According to the common narrative, Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu agreed to release a group of terrorist murderers as the “entrance fee” for talks with the Palestinians because:

#1. In the absence of talks, Israel faced a nightmare at the UN (sound familiar? “tsunami” anyone?).

#2. Israel wanted to avoid losing the “blame game” by being identified as the party responsible for the failure of the “peace process”.

#3. Mr. Netanyahu has truly existential matters to address in the timeframe that coincides with the length of the talks and participating in the talks facilitates addressing these truly existential matters.

Which brings us to the obvious question: what happens the day that the last group of pre-Oslo terrorists is released and the Palestinians express their profound disappointment and frustration due to the ongoing refusal of Israel to cross various “red lines”?

“Red lines”, by the way, that American officials and many retired Israeli security officials and leading Israeli journalists consider “crossable”.

What happens then?

#1. Will we be any better prepared to address Palestinian action at the UN and other international forums?

#2. Will we have a strategy in place for minimizing the consequences of losing the “blame game”?

And most important:

#3. Will we have a viable game plan on the shelf in the event that it turns out that the truly existential matters aren’t resolved before the talks?

My concern?

That in the absence of a workable post-talks plan, the concessions and gestures Binyamin Netanyahu may feel compelled to make in order to extend the talks will be magnitudes worse than the painful and costly release of the pre-Oslo terrorists that facilitated launching the talks.

Dr. Aaron Lerner, Director IMRA (Independent Media Review & Analysis)
(Mail POB 982 Kfar Sava)
Tel 972-9-7604719/Fax 972-3-7255730