Israel’s Intelligence Failure

Hamas’ attack on Oct. 7, 2023, was not Israel’s first intelligence failure. In the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, Israel was surprised by Egypt and Syria’s two-front armored attack. It is the mission of national intelligence services to avoid such surprises. Nothing is perfect; some levels of imperfection are to be expected, and the public never sees the after-action report. In fact, most intelligence failures register far below the level of intolerability. But Hamas’ Oct. 7 attack was an intolerable failure.

Israel has since completed a review of its intelligence failures that day, even going so far, apparently, as to give the media complete access to its operations. The Times of Israel recently published an article about the findings, which are fairly damning. The first two paragraphs tell the tale:

“The Israel Defense Forces Military Intelligence Directorate received information and plans outlining Hamas’s intent to launch a wide-scale attack against Israel over a period of several years, but dismissed the plan as unrealistic and unfeasible, according to a probe of the intelligence failures leading up to the October 7 attack.

“Instead, the Military Intelligence Directorate falsely assumed that Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar was a pragmatist who was not seeking a major escalation with Israel, and that the terror group viewed its 2021 war as a failure and was focusing its capabilities on rocket fire and not a ground invasion.”

The first point is based on human reality. No one can be sure of what another human is thinking, and therefore no one can be sure of their intent. This is particularly true of public figures, especially public leaders. Their thoughts are shaped by reality. They present one face to the public and keep their own thoughts to themselves. We all do that. Thoughts can be shaped by fantasy, but a successful person’s thoughts are shaped by reality. Their public face is a tactic that hides intent and a weapon that pursues intent.

The Israelis tried to read Sinwar’s mind, correlating it with what they saw as an insufficient force. This validated a (faulty) model, whereby Sinwar could not intend to attack because he didn’t have a sufficient force.

What the Israelis missed is that reality had forced a very different thinking on Sinwar. He had a force already, one that could serve as the core of a major force or could over time decline into a demoralized impotence. Sinwar would not be able to continue to lead Hamas if he continued to do nothing. Israeli intelligence also overlooked something more important: that Israel had conquered Palestinian land, and that the Palestinian desire to recover that land was as strong as the Jewish urge to reclaim it. In other words, it missed an empathetic – not sympathetic – element necessary to intelligence, one that imagines real thoughts in another’s mind, the pressures it is under and the opportunities it sees.

This constitutes the geopolitical imperative I often speak of. The imperative is the combination of the moral and geopolitical forces driving a nation or group. The dispossession of the Palestinians created a moral imperative, not unlike the one created among Israelis, to retrieve what was lost. The geopolitical imperative was that time was passing and nothing was happening. The Arab nations were reaching accommodation with Israel, as evidenced by the Abraham Accords. For Hamas, if an accommodation was reached, it would create a geopolitical reality that negated the moral reality.

Hamas saw the Palestinians running out of time, and empathetic analysis would have shown that Hamas had to act as quickly as possible to undermine Arab-Israeli accommodation. Had Israeli intelligence considered the imperative, it would have seen what Sinwar had to be thinking, having lived his life with this on his mind. But their thoughts were shielded. The documents Israeli intelligence received might have been real at the time, and their spies honest, but they also all could have been planted to mislead the Israelis.

If Hamas had remained passive, it would wither away or be destroyed. Thus its strategic imperative, driven by moral and geopolitical imperatives, was to preempt an Israeli attack with an attack of its own. The attack would not destroy Israel but would divide it. It was intended for an Arab audience, the message being that Israel is not invincible. A small force that had no business surviving could stun Israel, even if it couldn’t defeat it. Imagine what a large force could do. Accommodation with Israel, then, would be unnecessary.

This imperative led to a strategy that did not in any way threaten the survival of the Israeli state, although it did threaten the survival of Israeli citizens. It was a miniature demonstration of what was possible. Similar attempts had been tried, but Hamas intended for this one to work.

The key was to build a suitable force without alerting Israel. Israeli intelligence saw the slow growth of Hamas’ force but could not escape from its geopolitical model. Israel is powerful enough to destroy any Hamas force of any conceivable size, so Israel saw no need for a preemptive strike that would potentially rupture its Arab accommodation process or strain relations with the United States, which would support its defense but could balk at a larger offensive operation. What the Israelis didn’t understand was that the point of the attack was not to defeat Israel but to demonstrate Israel’s inherent vulnerability, reveal Israel’s potential capabilities, and trigger a larger and longer process that could destroy Israel. So Israeli intelligence, having misread the intent and dismissed the imperative as fantasy, also misread the buildup. Even as the men and equipment were readied, and as engineers were preparing the invasion routes, Israel could not abandon its model.

It was right in thinking Sinwar was a pragmatist but wrong about where pragmatism would lead him. How could they know whether Sinwar’s pragmatism would lead him to aggressive action or to inaction? The misreading of the intent created an associated misunderstanding of military reality. As a fighting force, Hamas was small. But size didn’t matter if the intent was to create a crisis of confidence in Israel that would make it more paranoid and defeat the process of accommodation. In time, Israel’s fear of surprise would lead to preemptive attacks on imagined threats and rekindle the Arab world’s fear of Israel, or at least maintain Arab-Israeli hostility.

Arab hostility toward Israel would, notably, also affect the United States. The U.S. countermove was to inch toward an understanding with Saudi Arabia, using the nonsense of taking over Gaza as an indicator of how unpredictable the U.S. is and forcing the Saudis to offer a different strategy in which it takes responsibility for Palestinian behavior.

So the question now is whether Hamas has succeeded in its strategy to end Arab accommodation with Israel, or if it has created its own worst nightmare: accelerating Riyadh’s accommodation under U.S. cover and forcing other Arab nations to follow suit.

The Oct. 7 attack, then, was a Hail Mary. It may end in success or failure. But Hamas made the only move it could, and where Israeli intelligence analysts should have sensed there was an imperative behind it, they chose to comfort themselves by pretending to read the enemy’s mind.

Now Israel must reexamine its own imperatives. Can it endure a Palestinian strategy with periodic attacks that wound it and undermine its people’s confidence, which is so essential to its geopolitical needs? This will surely be discussed in Riyadh.

For now, though, this example is a lesson for all who work in intelligence. Intelligence is the art of ignoring intent and focusing on imperatives. Imperatives must be married to constraints – that is, what a leader cannot do. Imperatives and constraints create reality, and geopolitics generates both.

I draw from this a number of principles on intelligence. Do not imagine you know the intent of an enemy’s leader. What leaders want to do and what they must do are different things. Leaders don’t become leaders without crafting an image of themselves and hiding their deeper thoughts. They are leaders, whether democratic or dictatorial, because they have understood what it takes to become and stay a leader. They did that by having a public mind that is designed to maintain power in the mode appropriate to their nation. The reality of their thinking is hidden to thwart a view of their fears, hopes, ruthlessness and pleasures.

Do not trust sources because they may lie, may not know, or may have been sent to mislead you. We humans are deceptive, and having access to the general’s wife doesn’t get you much more than bribes or blackmail. Counterintelligence does not depend on truth. Counterintelligence is easier than intelligence.

Focus on the nation and what it must have as a nation. Leaders become leaders and survive by knowing this. They act on it but rarely reveal it.

Know what a nation can’t do. That is the most important thing. If you know what is impossible, you will know what is possible, and that limits surprises.

The personal is anything that is communicated personally or electronically to someone who you believe is not deliberately talking and hoping to be intercepted and believed.

Note that this does not apply to intelligence about the available military force. On this, intelligence is indispensable, for it helps define the impossible.

Analysis can get a glimpse of national imperatives and constraints not just between two nations but concerning all involved. The role of intelligence is to know what must and what can happen. This must first be known on the broadest level, and that must guide intelligence on a more detailed level. This is the Israeli lesson. They have learned and even published it. What conclusions they draw about improving intelligence will almost certainly not be mine. Depending on the Hamas leader’s personality type is a dicey proposition.

US talks with Hamas: Trump unfazed by Netanyahu’s opposition

U.S. President Donald Trump delivers an address to a joint session of Congress in Washington, March 4, 2025. Credit: Daniel Torok/White House.

Diplomacy—unlike the approach of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy—requires delicacy. Especially when it involves relations with a power as crucial to Israel as the U.S. And even more so when that power is led by Donald Trump.

That is why Israel’s expression of opposition to the direct, extraordinary talks between the U.S. and Hamas has been articulated in the most careful and subdued manner. In fact, it takes a Rashi-level interpretation to decipher what Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu truly thinks about the matter.

“In contacts with the United States, Israel has expressed its opinion on direct talks with Hamas,” the Prime Minister’s Office declared in a cryptic statement.

Anyone who can crack this riddle can understand just how delicately Jerusalem is treading when the intended recipient is Trump. After all, Netanyahu’s statement does not specify what exactly Israel’s “opinion” was. Readers are left to draw their own conclusions.

It is, of course, obvious that Israel’s “opinion” is not positive. If it were, Netanyahu would not hesitate to praise and commend Trump, as he often does. Moreover, Israel and the U.S. have maintained a decades-long policy of avoiding any contact with Hamas due to its murderous terrorism. That was true before Oct. 7, 2023, and it is exponentially more so now.

Furthermore, in the codes of diplomacy, direct talks grant mutual recognition and legitimacy. For Hamas, the very fact of meeting with an American representative is a significant achievement, regardless of the content of the talks or whether they lead anywhere.

Israel is clearly opposed to granting Hamas such a prize. After all, if direct meetings of this kind posed no issue for Israel, it would conduct them itself, rather than relying on mediators such as Egypt or Qatar, a no less problematic interlocutor.

A disregard for diplomatic formalities

For all these reasons, there is no doubt that the unspecified “opinion” of Netanyahu’s office was negative, perhaps very negative. And for anyone still unconvinced by the circumstantial evidence, an informed source told Israel Hayom, “This is a highly problematic move, to say the least.”

In any case, Israel’s opinion did not persuade Trump. After all, he dispatched Adam Boehler, his appointee overseeing negotiations for the recovery of U.S. hostages held by non-state actors and of U.S. citizens wrongfully detained by foreign states, to meet with Hamas representatives in Doha. The 47th U.S. president took this step because he does not believe in diplomatic formalities. Trump, as we recall, met with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un during his previous term despite a longstanding American embargo.

Trump also sent his representatives to meet with the Taliban, who had killed U.S. soldiers, solely to reach an agreement to end the war in Afghanistan. The reason for all these moves is that Trump is a man of results, not processes. He does not care how exactly a hostage deal is reached. As long as the U.S. is not paying exorbitant costs, the protocol along the way is irrelevant to him. The bottom line is what matters.

And so, Israel has expressed its “opinion,” but it has clearly not been accepted. The question now is whether this problematic path Trump is pursuing will lead to results.

Originally published by Israel Hayom.

The Historical Roots of President Trump’s Gaza Relocation Plan

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: President Donald Trump’s controversial initiative to relocate the Palestinian population from the Gaza Strip, primarily to Egypt and Jordan, is causing a stir in the Arab world. While the strong public resistance to the idea expressed by Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi and Jordanian King Abdullah seems to negate the possibility that the president’s initiative can be implemented, President Trump insists that his plan is achievable and that Egypt and Jordan will eventually cooperate. His resettlement idea, viewed in today’s political environment as anathema, has a series of historical precedents.

President Donald Trump has overturned the Middle East chessboard by proposing that the population of Gaza be resettled elsewhere to allow for the total razing and reconstruction of the Gaza Strip and the full eradication of its terrorist infrastructure. He views Egypt and Jordan as logical hosts to the resettled Gaza population. By mentioning the critical contributions the US makes to Egypt and Jordan, not to say their full reliance on the US, Trump is sending a strong hint to President Sisi and King Abdullah that their reservations about his proposal will come with a price. This could have serious consequences for the two Arab states, both of which face major domestic challenges including economic instability and political unrest. 

Those fears notwithstanding, Egypt and Jordan have called on the Arab League to demonstrate a determined and united front against the relocation initiative. The Joint Arab statement of February 1, 2025, read, “We affirm our rejection of [any attempts] to compromise Palestinians’ unalienable rights, whether through settlement activities, or evictions or annexation of land or through vacating the land from its owners…in any form or under any circumstances or justifications.”

Several European countries have wondered about the ethics of forcibly relocating a population. Relocation, even if framed as voluntary, often involves coercion when individuals have no real alternatives. This raises questions about the morality of displacing millions of people who have already suffered decades of conflict, displacement, and loss.

Will this thwart the American president’s ambitious plan? Not necessarily. Trump will likely exert additional pressure on the Jordanian king and Egyptian president, alongside generous economic incentives.

It should be noted that the current relocation initiative is not a new idea. It has long historical roots that stretch all the way back to the conclusion of Israel’s War of Independence (1948-1949) and the emergence of the problem of Palestinian refugees. Plans were proposed that were mainly directed toward resettling the refugees through formal absorption into host countries.

Most of these initiatives were thwarted by the Arab League countries as part of a strategy intended to eventually annihilate Israel by inflating the cause of the refugees’ “right of return” to the territory of the State of Israel.

The lessons learned from past failures can serve as reference points for considering President Trump’s plan to relocate the residents of the Gaza Strip. The following historical overview sheds light on the circumstances that played a critical role in the past and can help us judge the prospects for Trump’s relocation and resettlement initiative.

Background

The documented evidence shows that the Arab countries, since the very beginning of the Palestinian refugees’ tragedy, have never been interested in any kind of solution to the refugee problem but solely in their return to their homes within Israel. Using this rationale, all the Arab states, with the exception of Jordan, refused to grant citizenship to any Palestinian refugees residing within their borders. Most Arab leaders reasoned that resettling the Palestinians was tantamount to renouncing Arab claims to Palestine. Out of an overt hostility toward Israel, they deliberately refused to resettle Palestinian refugees in an effort to maintain their refugee status and keep the Palestinian issue alive in the world’s consciousness.

Resettlement versus the “right of return”

Official Arab discourse on the matter centered around the implementation of the “right of return” and the preservation of UNRWA as a symbol of both the refugees’ plight and the international community’s responsibility for implementing UN General Assembly Resolution 194.

At the birth of the Palestinian refugee crisis, the Arab states faced a political challenge. While they encouraged their peoples to demand the refugees’ repatriation in Israel, the Arab governments lacked the power to force Israel to accept them. Arab host states found themselves insisting that the Palestinian refugees “go home” even though they did not have the ability to make this happen.

In striking testimony, British MP Richard Cross Brian said, on visiting a refugee camp in Jordan in March 1951, that “…the Arab League needs the refugee problem in order to keep the struggle against Israel. The resettlement of the refugees would have denied its most important tool in this respect”.

Systematic Arab rejection of the refugees’ resettlement

Ever since the early stages of the Palestinian refugee problem, numerous resettlement projects have been proposed, international funds provided, and studies undertaken, all of which focused on the benefits to the refugees of their absorption into Arab host countries. The main idea was that the Palestinians’ rehabilitation could help the host countries develop their own economic potential under proposed aid programs as well as remove the main obstacle to a settlement in the Middle East.

However, the resettlement initiatives, all of which were intended to better the lives and ease the suffering of the Palestinian people, became the official symbol of “betrayal” of the refugee cause. The term “return” remains to this day – an empty slogan devoid of any clear reference to the modalities of its implementation, either in terms of procedure or in terms of the political regime that might prevail in a recovered Palestine.

The principle of maintaining the refugees as stateless persons in order to retain their Palestinian nationality and thus preserve their “right of return” was the key premise of the Arab League’s Palestinian refugee policies.

Walter Eytan, the first director general of the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, wrote in his book The First Ten Years[1]:

…The Arab states were quick to see that they had in the refugees a priceless political asset. They were determined to do everything to preserve it – which meant doing nothing for the refugees…The Arab states as a whole will have no interest in the solution of the problem until the refugees become a political liability for them, as they have been for Israel, or at least cease to be an asset.

The logic behind the principle of resettlement

The first UN secretary general, Trigve Lie, expressed a realistic vision on the topic by stating, “The Arab States would have a change of opinion, and they would recognize the inevitability of reintegration of refugees elsewhere than in Israel.” A Report of the Special Study Mission of the US Congress stated in 1954 that the objective should be for refugees to become citizens of the Arab states – but also noted that “any Arab political leader suggesting an alternative to repatriation in what was formerly Palestine would have been ousted from office and, perhaps, have run the risk of assassination”.

The approach of Israeli President Yitzhak Ben-Zvi

A creative idea of how to solve the refugee problem was proposed in December 1960 by the late former Israeli President Yitzhak Ben-Zvi. He suggested that the Arab refugees be regarded as a fair exchange of population for the Jews expelled from Muslim countries who subsequently settled in Israel.

Ben-Zvi said, “The Arabs must accept the fact that Arab refugees should be resettled in their respective countries just as Jews were resettled in Israel…The UN must understand that this was the only way of solving the problem, even if it required financial support.” The Arab side rejected President Ben-Zvi’s proposal on the claim that it violated UN resolutions.

Resettlement initiatives that were stopped by the Arabs

Several initiatives were explored based on the idea of resettlement. They included the following:

  1. The Syrian case: After its 1948 defeat, the Syrian government was in desperate need of agricultural workers. A joint US-UK initiative to offer a deal for the resettlement of Palestinian refugees in Syria was raised, first with then Syrian Prime Minister Husni Za’im (mid-1949) and then with Adib Shishakly (who overthrew Za’im). The basic framework was settlement in return for money. The plan was to resettle 500,000 refugees in Syria at a cost of $200,000,000. However, shortly after the Egyptian revolution of July 1952, Shishakly shut down the project, claiming that he was being accused of suppressing freedom, binding Syria to the imperialist organizers of Western pacts and to the oil companies, and of “selling” the refugees. In February 1954, Shishakly was driven from the country by a military coup.
  2. The American plans: A plan was put forward by US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles in August 1955 that suggested the resettlement of the refugees in Arab states. This was to be incentivized through the development of water management projects with the US as a major contributor; payment of compensation for lost property; return of a limited number of refugees to Israel; and a solution to the border problem between Israel and the Arab states. Another US plan, initiated by President Eisenhower after the Israeli military campaign in Sinai (October-November 1956), offered an economic solution to the refugee problem through regional economic development. The last official US plan in this regard was that of Joseph Johnson in October 1962, who suggested that refugees be given a choice of return or compensation from UN and US funds while maintaining Israel’s right to refuse returnees on security grounds.
  3. The Iraqi case: On several occasions, the feasibility of resettling the refugees in Iraq was raised both theoretically and practically. One of the ideas was a possible quid pro quo in which Iraq would absorb a major share of Palestinian refugees in exchange for the 100,000 Jewish residents of Iraq, who would be authorized to emigrate to Israel without hindrance. Though a preliminary scheme for this kind of population exchange was raised by the Iraqi side, the idea was never implemented. This is unfortunate, as resettlement of the refugees in Iraq could have benefited the refugees while helping to solve one of Iraq’s own development problems.
  4. The Canadian case: In mid-1955, at the request of UNRWA, the Canadian government expressed a readiness to admit displaced Palestinian refugees. Canadian officials believed that alleviating the refugee problem in the Middle East would help to further regional stability. The resettlement scheme was still politically sensitive, however. Arab governments protested what they labeled a Zionist plot to remove Palestinians from their ancestral land, and Palestinian activists threatened to conduct violent attacks in Canadian cities if Ottawa kept offering Palestinian refugees safe haven in Canada.
  5. The South American option: It was recently revealed that the US proposed giving Palestinian refugees land in South America as a solution to the refugee problem. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, who served during the administration of George W. Bush, suggested that displaced Palestinians be settled in Argentina and Chile. Rice made the proposal during a June 2008 meeting with US, Israeli and Palestinian negotiators in Berlin. The initiative was bluntly rejected by the Palestinian side.

The special resettlement initiative of UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold

Of all the resettlement proposals, the initiative of UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold was the most comprehensive. On June 15, 1959, he made the assertion that there were feasible means of absorbing the refugees into the economy of the Arab region. He asserted further that the refugees would be beneficial to their host countries by adding vital manpower to assist in their development. Hammarskjold detailed the estimated cost of the refugee absorption, which he said could be financed by oil revenues and outside aid.

The Arab states strongly rejected the plan on the grounds that it overlooked the Palestinians’ national rights. They also strongly objected to its blueprint for regional economic development, which would result in economic cooperation with Israel and eventually political cooperation. This was deemed unacceptable as it would benefit Israel by ending the boycott.

The most radical remark on behalf of the Arab States was delivered by Saudi Arabian representative to the UN Ahmad Shukeiri, who warned that unless Israel was forced to accept the complete repatriation of the refugees, 80,000,000 Arabs “from Casablanca to the Persian Gulf” were ready and eager to go to war against the Jewish State.

The Jordanian option as an “alternative homeland”

The case of Jordan, which bears the highest burden of refugees, illustrates why other Arab states are reluctant to accept Palestinian refugees. In terms of demographics, the over 2 million refugees who reside in Jordan – 40% of all registered refugees – represent more than 70% of the total Jordanian population. The idea of flooding Jordan with large numbers of additional Palestinian refugees directly threatens the future of the Hashemite Kingdom. It can therefore be easily understood why Jordan’s King Abdullah expressed his firm position that he will never accept turning Jordan into the Palestinians’ “alternative homeland”.

No matter what the official Jordanian position may be, the notion of Jordan as an “alternative homeland” is still alive. It is being pushed by Dr. Mudar Zahran, the Secretary General of the Jordanian Opposition Coalition, who aims to bring about the collapse of the Kingdom of Jordan.

Conclusion

In all the proposals for resettling Palestinian refugees, they were identified not as a liability but as an asset. They were described as a reservoir of manpower which, combined with the economic potentialities of the area, could contribute toward raising the standard of living across the whole region. But on the political level, the refugees were perceived as a threat to stability and peace, and as people who could easily be exploited by Communist and other radical movements.

Since neither Israel nor the US had the power to compel resettlement, the Palestinians and the Arab states succeeded in resisting it. In the wake of the failure of any resettlement strategy to take hold, UNRWA – a tool of UN – was suspected of indirectly helping to subsidize Palestinian terror groups and even of abetting Palestinian atrocities against Israelis on October 7.

The Arab States’ resistance to resettlement was well reasoned. Notwithstanding the 1949 armistice, the Arab governments did not accept Israel’s legitimacy. To agree to resettlement as a resolution to the refugee problem would have been tantamount to acknowledging the permanence of Israel.

Israeli historian Prof. Benny Morris, commenting on the 1948-49 negotiations concerning repatriation and resettlement, bluntly argued that the Arab states regarded the refugees as a potential fifth column. Some Arab governments feared that the absorption of Palestinian refugees could undermine their own political stability.

Finally, voices among the refugees themselves have described their feelings on the matter: “The Arab States do not want to solve the refugee problem. They want to keep it as an open sore, as an affront to the United Nations and as a weapon against Israel. Arab leaders don’t give a damn whether the refugees live or die.”

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[1] Walter Eytan, The First Ten Years (Simon & Schuster, 1958) p. 131.

Dr. Raphael Bouchnik-Chen is a retired colonel and author of the books Diplomat and Secret Man and The Intelligence Failure and the Yom Kippur Surprise.

Arab League Summit in Cairo: Divergent Approaches to Gaza Reconstruction

What made the Arab League summit in Cairo, focused on Gaza reconstruction and rejecting President Trump’s Gaza migration initiative, particularly notable was that for the first time Aarab nations attempted to formulate a solution to the Palestinian issue that doesn’t adopt PLO positions. Instead, they tried to impose on the Palestinians a solution preferable to Arab states.

We use the term “attempt” because while the Egyptian decision to reconstruct Gaza already represents an effort to bypass the Palestinian position, a consensus Arab stance acceptable to all parties has not yet emerged. The weakness of the final position is that it attempts to bridge differences that remain unbridged.

The Egyptian position is essentially the preparation of a plan for an April summit in Cairo aimed at developing a five-year reconstruction program worth approximately $50 billion, as if it were a contractors’ plan rather than one from nations declaring their political intentions.

Gaza would meanwhile be managed by a Palestinian technocratic committee, with Egypt and Jordan training Palestinian security forces to deploy in Gaza.

In other words, the summit—meaning Egypt—did not address Hamas’s fate whatsoever. This was the root of disagreements among Arab states during the summit and its preparations. These disagreements remain unresolved, which means Gaza reconstruction will remain on paper and not be implemented, as it will be impossible to raise the billions necessary for reconstruction while Arab nations have not reconciled their differences.

What were these disagreements? First and foremost, Hamas’s future. During the preparatory conference in Riyadh, defined as “friendly” to avoid making decisions, Saudi Arabia made it clear to the participants that if they expected it to open its wallet while Hamas remained in Gaza, they should look for another sucker. From Saudi Arabia’s perspective, Hamas’s removal from Gaza is an iron-clad condition for any participation in Gaza reconstruction.

At the opposite pole stood Qatar, which argued that any future solution must preserve the “muqawama” (resistance)—meaning Hamas rule.

This means that if Saudi Arabia indeed keeps its wallet closed, Qatar will step in, and with the advantage it has over other Arab states in its special relationship with Israel, it has a good chance of winning the grand prize, along with Hamas.

While the dispute between Qatar and Saudi Arabia was fundamental, there were also shades of disagreement with Egypt. From this disagreement, we can learn about Egypt and Saudi Arabia’s true positions on the Palestinian issue.

Egypt demanded that any formula for Gaza be linked to the West Bank—reconnecting Gaza and the West Bank, with Gaza reconstruction being just part of overall Palestinian Authority rehabilitation and concrete first steps toward establishing a real Palestinian state.

In other words, the Egyptian plan’s purpose is to create a political wall between itself and Gaza, reinforcing the physical wall it has already built. From Egypt’s perspective, Gaza must be connected northward to Israel and the West Bank, not southward to Egypt itself.

Saudi Arabia is unconcerned with all this and sees it as obstacles to the main goal—removing Hamas from Gaza. The Egyptian plan adopted in Cairo might attempt to accommodate Saudi Arabia by defining the “Palestinian state” as a “horizon,” not something concrete to be implemented here and now.

The Palestinian Authority’s position—that it is the only body authorized to take over Gaza’s administration—received no consideration whatsoever.

Egypt’s desire to distance itself from direct involvement in Gaza’s problems explains why it rejected preliminary initiatives for the Arab League to decide to send Egyptian “peacekeeping” forces to Gaza, similar to how during Lebanese crises, the Arab League authorized Syria to restore order in civil war-torn Lebanon.

From this perspective, it was interesting to hear Lebanon’s new president, Joseph Aoun, say that if Arabs decided to destroy themselves, at least it should be for themselves and not for others… In this, he echoed Saudi Arabia’s positions in closed rooms. The Lebanese example largely explains Saudi Arabia’s position on Gaza—Saudi Arabia entered Lebanon with its economic power and began reconstruction only after Hezbollah was removed from the picture.

Initially, Saudi Arabia withdrew its support from Lebanon after Saad Hariri refused to confront Hezbollah, pulling its money from Lebanese banks and causing the collapse of the “Land of Cedars.” Now it returns as President Aoun is willing to do what Saad Hariri refused to do.

Hence, the difference between Saudi Arabia and Egypt is the degree of determination to remove Hamas. Saudi Arabia demands its removal, while Egypt wants to maneuver between it and the Palestinian Authority.

Qatar wants to maintain Hamas, and Abbas wants to take over Gaza as part of implementing the Palestinian state, rejecting Egypt’s position that the PA and Hamas should agree on a technocratic committee to manage Gaza.

The bright spot in all this inter-Arab turmoil was the UAE’s position that educational reconstruction in Gaza is no less important than physical reconstruction. In other words, the UAE is ready to impart to Gazans their educational approach, in which Islam is not jihadist but inclusive, extending a hand to Judaism and Christianity.

This brings us to the UNRWA issue, which we will expand on another time. For now, we’ll say that to maintain the connection between Gaza and the West Bank, Egypt must adhere to “UN resolutions” and UNRWA, like the Ramallah-based PA.

Saudi Arabia sees no importance in this matter either, and it doesn’t appear it will agree to participate in Gaza reconstruction together with the UN, just as the UN is not involved in Lebanon’s reconstruction, certainly not in the Trump era.

The Truth About The Oscar-Winning Anti-Israel Documentary ‘No Other Land’

The Oscar winner for Best Documentary Feature Film, “No Other Land,” is based on lies, according to an Israeli group that documents illegal Arab construction in Judea and Samaria, also known as the West Bank.

“No Other Land,” a documentary co-directed by left-wing Israelis and Arab activists, won the Oscar on Sunday night. Its Palestinian co-director, Basel Adra, took to the stage for his acceptance speech to accuse Israel of ethnic cleansing.

“‘No Other Land’ reflects the harsh reality that we have been enduring for decades and still resist as we call on the world to take serious actions to stop the injustice and to stop the ethnic cleansing of the Palestinian people,” Adra said.

His Israeli co-director, left-wing journalist Yuval Abraham, chimed in, claiming that he is free as an Israeli, while Adra is “under military law that destroys his life and he cannot control.”

But according to the Israeli NGO Regavim, the documentary relies on a “concoction of misrepresentations and outright fabrications.”

“This is a propaganda film that serves the false Palestinian narrative, and seeks to undermine the legitimacy of the State of Israel in the international arena in order to cause boycotts and sanctions of IDF fighters,” Meir Deutsch, director-general of Regavim, said in a statement.

Throughout the film, Adra documents his struggle to stop the Israeli Defense Forces from demolishing what are described as “ancient villages” in an area called Masafer Yatta, which is east of the Palestinian Authority town of Yatta. In reality, Regavim points out, all of the so-called villages of Masafer Yatta did not exist when Israel declared the area an IDF training zone for live-fire exercises in the early 1980s.

The name Masafer Yatta is believed to come from the word “traveling,” a reference to its distance from Yatta, or from the Arabic word for “nothing” or “zero,” a reference to the desert wasteland that was not suitable for anything.

Bodies of Bibas Family Return Home; Hamas Uses Coffins, Satanic Picture of Netanyahu for Victory Celebration; How Jewish Traditions Kept Hostages Alive in Gaza Captivity

For Hamas, the bodies of an innocent Jewish mother, from a peace-loving Israeli Kibbutz, and her little children– those coffins ARE Hamas’ endgame. What will the world do about it? If the International Red Cross is any example, the world will again remain silent and will some will excuse or even cooperate with ultimate evil. IRC’s mantra when it comes to Jews: Say nothing and do NOTHING. The ICC and ICJ are putting Netanyahu in the docket for fighting back against these monsters? A perversion of justice. The world is deconstructing its values to cater and cower to these monsters. Israel and the US won’t.

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Bloopers

Way back in the dim and distant past, there used to be a popular programme on New Zealand television called “Bloopers.”

It portrayed individuals and groups in a less-than-flattering light as they articulated outrageous views or found themselves in embarrassing situations.

Some synonyms of “bloopers” according to Wikipedia are “blunders, howlers, mistakes, inaccuracies, miscues and goofs.”

These examples just about cover the field as recent such events reveal, especially when it comes to coverage of Israel and Jews. It is difficult to prioritize the level of insanity we face in recent times. Ranging from malicious media reporting to deliberate acts of uninformed and often unhinged behaviour, the unending litany of “howlers” just keeps coming.

If there was an Oscar prize for the most disgusting and depraved performance of the year it must surely be awarded to Hamas and their fellow travellers. Dante’s “inferno” which describes a journey through hell has nothing on the spectacle enacted in Gaza. The few live remaining Israeli hostages, two of whom had been held for a decade, were forced to endure an excruciating “ceremony” as props in a farce from hell.

Even more depraved was the tragedy of the return of the two Bibas children and their motherIsraeli media refused to show images of this barbaric farce but the foreign media had no such qualms. In scenes reminiscent of mobs witnessing Roman pagan circuses, the coffins were paraded in front of a cheering and baying mob of Gazans, which included women and children. Complicit in this orgiastic ritual were representatives of the International Red Cross, who, for years, had done nothing to visit the hostages and demand their release.

Some overseas media outlets reported that the Bibas children and mother had died in captivity, which is as great a blooper as one can get. They were murdered in cold blood by jihadist groups, but this fact is obviously too close to the truth to be reported by some news sites. What makes this event even more revolting are the crocodile tears shed by political leaders who urge Israel to gift these despicable specimens of humanity a terror state “living in peace and security.”

Anything more delusional would be hard to imagine, yet this is the chorus issuing forth from Canberra, Wellington and other capitals and, of course, the corrupt UN.

There are amazingly still some lost souls who try to make a differentiation between the Islamic jihadists and the mythical “moderates” of the Ramallah-based Palestinian Arab Authority. Presided over by a President who hasn’t faced an election since 2005, this “dove of democracy” is touted as a guardian of religious tolerance and guarantor of peace. Despite all evidence to the contrary, this pernicious platitude continues to be the infallible gospel.

Fatah, the ruling party of the PA, of which Abbas is the head, has clarified its “peaceful” agenda. It has revealed that it is preparing to integrate the terrorist murderers released in the hostage deal, into the movement and national framework. In case this message is not clear enough, it issued this declaration: “we are committed to supporting the families of martyrs, prisoners and injured individuals. They are heroes of freedom who deserve top priority in terms of protection and care.”  

How much clearer do their intentions need to be?

Unfortunately, given the past and current track record, no amount of dead Jews will suffice to induce any sort of logical conclusion.

Proof of this is provided by this week’s expressions of “grave concern” by the UN Secretary-General and the International Red Cross over Israel’s campaign against terror and talk of the annexation of Judea and Samaria. Heaven forbid that Jews should be allowed to fight back against murderers and claim territory that was sovereign parts of a nation three thousand years ago.

Meanwhile, in Moscow, President Putin expressed his thanks to Hamas for their “goodwill” in releasing an Israeli hostage with dual nationality. In the absence of any Russian outrage over the mass kidnapping of Israelis and their continuing support of Abbas and his corrupt authority, this cringe-worthy expression of appreciation is yet another example of political hypocrisy at its worst.

As though international adoration of terror supporters is not sufficiently nauseating the reported visit of the World Jewish Congress President to Abbas scrapes the bottom of the barrel. At a time when Israelis are being targeted for murder, Ronald Lauder feels it imperative to have an audience with one of the chief architects of violence. To make matters worse the PA news agency triumphantly proclaimed after the meeting that Lauder supports the “two State solution.”

Making this “blooper” even worse was a report that a PA spokesperson demanded that Israel should be “flooded” with Gaza refugees. Remember that the 7 October Hamas pogrom was called the Al Aqsa flood. It therefore does not need a genius to work out exactly where the aspiring Palestinian State is headed.

Senator Graham of the USA declared that “if negotiations fail, Hamas should be destroyed as we destroyed the Germans and the Japanese.” What he omitted to point out was that no negotiations took place with these terror nations. In the words of Churchill and Roosevelt it was a matter of “unconditional surrender.” What followed was a period of re-education and a complete pivot to democratic values.

Faced with an Islamic Jihadist mindset which denies any valid Jewish sovereignty and a religious fanaticism which views all non Muslims as “unbelievers” the chances of a mass conversion to tolerant and democratic values are zero. There are indeed pockets of enlightenment, but unfortunately, the vast majority is irredeemably subverted in an endless nightmare of violence and intolerance.

The Taliban authorities have complained that Pakistan was carrying out a mass expulsion of Afghan refugees. Has anyone, by some remote chance, noticed any demonstrations on the streets and universities over this violation of human rights? How many urgent meetings of the UN, Human Rights Council and the International Criminal Court at The Hague have been convened? This shameful display of double standards and selective outrage must be exposed and paraded for all to witness.

The new regime in Syria has resulted in a torrent of expectations. Presumably, anything other than the despotic Assad dictatorship should be an improvement, but it is important to realise exactly who these new groups actually represent. They are not, as many starry-eyed optimists would have us believe, heralds of a dawning age of tolerance. Their dire need for international legitimacy may temper initial urges to enact extreme policies but that will not last too long.

As a report in the Jewish Chronicle noted, new Syrian school textbooks issued by the authorities are filled with antisemitism and praise for terrorists. The outlook for any sort of peace is bleak if this is how the next generation of Syrian students is going to be educated about Jews and Israel.

Despite these clear indications, there are amazingly still some Jews who are dazzled by the mirage being promoted. A delegation of former Syrian Jews now residing in the USA made a pilgrimage back to the “old country.” Reportedly welcomed by a few ex-neighbours, they visited the old Jewish quarter and marvelled at the ruins of the Synagogues. No mention was made, of course, of how they had been hounded from Syria in the first place and how their properties had been confiscated.

A news headline trumpeted, “Excited Jews are coming back. US Jewish group receives warm welcome in Syria.” In a letter written to the Syrian leader, the former Rabbi of the community in Syria congratulated the new regime. It then went on to say that ”despite decades of exile the Syrian Jewish community continues to cherish its deep rooted connection to Syria – its motherland.”

I had to reread this several times to make sure that it was not some sort of hoax. This so-called “motherland” ethnically cleansed its Jewish citizens and, after a series of pogroms, drove them from the country. Instead of yearning for Zion it seems that they still hanker for the “fleshpots of Damascus.”

This genetic disposition to return to the scene of past crimes is, it seems a common trait which has haunted us ever since the Exodus from Egyptian slavery.

In the face of a concerted campaign to deny a Jewish historical claim to the Land of Israel, it is timely to remember the stirring words of Winston Churchill uttered in 1922.

“Jews have returned to Palestine (as it was called then). Canaan is their inheritance and has served as their sanctuary for nearly four thousand years in a world which largely despises them. Palestine is the name given by the Roman Emperor Hadrian who was trying to sever Judea from the Jews. They have returned as of right and not by sufferance and this is based on their ancient historical connections.”

Would it not be refreshing if today’s political leaders articulated a similar truth instead of the mealy-mouthed, distorted and twisted versions of history we hear today?

WATCH: Michigan imam – ‘Nasrallah’s death will lead to recruitment of thousands of fighters against Israel’

Michigan Imam Hassan Qazwini of Dearborn Heights said that despite the terror chief’s assassination, his goals and spirit remain alive.

USAID Bombshell: Biden’s Secret War on Israel Exposed

With all the corruption being exposed at USAID, Elon Musk and his team are finding out how much money the Obama/Biden/Harris administration transferred towards toppling the Netanyahu government. Not only did they transfer USAID funds to the anti-government protest movement before the war, they also transferred money that supported the terror war against us.

We are so blessed that Prime Minister Netanyahu succeeded in surviving this US funded coup to topple him and that President Trump won the election!