The Israeli companies that earned $60 million working with UNRWA
Biden has failed to understand what this war means to Israel
The growing tension between Washington and Jerusalem, which this week escalated into blunt messages towards Benjamin Netanyahu from President Joe Biden, makes it that much worse for the IDF to ensure it would have the freedom of operation in Gaza. It also presents Israel’s civilian leadership with a challenge: Is there a way to achieve the war objectives in Gaza without escalating the confrontation with the Biden administration and losing the support of the White House?
Biden’s standing by Israel at the start of the war will be remembered as one of the high points in the special relationship between the countries. But this has been blunted by the passage of time, the images from Gaza, the disputes over the “day after”, and domestic US politics ahead of the presidential elections, all of which have made relations tense and delicate.
While Biden says that he continues to support the goals Israel has defined for the war, the limits he has placed on Israel make achieving them an almost impossible task.
The points of friction can be summed up as follows:
Israeli action in Rafah
Hamas’ brigade in Rafah, with its four battalions, constitutes one-fifth of the organization’s military force. In addition to its missions, it is also responsible for the stretch of border connecting Gaza to the outside world via Egypt. Through it, weapons, technical equipment, operatives, and commanders are smuggled in. Terrorists from other areas of the strip have found refuge in Rafah during the fighting. Does anyone really think that Hamas’ rule and military capabilities can be defeated without action in Rafah?
Reducing Palestinian casualties
Biden expects the fighting to continue while reducing Palestinian civilian casualties. He relies on data from Hamas’ Ministry of Health, whose reliability is unclear, and is not satisfied with the IDF’s evidence of an extremely low fatality ratio of “uninvolved” vs. combatants, partly thanks to population evacuation and stringent precautions taken by Israeli troops, which some say are overly stringent.
Should the entire burden be on Israel’s shoulders? Have they thought in Washington about persuading Egypt to allow temporary humanitarian refuge in Egyptian Rafah to enable the fighting? At a time when the US, the EU, and other countries are providing billions of dollars in aid to the Egyptian economy, this option could have been seriously considered as well.
Increasing humanitarian aid
Biden’s demand to increase humanitarian aid and related initiatives (airdrops, maritime pier) show that his administration has not internalized that the problem is not delivering aid to the strip, but its distribution within it. Hamas will take control of everything that enters. It will use it to supply its fighters (and prolong their ability to fight) and strengthen its rule. The way to prevent this is to deliver the aid to areas that Hamas would not be able to access it, which could also be achieved by establishing a humanitarian refuge in the Egyptian side of Rafah.
An “improved Palestinian Authority” in Gaza
Another issue straining relations with the Americans is the Israeli position regarding the establishment of an “improved Palestinian Authority” in Gaza. The Biden administration has not internalized the suspicion Israelis harbor towards the PA and its current or former leaders, and to the possibility of establishing a Palestinian government in the terror city that will not cooperate with Hamas.
The US’ posture of discounting the extent of public support for Hamas in Gaza, and the fact that it is entrenched in all spheres of life in the strip has had the administration hold on to an optimistic assessment regarding the ability to bring about deep change through governmental models under Arab or international auspices, detached from Hamas. As long as there remains a strong, organized, and armed core of the terror organization in Gaza, it will have effective control over the strip.
“Regional integration” and a “Palestinian state”
Looming over all these issues is the disagreement over America’s vision, which seeks to create regional integration that includes peace agreements between Israel and Saudi Arabia and the establishment of a Palestinian state. The war provided the Biden administration with an opportunity to bring about a new regional order. The president also needs this ahead of his elections, but from Israel’s perspective, normalization with Saudi Arabia will not compensate for Hamas’ non-defeat.
Talk of a “Palestinian state” after the Oct. 7 massacre constitutes a prize for Hamas and also expresses a lack of understanding of the sentiment in the Israeli public. Anyone who thinks that after the October events Israel will take risks like those taken in the past lives in La La Land.
The root problem
The root of the dispute between Washington and Jerusalem concerns the meaning of the war, which brought Israel back to the realization that it is still fighting for its existence. The Biden administration has not internalized that for Israel, the defeat of Hamas is an existential issue. It is not like America’s wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, which were conducted thousands of miles away.
The players in our region are keeping a watchful eye on what is unfolding. Their posture and conduct toward Israel will be influenced by the results. The deterrence that collapsed on October 7 will not be restored if Israel stops short of meeting the goals it has defined for the war. An Israeli failure will have it face an existential threat, the temptation to attack it will grow, and its diplomatic standing will be severely crippled. Therefore, the room for maneuver that Israel can afford is highly constricted.
Biden expects the fighting to continue while reducing the scope of civilian casualties.
The administration’s approach plays into Hamas’ hands and has granted Hamas freebies: A delay in action in Rafah and increased humanitarian aid – conditions that help it reassert its control. The pressure from Washington moves Israel closer to a war of attrition, whose costs are high and its duration is difficult to control. They even push away America’s hopes of advancing a deal for the release of the captives.
So what should we do?
First, continue public diplomacy and persuasion efforts with administration officials and the American people despite the slim chances of moving the needle.
Second, increase efforts in areas where there is no dispute: targeted assassinations of Hamas leaders abroad, raids on targets in the strip where signs of Hamas has been rearing its head.
Third, promote the establishment of temporary humanitarian shelters, in Egyptian Rafah (with Egyptian consent) or the strip (such as in the Dahaniya area near Rafah), and accelerate preparations for action in Rafah.
In the spirit of President Biden’s words, in the speech he gave after the massacre: “Hamas’ stated purpose is the annihilation of the State of Israel and the murder of Jewish people. Israel has the right to respond — indeed has a duty to respond – to these vicious attacks.”
Inside Israel’s plan to force Biden to drop settlement sanctions
The Israeli government is preparing to take steps to dramatically curb financial interactions between Israeli and Palestinian Authority banks, a move eyed as a response against the Biden administration’s decision to sanction two Israeli towns in Judea and Samaria, according to a new report Thursday.
According to Axios, the Biden administration is planning to impose new sanctions as early as Thursday on two Jewish outpost communities in Samaria linked to alleged attacks on Palestinian Arabs.
The sanctions will also target three Israelis living in the area, said the report, citing three U.S. officials, and would include freezing of assets, entry bans to the U.S., and loss of access to the U.S. financial system.
On Thursday, Israel Hayom reported that the Israeli Finance Ministry, under Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich (Religious Zionist Party) is planning to respond to the Biden administration’s sanctions with punitive measures against the Palestinian Authority.
The steps being considering by Smotrich include ending the broad exemption granted to Israeli banks which conduct business with Palestinian Authority financial entities from liability for any terrorist funding carried out by PA banks.
The exemption is extended on a regular basis, and the Finance Minister need only withhold his signature to end it.
Such a move would likely force Israeli banks to cease their business ties with PA banks, for fear of being targeted either in civil or criminal proceedings over any terrorist funding conducted by the PA banks they do business with.
Given the extent to which Palestinian banks rely on their financial ties to their Israeli counterparts, ending the exemption could cause serious damage to the Palestinian Authority economy.
The U.S. itself has hitherto refrained from forming closer ties to Palestinian financial institutions, given their links to terrorist entities – links which could create legal barriers to the U.S. directly involving itself with Palestinian banks.
Sources close to Smotrich said that the Palestinian Authority is creating risks for Israeli banks, and the Finance Minister is no longer willing to shield banks from those risks.
According to Thursday’s report, the Finance Ministry believes that faced with the potential collapse of the P.A. banking system, the Biden administration will ultimately agree to turn a blind eye to the unfreezing of the Israeli accounts of the seven Israelis targeted by the new U.S. sanctions.
In addition to the three Israeli nations set to be sanctioned Thursday, four others were sanctioned in February for alleged harassment of and attacks against Palestinian Arabs.
Israel, Jews and Peace in Schoolbooks and Teachers’ Guides Used in UNRWA Schools in Judea, Samaria, East Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip
Introduction
The schoolbooks issued by the Palestinian Authority (PA) are mandatorily
used in all areas of Judea, Samaria, the Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem (In
schools that follow the PA curriculum) – in government, private and UNRWA
schools. The books surveyed here are of the latest edition and are used in the
current school year. They were mostly published in 2020. Teachers’ guides,
mostly published in 2018, were examined as well. They shed special light on
the PA indoctrination process which is also applied in UNRWA schools.