to summer’s end —
a significant advance. Stressing that the opening of the
Rafah crossing would not halt the construction of the wall,
an Egyptian official, who asked not to be named during a
meeting with a group of journalists, emphasized, “It is our
project, we will pass goods to them over the surface of the
earth (and not from underneath) and this must happen before
our eyes.”[4] In short, for the Egyptians, the smuggling
tunnels continue to pose a threat to its national security
on several fronts. Cairo, therefore, intends to continue its
chosen policy in this regard, independent of other decisions
relating to the actual border crossing.

3) Egypt’s position on Turkey and Israel. Egypt and Turkey
seem to have situated themselves on opposite sides of this
new regional divide on a host of critical issues. From this
perspective, Egypt is likely to see Turkey’s championing of
the Palestinian cause as part of Ankara’s growing regional
ambition including its increased cooperation with Iran.
Accordingly, the Egyptian press has been unrelenting in its
criticism of recent Turkish foreign policy choices, not
because it disagreed with the flotilla’s intention or its
outcome, but rather for usurping Cairo’s natural role as the
caretaker of the Palestinian issue and for advancing the
Iranian agenda. Of course, these grievances are never fully
addressed in the press. Instead, frustration most often
manifests in the form of accusing Turkish Prime Minister
Recep Tayyip Erdogan of crowning himself the new sultan of
the Middle East, and working to restore Ottomanesque Turkish
leadership over the region.

By contrast, Egypt’s reaction to the Israeli raid has been
largely muted and it seems as if it is leaving the most
inflammatory, anti-Israel rhetoric and threats to the Turks
and the Iranians. In response to intense international
pressure, Israel announced that it will work to ease its
blockade of Gaza. It is unclear how much change this will
bring to daily life in Gaza since the most critical need in
the territory presently is rebuilding the infrastructure; as
of yet, construction materials are still prohibited. Cairo’s
greatest fear is that Israel will push Gaza towards Egypt.
There have been reports in the press of an Israeli proposal
to disengage from Gaza entirely, which would leave the Strip
totally dependent on Egypt for goods and access. Mubarak’s
government strongly rejected this proposal. A spokesperson
for the foreign ministry said on June 15th, “This kind of
talk confirms what we have been saying for years, which is
that there is official Israeli thought which aims to evade
responsibility for the Gaza Strip and dump it on Egypt.”[5]

Nevertheless, as the situation continues to develop, it will
become more apparent whether this incident was enough of a
catalyst to a) make a lasting change in Gaza and in the Gaza
policies of Egypt and Israel, and b) revive the floundering
Israeli-Palestinian peace process. In terms of the Middle
East alignment, it looks as if Turkey is moving toward one
side and Egypt remains firmly grounded on the other. While
the extent to which the Erdogan government is willing to
assist the likes of Iran and Hamas remains ambiguous,
Turkey’s recent moves are nearly as alarming to Egypt as
they are to Israel. Cairo has made clear, at least, that its
attitude towards Gaza, and its basic regional alignment, are
not about to change. As the Egyptians (and Israelis) have
more control over the land, air and sea around Gaza, Hamas’
new found friend in Turkey may be less helpful than
initially thought.

———————————————————-
Notes
[1] Carol Migdalovitz, “Israel’s Blockade of Gaza and the
Mavi Marmara Incident,” CRS Report for Congress, June 5,
2010.

[2] “President Mubarak Ordered the Rafah Crossing to Open
for an Indefinite Period,” Al Masry Al Youm, June 1, 2010,
<www.almasryalyoum.com>.

[3] For examples, see: Amira Howeidy, “Destination Rafah,”
Al-Ahram Weekly Online, No. 1002, June 10 – 16, 2010,
http://weekly.ahram.org.eg; Amira Howeidy, “Testing the
Border,” Al-Ahram Weekly Online, No. 1003, June 17 – 23,
2010, http://weekly.ahram.org.eg;

[4] “Egyptian Official: Steel Wall between Egypt and Gaza
will be Completed at the End of Summer,” Al-Dostor, June 7,
2010, <http://dostor.org >.

[5] “Egypt: Israel Wants to ‘Dump’ Gaza on Us,” Haaretz,
June 15, 2010, <www.haaretz.com>

———————————————————-
Copyright Foreign Policy Research Institute
(http://www.fpri.org/). You may forward this essay as you
like provided that it is sent in its entirety and attributed
to FPRI., provided that you send it in its entirety.
.

RELATED ARTICLESMORE FROM AUTHOR