The Implications: This Far and No Farther

Up until yesterday it was often said that the twentieth century ended in 1989, with the fall of the Berlin Wall. Within months the Soviet bloc disintegrated and the Cold War ended. It appeared that the world had chosen to live happily under the wings of one superpower, one culture, and one economic system. The world chose America.

Yesterday, when New York’s Twin Towers collapsed one after the other, the real opening signal for the twenty-first century was sounded. It began with a war. This time America’s enemy is not a rival superpower. The enemy is the anger, jealousy and thirst for vengeance of those left behind. The enemy is a different culture, a different ideology, a different set of values. The American victory celebration lasted for twelve years, from Berlin to Durban. Yesterday it paid the price.

Israel, which has gained quite a bit of experience with suicide-bombers, has never seen such a sophisticated, bold and lethal operation as the attack in American yesterday. The results show us how vulnerable centers of power are, not only in America, but in any country. There is no need for chemical or biological weaponry, or a pocket-sized atomic bomb. When the enemy is impervious to intelligence, and is trained and prepared to commit suicide, there is almost no way to stop it.

Yesterday, many compared this terror attack to the surprise attack by the Japanese on Pearl Harbor. In certain respects, yesterday’s attack was far worse. It hit the heart of America and its distinctive symbols of power, and it pitted America against an anonymous and faceless foe, without a known address.

If America follows its own tradition, it will return fire. President Bush’s initial reaction, which was quiet, almost pathetic, points to his inexperience rather than to the type of response he will choose.

According to the American perception, a terror attack such as yesterday’s poses an existential threat. It threatens the US’s position as a superpower, its stability and its values. Therefore, it justifies a brutal attack, which does not necessary distinguish between the guilty and the innocent. That is one of the prerogatives superpowers have.

If yesterday’s terror attack is tied to the Middle East it has serious implications for Israel. Terrorism has expanded to such a scale that the entire West cannot accept it, let alone Israel. This needs to be handled from the source.

The series of terror attacks in the US caught Arafat on his way to Damascus. His reconciliation with the Assad government is based on the two’s involvement in supporting terrorism. It is hard to be impressed by it.

The question is, whether it is not time for these two gentlemen to decide to which part of the world of nations they wish to belong. Irrespective of the question of who is responsible for these terror attacks, their horrific results oblige the West to begin an all-out war against terrorism, including a war against any country or political entity aiding terrorism. That is the message Israel will bring to the world. It appears that this time the world will listen.

Last night the ministers held a consultation in Jerusalem. Some of them demanded to take advantage of this opportunity: under cover of the terror attack in New York, to settle scores with the Palestinians. Sharon preferred not to be in such a hurry. The blow of the terror attack that America suffered is so significant, that it would be best not to take advantage of it like thieves in the night.

Thomas Friedman, the influential New York Times columnist, came to Israel this week for a working visit. In his first column from here, which was published yesterday, he said that on the eve of his departure his daughter asked him here he was going. When he told her “Israel,” she advised him not to go. She was that concerned.

Yesterday Friedman was in safe Tel Aviv, whereas his daughter was in besieged Washington. It is a small and dangerous world. It seems that terrorism, like so many other areas, is part of globalization.

This article ran in Yediot Aharonot, September 12th, 2001

General Sharon on the Ground

This week Prime Minister Ariel Sharon was reminded of an officer by the name of Amnon Schwartzburg, a member of Kibbutz Beit Alpha, whom he had recommended for a favorable citation after the paratrooper raid of Syrian outposts on the Sea of Galilee in 1955. Schwartzburg won Sharon’s praise by meticulously fulfilling his orders: first capture the target, and only later care for the wounded.

The wounded man Schwartzburg left being was Rafael (Raful) Eitan, then a company commander in Brigade 890 who had been hit by fire from a machine-gun stationed on one of the sides. Schwartzburg passed the bleeding Raful and continued charging the target, running in the trenches, and did not stop until he had cleared out the furthermost Syrian position.

Forty-six years later, Schwartzburg’s determination is a model for Sharon. He views himself as a fighter in the trenches, ignoring the shells landing around him and persisting in striving to capture the fortified target. His increasing difficulties at the Likud Central Committee and Binyamin Netanyahu’s attempts to move in are, according to Sharon, merely a “bothersome machine-gun” which can be dealt with later, after the mission is accomplished.

Sharon’s command for operating was completely clear: force Arafat to cease fire, without being dragged into an all-out war, but without conceding a single comma to the Palestinians in the political realm. The prime minister believes his policy, with the assassination of terrorist activists at its core, is beginning to bear fruit.

Sharon does not accept the definition of the assassination at the Hamas headquarters in Nablus as a “step up.” He scorns the idea of Hamas “political echelons,” and makes it clear that the people killed in Nablus were directly involved in organizing terrorism, including the terror attack at the Dolphinarium. Sharon cites intelligence assessments saying that the assassination policy is already showing “results on the ground,” that the terrorists are spending more time hiding from the long arm of the IDF than preparing new terror attacks. We have not yet eradicated the terrorist organizations, Sharon says, but we have significantly damaged their capabilities.

It seems Sharon is not impressed by the flaring of tempers on the Palestinian street, of the calls for revenge, of the uniting of forces by Hamas, Islamic Jihad, Fatah and the Tanzim. He says that anyway the information collected from terrorists Israel has captured shows that 42% of the Israelis killed since the Intifada started were killed by PA men. This week Sharon emphasized to the American Secretary of State Colin Powell that senior level officials in the PA are involved up to their necks in organizing the terror attacks, and Powell could have understood, by inference, that these officials too may become a legitimate target for assassination by Israel.

Sharon said that he will not “cave in to the cries on the street which are meant to serve “personal interests,” code words meant to say that as far as he knows the public campaign for a general offensive against the Palestinian Authority is being run mainly by his rival, Netanyahu. He says he is not worried by the polls which show a clear weakening in his position among right wing voters, nor by the report of a majority formed against him in the Likud Central Committee, because “panic is not my thing.” He believes that his way will hold sway, also in the party’s institutions, but even if not, it is a matter of “a mosquito biting here and there,” and eventually nothing will come of it. He says, the elections will take place exactly on time, on October 28, 2003.

Sharon does not intend to be dragged into an uncontrollable escalation, which he believes would be the result of Netanyahu’s recommendations but, at the same time, he is strictly opposed to the proposal of Foreign Minister Shimon Peres to begin a channel of political talks with Arafat. He defines the distinction Peres makes between “negotiations under fire” and “negotiations for achieving a cease-fire” as naivety. “Anything like that is a reward for terrorism” Sharon said of his partner’s proposals, while continuing to shower him with respect. “Arafat should absolutely not be given the feeling that there is a reward for terrorism, just as the Americans and the world should not be allowed to get used to an idea that there is a level of terrorism that can be lived with.”

Sharon might not have spoken like Minister Uzi Landau who said this week, “In this conflict Arafat has to lose in a clear-cut fashion,” but that is what he means. Sharon wants to push Arafat into a corner, cut off his escape routes, tighten the noose about his neck, among other things, by stepping up the level of assassinations perhaps even to Arafat’s very doorstep. “Arafat has to understand that he has nowhere to go any longer,” Sharon said, “that he will not gain anything until he takes action against terrorism.”

On the other hand, a senior political figure believes that Sharon’s assassination policy is simultaneously destroying even the slim remaining chance of Arafat taking action against terrorism. Sharon, says the official, is ignoring the effect the assassinations are having on the feeling in the Palestinian street and is not giving them the importance they deserve. Now, when the revenge becomes a unified battle cry and the central test of the leadership of the Palestinian organizations, it is truly only a matter of time until the big terror attack comes along, with a casualty toll which will force a massive Israeli reaction, which will in turn cause a general escalation.

“Sharon is correct in principle in trying to prove that violence does not pay,” said the official, “but now we have been caught in a catch in which insisting on this principle could entail far more dire results than if we displayed some flexibility. The question is whether we have to continue insisting on this, even when it is clear it is leading to a disaster.”

This week Sharon did not sound like someone who understands reason. He is set on the political and security tactic he has chosen. As in a battle in the trenches, he is prepared for a long struggle, filled with obstacles and surprises, and his major weapon is perseverance.

Like Officer Schwartzburg, Sharon believes this is the trait that is the tried and true recipe for capturing the target.

P.S. Sharon said that the raid on the Syrian outposts was “One of the most successful things that paratroopers have ever done.” In his book, Does Not Stop on Red, the journalist Uzi Benziman confirms that the raid on the Syrian outposts in December 1955 was considered “an impressive success.” Fifty six Syrian soldiers were killed and 32 captured, whereas the IDF lost six men and twelve were wounded.

However, Benziman adds that Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion, though he supported an aggressive line against the Arabs, was taken aback by the large number of losses the Syrian’s suffered. Ben-Gurion had not forgotten the 69 people killed in the Kibya Operation two years earlier. Sharon did try to convince “the old man” but Ben-Gurion maintained that “the operation was too good.”

When Sharon left the room, then chief of staff Moshe Dayan turned to Ben-Gurion and said to him: “Arik’s quota in these kinds of operation is dozens. He does not finish an operation without the enemy having at least dozens killed.” Peres

Sharon’s strongly worded statements against Peres’s initiatives might signal a near clash between the two men. What Sharon describe as “a reward for terrorism” is viewed by Peres as a final rescue option before the catastrophe. If it were up to Peres, he would start uninterrupted and intensive contacts with Yasser Arafat in an attempt to achieve a cease-fire and political negotiations, not necessarily in that order.

Peres supports deploying American or international observers, and he does not really care when they come, because he wants Arafat to earn some sort of “achievement” which will spur him to begin changing his ways. However, Peres is doubtful as to whether the Americans are prepared to risk having their observers getting caught in the cross-fire between Israelis and Palestinians, just as he doubts whether the Americans want to or can mediate between the sides in any significant way.

What is left is Peres’s classic motto: If I do not work for myself, who will? His schedule is filled with “secret meetings” in Israel and abroad, and he is continuously working behind the scenes. This week Peres was barely back from an enjoyable but arduous trip to Peru, and is already calling everyone, a foreign minister here, a foreign minister there, trying to get Arafat to give him just the barest of leads, just one day of quiet, and he [Peres] will already get the world to move.

After his meetings with Arafat in Lisbon and Cairo, Peres has been demonstrating greater understanding of the Palestinian distress and is more critical of the IDF which he feels has not done enough to make things less difficult for the population. He does not accept the version that sees Arafat as the guiding hand over everything and doubts Arafat’s ability to confront the terrorist organizations. In response to the claim that Arafat himself is setting the level of the flames, Peres says: “He is a chairman, not a flame-thrower.”

Peres claims he is not getting involved in his party’s primary elections, though he is completely in favor of postponing them. He is concerned that the primaries might ignite a process which will eventually lead to the dissolution of the government and earlier general elections. Peres believes that, in the better case scenario, Sharon will win, and in a worse scenario, Netanyahu will win, with a Likud faction which will have doubled its size in the Knesset.

The concern over Netanyahu is the glue holding Sharon and Peres together. This means that this Catholic wedding between the two could hold up despite their increasing controversies, even though very soon Peres might find himself with his political hands tied, or Sharon might find that Peres has felt completely at liberty to do whatever he wants to, with or without a mandate.

This feature ran in Maariv, August 3, 2001

Taleb A-Sana MK (United Arab List) lavished praise on the terrorist attack near Tel Aviv IDF HQ

[IMRA commentary – Question: If MK A-Sana had advance warning of the “justified” attack would he keep it to himself? The A-Sana remark raises the dual-loyalty (or more appropriately – loyalty to the enemy) in a very sharp way. Time and again it is explained that these MK’s do not reflect the atitude of the rank-and-file Arab Israeli public. We will see over the course of today if other voices from the Arab-Israeli community are heard. The absence of a significant reaction may tell us more, in fact, than the original remark.]

Taleb A-Sana MK (United Arab List) yesterday lavished praise on the terrorist attack at the Tel Aviv Kirya in an interview with Abu Dhabi television.

“This is an attack of special quality,” A-Sana said, “because it was not against civilians but against soldiers in the very heart of Israel. The Israelis have to understand that if there is no security for Palestinians there will not be security for Israelis.” A-Sana added: “There can be no guilt feelings in this case. This is the legitimate struggle par excellence of the Palestinian people.”

Attorney General Elyakim Rubinstein intends to look into the Bedouin MK’s remarks to see if there are grounds for an incitement charge. Rubinstein is waiting for the full text of the Abu Dhabi interview before considering the case.

However sources in the Justice Ministry said last night that it is difficult to bring charges for incitement.

The Knesset two months ago failed to approve a law against incitement tabled by the ministry. It is possible, however, that Rubinstein will ask the police to investigate if there is room for charges on the grounds of inciting rebellion or failing to prevent terrorism.

This article ran on August 6, 2001 in Ha’aretz

TIPH — A textbook case in the failure of “peace observers”

The specified objective of the TIPH (Temporary International Presence in Hebron) observers is “to provide a feeling of security among the Palestinians in the city of Hebron and to contribute to the renewal of normal life.”

Within an approved potential group of 160 observers, there are today 88 observers in Hebron, from Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Switzerland, Turkey, and Italy. Some of them come from a military or police background, and some have a background working with human rights organizations. Once every three months the group publishes a situation report which is presented to the foreign ministries of the participating countries, Israel, and the Palestinian Authority.

A Joint Hebron Committee meets regularly, chaired by the head of the TIPH, in order to discuss with both sides what is happening in the field. At these meetings, the observers sit at the head of the table and the Israelis and Palestinians address the observers, not each other. IDF officers have no authority to speak directly to the Palestinians in the discussions of the committee. Everything must go through the head of the TIPH delegation, who also sets the agenda of the committee and summarizes the discussions.

According to IDF Colonel (res.) Baruch Nagar, who served until the middle of 1999 as military governor of Hebron: “It is clear from their mandate that they are in the city to serve the Palestinians. My task was to limit the damage they cause…. There was no chance that they would prove useful to us.” In practice, according to Nagar, the TIPH served as a “factor that greatly interfered. Their activities very much limited the IDF and the Jewish residents.”

According to Nagar, “in private conversations with most of the TIPH people, their tendency was to speak the truth. It was clear to them that the Palestinians were the aggressors and in conversations with us they justified the IDF actions in most incidents. But the minute that Palestinians were present at the conversation, and when they wrote their periodic reports, we came out badly. Then they spoke and wrote the opposite of what they said to us privately.”

What is the explanation for this? According to Nagar, without any connection to the worldviews of the observers, the blindness to reality of the observers resulted from a combination of personal and organizational factors. Nagar believes that on the personal level, the observers are most concerned with their own self-defense and simply feel personally threatened by the Palestinian Authority. “The observers know that the Palestinians are violent terrorists. They see this daily and are afraid of them. On the other hand, they know that the reaction of Israel to unfair criticism will be no more than an unpleasant conversation. So they prefer to disagree with us and not with the Palestinains.”

“At the organizational level, the TIPH has no interest in accusing the Palestinians of aggressiveness. Indeed, they are in Hebron in order to give the Palestinians a feeling of security. If it comes out that the Palestinians are causing the Israelis to feel insecure, how can they justify their mandate.”

According to another IDF source: “The TIPH as an organization has adopted the position of the Palestinians regarding the necessity of Israel turning over to Palestinian sovereignty all of Judea, Samaria, Gaza, and east Jerusalem.”

Sources in the security services who work with TIPH speak of the political damage it causes to Israel. The reports of the observers are distributed in the international arena, and provide more justification for adopting the position of the Palestinians among the states contributing manpower to TIPH. In one of the latest reports, the observers found it necessary to emphasize that the “Jewish neighborhoods have not yet been dismantled.”

According to Baruch Nagar, “The TIPH sees itself as a model for international observers for the entire area, and they are constantly trying to bring about the extension of their deployment to the pre-1967 border.”

From the perspective of security, according to all the sources, the presence of the observers in the city interferes with the IDF. “When IDF soldiers stop a Palestinian at a checkpoint because he appears suspicious, and they want to check his papers and see what he has in his pockets, an observer comes and begins to photograph him up close. This discourages the soldier from doing his job, because he does not want to harm the image of Israel.”

According to a senior IDF source, “One night, Palestinians inside a school opened fire on IDF soldiers in Hebron, and the army decided to go after the attackers. When the soldiers drove toward the school, they suddenly saw a car speeding from the school. Seconds before the force opened fire at the vehicle, they saw the TIPH flag on the car. The observers were inside the school at the time that the Palestinians were shooting at us.”

“On the political level,” said a senior military source,” the minute they bring international observers here, the Palestinians will simply stop relating to us as the local authority. We won’t have anyone to talk with because they will speak only to the observers.” This article ran on July 27th, 2001 in Makor Rishon

Peres and Melchior allow the EU funding to PA education to Resume… WHY??

The donor nations to the Palestinian Authority educational system had egg on their face last summer, when our investigative research showed that the consuls of Italy, Holland, Belgium, Finland and Ireland, had financed new school books for the Palestinian Authority for the past school year that were supposed to promote peace yet instead promoted a war curriculum.

These school books and that curriculum of the PA can be perused at the website of the Center for Monitoring the Impact of Peace located at www.edume.org, an organization now affiliated with the Truman Center for the Advancement for Peace at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem.

This year, foreign governments waited for feedback from the Israeli government before they decided whether or not to finance the Palestinian school system.

In late June, We asked the Israeli Foreign Ministry, as to whether or not it would recommend that foreign governments continue to fund the Palestinian school system. Their response: “We ask that the donor nations support the Palestinian school system, but not the school books, and implore the PA not to use their school system to incite hatred against Israel”.

We asked the Palestinian Authority Ministry of Education whether it would consider changes in its curriculum this year, or the removal of any school books which continue to teach the idea of Jihad to conquer the whole land of Palestine. The answer, from all levels of the PA Ministry, was a curt “no”.

Our follow-up question to the Israel Foreign Ministry: Since the PA ignores the requests to change its curriculum, what is your recommendation as to whether the donor nations should continue to fund the PA school system? It took the ministry of Israel Foreign Affairs a full month to answer that question. The answer that I got at the end of July was the same as a month before: Finance the PA school system, not the PA school books, and implore the PA not to use its schools to incite against Israel.

We posed the same question to deputy minister of Foreign Affairs, Rabbi Michael Melchior. His spokesman wrote back that Rabbi Melchior had indeed raised the issue of incitement with the foreign consuls.

That was not the question, we pointed out. The question that we had asked Rabbi Melchior, (who is also the head of Meimad, a liberal Orthodox movement that promotes peace education) was whether or not he supports the continued funding of the PA educational system. Rabbi Melchior personally answered this question after addressing a forum of diplomats and journalists on July 25th. Rabbi Melchior said that he had been assured that all donor nations had implored the PA to cease its anti-Israel curriculum in the PA schools. Yet he would not answer the question as to what to recommend to the foreign consuls in Jerusalem, now that the PA is ignoring all requests to change their curriculum.

The bottom line: Israel indeed recommends to the donor nations of the PA that they renew funding for the PA school system, despite the fact that the PA runs the first curriculum since Nazi Germany to promote a war against the Jews.

Official Fatah Editorial: Continue the War

Official Fatah Editorial: Demand complete Israeli withdrawal – including Jerusalem, return of refugees, attack settlers, soldiers…

[IMRA Commentary: As Oslo supporters push a revisionist history to excuse Arafat for the failure of the Camp David and Taba Talks and Yossi Beilin celebrates the latest Palestinian-Israeli “joint declaration” (explaining that it doesn’t matter what the Palestinian REALLY think/plan – just what they sign), Yasser Arafat’s own official Fatah website leaves no question that the goals are far beyond what Beilin envisions: complete withdrawal from easern Jerusalem and the return of refugees to within Israel.

The editorial also approves attacks against settlers and soldiers AND attacks within the Green Line if Israel continues to attack.]

Rejection and Imposition

The Intifada broke out in September 2000, following the obnoxious visit of Sharon to al Aqsa mosque. The visit was seen as an Israeli attempt to impose surrender on the Palestinian people and their leadership. One should remember that the visit took place after the Camp David summit at which President Arafat rejected a proposal that the Israelis supposed would end the Arab Israeli conflict. The Intifada proved that Palestinian steadfastness and resolution would never wither away. The PNA and the National and Islamic Forces have managed to activate all the institutions of the civil society in the battle against the Israeli occupation.

At the beginning, the Intifada did not need a specific program in order to show the Palestinian rejection of the Israeli US attempts to impose Clinton’ s proposals. The violations the proposals made against the international legality were listed in our December 31,2000 edition of our bulletin (the Fateh bulletin).

Following is a summary of these violations: Clinton’s proposals

  1. Denied the Palestinian refugees the right to return to their properties in line with UN Resolution 194;
  2. Allowed Israel to Judaize and annex the Arab city of Jerusalem which was occupied in 1967. This contradicts UN Resolutions 242 252;
  3. Allowed Israel to annex occupied territories, and this violates UN Resolutions 242 and 338;
  4. Legitimized the presence of Israeli settlements. This violates UN Resolution 486, which considers these settlements illegal and an obstacle on the path to peace;
  5. Accepted Israel’s plan to divide al Aqsa Mosque and approved of what Israel did to al Haram al Ibrahimi in Hebron. These acts threaten the Arab character of the Christian and Islamic holy sites.

The Intifada has gone beyond the idea of rejecting the Zionist proposals and it should now answer the questions that many people raise. These include: Where is the Intifada heading? What is the Intifada’s program from the perspective of the National and Islamic Forces?

Some people believe that the Intifada has already proved that the Palestinian people will never succumb to the Israeli will, and this helps in improving our negotiating position. Therefore, further bloodshed in the confrontation with Israel will not lead anywhere. Another group of people, on the other hand, believe that we should seize the historic opportunity the Intifada has provided to achieve our strategic goal, the liberation of all historic Palestine by liquidating the Zionist entity at the military, political, economic and cultural levels. While the first group failed to value the determination of their people, the second underestimated the enemy that receives the full support of the US.

Since the beginning of the Intifada, the National and Islamic Forces have agreed on a number of principles that govern the Intifada’s political discourse and attract the consensus of all factions. Each faction, however, is allowed to express its own strategic line separately or in cooperation with other factions.

The National and Islamic Forces have been carrying out joint activities that are usually announced in a central statement. These activities aim to unify the efforts of all factions. For this purpose, the Central Coordination Committee and the Higher Follow-up Committee have been established in the West Bank and Gaza respectively. There has been a general feeling that popular activities are decreasing. This is due to the absence of the organizational bases that govern the work of the popular forces in the institutions of both the PNA and the civil society such as trade unions, commerce and industry chambers, societies and clubs.

In their latest meetings, the National and Islamic Forces have differentiated between two types of working programs: the first one includes activities that are a mere reaction to the Zionist aggression against our people. The second includes activities aimed at the origin of the aggression, i.e. Israel’s occupation and its settlement policy. The first type of activities consists of spontaneous popular gatherings in the proper time and place. However, the second type of activities that should have a direct influence on the occupation and settlers, requires the specification of a clear political line that motivates the people to play a basic role in the Intifada when they feel the tangible results of the confrontation.

In addition to having a clear political line, securing people’s participation requires an organizational line that regulates the relationship of the National and Islamic Forces with the organized popular forces and the PNA institutions. This will help clarify the positions of all parties and in return bring us closer to achieving our goals. As to the military line, it needs the effective participation of the leaders and the competent cadre of all factions.

A clear political line of a working program should be based on the commitment of all factions to the following goals:

  1. The cessation of Sharon’s escalating aggression that aims to impose the Zionist security perception;
  2. The removal of settlers and settlements;
  3. The withdrawal of Israeli forces from all occupied territories including East Jerusalem;
  4. The return of refugees to their homes;
  5. The actualization of national independence and the establishment of our sovereign state with Jerusalem as its capital.

Also, the international demand that Israel cease the construction of new settlements, puts an end to one of the basic tenants of the Zionist movement. However, this does not achieve our goal, i.e. the removal of all settlements from our land. Two things need to be done to achieve this goal. The PNA should continue to warn the world against this flagrant violation of agreements it has signed. Secondly, further coordination need to be made between the PNA and the National and Islamic Forces to find the proper ways of confronting the confiscation of our land.

A clear organizational structure should be worked out to illustrate relationships among the parties involved in the Intifada. Tanzim sites, popular committees, and resistance and self-defense committees should be linked to the areas committees. These in turn are linked to the regions committees that are linked to the Central Coordination Committee.

A larger participation in the Intifada activities will be secured when members from all factions seriously shoulder their responsibilities.

The organizational structure of the Intifada should complement that of the PNA. The different committees of supplies, civil defense, emergency, social solidarity, information and culture, and popular defense should coordinate with the ministries that offer similar services.

To run the affairs of the Intifada, specify its requirements and follow up its decisions, an independent organizational structure should be established. Such a structure could take the form of a small committee or a secretariat that deals with the Intifada not only at the local level but also through communicating with solidarity committees that have been formed through the Arab & Muslims world and in other countries. An Intifada secretariat will also carry out information campaigns to remove all the distortions that Zionist organizations have been spreading against us.

As to the working program of the military resistance, we should be careful not to give the Intifada a military character. Militarization serves the Israeli ends, since it takes away the popular character of the Intifada and allows the Israelis to depict themselves as victims rather than aggressors.

The Israeli army and settlers constitute legitimate targets because their presence violates the UN resolutions. Hitting such targets will have its effects on the Israelis who should realize the high price they have to pay for occupying another people and settling in their land. The Palestinians, after all, should be able to deter Israel from using its F16 fighter jets. In fact, if Israel continues to attack targets in the PNA-controlled areas, it will be permissible to hit targets inside Israel proper. Under pressure, the Israeli society should eventually call for the withdrawal of their army and the dismantling of their settlements.

While the Intifada is approaching its second year, it is necessary to maintain its achievements at the top which are national unity, the complementing roles of the PNA and the National and Islamic Forces, and the revival of the Palestinian resistance spirit. However, creativity remains essential for opining up new horizons for the Intifada.

Revolution until victory. Issued on July 28, 2001

President Arafat Received the Letter of Credentials of the new German Ambassador And the German Ambassador Lauded PLO Ambitions

GAZA – July 28 – WAFA (Official Palestine News Agency) – President Yasser Arafat received in His Headquarters in Gaza this morning, the credential letter of Mr. Andreas Reinieke, the new German representative to the PNA.

“I want to tell you that I am very happy and grateful to meet you as the new representative of the German government to the Palestinian Authority and to all the Palestinian people”. The President said.

“The Foreign Minister Joshka Fischer who you know very well and he knows you very well has specifically asks me to convey his best wishes and personal warm wishes for yourself and for the people of Palestine”, said Mr. Reinieke.

” I am very happy to be here in this beautiful country, this is the country where Palestinian people live since many centuries, your fathers, your grandfathers, your grand father have already seen the beautiful seaside, the beautiful shore, they have planted olive trees in the beautiful country and you have made a difficult decision to share this lovely land with other people. I know this is a difficult task, I know you have a very difficult task, I wish you for fulfillment of dream of your people to live one day in your own liable, free democratic state and in peace and mutual respect with all of your neighbors”, he added.

“You have a big task beside it is difficult, but it is difficult task you have chosen and a lot of problems, and a lot of obstacles behind you, and of course before you.

I assure you Mr. President with a good hand and Leadership that you have achieved this aim for benefit of your country” Mr. Reinieke concluded.

Arafat Negotiates with Hamas

Will Have to Compromise With Hamas
Yedioth Ahronoth (p. B9) by Roni Shaked — Gaza, unlike the West Bank, is a powder-keg for Arafat too. Hamas has been flourishing, especially in the past few months, thanks to the socio-economic distress there, and has begun to pose a threat to Arafat. The activities of welfare organizations and the help of Islamic charity funds has made them an alternative to the PA. Thus, for example, Hamas summer camps –an entire month with two meals a day, lessons in English, computers, and weapons training, along with tradition and religion — cost only ten shekels in Gaza. Gaza is not homogenous. Despite the cooperation between the various organizations since the beginning of the Intifada, there are still many pockets, like Rafah, where Arafat has no control. The opposition organizations feel stronger there, with wider public support, and do not always fulfill agreements and understandings. After the Dolphinarium attack, Arafat held many meetings with Hamas and managed to convince them to coordinate their military actions with him. But in the past three weeks, Hamas, along with operatives of the new ‘Popular Resistance’ organization, has started firing mortars from Gaza into Israeli territory.

The PA reaction: Ghazi Jabali and soldiers from Moussa Arafat’s (the Rais’s cousin) Military Intelligence erected roadblocks in order to arrest the operatives of Hamas and the Popular Resistance. The result: gun battles at one of the roadblocks and the wounding of three members of the Popular Resistance. The atmosphere began heating up. On Monday there were marches and a protest in Gaza against Arafat’s security coordination with Israel. Protesters marched on the Burij police station and tried to take it over. Palestinian police officers succeeded in repelling them. The protesters changed direction, marched to the house of Moussa Arafat, fired at his car and his house, and engaged in gun battles with his bodyguards and reinforcements from the PA security organizations. Only after midnight, when the security organizations cut off the flow of electricity to Gaza, did the shooting stop.

Arafat, who was in the Persian Gulf at the time, received reports of the loss of control and immediately returned to Gaza to deal with the problem. This incident can indeed teach us much about the fragility of the internal stability of Gaza. Arafat can use his armed forces against Hamas, but his problem is that today most of the public supports Hamas and its policy of terror attacks. An opinion poll conducted this week in the territories revealed that 95% of the population of Gaza supports military actions against settlers and soldiers in the territories, and 65% supports terror actions inside Israel.

Therefore, Arafat has no choice but to resolve his conflict with Hamas. He must compromise in order to preserve national unity and avoid an internal crisis. And compromise with Hamas has clear significance: a green light for escalating the struggle against Israel.

This article ran in Yediot Aharonot, July 27th, 2001

Arafat’s New Army

On Tuesday, a few hours after Yuri Gushtzin was murdered and his body dumped near the slaughterhouse in Ramallah, the “el-Aksa Martyrs Brigades,” the military arm of Fatah, took responsibility for the murder.

The announcement was no different from dozens of press releases published in recent months with the signature of the organization, taking responsibility for shooting attacks, bombs, mortar fire and other murderous actions. Since the beginning of the Intifada the el-Aksa Martyrs Brigades have played a vital role in leading the armed struggle against Israel. On the West Bank, in the Gaza Strip and inside the Green Line, some 6,000 terror attacks were carried out in this period, the decisive majority of them by the el-Aksa Martyrs Brigades.

The name of the commander of the organization, which has established itself as the central military wing of the Fatah movement, is Haj Abu Ahmad. Israel’s intelligence arms have no picture of Haj Abu Ahmad, nor do they have any other identifying details. There are those who say that he is hiding in Nablus, while others say that he is abroad, pulling the strings of terror from there. Hussam Khadr, one of the leaders of the Tanzim in the Balata refugee camp, says that Abu Ahmad is nothing more than an invention of Israeli Intelligence.

The mystery that surrounds the identity of the commander Abu Ahmad, reveals much about the organization’s operational methods. Maximum secrecy, compartmentalization of underground cells, operations in small groups, cruel acts of terror, and the most significant point: unconditional and unquestioning loyalty to Yasser Arafat. For them, he is the source of authority for carrying out acts of terror.

For Arafat, the el-Aksa Martyrs Brigades are a central tool in controlling the height of the flames of the Intifada. They don’t need to receive an explicit directive from him in order to decrease or escalate the level of terror attacks. They know how to translate the Rais’s body language, his expressions, his tone and the meaning of his words, into the rhythm of bursts of Kalachnikov fire.

Dahlan and Tirawi Sign Up

A few days after the outbreak of the Intifada, when developments already pointed at long-term fighting, Arafat needed an extra-governmental military wing not identified with the Palestinian Authority institution, which would be loyal to his policies, obey his orders, receive wide support on the Palestinian street and, most importantly, would be strong enough to fight against the settlers and IDF soldiers. The goal of the establishment of this organization was to consolidate all of the Fatah fighters under the new framework in order to improve the fighting capability of the Palestinians in the armed struggle against Israel.

The military core group of Fatah, the movement headed by Arafat, answered all of these criteria. The process of building the el-Aksa Martyrs Brigades took several months. In an attempt to give the new body a measure of operational momentum, and thus also turn up the level of the Intifada a few notches, Arafat allowed his security organizations — Mohammed Dahlan, commander of the Palestinian GSS in Gaza, and Tawfiq Tirawi, commander of General Intelligence in the West Bank — to join the fighting under the umbrella of the el-Aksa Martyrs Brigades.

The organization was established in stages, not in one fell swoop. The first shot was fired in Nablus, on October 12, 2000, during a military parade attended by several hundred Fatah members armed with a wide range of weapons: pistols, rifles, sub-machine guns, and hand grenades. In a ceremony held at the end of the parade, the establishment of the “armed militias” was announced. Three or four days later, announcements were already being released, signed by the el-Aksa Martyrs Brigades. After Nablus came Ramallah, Gaza, Khan Yunis, Hebron, Bethlehem and other cities in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Fighting cells were also established in towns under Israeli security control. The process of establishing a firm base for the organization took several months. Today, the organization already includes most of Fatah’s fighting activists.

The Language of the Rifle

In September of 1993, after the historic handshake between Arafat and Rabin on the White House lawn in Washington, Fatah announced a halt to its armed actions against Israel. Contrary to Israeli expectations, Arafat did not turn Fatah into a political party, instead building the movement as a popular organization with military characteristics in order to provide him with a lever to bring out the masses for confrontations with Israel, and also to use in armed struggle when the time came. So it was, for example, during the Tunnel Riots of September 1996, the Nakba Day riots of May 2000 and, of course, in the el-Aksa Intifada.

In contradiction to the agreements, which required Arafat to confiscate illegal weapons, he did not disarm Fatah. On the contrary, he provided it with weapons and ammunition from PA warehouses, and PA officers trained cadres of fighters from among Fatah youth.

Military power was kept decentralized, in separate groups on a local level, mainly in the refugee camps. Arafat did not fight against them, and forgave them when they attacked the PA or when they acted like street hoodlums.

Immediately after the establishment of the PA, many groups of veteran Fatah fighters were posted to the intelligence organizations commanded by Rajoub, Dahlan, or Tirawi, but their loyalty was and still is to the mother movement, Fatah.

When the Intifada broke out, it was easy to establish the el-Aksa Martyrs Brigades on this base. And since the outbreak of fighting, Fatah has renewed, widened and broadened the base of its military wing. The call was easily answered: these are fighters who wanted to show their abilities and military power, fighters who are loyal to Fatah ideology, and who believe that the peace process has failed. [… ]

A week ago the el-Aksa Martyrs Brigades released a pamphlet detailing the ideology that guides them: “The ten hungry years of the peace process proved that the Zionist occupation that disturbs the heart of the Palestinian homeland understands nothing but the language of rifles and fire and the language of revolution and the bullets of the revolutionary fighters. Jerusalem is Arab and Muslim land and not one grain of its soil can be given up. The return of the refugees to their homes is the heart of the problem and its foundation, and any concession on their rights is considered treachery. Unity is the main gate to the liberation of Palestine.” [… ]

According to Israeli assessments, the el-Aksa Martyrs Brigades include several hundred active fighters; of those only a few dozen are in the operational cells which are carrying out the shooting attacks and planting bombs. The upkeep of such units requires a large amount of money for salaries, vehicles, the purchase of weapons and ammunition, and operational costs such as apartment rentals. The organization is believed to be funded by the Palestinian Authority in the framework of the budget allocated to Fatah.

The military wing of Fatah is at the height of a process of growth and stabilization. This is an organized system that coordinates actions between various sectors and transfers weapons from place to place. Thus, for example, on July 2nd, terrorists of the el-Aksa Martyrs Brigades carried out five attacks in various parts of the West Bank at almost the same time, and the organization’s headquarters took responsibility for the attacks in one press release. The attacks were as follows: the murder of Yair Har-Sinai at the settlement of Susya in the southern Hebron Hills, the murder of Rabbi Aharon Abidayan in Baka el-Sharkiya, shooting at an IDF position at the settlement of Beit El, the wounding of a settler at the settlement of Bracha near Nablus, and the ambush of an IDF force in the southern part of the village of Hawra near Nablus.

The el-Aksa Martyrs Brigades are also the base of a political force which is growing in importance and developing its own agenda. The Brigades receive wide support in the Palestinian public, almost a consensus. They represent those who led the Oslo process and now oppose it, like the vast majority of the Palestinian population. Whoever is crowned commander of the organization will have a strong power base for future political action.

This article ran in Yediot Aharonot, July 27th, 2001

Joint Statement of Israeli Peace Now and PLO

NO TO BLOODSHED, NO TO OCCUPATION
YES TO NEGOTIATIONS, YES TO PEACE

We, the undersigned Israelis and Palestinians, are meeting in the most difficult of circumstances for both our peoples. We come together to call for an end to bloodshed, an end to occupation, an urgent return to negotiations and the realization of peace between our peoples. We refuse to comply with the ongoing deterioration in our situation, with the growing list of victims, the suffering and the real possibility that we may all be drowned in a sea of mutual hostility.

We hereby raise our voices and implore all people of goodwill to return to sanity, to re-discover compassion, humanity, and critical judgment and to reject the unbearable ease of the descent into fear, hatred, and calls for revenge.

In spite of everything we still believe in the humanity of the other side, that we have a partner for peace and that a negotiated solution to the conflict between our peoples is possible. Mistakes have been made on all sides, the trading of accusations and pointing of fingers is not a policy and is no substitute for serious engagement.

The impression that exists in both communities that ‘time is on our side’ is illusory. The passage of time benefits only those who do not believe in peace. The longer we wait, the more innocent blood will be spilt, the greater will be the suffering and hope will be further eroded. We must move urgently to re-build our partnership, to end the de-humanization of the other, and to revive the option of a just peace that holds out promise for our respective futures.

The way forward lies in international legitimacy and the implementation of UNSCR 242 and 338 leading to a 2-State solution based on the 1967 borders, Israel and Palestine living side-by-side, with their respective capitals in Jerusalem. Solutions can be found to all outstanding issues that should be fair and just to both sides and should not undermine the sovereignty of the Palestinian and Israeli states as determined by their respective citizens, and embodying the aspirations to statehood of both peoples, Jewish and Palestinian. This solution should build on the progress made between November 1999 and January 2001.

The immediate need is for the full and accurate implementation of the Recommendations of the Mitchell Committee, including: the cessation of violence, a total freeze on settlement activity, the implementation of outstanding agreements and a return to negotiations. This process needs to be monitored by an objective third party.

We see it as our duty to work together and each of us in their own communities, to put a halt to the deterioration in our relations, to rebuild trust, belief and the hope for peace.

Palestinian signatories: Yasser Abed Rabbo, Minister of Culture and Information; Hisham Abdul-Razek, Minister of Detainees and Ex-Detainees Affairs; Nabil Amr, Minister of Parliamentary Affairs; Dr. Hanan Ashrawi, PLC Member, Secretary-General of the Palestinian Initiative for Global Dialogue and Democracy ; Hakam Balawi, PLC Member; Dr. Sari Nuseibeh, President, Al-Quds University; Dr. Gabi Baramki, Bir Zeit University; Hafez al-Barghouti, Editor, al-Hayat al-Jadida Daily; Dr. Nazmi al-Ju’beh, Director-General, Riwaq; Dr. Salim Tamari, Director, Institute for Jerusalem Studies; Suleiman Mansour, Director, Al-Wasiti Art Center; Dr. Mahadi Abdul-Hadi, director PASSIA; George Ibrahim, Director, Al-Qasaba Theater; Sufian Abu-Zaideh, Deputy Minister, Ministry of Civil Affairs; Jamal Zaqout, Director-General, Ministry of Civil Affairs; Sama’an Khoury, Director-General, Palestine Media Center; Dr. Samir Abdallah, Director, Pal-Trade; Samir Hulieleh, Manager, Nassar Investment Co.; As’ad al-As’ad, Writer; Abdul-Rahman Awad, Writer; Samir Rantisi, Media Advisor to the Minister of Culture and Information; Nisreen Haj-Ahmad, Lawyer; Rami Shehaded, Lawyer; Ghaith Al-Omari, Lawyer

Israeli signatories: Dr. Janet Aviad, Peace Now; Chaim Oron, former Minister, Meretz; Prof. Arie Arnon, Peace Now; Yossi Beilin, former Minister, Labor; Prof. Menachem Brienker, Hebrew University; Prof. Galia Golan, Peace Now; David Grossman, author; Dr. Yossi Dahan; Prof. Moshe Halberthal, Hebrew University; AB Yehoshua, author; Prof. Yirmyahu Yovel, Hebrew University; Prof. Dan Yaacobson, Tel Aviv University; Prof. Ephi Ya’ar, Steinmatz Institute for Peace; Daniel Levy, ECF; Ronit Matalon, author; Prof. Avishai Margalit, Hebrew University; S. Yizhar, author; Prof. Sami Samuha, Haifa University; Amos Oz, author; Ron Pundak, ECF, Peres Peace Center; Yair Tsaban, Former Minister, Meretz; Dr. Nissim Calderon; Prof. Ephraim Kleinman; Dr. Menachem Klein, Bar Ilan University; Dr. Aviad Kleinberg; Adv. Tzali Reshef, Peace Now; Prof. Yuli Tamir, former Minister, Labor