Introduction

The War of Redemption (Swords of Iron) quickly expanded into a multi-theater conflict, challenging Israel simultaneously across several fronts. Of the seven primary arenas in which the Israel Defense Forces operated—Gaza, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Iran, and the domestic front—the Lebanese arena emerged as the decisive northern theater, defined by sustained confrontation with Hezbollah. Operations in Lebanon evolved through three distinct phases: an initial period of containment and attrition (October 2023–September 2024), a phase of intense combat in the north (September–November 2024), and the current enforcement phase, ongoing since late November 2024.

The Lebanese theater is now characterized by escalating tension. Hezbollah is systematically violating the agreement, rebuilding and expanding its military capabilities—particularly its indirect-fire systems—while refusing to disarm and steadily pushing the ceasefire framework toward collapse. This article assesses how Israel has conducted itself on the Lebanese front since the outbreak of the war, traces the successive phases of the fighting, examines the implementation of the 2024 ceasefire agreement and its persistent violations, and evaluates the strategic alternatives available to Israel. It also considers how developments in the Lebanese arena shape dynamics across the other theaters. The objective is to present an integrated analysis that clarifies the complex interaction among Israel, Hezbollah, Lebanon, and the United States.

Restraint and Mutual Deterrence

Relations between Israel and Lebanon are rooted in a long-standing conflict, culminating in the Second Lebanon War (2006), which ended with UN Security Council Resolution 1701. The resolution established a ceasefire, called for the disarmament of all armed groups in southern Lebanon, and transferred responsibility for security to the Lebanese Armed Forces, under the supervision of a UN force mandated to monitor and enforce compliance (UNIFIL). In practice, however, following the war, Hezbollah—backed and financed by Iran—consolidated as a parallel and dominant military force within the Lebanese state.

Since 2006, Israel pursued a policy of restraint and containment toward Lebanon. On the one hand, this policy rested on claims of effective deterrence, as Hezbollah avoided large-scale confrontation. On the other hand, Israel limited its proactive military activity largely to Syria, within the framework of the “campaign between wars,” as a partial and ultimately insufficient means of slowing Hezbollah’s extensive military buildup. That buildup included the construction of cross-border tunnels, the accumulation of precision-guided missiles, and the establishment of the Radwan Unit—a large, specialized assault force designed and trained for a ground incursion into Israel.

Between 2006 and 2023, Hezbollah carried out dozens of border attacks, yet Israel responded in a limited fashion each time. This restraint peaked in Israel’s decision not to strike a Hezbollah cell that attempted to infiltrate the Mount Dov area, as well as its prolonged inaction regarding the tents Hezbollah erected in the same sector. One notable exception to this containment policy occurred in 2018, when Israel conducted cross-border operations to locate and destroy attack tunnels penetrating its territory as part of Operation Northern Shield. While the operation successfully neutralized the tunnel infrastructure, Israel again refrained from broader escalation out of concern that it would trigger a full-scale war. With the benefit of hindsight, Israel’s long-standing policy of containment can now be seen as one of the factors that helped pave the way for the October 7 attack.

In the year leading up to October 7, three developments stood out as reinforcing the broader pattern of Israeli restraint and containment:

The first was the maritime gas agreement between Israel and Lebanon, signed by Prime Minister Yair Lapid in October 2022. Under the agreement, Israel relinquished territory within its territorial waters and exclusive economic zone in favor of Lebanon, in part to defuse tensions with Hezbollah and prevent it from acting on its threat to attack Israel’s Karish gas platform. The rushed signing of the agreement—during a transitional government and an election period—was justified as a vital measure to avert war, representing containment in its most explicit form.

The second development was Israel’s muted response to a bombing at the Megiddo Junction on March 13, 2023, likely carried out by Hezbollah, which seriously wounded a young Israeli.

The third was Hezbollah’s establishment of tents along the Mount Dov ridge in June 2023, at a location clearly within Israeli sovereign territory. Despite the blatant violation of sovereignty, the Israeli government refrained from military action to remove the encroachment and relied instead on diplomatic pressure. The tent was attacked and destroyed only on October 8, 2023, after Hezbollah partially joined Hamas and opened fire on Israeli territory.

Yahya Sinwar, Hamas’s leader in Gaza and the architect of the October 7 attack, interpreted Israel’s restraint as a sign of weakness—an assessment that reinforced his confidence in the plan and in its potential to advance Hamas’s strategic objectives.

Mutual deterrence proved fragile. Hezbollah built an arsenal exceeding 150,000 rockets and missiles, including precision-guided systems such as the Fateh-110. Israel’s restraint fostered an “illusion of stability,” within which Hezbollah continued to arm itself at minimal risk. Over time, informal yet broadly accepted rules of the game emerged: Hezbollah refrained from direct attacks on Israel, including during Israel’s military campaigns against Hamas in Gaza (2008, 2012, 2014, and 2021); in parallel, Israel almost entirely avoided striking inside Lebanon, except in rare cases and even then with deliberate efforts to prevent casualties. Most Israel operations to prevent weapons transfers and force buildup therefore took place on Syrian territory. The outbreak of the Syrian civil war in 2011 drew Hezbollah deeply into the conflict in support of the Assad regime, tying the organization down operationally, but simultaneously allowing its fighters to acquire substantial combat and operational experience through sustained engagement with rebel forces.

The outbreak of war on October 7 shattered this equilibrium. Hamas launched its assault from the Gaza Strip, and Hezbollah joined in—although initially with measured strikes, refraining from full-scale engagement. Had Hassan Nasrallah chosen to enter the campaign decisively and in parallel with Hamas’s southern attack, Israel’s strategic position would have been far more precarious. The northern border—vast and far more complex than the Gaza perimeter—was not configured to absorb a large-scale assault, and Hezbollah, with tens of thousands of trained fighters and an extensive tunnel network constructed along Israel’s frontier, represented a force several orders of magnitude more formidable than Hamas.

Containment and Absorption

Beginning on October 8, 2023, one day after Hamas’s attack, Hezbollah initiated limited rocket fire, later expanding to mortars and anti-tank missiles against IDF positions in the Upper Galilee. Initial targets were primarily military, including bases, observation posts, the border fence, and encampments. Israel responded with precision airstrikes against launchers, weapons depots, and junior commanders. This approach— “containment and absorption”—sought to prevent escalation while preserving deterrence: the IDF responded to each attack but avoided broader ground or air operations in order to concentrate on Gaza. To reduce civilian risk, Israel evacuated approximately 60,000 residents from border communities exposed to direct fire, a historically unprecedented step reflecting the severity of the threat. The evacuation, which began on October 9, depopulated large stretches of the border area, a reality Hezbollah exploited to expand its freedom of action.

This phase was marked by gradual escalation. Hezbollah expanded its fire: Kornet missiles hit Israeli tanks, Iranian-manufactured UAVs penetrated Israeli airspace, and rockets reached as far as central Israel. A turning point came on July 27, 2024, when a rocket fired from Lebanon struck a soccer field in Majdal Shams, killing 12 children and wounding 40 others. The incident, which shocked Israel, underscored the vulnerability of civilians along the northern border. Hezbollah claimed the strike was accidental; Israel assessed it as deliberate escalation. In response, Israel eliminated Hezbollah’s chief of staff, Fuad Shukr, and carried out extensive airstrikes against dozens of targets in Lebanon, including the Radwan Force headquarters, to disrupt preparations for large-scale launches.

During this period, Hezbollah fired roughly 8,000 rockets and missiles into Israel but avoided a ground incursion or sustained deep rocket strikes, deterred by the prospect of a severe Israeli response and due to its understanding of Israeli public discourse, which was centered on containment and de-escalation. The result was a “routine of fire,” which allowed Hezbollah to restore capabilities while sustaining limited damage, supported by continued Iranian resupply via Syria, then still under the Assad regime.

From Containment to High-Intensity Operations

The first major blow against Hezbollah, reflecting the shift in the character of the fighting, was the “pager operation” on September 17–18, 2024, when thousands of pagers used by Hezbollah operatives detonated simultaneously, killing approximately 40 operatives, including senior figures in eastern Lebanon, and wounding thousands more. The incident generated internal chaos, damaged morale, and starkly demonstrated Israel’s intelligence and technological superiority, leaving Hezbollah’s leadership visibly stunned. In response, the organization launched waves of rockets toward central Israel; however, most were intercepted by Israel’s air-defense systems.

The second phase consisted of a sustained series of strikes and targeted killings, culminating in the elimination of Hassan Nasrallah on September 27, 2024. His elimination shattered Hezbollah’s command structure and triggered a temporary escalation, with the organization launching roughly 200 rockets per day, striking IDF bases in the Galilee and other locations. Israel, in turn, struck approximately 1,000 targets per day, including missile production facilities and weapons depots.

This phase, and the severe damage inflicted on Hezbollah’s command-and-control system, enabled the transition to a ground maneuver in southern Lebanon. The operation, designated “Northern Arrows,” marked a dramatic shift in Israeli policy—from prolonged containment to comprehensive offensive action. Its stated objective was to dismantle Hezbollah’s capabilities in the area, particularly rocket launch infrastructure, infiltration tunnels, and Radwan Unit bases, while establishing a temporary security buffer inside Lebanon to shield Israeli communities on the other side of the border. The ground maneuver began on October 1, 2024, with IDF ground forces destroying numerous tunnels and ammunition stockpiles. An analysis of the IDF’s operational concept during the ground maneuver, and a critical assessment of it, will be presented later in this article.

Ceasefire and Enforcement

Under heavy pressure from the Biden administration in its final months, the parties agreed to a ceasefire on November 27, 2024. The agreement, initially set for 60 days (through January 26, 2025, and later extended), contained several provisions but suffered from inherent weaknesses—chief among them Hezbollah’s refusal to disarm, its rapid return to force buildup, and its efforts to preserve and expand its presence in southern Lebanon in violation of the terms. As a result, the ceasefire proved incomplete and in need of supplementation and revision. To address this gap, a violations-reporting mechanism was established, and Israel and the United States agreed—with the knowledge of the other parties—that if the Lebanese Armed Forces and UNIFIL failed to address Hezbollah violations, Israel would be entitled to act. For more than a year, Israel has conducted operations to enforce the agreement and disrupt Hezbollah’s attempts to rebuild and rearm.

Hezbollah’s continued refusal to disarm and its persistent violations of the ceasefire, combined with the transition in Washington and the entry into office of a Trump administration more supportive of Israel, enabled Israel to halt its withdrawal to the international border and retain five controlling positions inside Lebanon. Under U.S. pressure, the Lebanese government adopted a decision calling for Hezbollah’s disarmament, and the Lebanese Armed Forces prepared an implementation plan with firm timelines. In practice, however, the army has struggled to execute it. As of this writing (January 2026), the military situation in Lebanon remains tense and anchored in a fragile ceasefire.

As Iran continues its efforts to rehabilitate Hezbollah, which remains unwilling to disarm, the Lebanese government is attempting to navigate between U.S. pressure and Hezbollah’s threat of civil war should a serious attempt be made to disarm it by force. This dynamic is pushing Israel and the United States toward a decision point regarding the completion of Hezbollah’s disarmament through coercive means. The dilemma is sharpened by signals from Iran indicating a return to destabilizing behavior, including renewed efforts to restore its ballistic capabilities while continuing to arm its regional proxies—most notably Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Houthis in Yemen.

Analysis

Despite absorbing significant blows, Hezbollah remains weakened but not defeated. Intelligence assessments indicate that the organization has lost roughly 40 percent of its overall strength, including thousands of fighters, weapons stockpiles, and senior leaders. At the same time, Hezbollah has retained tens of thousands of rockets and missiles, including precision-guided systems. The Lebanese Armed Forces, with U.S. support, have reportedly dismantled close to 10,000 rockets and some 400 missiles belonging to Hezbollah as part of the first phase, though the precise scope of this action remains unclear. [1] Prime Minister Nawaf Salam recently claimed that this phase was “days away” from completion, but it is clear that this is not the case and that Hezbollah continues efforts to rebuild its capabilities, including in southern Lebanon.

Since the ceasefire, Israel has conducted hundreds of airstrikes in southern and eastern Lebanon, as well as several strikes in Beirut, including the killing of Hezbollah’s “chief of staff,” Ali Tabatabai, on November 23, 2025. Hezbollah threatened a “harsh” response and accused the Lebanese government of weakness. Senior figures, including the organization’s secretary-general Naim Qassem, have warned of “all-out war” if Israel does not withdraw; in practice, however, Hezbollah has continued to refrain from resuming fire into Israeli territory.

Hezbollah’s continued force buildup and attempts to restore its capabilities may, sooner or later, compel Israel to undertake broader action in Lebanon. In the previous campaign, Israel’s objectives were to force Hezbollah to halt its solidarity fire with Gaza without conditions and to force it to withdraw from areas south of the Litani River. The ceasefire achieved some of these goals and created legitimacy for Israel to pursue additional goals. In the wake of the ceasefire, Israel chose to concentrate its efforts on building capabilities and readiness for action against Iran, culminating in Operation Rising Lion in June, 2025. Israel may now be required to complete the task in Lebanon, including ground operations to dismantle terrorist infrastructure in the south and the establishment of a security buffer along the border to enable the reconstruction of communities damaged during the ware and the safe return of evacuated residents.

The central question at present is one of timing, alongside the need for coordination with the United States and for action undertaken with broad legitimacy. The timing question must be assessed against the operational reality in the other theaters, particularly Gaza and Iran. In both arenas, the task remains incomplete, and Israel will likely be required to act, sooner or later. Hamas’s force buildup in Gaza, Hezbollah’s continued strengthening in Lebanon, and Iran’s efforts to restore its ballistic array require the formulation of an approach that enables effective confrontation with these threats at a time most favorable to Israel. During Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s recent visit to the United States, these issues were discussed extensively, and judging by public statements and official briefings, Israel received approval to act in Lebanon in light of the Lebanese government’s failure to meet its commitments to the United States and to disarm Hezbollah by the end of 2025.

We believe it is necessary to critique the ground-force concept applied in the campaign in southern Lebanon, which left a substantial portion of terrorist infrastructure in the area. Israel’s maneuver focused on a frontal advance against the line of villages along the southern Lebanese border, in contrast to an alternative approach long discussed within the IDF: a rapid ground thrust toward the designated end lines of the fighting—whether the Litani, the Zahrani, or even the Awali Rivers—followed by stabilization along those lines and systematic clearing from north to south. Such an approach would likely have encountered limited resistance, given Hezbollah’s withdrawal northward, and would have enabled more thorough clearance of the area, as well as the establishment of a more effective security buffer than the five positions currently held by Israel.

In our assessment, the approach that was chosen was flawed both militarily and politically. Renewal of combat in Lebanon would allow the IDF to operate along the lines described above and pursue the creation of a more effective security buffer, particularly given that Israel is acting in coordination with the U.S. administration, which views Hezbollah as responsible for the failure to implement the agreement and is frustrated by Lebanon’s inability to carry out disarmament as agreed. Such a buffer could also serve as leverage toward a more favorable future arrangement with the Lebanese state. The limited maneuver conducted in Lebanon—like the constraints imposed on the maneuver in Gaza—stemmed from a combination of insufficient professionalism and a lack of confidence in the capabilities of the ground forces among senior General Staff and security officials, as well as from their assessment of the scope of legitimacy afforded by the United States at the time.

Conclusion: Achievements and Challenges

The IDF made impressive gains in the Lebanese theater, reducing Hezbollah from a dominant and leading actor across the axis to a substantially weakened organization. This weakness gave the Lebanese government a degree of hope that it might dare to confront Hezbollah, even if only hesitantly. There should be no mistake, however: alongside the substantial damage inflicted on the organization, Hezbollah retains meaningful capabilities, both in armed ground forces and in its capacity to launch rockets and missiles into Israeli territory. One threat that has been fully removed is the extensive deployment of the Radwan forces in villages along the line of contact, including fortified above- and below-ground infrastructure and large quantities of weapons—a deployment that was intended to serve as the launch platform for a ground assault into Israel when the order came.

This infrastructure was destroyed, significantly degrading Hezbollah’s ability to carry out a surprise ground attack along the northern border. Nevertheless, the organization remains a central component of Iran’s regional force structure. Accordingly, despite Iran’s severe economic difficulties, Tehran continues to invest substantial resources in Hezbollah’s rehabilitation and force buildup, including the smuggling of weapons and cash through multiple channels. Iran has transferred approximately one billion dollars to Hezbollah since the ceasefire took effect about a year ago.

Israel cannot accept the continued armed presence of Hezbollah in Lebanon. A central element of Israel’s post–October 7 transformation has been the abandonment of containment and the principle of “quiet answered by quiet” that characterized its prewar conduct. Israel has now adopted an enforcement-based approach that denies adversaries the ability to rebuild and threaten Israel, coupled with readiness to act decisively against renewed efforts to generate security threats. The concept of “peace through strength” now guides policy—a concept shared by the Israeli government and the current U.S. administration. Israel should use the coming years to shape a more favorable security reality across all active theaters surrounding it.

In this context, the Lebanese theater and Hezbollah constitute a central pillar, and the manner in which Israel applies this policy toward them will shape outcomes across other arenas. The challenges Israel faces concern the correct sequencing for addressing the different theaters and the close coordination required with the United States. Given that President Trump’s vision includes a new regional order in the Middle East, in which Israel plays a central role, it should act in a coordinated and phased manner and allow the necessary time to exhaust the possibility of resolving these issues through dialogue.

Growing U.S. pressure on the Lebanese government, combining incentives and coercive measures; direct dialogue between Israel and Lebanon for the first time in years; and Israel’s ability to continue enforcing constraints on Hezbollah’s force buildup during the interim period together provide the Israeli government with a measure of freedom of action that it should fully utilize. At the same time, Israel should continue planning and preparations for a broad military operation, both air and ground. Such an operation could be executed in a deliberate, phased manner or in response to a Hezbollah attempt to retaliate for the ongoing strikes against it. To conduct an effective ground operation, Israel must draw lessons from the most recent fighting in Lebanon and in Gaza and train the relevant forces accordingly.

“From the north shall disaster break forth,” warned the prophet Jeremiah—an admonition intended to alert and awaken the people of Israel. If Israel applies the necessary lessons and prepares to act with determination and resolve, there is a chance that from the north, good may yet emerge.

RELATED ARTICLESMORE FROM AUTHOR