“Between Palestine and Hamastine”

“Our situation is firm, we are expecting an upheaval.” This was the closing sentence of the latest report sent from Hamas headquarters in the territories to the headquarters in Syria. The strengthening of Hamas in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank has brought the leadership of the organization to the decision to accelerate the battle over the future of the Palestinian Authority, the battle between “Palestine,” the future democratic and secular state, and “Hamastine,” the Islamic Palestinian state to which Hamas aspires.

The first shot was fired on Sunday morning. Hamas headquarters dispatched a cell headed by Imad Akel from the Nusseirat refugee camp to kill Col. Rajah Abu Lehiya in a targeted operation. Abu Lehiya was the commander of the special intervention force, the elite unit of the Palestinian police. The operation was planned similarly to the manner in which IDF undercover units operate: the necessary intelligence material was gathered, all the moves were planned, and after the plan was authorized by the senior leadership of the organization, Akel and his men were sent on their mission.

On the previous day, Dr. Abdel Aziz Rantisi, the number two man in Hamas, had given incitement speeches condemning all those who call to return to the negotiating table with Israel, and demanded that they be treated as traitors. Rantisi spoke in a threatening, arrogant and provocative tone. The day afterwards, Akel and his men put on uniforms of the Palestinian police and waited at a roadblock on the main road in Gaza. When Col. Abu Lehiya’s car approached the roadblock, they ordered it to stop. Within seconds, they overpowered the commander of the elite unit and his five bodyguards. The wheel of the car was taken by a Hamas man who drove quickly to the Nusseirat refugee camp in southern Gaza. Abu Lehiya was killed, his bodyguards sent away shamefacedly, and the car torched. Hamas announced this joyfully through a system of deafening loudspeakers posted over the city’s mosques.

The assassination was carried out on the day when 14 Palestinians were killed during the IDF operation in the El-Amal neighborhood of Khan Yunis. Despite the disaster, the Hamas commanders did not consider the possibility of delaying the planned mission.

“If the commander of the police elite unit cannot defend himself, who can defend the Palestinian police?” people asked in Gaza.

Arafat was among the first to receive the news of the killing. He was furious. From his office in the demolished mukataa he cursed Hamas, poured out his fury on Sheikh Yassin and ordered his men to arrest the murderers and put them on trial at the state security court, which is empowered to issue the death sentence.

The Palestinian policemen who arrived at the Nusseirat refugee camp encountered fierce resistance on the part of Hamas. During the failed attempts to break into the camp, five Hamas members were killed. The next day, street demonstrations broke out against the Palestinian police, and Gaza seethed and boiled.

Mohammed Dahlan, the strong man in Gaza, said that this time he could not make a concession to Hamas. This was the murder of a senior officer in broad daylight, he announced, and demanded that Hamas turn over the murderers. Dr. Abdel Aziz Rantisi announced that his organization is interested in the rule of law, but added that the law should be applied to policemen as well as civilians, and the policemen who killed Hamas men should also be put on trial. The Borno family, one of whose sons was killed by the gunfire of the Palestinian policemen, published an advertisement in the East Jerusalem Al-Kuds daily, stating that they do not intend to begin mourning as long as the son’s murderers have not been arrested.

The Red Line

There has been great tension in Gaza ever since the colonel’s murder. Despite the mediation attempts between the Palestinian leadership and Hamas, the dispute has not been settled. “The situation will not calm down until the colonel’s murderers are turned over,” announced Fatah. But Hamas is refusing to turn them over.

The confrontation is serious, and could definitely snowball. But it is early to speak of civil war. Hamas knows where the red line runs that they will not cross. Fitna, a civil war, is the red line for them, and they will be careful not to let the events deteriorate to such a war.

The leaders of Hamas know that the Palestinian Authority’s force will determine the matter eventually, but this does not stop them from provoking the PA. In fact, the goal of the confrontation, initiated by Hamas, is to test the balance of power between Hamas and the PA, in view of the ongoing decrease in Arafat’s power, the collapse of the Palestinian government institutions and the helplessness of the residents of the territories in recent months.

The Palestinian police reacted with great determination to the Hamas offensive, proving that when an internal struggle arises over the question of who is in charge, Arafat does not hesitate to send his men and exert his full force. Conversely, when Israel demands that he act against Hamas, he demonstrates ineffectuality, weakness and complete inaction. In such cases he treats Hamas as an ally.

The latest surveys held in the territories indicate an impressive rise in the support for Hamas: Between 20 and 29 percent of the residents of the territories support Sheikh Ahmed Yassin’s organization, and this is a great deal. “The tanks created a vacuum, which gave Hamas oxygen,” explains Sufiyan Abu Zeida, one of the heads of Fatah in Gaza.

Last week Hamas opened a large clinic in Khan Yunis, another institution of the Daawa, Hamas’ developing aid and welfare system. The Daawa activity has expanded greatly during the Intifada. The citizens’ distress was utilized well to expand the circles of support. Food and money were provided to families in need, clinics were built, a supplementary education system was created, new mosques and youth clubs were established, and day camps were held for children during the summer. The elaborate Hamas ceremonies draw crowds of tens of thousands of people, and at funerals and demonstrations the green flag is prevalent-the flag of Islam.

Through a well oiled fund-raising system in Europe, the United States and Arab countries, Hamas has succeeded in giving sponsorship to all the spheres that the PA has relinquished due to financial distress. The senior PA officials stand by helplessly and grind their teeth. The weaker the PA becomes, the stronger the anti-Israel stream grows and the greater the support for Hamas becomes, not only as a religious movement but also due to its path in battling Israel.

Main Opposition to Fatah

In three weeks the month of Ramadan will begin, and Hamas has already begun its preparations. Hamas intends to dedicate this month not only to strengthening religious faith and returning many people to the fold, but also to encourage fulfillment of the precept of jihad. The meaning: Encouraging acts of terror.

The Intifada has greatly strengthened religion in Palestinian society. Arafat and his men have also used religious symbols and Koran verses to enthuse the people and add as many as possible to the circle of violence against Israel. As the distress increased, many Palestinians found sanctuary in the mosques, with Allah. Arafat has not fought Hamas, nor did he have any intention of fighting it. He regards it not as an enemy but as a partner who has deviated from the path. Arafat has also used Hamas for his own purposes, and the criticism it voiced towards him is meant to preserve Palestinian interests.

After the blowup of the Palestinian national dialogue, which attempted to limit the terror attacks to the West Bank territories alone, the members of Hamas began to take an independent line that deepened even further the gap between them and the PA and Fatah. Hamas also proposed to the other rejectionist organizations to establish joint headquarters, which would serve as an alternative. At the beginning of the week, the political bureau of the PFLP and the DFLP announced the acceptance of the Fatah formula for limiting acts of terror to the territories. Hamas was the only organization that did not join these understandings, and thus remained the main opposition to Fatah.

Arafat and the Fatah leaders fear the rise in Hamas’ power. The PA recently tried to create a division between the overseas branch of Hamas and the domestic branch of Hamas, and isolate Sheikh Abdel Aziz Rantisi, the more extreme leader of the organization. The attempt was unsuccessful: Rantisi grew stronger, and is now the most notable voice in the leadership of Hamas.

“The Sausage Theater”

In conjunction with the firm opposition stance presented by Hamas, harsh criticism of Arafat has also been voiced over the past few months within Fatah, the chairman’s own organization, as well as in the Palestinian Legislative Council, the media and among Palestinian intellectuals. This criticism has led to the establishment of three new parties, which can be termed the Palestinian left wing: Bassam Abu Sheriff, who served as Arafat’s spokesman for many years, established the Palestinian Democratic Party in Gaza; Mustafa Barghouti established the Reform Party in Ramallah; and Nabil Amer, member of the PLC, who is leading the group of reforms, has also announced the establishment of a new party.

New parties have been established; the question is when the elections will be held. Arafat has announced that they will be held at the beginning of January 2003, that is, in another three and a half months. This week, however, a delegation from the American organization helping prepare the elections visited Arafat’s office in Ramallah, and announced that the preparations for the elections would last for at least half a year. Arafat voiced no objection. Arafat is doing everything to defer the elections, for fear of an increase in the power of Hamas and the new left wing parties. He also wants to see what the developments will be in Iraq. After the war, he hopes, a new “Madrid Conference” will be held to establish a new order in the region, with effective US intervention.

Meanwhile, Arafat is flourishing anew, among other factors due to the siege that Israel imposed on him and the demolition of the mukataa. When the siege was removed, Arafat came out strengthened, and returned to center stage. His status in the Palestinian street was bolstered, and the criticism against him subsided. On Wednesday there was a pilgrimage to his office by diplomats from around the world, and all the senior PA officials arrived in the evening. Arafat’s increase in strength has greatly softened his opponents. Nabil Amer, for instance, has already announced that he is withdrawing his demand to appoint a prime minister, the Palestinian Legislative Council has given Arafat another month to establish the new government, and the reforms have also been shelved for the present.

Following the siege and the demolition of the mukataa, Israel absorbed criticism from the reform advocates and those who wished to move Arafat aside and curtail his powers. In off-the-record conversations, they refer to the Israeli siege as Masrahiyat al-mortodela, or the sausage theater. “You supplied Arafat with a lot of humus, beans and sausage,” they say, “and detergents and underwear. You pampered him. You helped him leave there with the upper hand.”

Despite the criticism, Arafat remains the undisputed Palestinian leader, and no one dares challenge his leadership, not even the Hamas men, who are occupied with internal wars in Gaza. As soon as Hamas sends another suicide bomber to Tel Aviv, Arafat may pay the price. And let there be no mistake: the internal wars in the PA do not come instead of the struggle against Israel. This cycle of violence has not yet ended.

This article ran in Yediot Ahronot on October 11, 2002