“Déjà vu”: Gaza: David Bedein “Where Terror Rules” | September 7, 2005

Ariel Sharon’s government added a specific clause to the final version of the Disengagement Plan, a plan that was ratified by the Israeli government on June 6th, 2004 after an earlier version had been rejected by Sharon’s own Likud Party referendum on May 2nd, 2004. That clause mandated that all properties from evacuated Israeli communities be transferred to “a third, international party which will put them to use for the benefit of the Palestinian population that is not involved in terror.” The Prime Minister’s Disengagement legislation in English can be found at www.pmo.gov.il.

With such legislated assurance that all assets given over to the PA would not be handed over to any terrorist organization, Prime Minister Sharon was able to win successive Knesset (Israel’s parliament) votes and numerous suits in the Israel High Court of Justice that challenged the legality of the Disengagement Plan.

But open sources in the Palestinian Authority, monitored by the Israeli government, contradict that assurance that Israel’s real estate assets would not be handed over to terrorists.

In an interview with the popular “Islam On Line” website, on July 25th, 2005, at www.islamonline.net, three weeks before the Disengagement, Palestinian Authority Foreign Minister Nabil Shaath boasted that the United Arab Emirates had offered a 100 million dollar grant to transform one of the evacuated settlements into a housing project that would honor suicide bombers and provide housing for the children of suicide bombers.

Meanwhille, WAFA — the Palestinian Official News Agency — confirmed on August 24th, 2005 (www.wafa.pna.net) that the Hamas terrorist organization would indeed receive these assets. The agency quoted senior Hamas leader Yunis al-Astal as saying that he had been assured that “The colonies’ lands” will indeed be awarded to the “families and relatives of the martyrs (shahaida)” in honor of their suicide bombing attacks against Israelis.

At the same time, the Palestinian Authority has raised Hamas’s profile in its tightly controlled official media. Reports have highlighted the rising prominence of Hamas and its expanded role in the wake of the Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip.

Perhaps the most important step was the PA agreement to share authority with Hamas in a working committee that was formed with the PA’s dominant Fatah Movement. [1] That committee was established to monitor the Israeli withdrawal and the Palestinian takeover of areas of the Gaza Strip evacuated by the Jewish state.

That decision was regarded as one of the most important in the PA’s new policy of bringing Hamas into power. This new committee’s responsibility is to review all information and all PA plans for the Israeli areas of the Gaza Strip, and to access the $500 million in international funds allocated for development of the area. [2]

The most telling sign of Hamas’s power was not the committee itself. It was where Fatah and Hamas met to decide on the panel. The meeting took place on August 13th at the home of Hamas spokesman and titular leader Mahmoud A-Zahar in Gaza City. [3]

A-Zahar has become to the Palestinian Authority what Hizbullah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah is in Lebanon — a leading non-state actor. “The Palestinian Authority has the right to administer the land [evacuated by Israel] after consulting with the committee, which consists of representatives of the national and Islamic factions,” A-Zahar is quoted as saying.

Unlike PA Chairman Mahmoud Abbas, A-Zahar does not occupy a daily presence in the PA media. But when he appears, A-Zahar’s views are given the utmost prominence.  PA dailies have been either quoting A-Zahar directly or reprinting the interviews that he gives to other Arab media.

Perhaps the most important article was an interview that A-Zahar gave to the London-based A-Sharq Al Awsat daily on August 18th, just as Israel was evicting its citizens out of its settlements.

The interview was reprinted the following day in Al Ayyam, a newspaper owned by the PA and edited by a leading Fatah operative. In that interview, A-Zahar outlined Hamas’s strategy of maintaining attacks against Israel until its complete destruction. He added that his movement would seek to destroy the 1993 Oslo Accords between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization.

The publication of Hamas’s platform in a Fatah-aligned newspaper would have been unthinkable even a year ago.

The Hamas platform declared that the PA had failed in its attempt to force the Islamic movement to end attacks against Israel or surrender Hamas weapons. A-Zahar continued that Interior Minister Nasser Yusef sought to confront Hamas operatives in the United Nations Jabalya refugee camp north of the Gaza City with armored vehicles, “But he quickly realized that he could not resolve the situation through military means.” A-Zahar further stated, “Now they seek dialog, which we welcome.”

A-Zahar came across in the interview as the leader of Palestinian jihad or holy war. He stressed that Israel’s withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and northern West Bank would influence the Arab and Muslim world in jihad. He said the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza would galvanize the Sunni insurgency in Iraq and the Taliban and Al Qaida campaign in Afghanistan.

A-Zahar said Israel did not choose to withdraw from the Gaza Strip. Instead, A-Zahar emphasized that  it was Hamas missiles, mortars and boobytrapped tunnels that drove the Israeli military out of the area. That message was consistent with that of Mahmoud Abbas who talked of jihad in the struggle against Israel, but had stressed that armed resistance was no longer necessary after the Israeli withdrawal. “[Hamas] wants to spread the culture of resistance,” A-Zahar said in a reference to suicide strikes. “We will enter the settlements and soil Israel’s dignity with our feet. We will stand on the ruins of the Israeli settlements and tell our people we have won.”

A-Zahar hasn’t been the only Hamas official given major publicity in the PA media. Sheik Hassan Yusef, regarded as the leader of Hamas in the West Bank, was given prominence in an interview with Al Hayat Al Jadida, the most ardent of pro-Fatah dailies.

Yusef reiterated the Hamas position that the movement would not surrender its weapons to the PA after the Israeli withdrawal. Instead, Yusef said the PA, including Abbas, never raised such a demand in meetings with the movement. The Hamas leader said the two sides would continue to coordinate.

“There are no moderates or extremists in Hamas,” Yusef said. “Our coordination with the PA has not been severed and talk of disarmament was not proposed.” [4] In essence, Hamas has become a full-fledged partner of the Palestine Authority–on a par with or even beyond that of Fatah. Hamas’s activities are deemed as legitimate and important. Indeed, PA-owned newspapers report on Hamas in greater detail and with greater prominence than Fatah.

The best example of the new PA policy was highlighted in Hamas preparations for the Israeli withdrawal. All of the three PA-aligned dailies [5] have reported on Hamas rallies to mark the Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip. The reports have been prominently placed in all of the dailies and often include photographs.

As a result, readers of PA newspapers now learned of Hamas rallies throughout the Gaza Strip and West Bank. All of these rallies were described as “huge” and included photographs of masked Hamas operatives in dune buggies in Nablus. [6]

In contrast, coverage of Fatah activities in the Gaza Strip appears marginal. Most important, articles on Fatah celebrations to mark the Israeli withdrawal do not include photographs, an acknowledgement that these events did not match the crowds at Hamas-sponsored marches.

Hamas, however, doesn’t need the PA to get across the message of jihad.

Abbas has enabled Hamas to maintain its own radio station in the Gaza Strip where it is free to preach holy war against Israel. Indeed, Hamas has launched an intensive media campaign to win support for the continuation of the so-called “armed struggle” in the goal to destroy Israel. The campaign has also been highlighted in the pan-Arab media as part of an effort to raise its profile in the months leading to the Palestinian Legislative Council elections, scheduled for January 2006.

The PA, which pledged to Israel and the United States to stop incitement, has not shut down the Hamas radio station. The PA has also not moved against Hamas’s Internet site, which encourages terrorism. The Hamas website provided data to support a claim that it has been the most active Palestinian group in the war against Israel.

The website said Hamas had conducted 145 out of the 215 insurgency operations in the Gaza Strip. [7] At the same time, Hamas claimed to have killed 646 Israelis since September 2000.  Hamas has also used its website to promulgate anti-Semitism. [8]

Hamas’s Voice of Al Aqsa radio station said the movement would continue to fire Kassam-class, short-range missiles toward Israel after its withdrawal. The message was accompanied by a song that praised Hamas operatives and called for “the raining of rockets on the settlers, preparing missile launchers and aiming them at settlements. Strap on the belts [of suicide bombers] and load them with TNT.” [9]

Hamas has used Voice of Al Aqsa to encourage Palestinians to launch holy war against the United States and the West too. The radio has broadcast interviews with Palestinian experts that asserted that the holy war against Israel would help what they term the global jihad.

“When all of Palestine has been liberated, the weapon of the jihad warriors can be moved to a different region where Islamists will wage war for the sake of Allah against the Crusader [Western], enemies of Allah — in Iraq, Chechnya and Afghanistan,” Salih Al Raqab, a senior Hamas official and lecturer at the Gaza City-based Islamic University, said. [10]

Hamas’s radio said Islam’s goal was to return Christians and Jews to their “natural state.” This state — promised by the Koran — was one of “humiliation and poverty.” [11]

For his part, Abbas has adopted the language of Hamas and made it clear that the movement would be a partner in government. Abbas, who also refers to “Jihad,” says that the PA has decided to allocate five percent of all government positions to the injured in the war against Israel. Given Hamas’s leading role in the war, that would mean Abbas would reserve the largest portion of government jobs to the Islamic opposition. [12]

Abbas’s policy of sharing power with Hamas, particularly regarding the future of the Gaza Strip, has not sat well with leading Fatah operatives. They see such a policy as encouraging Hamas to take over the Gaza Strip with its army of thousands of armed fighters. They said the PA-Hamas confrontation is one step away from blowing up into a major killing spree.

Yayha Ribah, a leading Fatah operative, asserts that Egypt prevented a Hamas-PA war. Yet he declared that Hamas has been violating all of the agreements with the PA, including the “ceasefire” announced by Abbas in February 2005.

To the question as to whether the PA or the Hamas will control the Gaza Strip. Ribah said the situation in the area has become volatile. “Today, we see a game being played in the arena, and it is a very dangerous game,” Ribah said. “Any simple violation could lead to a real tragedy.” [13]

At the time of writing of this piece, after the Israeli government has removed its citizens from the Katif districts of Gaza, and before Israel hands over any assets to the Palestinian Authority, our news agency asked Israeli government spokespeople about enforcing Cause Seven of the Disengagement Plan that forbids Israel from handing over any assets to Palestinians “involved in terror”.

An Israeli government spokesman said in response that Israel would be “watching very carefully to monitor every move of the Palestinian Authority in this respect.” However, the Prime Minister’s office has altered the Hebrew version of the web site version of its disengagement legislation to present only the April 18th version of the Disengagement Plan, a plan that  did not include Clause Seven forbidding Israel from handing over real estate assets to Palestinians who are “involved in terror.”  A version of the Prime Minister’s plan can be found in Hebrew at: www.pmo.gov.il.

So the question remains: will the government of Israel enforce Clause Seven of the Disengagement Plan to the letter of the agreement since Israel has removed every Jew, every Jewish home, every Jewish farm and even every Jewish grave in good faith gestures toward peace? Israel stuck to its part of the bargain and the message from the Palestinian Authority is that once again they will not do so.

Stay tuned for more in The War on Terror.

Notes:

  1. Al Hayat Al Jadida. August 14. Pg. 1
    2. Al Ayyam. August 23. Pg. 1
    3. Al Hayat Al Jadida. August 14. Pg. 1
    4. Al Hayat Al Jadida. August 20.
    5. Al Quds is not owned by the PA, yet it is influenced by PA policy.
    6. Al Hayat Al Jadida. August 23.
    7. The data was supplied by Hamas’s military wing Izzedin Kassam on the Hamas site.
    8. Hamas website contained a poster headlined: “Our Koran was right and your Talmud lied.”
    9. Voice of Al Aqsa on August 18
    10. Voice of Al Aqsa. August 21.
    11. Voice of Al Aqsa broadcast on August 19
    12. Al Hayat Al Jadida. August 21
    13. Al Hayat Al Jadida. August 14

Trump’s Peace Delusion Is Bringing Chaos To Southern Syria

I don’t say this lightly, because President Trump has done some good things in the past. However, the current US administration led by President Trump is sowing the seeds for more strife and war in the Middle East - especially in Syria. It will end up being a full failure unless President Trump changes his strategy.

On 14 May 2025, US President Donald Trump met with Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa in Riyadh during his Middle East trip. The meeting was hastily put together at the behest of the Saudis. That meeting eventually led to the lifting of sanctions on Syria and then up until the massacres of Druze at the hands of Syrian regime forces over the last two days, Trump’s team was attempting to push some sort of security agreement with the Syrian Jihadist Regime on Israel.

It is no secret that President Trump is after a Nobel Peace Prize and wants to rush through a series of “peace” agreements between Arab countries and Israel as soon as he can. There is just one problem. President Trump believes countries run by Jihadists can be peaceful if enough carrots are dangled in front of them.

Peace with Jihadists is not possible – no matter how they dress and. how much money they are given. If there was any doubt, the events of the last few days in Sweida should be proof enough. However, for Trump, the illusory “deal” was held onto even as Ahmed al-Sharaa’s men pushed south into Sweida in complete disregard of Israel’s warnings, assuming the Trump administration would hold back the Jewish State from acting – they gambled wrong.

It was reported that Trump told us not to intervene, but Prime Minister Netanyahu and Defense Minister Yisrael Katz disregarded the American directing and instead pounded the Syrian regime forces. That’s right, the Trump team would have allowed 700,000 Druze to be massacred in southern Syria in order to keep hope alive for some sort of “peace” agreement between Syria and Israel. If it wasn’t for Israel that massacre would have most surely happened. Israel blew up the national military headquarters in Damascus. More than 200 bombs were dropped in the vicinity of Damascus. The IDF took out regime convoys, tanks, fighters, and more - decimating al-Sharaa’s forces.

Unfortunately, the Trump team, including Marco Rubio dropped the ball in regards to the Druze and instead allowing Israel to finish off the Jihadist regime in Damascus, the State Department released what would be considered a “balanced” statement. ”The events in Syria are regrettable, and there is a lack of understanding between the Israeli and Syrian sides. We anticipate that there will be significant developments in the coming hours regarding the issue of tension in Syria, and we expect to see both Syrian and Israeli withdrawals from the conflict area and an end to the violence. We call on the Syrian government to withdraw its forces in order to allow all sides to achieve a de-escalation.”

Given the events over the last 48 hours there is no going back. Syrian forces led by Ahmed al-Sharaa massacred Druze in Sweida. Some counts are saying over 250 people were murdered. Videos show humiliation of Druze men before they are killed in cold blood. They also massacred sick Druze in the main hospital in Sweida. If it wasn’t for the IDF, the situation would have been disastrous.

As of the writing of this article Secretary of State Marco Rubio insists that there is an agreement between Israel and Syria for both sides to withdraw forces. There is some evidence that al-Sharaa has ordered his forces out of Sweida based on a ceasefire they reached with one of the Druze sheikhs.

However, the Military Council in Sweida issued this statement: “We do not recognize the agreement made by Yusuf Jarboo (the Druze sheikh Jarboo reached an agreement with the regime). He does not represent us. Only Sheikh Hikmat al-Hijri represents us.” Hijri is very pro-Israel and is considered the most powerful of the sheikhs in Sweida.

The USA must understand that the only way to reach stability in southern Syria is to support Druze autonomy as an Israeli protectorate. Anything less is inviting the same sort of barbarism that has been on display over the last 48 hours.

Unfortunately, President Trump is far more worried about prizes and accolades than bringing an end to the Jihadist hordes that have streamed into Syria and threaten the existence of minorities there as well as posing a strategic problem for Israel. We all know that Trump speaks very highly of Turkish President Erdogan. Could there be a connection between that relationship and his softball attitude when it comes to the Druze in Syria? After all, the regime in Damascus is essentially an Erdogan project and President Trump has no problem with that at all.

Ahmed Al-Shara’s Foreign Jihadist Problem

When Trump met Syria’s new leader, Ahmed al-Shara, in Riyadh, he couldn’t stop praising him. “He’s a young, attractive guy—tough guy,” Trump said. “He’s got a real shot at pulling it together.” The White House cast the meeting as a breakthrough, announcing sanctions relief and backing engagement with Shara’s government as a path to stability and an opportunity to counter extremists.

Trump even sent longtime ally Thomas Barrack as a special envoy, who praised Shara for “taking meaningful steps” on tackling foreign terrorist fighters.

But in the weeks since, Shara has done exactly the opposite. Rather than removing extremists, he’s absorbing them into his unified national army. The new government’s approach folds groups affiliated with the world’s most dangerous jihadists into Syria’s armed forces.

Up to 3,000 fighters from the Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP)—a Uyghur-led jihadist group tied to Al Qaeda—have been integrated into Syria’s new military under Shara’s watch. This isn’t happening in secret. “There is an understanding, with transparency,” Barrack said of the move, signaling that Washington gave it its blessing.

Some analysts argue that integrating the Turkistan Islamic Party into Syria’s army is a pragmatic move because TIP’s Syria branch has cut ties with Al Qaeda, its fighters cannot return home, and it is better to control them within the system than risk pushing them back into the arms of other extremist groups. Nevertheless, this argument ignores the fact that many of these fighters are still loyal to Al Qaeda’s leadership, have engaged in sectarian violence, and pose a serious threat to Shara’s authority, especially if he pursues policies they oppose.

Analysts who favor integration accept TIP’s claim that it no longer takes orders from its external leadership and Al Qaeda. But there is little indication that the TIP in Syria has severed its ideology or operations from Al Qaeda. Their leader, Abdul Haq al-Turkistani, is a longtime jihadist and member of Al Qaeda’s top leadership council, and according to the United Nations Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team, he still directs TIP’s operations inside Syria from Afghanistan. TIP targets China’s Xinjiang province, where it seeks to establish an Islamic emirate, but it also operates as part of Al Qaeda’s global network, with strongholds in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Shara promoted Abdulaziz Khudaberdi, the TIP’s Syria branch leader, to brigadier general in the Syrian army in December 2024. Audio recordings reveal Khudaberdi’s unwavering obedience to al-Turkistani, further showcasing the strong affiliation with the TIP leadership in Afghanistan and, by extension, Al Qaeda.

Shara and his associates have sought to convince Western interlocutors that bringing foreign fighters into the army would be less of a security risk than abandoning them, which could drive them into the orbit of Al Qaeda or the Islamic State.

Shara is partially right about that: The most hardline of these foreign fighters are already turning against him. They are angry that their former comrade in arms has not yet imposed Sharia law and have alleged that “he has cooperated with the United States and Turkish forces to target extremist factions.”

Instead, the authorities are setting clear guidelines outlining how they expect the foreign fighters to behave. They are to avoid inciting sectarian or political violence and to refrain from calling for attacks on other countries.

The claim that appointing foreign commanders is an effective way to insulate the regime from coups is right, but if these groups continue to maintain operational ties with their parent organizations abroad, they may just be biding their time to assert their own agendas. Their loyalty remains uncertain, and the threat of defiance persists, especially if they don’t agree with how Shara implements Sharia law or establishing a security relationship with Israel.

Additionally, taking Shara at his word that excluding foreign fighters will push them toward Al Qaeda or the Islamic State ignores the fact that many of the groups he seeks to integrate are already part of Al Qaeda’s network. That includes the newly formed 84th Division, a unit that Syrian commanders have filled primarily with TIP militants and other foreign combatants.

Among these combatants is a group named Katibat al-Tawhid wal-Jihad (KTJ), an Uzbek and Kyrgyz faction that operates in both Syria and Afghanistan. Unlike TIP, KTJ is officially identified as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist group by the United States, and KTJ has remained loyal to Al Qaeda.

In December 2024, Shara promoted KTJ’s leader, Saifuddin Tojiboyn, to the rank of colonel. Following his appointment, Saifuddin shut down his Telegram channel and vanished from public view—likely an attempt to “hide his extremist credentials and his allegiance to Al Qaeda while Syria seeks international sanctions relief,” according to Uran Botobekov, an expert on Central Asian Jihadi movements. The presence of an individual like Tojiboyn in Syria’s new army shows that Washington is at risk of greenlighting the enlistment of terrorists from its own blacklist into Syria’s military ranks.

Many of Syria’s foreign fighters committed human rights abuses during the violent clashes along the Syrian coast in March 2025. Among them were Turkmen and Chechen militants. According to a resident of an Alawite neighborhood, these foreign fighters “were everywhere.”

These incidents showed the lack of control Shara has over the foreign fighters. The Interior Ministry’s directive amid the clashes was that “all pro-government forces should adhere to procedures used during the offensive against the Assad regime, namely, no targeting of civilians.” However, the killings continued. The involvement of foreign jihadists directly complicates the situation, as many of these fighters came to Syria for explicitly sectarian reasons.

Shara and his government say that he wants the state to control these foreign fighters, but the attacks against the Alawites proved the opposite. These fighters acted with impunity, and their sectarian motivations endure despite their army membership. With the country still vulnerable to this type of conflict, their presence risks igniting further violence and bloodshed.

Now, with Washington greenlighting their integration and with a dedicated unit established for them, it will be difficult for the Syrian government to root out groups like the TIP that have already been absorbed.

At the very least, Damascus must ensure that these fighters sever all ties with Al Qaeda and stop receiving directives from al-Turkistani and the rest of the leadership in Afghanistan, as well as renounce their affiliation with TIP. It will also be sensible to keep these units away from sectarian flashpoints such as the Alawite-majority Syrian coast or the Druze-dominated Suwayda Governorate.

In addition, placing these units under the command of professional Syrian officers who will ensure the units train and learn properly, rather than becoming jihadi pockets within the Syrian army, will also help monitor and contain any insurrections, especially if Syria begins moving toward normalization with Israel. Additionally, Shara must demonstrate accountability for the perpetrators of the March massacres. The fact-finding committee, tasked by Shara, has yet to complete its final report on the incidents. Still, if he hands out token punishments for mass murder, it will show that putting extremists in the army may do more to legitimize them than empower Shara and the Syrian state.freestar

The Trump administration must also make clear to the Syrians that it will not tolerate the integration of foreign fighters designated as Specially Designated Global Terrorists or listed as Foreign Terrorist Organizations, such as Katibat al-Tawhid wal-Jihad, into Syria’s new army.

The United States must also communicate to Syrian leadership that the use of Syrian territory for cross-border attacks is a red line and that Damascus will be held accountable for harboring groups that intend to export terrorism beyond Syria’s borders. Finally, Washington should be ready to impose direct sanctions on specific military units, such as the 84th Division, if they engage in sectarian violence against Syria’s ethnic and religious minorities.

Reprinted from: https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2025/07/11/ahmed-al-sharas-foreign-jihadist-problem/

BLOOD LIBEL EXPOSED: Did Jewish “Settlers” Kill A “Palestinian-American” On Friday?

A blood libel is now being spread throughout western media concerning the deaths of two Arabs in the vicinity of Ramallah, supposedly by Jewish “settlers”. 23-year-old Saif al-Din Kamil Abdul Karim Musalat, one of the dead Arabs holds “Palesitnian-American” citizenship. The other was Mohammad Shalabi also 23. Arab media immediately reported that they were killed by Jewish “Settlers.” Without checking further, news outlets from NPR to The Telegraph to the New Arab began repeating this claim without any evidence.

So what did happen?

Here are the facts as best presented from those that were there. The video shown above clearly shows that Musalat is no peaceful bystander by rather part of a gang throwing rocks and attacking Jewish youth.

On Friday, a group of Arabs attacked Jewish shepherds near Ramallah in a premeditated attack. Reports confirm that dozens of Arab terrorists and rioters attacked a small group of Jewish shepherds with stones and slingshots in the area of the Ateret settlement in Binyamin. They burned and destroyed equipment and a Bible and injured two shepherds. The Arabs were accompanied by well-known anarchists and extreme left-wing activists.

The attack was planned in advance by the Arabs of the area. This was also reported by the Arab news agency “Wafa”, when the rioters’ goal was, according to them, to storm the place in order to “remove an outpost”.

The Jews called the security forces* who immediately arrived on the scene and repelled the rioters, while also attacking the forces in the open area along the mountain. When the forces arrived, a gas cylinder placed by the Arab rioters inside a bonfire they had lit exploded near them. There were no casualties from the explosion. At the same time, in light of the attack by the terrorists and rioters, Jewish activists were called to the scene and friction arose between them and the rioters who continued to throw stones.

Hours after the end of the event, the Arabs reported that two Arabs had been found dead, who they claimed had been injured during the events.

So was Musalat some peaceful “palestinian” learning about his heritage and traditions as his family has claimed? In a way they may be partly telling the truth. After all, one of the traditions “palestinians” hold in high esteem is throwing rocks and attacking Jews. Looks like Musalat fit right in.

Musalat was no innocent bystander or tourist, but as evidence becomes more clear he was a Hamas member and did not come to Israel to merely visit, but rather to partake in activities relating to attacking and harming Jews. Hamas is now declaring Musalat and Shalabi a martyrs, urging their followers to attack more Jews. Unfortunately, global media – even outlets in Israel are helping to enrage further hate towards Jews by spreading this blood libel – designed to cause increased violence and harm to Jews in Israel and abroad.

Egypt rejects Israel’s Gaza plan, threatens to dump peace agreement

An Egyptian official involved in the negotiations between Israel and Hamas, mediated by Egypt and Qatar, stated that Egypt’s security delegation opposes Israel’s proposed military redeployment plan in Gaza.

In an interview with Al-Araby Al-Jadeed newspaper, the official said that Cairo strongly opposes the continued Israeli military presence in the entire Rafah area, as well as the plan to establish a tent city in Rafah to house hundreds of thousands of Gazan refugees.

He stated, “This would create a human bomb at the Egyptian border, which would pose a clear threat to Egypt’s national security.”

The Egyptian official also noted that his country has warned in the past against Israeli violations of the Camp David Accords. He said that in response to Israeli unilateral actions, Egypt has reinforced its military forces and heavy weaponry in Sinai’s Zone C, contrary to the peace agreement and in direct response to Israel’s actions, which it perceives as violations of the agreement.

He also emphasized that the military buildup in Sinai is meant to send a message, and that Egypt may reconsider the peace agreement if it identifies Israeli violations which it believes pose a definite threat to Egyptian security.

How the Gaza Ministry of Health Fakes Casualty Numbers

The number of civilian casualties in Gaza has been at the center of international attention since the start of the war. The main source for the data has been the Hamas-controlled Gaza Health Ministry, which now claims more than 30,000 dead, the majority of which it says are children and women. Recently, the Biden administration lent legitimacy to Hamas’ figure. When asked at a House Armed Services Committee hearing last week how many Palestinian women and children have been killed since Oct. 7, Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin said the number was “over 25,000.” The Pentagon quickly clarified that the secretary “was citing an estimate from the Hamas-controlled Health Ministry.” President Biden himself had earlier cited this figure, asserting that “too many, too many of the over 27,000 Palestinians killed in this conflict have been innocent civilians and children, including thousands of children.” The White House also explained that the president “was referring to publicly available data about the total number of casualties.”

Here’s the problem with this data: The numbers are not real. That much is obvious to anyone who understands how naturally occurring numbers work. The casualties are not overwhelmingly women and children, and the majority may be Hamas fighters.

If Hamas’ numbers are faked or fraudulent in some way, there may be evidence in the numbers themselves that can demonstrate it. While there is not much data available, there is a little, and it is enough: From Oct. 26 until Nov. 10, 2023, the Gaza Health Ministry released daily casualty figures that include both a total number and a specific number of women and children.

The first place to look is the reported “total” number of deaths. The graph of total deaths by date is increasing with almost metronomical linearity, as the graph in Figure 1 reveals.

This regularity is almost surely not real. One would expect quite a bit of variation day to day. In fact, the daily reported casualty count over this period averages 270 plus or minus about 15%. This is strikingly little variation. There should be days with twice the average or more and others with half or less. Perhaps what is happening is the Gaza ministry is releasing fake daily numbers that vary too little because they do not have a clear understanding of the behavior of naturally occurring numbers. Unfortunately, verified control data is not available to formally test this conclusion, but the details of the daily counts render the numbers suspicious.

The graph reveals an extremely regular increase in casualties over the period. Data aggregated by the author and provided by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), based on Gaza MoH figures.
The graph reveals an extremely regular increase in casualties over the period. Data aggregated by the author and provided by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), based on Gaza MoH figures.

Similarly, we should see variation in the number of child casualties that tracks the variation in the number of women. This is because the daily variation in death counts is caused by the variation in the number of strikes on residential buildings and tunnels which should result in considerable variability in the totals but less variation in the percentage of deaths across groups. This is a basic statistical fact about chance variability. Consequently, on the days with many women casualties there should be large numbers of children casualties, and on the days when just a few women are reported to have been killed, just a few children should be reported. This relationship can be measured and quantified by the R-square (R2 ) statistic that measures how correlated the daily casualty count for women is with the daily casualty count for children. If the numbers were real, we would expect R2 to be substantively larger than 0, tending closer to 1.0. But R2 is .017 which is statistically and substantively not different from 0.

This lack of correlation is the second circumstantial piece of evidence suggesting the numbers are not real. But there is more. The daily number of women casualties should be highly correlated with the number of non-women and non-children (i.e., men) reported. Again, this is expected because of the nature of battle. The ebbs and flows of the bombings and attacks by Israel should cause the daily count to move together. But that is not what the data show. Not only is there not a positive correlation, there is a strong negative correlation, which makes no sense at all and establishes the third piece of evidence that the numbers are not real.

The daily number of children reported to have been killed is totally unrelated to the number of women reported. The R2 is .017 and the relationship is statistically and substantively insignificant.
The daily number of children reported to have been killed is totally unrelated to the number of women reported. The R2 is .017 and the relationship is statistically and substantively insignificant.

Consider some further anomalies in the data: First, the death count reported on Oct. 29 contradicts the numbers reported on the 28th, insofar as they imply that 26 men came back to life. This can happen because of misattribution or just reporting error. There are a few other days where the numbers of men are reported to be near 0. If these were just reporting errors, then on those days where the death count for men appears to be in error, the women’s count should be typical, at least on average. But it turns out that on the three days when the men’s count is near zero, suggesting an error, the women’s count is high. In fact, the three highest daily women casualty count occurs on those three days.

Taken together, what does this all imply? While the evidence is not dispositive, it is highly suggestive that a process unconnected or loosely connected to reality was used to report the numbers. Most likely, the Hamas ministry settled on a daily total arbitrarily. We know this because the daily totals increase too consistently to be real. Then they assigned about 70% of the total to be women and children, splitting that amount randomly from day to day. Then they in-filled the number of men as set by the predetermined total. This explains all the data observed.

The correlation between the daily men and daily women death count is absurdly strong and negative (p-value < .0001).
The correlation between the daily men and daily women death count is absurdly strong and negative (p-value < .0001).

There are other obvious red flags. The Gaza Health Ministry has consistently claimed that about 70% of the casualties are women or children. This total is far higher than the numbers reported in earlier conflicts with Israel. Another red flag, raised by Salo Aizenberg and written about extensively, is that if 70% of the casualties are women and children and 25% of the population is adult male, then either Israel is not successfully eliminating Hamas fighters or adult male casualty counts are extremely low. This by itself strongly suggests that the numbers are at a minimum grossly inaccurate and quite probably outright faked. Finally, on Feb. 15, Hamas admitted to losing 6,000 of its fighters, which represents more than 20% of the total number of casualties reported.

Taken together, Hamas is reporting not only that 70% of casualties are women and children but also that 20% are fighters. This is not possible unless Israel is somehow not killing noncombatant men, or else Hamas is claiming that almost all the men in Gaza are Hamas fighters.

There are three days where the male casualty count is close to 0. These three days correspond to the three highest daily women’s casualty count.
There are three days where the male casualty count is close to 0. These three days correspond to the three highest daily women’s casualty count.

Are there better numbers? Some objective commentators have acknowledged Hamas’ numbers in previous battles with Israel to be roughly accurate. Nevertheless, this war is wholly unlike its predecessors in scale or scope; international observers who were able to monitor previous wars are now completely absent, so the past can’t be assumed to be a reliable guide. The fog of war is especially thick in Gaza, making it impossible to quickly determine civilian death totals with any accuracy. Not only do official Palestinian death counts fail to differentiate soldiers from children, but Hamas also blames all deaths on Israel even if caused by Hamas’ own misfired rockets, accidental explosions, deliberate killings, or internal battles. One group of researchers at the Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health compared Hamas reports to data on UNRWA workers. They argued that because the death rates were approximately similar, Hamas’ numbers must not be inflated. But their argument relied on a crucial and unverified assumption: that UNRWA workers are not disproportionately more likely to be killed than the general population. That premise exploded when it was uncovered that a sizable fraction of UNRWA workers are affiliated with Hamas. Some were even exposed as having participated in the Oct. 7 massacre itself.

The truth can’t yet be known and probably never will be. The total civilian casualty count is likely to be extremely overstated. Israel estimates that at least 12,000 fighters have been killed. If that number proves to be even reasonably accurate, then the ratio of noncombatant casualties to combatants is remarkably low: at most 1.4 to 1 and perhaps as low as 1 to 1. By historical standards of urban warfare, where combatants are embedded above and below into civilian population centers, this is a remarkable and successful effort to prevent unnecessary loss of life while fighting an implacable enemy that protects itself with civilians.

Abraham Wyner is Professor of Statistics and Data Science at The Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania and Faculty Co-Director of the Wharton Sports Analytics and Business Initiative.

Debunking the Genocide Allegations: A Reexamination of the Israel-Hamas War (2023-2025)

Hebrew version 
view Executive Summary – pdf

The following study offers a thorough historical exploration and a quantitative-statistical analysis of the allegation that the State of Israel committed genocide against the Gazan population following the October 7, 2023, massacre. Specifically, we address the claims that Israel intentionally starved the Gazan population, that IDF ground forces deliberately massacred civilians, and that the Israeli Air Force (IAF) carried out indiscriminate bombings, failing to distinguish between combatants and civilians and conducting disproportionate strikes.

The goal of this study is to carefully assess both primary and secondary sources in order to draw independent conclusions about the factual aspects of the conflict. This process involved reviewing testimonies, primary sources, and the methodology of data collection utilized by organizations and researchers promoting the genocide allegation, as well as conducting statistical analysis and distinguishing between narratives promoted by various parties and verified facts. The purpose of our investigation is to identify the factual events that occurred, not to engage in legal or ethical discourse. While discussing the war’s legal and ethical implications is important, we firmly believe such discussion must be grounded in a solid foundation of facts to be meaningful as well as relevant.

Our focus on factual analysis in no way diminishes or ignores the severe human suffering in Gaza, nor does it seek to downplay the rhetoric or policy failures of the Israeli government. However, as we demonstrate throughout this report, subordinating factual analysis to the advocacy of a specific policy or ethical position undermines our ability to understand the facts needed to shape informed policy and ethical conduct. Therefore, we have made every effort to avoid taking any stance or offering recommendations that are not rooted in a comprehensive factual analysis.

This research is structured into eight chapters, each addressing different aspects of the Israel-Gaza conflict:

  • Chapter 1 examines accusations of the deliberate starvation of Gaza’s civilian population.
  • Chapter 2 addresses the lack of sufficient context for understanding Israel’s military actions during the war, particularly the challenges of urban warfare. We focus primarily on Hamas’s “human shields” practice and overall strategy, recognizing that war is shaped by reciprocal measures taken by all parties involved. Thus, the actions of one side to the conflict cannot be assessed without considering those of its adversary.
  • Chapter 3 provides an in-depth analysis of claims regarding deliberate killings of civilians.
  • Chapter 4 investigates allegations that Israel systematically violated the principles of distinction and proportionality in its strikes on the Gaza Strip.
  • Chapter 5 critically reviews Gaza Health Ministry (GMOH) data and manipulations. While recognizing the uncertainty of the available figures, we offer a speculative scenario for how these manipulations skewed the actual gender and age distribution of casualties, and draw conclusions as to plausible combatant-civilian casualty ratios.
  • Chapter 6 explores the capability of UN agencies, humanitarian organizations, and major media outlets to assess humanitarian crises in closed societies under oppressive regimes such as Hamas-controlled Gaza. It draws a comparison to Iraq under U.S. sanctions between 1991 and 2003, and explores the inability of said organizations to pierce the heavy-handed humanitarian deceptions of the Iraqi regime.
  • Chapter 7 evaluates the ability of UN agencies and human rights organizations to credibly distinguish between civilians and combatants among war casualties in contexts marked by manipulation and politicization within closed or controlled societies. This chapter includes findings from a comparative analysis of the 2002 Battle of Jenin, the 2006 Lebanon War, and previous conflicts in Gaza.
  • Chapter 8 analyzes the methodologies used by UN agencies, human rights organizations, and affiliated journalists and researchers that have led to recurring analytical failures, as well as the lack of subsequent insights or corrective action, even when these failures were eventually acknowledged by the same organizations.

EXPOSING Qatar’s Double Game: Ally or Enemy of Israel?

Netanyahu’s DC visit appears to have collapsed after a secret second meeting with Trump, leading Steve Witkoff to cancel his Doha trip and Netanyahu’s team to quietly exit Washington. At the same time, ceasefire talks with Hamas fell apart over demands for a permanent truce, increased aid, early prisoner swaps, and a full IDF withdrawal from Gaza. Meanwhile, a long-delayed U.S. shipment of armored bulldozers has arrived in Israel, boosting IDF ground operations. In southern Gaza, a soldier from Yitzhar was killed in a Hamas ambush while operating heavy machinery—terrorists attempted to kidnap him, but he resisted and was fatally shot before Israeli troops intervened.