Israel at Fifty Makes an Offer “Territories for Peace”, Not “Territories Before Peace”

On the occaision of Israel’s fiftieth anniversary, the Jewish state finally finds itself in full scale peace process, following formal peace treaties signed with Egypt (1979) and Jordan (1994). That is because of a surprising turn in Israeli public opinion, which now widely accepts 1974 Yariv-ShemTov formula of “territories for peace”, which at the time it was suggested was embraced by less than 15 members of Israel’s 120-member Knesset parliament. Yet by the 1996 Israeli elections, 118 members elected to Israel’s Knesset had run on platforms that favored and endorsed the concept of territories for peace, as embodied in the 1993 Oslo accords signed on the White House lawn by US President Bill Clinton, PLO leader Yassir Arafat and the late Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin.

This most recent Israeli election occurred at a time of unprecedented Israeli-Arab cooperation in almost all fields of endeavor. Israel’s level of exports to Arab countries, some of whom are still in a formal state of war with Israel, has surpassed a billion dollars. Israel’s former Minister of Public Security, Attorney Moshe Shachal, who recently resigned the Knesset to resume his law practice, now represents Arab countries from the Gulf States. Israel’s former military liason to the west bank and the Palestine Authority, General Oren Shachor, now exports soft drinks to Kuwait, working with Palestinian partners, some of whom spent years in Israeli prisons.

Likud member of Knesset Gideon Ezra, a career Israeli intelligence officer, opened a firm together with Palestinian partners to locate stolen vehicles.

The examples of economic cooperation are matched by a new social milieu – No less than five hundred Arab-Jewish reconciliation organizations are now registered with Israel’s Registrar of Non-Profit Organizations, some of which have been initiated by Arabs.

Indeed, Palestinian Arab journalist Daoud Kuttab, Arafat’s press liason during the Intifada riots of the late eighties, intiated a private media firm that cooperates with Israeli and American tv companies to produce the first Middle East “Sesame Street” to encourage Israeli and Arab children to play together without stereotypes and hatred. You can ask the obvious question With all this cooperation, why are the peace talks between Israel and the new Palestine Authority so bogged down? Have Israelis lost their desire for peace. I would think not. Have Palestinian Arabs had second thoughts? Not in my judgement.

As a religious Jew and a social work professional, I have the opportunity to participate in timely dialogues with Palestinian Arabs from all walks of life. The Palestinian Arab people want peace. So what is holding up the works? Well, there is the institution known as the United Nations, which in Jerusalem is headquartered on what the New Testament refers to as the “Hill of Evil Counsel”. The UN, back in 1949, established UNRWA, the United Nations Relief and Works Agency, that now plays host to more than three million Palestinian Arab refugees who are descended from the 650,000 Arabs who left the area that became known as the new state of Israel, at a time that Israel absorbed more than 800,000 Jews who left the Arab countries. Such a population exchange is not rare in the twentieth century, except that the way that the UN chose to deal with the issue was exceptional – by confining the Arab refugees to the squalor of transient huts, where they have languished for almost fifty years, under the proscribed UN resolution #194 promise and premise of the “right of return” to homes and villages that no longer exist, with absolutely no UN right to compensation for the property that the Arabs lost in 1948.

The idea of a west bank/Gaza Palestinian entity may be acceptable to the one million Palestinians who see the west bank and Gaza as their home, but not to the vast majority of Palestinians who live in the UN refugee camps of the west bank, Gaza, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon. Tragically, one of the first laws of the new Palestine Authority, established in 1994, was to forbid improvements on the UNRWA camps, based on the legislated UN promise and premise of the “right of return” to what Israel proper.

In the heart of Samaria, in an area under the Palestine Authority area of control, sits a mountain of 1,300 empty homes that were built to house Palestinian Arab refugees, constructed with generous funds provided by a Catholic charity with Israeli encouragement. However, United Nations retains a guard at the foot of the hill, ensuring that no Palestinian Arab refugee will move into these homes. According to a United Nations decsion in 1985, any such move into any such permanent housing would violate the “inalienable right of return ” of Palestinian Arabs. Many people are inclined to believe that Yassir Arafat’s willingness to sign a peace accord with Israel was based on new Arab willingness to accept what for them would be a historic compromise that would limit Palestinian Arab sovereignty to the west bank and Gaza, with some linkage to East Jerusalem. That was the basis on which Arafat was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, a ceremony which I covered in Oslo. On that occasion, I asked Arafat whether he would indeed relinquish the greater Palestinian vision that demanded the “right of return” of three million Palestinian Arabs. Arafat would not answer my question. I also asked Arafat if he would disarm the Hamas. Arafat again would not answer. The answers to my questions were not long in coming. In May 1995, Arafat authorized weaponry for the Hamas. In December 1995, Arafat signed a pact with the Hamas, to include them in the Palestine Authority. And in April 1996, my TV crew covered the session of the Palestine National Council, which was supposed to cancel the PLO state of war against the state of Israel and agree to a “west bank/Gaza” entity. At that session, Arafat would only authorize the PNC to establish of a committee to consider “changes” in the PLO constitution.

And, most recently, on April 19, 1998, Arafat told Egyptian television, that, indeed, “all options are open before the Palestinian people”, and that, as an Arab Moslem leader, Arafat had signed the Oslo accords in the context of the historic Khudaibiya agreement that was made by Muhammad with the tribe of Koreish. The Khudaibiya agreement, slated to last for ten years, was broken within two years, when Muhammad’s forces – having used the peace pact to become stronger – massacred the Koreish tribe.

So much for the concept of “territories for peace”.

Shortly before his death, I interviewed Aharon Yariv, the Israeli general and former IDF intelligence chief who had first conceptualized the idea of territories for peace.

Yariv said to me that “people today misunderstand the Yariv-Shemtov formula. We offered `territories for peace’, not `territories before peace’…”, said Yariv.

That formula constitutes the risk that the government and people of Israel are ready to make.

All indications are that the Palestinian Arab people are ready for such a formula.

Tragically, the United Nations and the new Palestine Authority, under the leadership of Yassir Arafat, are not.

That remains the complex legacy of peace for Israel’s fiftieth birthday.

When Jewish Organizations Research Antisemitism and Delete Mention of the Palestine Authority

In a joint news conference held on April 22, 1998, the day before Holocaust Rememberance Day, the representatives of Stephen Roth Institute of Anti-Semitism at Tel Aviv University, the ADL and the World Jewish Congress distributed a summary of their annual international survey of anti-Semitism that deleted any reference to the Palestine Authority, the Palestine Ministry of Information and the Palestine Broadcasting Corporation.

The stated reason: The full 400 page text is still at the printers.

That text does relate to the anti-Jewish tirades that have emanated daily from the Palestine Authority since its inception in 1994.

A case in point: On the morning before this report was issued, children on the official television station of the Palestine Broadcasting Corporation TV program were led in a chorus that chanted Jihad and called for extermination of the Jewish state. Quite a message from the PA: “Jihad” the day before Holocaust Remembrance Day.

This PBC program is fully accessible to the media, and to the ADL, the World Jewish Congress and Tel Aviv University.

Yet the media and these mainstream agencies have made a conscious decision: to obfuscate the expressions of the Palestine Authority to their own people from the people of Israel and from public opinion as a whole.

The PA media obfuscation policy is in keeping with the request made by the late Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin of the Israeli Broadcasting Authority in 1995 to refrain from any news reports that will feature what Arafat says to his own people in Arabic.

In the words of IBA officials who knew of the policy, Rabin explained that reportage of Arafat’s speeches would hurt the peace process.

Rabin carried this policy to the US.

In September 1995, just before Oslo 2 was initialled at the White House, the US House International Relations Committee conducted audiovisual hearings, during which time more than thirty congresspeople viewed videos of the programs featured on the Palestine Broadcasting Corporation. More than fifteen news bureaus covered the event. Yet Rabin’s cousin, Israeli ambassador to the US Itamar Rabinovitch, working together with a high official of the US state department, lobbied the American media and requested that they not report these hearings. With the exception of the Jewish Telegraphic Agency and the Washington Jewish Week, the media acceeded to their request.

People in Israel are in the dark, knowing very little of the daily dose of incitement that has spewed forth from the Palestine Broadcasting Corporation since the inception of the Oslo process. Such matters are seen as the obsession of a few anti-peacenicks.

That is due in part to a policy of self-censorship that the media has imposed on itself and that groups such as the ADL and the World Jewish Congress have adopted. The fact that the full report on anti-Semitism will be issued in a few weeks time will have little effect on the public domain. The ADL and the WJC will not conduct a press conference nor organize any forum on the subject of official anti-Semitism that emanates from the PBC, which is under Arafat’s direct control.

On Holocaust Remembrance Day in 1998, let it be remembered that three prominent institutions of the Jewish people have prevented the public from knowing what they know, which is that the newly created Palestine Authority makes no bones about its warlike and anti-Semitic intentions.

In 1996, the full text distributed to the press of the same international survey did not even mention the Palestine Authority. In 1997, the full text distributed to the media mentioned the PA in only a few paragraphs that analyzed one PA poet.

Yet in 1998, when the full text finally dealt with the PA, the convenors of the press conference decided not to distribute it and indeed, to delete any mention or reference to the Palestine Authority in the summary made available to the media.

Today there is legitimate concern about systematic Holocaust denial, when organizations make it their business to prevent people from knowing about the murder of six million Jews and what led up to it.

What about the effort for systematic Arafat denial?

Deir-Yassin

In March, the acts of hostility reached their peak, and it seemed that the Ishuv (pre-state Jewish community) could no longer endure the blows inflicted by the Arabs. The irregular Palestinian forces controlled all the inter-urban routes, the road to Jerusalem was blocked and the city was under siege. The settlements of the Galilee and the Negev were also cut off. Murderous onslaughts were launched on convoys, and the numbers of Jewish victims grew from day to day. The despatch of armed escorts with convoys had not proved effective, and most of the armoured vehicles, which had been assembled with great difficulties, had been destroyed or lost. The Arabs were taking the initiative, and were aided to no small degree by the ‘neutrality’ of the British, who were doing nothing to maintain law and order in Palestine.

Irregular forces streamed into the country from across the border and reinforced the Palestinian units already active there. Kaukji, who had arrived from Syria at the head of a large force, operated in the north, and a large unit led by Hassan Salameh, was active in the centre of the country. The Arab forces in the Jerusalem region were commanded by Abdul Kadr Husseini, who used Iraqi volunteers who had crossed from Transjordan, as well as deserters from the British army.

The brunt of the suffering was borne by the Jews of Jerusalem. The city was surrounded by Arabs, who harassed the inhabitants of the widely dispersed Jewish neighbourhoods, greatly restricting the area in which Jews could move around safely.It should be recalled that although British troops were evacuated from all the Jewish settlements in the country in February, the British remained in Jerusalem until May 14, 1948. This presence hampered the manoeuverability and defensive capabilities of Jewish forces. The indifference of the British and their reluctance to intervene made it easier for the Arabs to attack the Jewish community.

The Jews of Jerusalem absorbed blow after blow: the death of thirty five members of a convoy en route to bring help to the Gush Etzion region (16/1/48); the explosions caused by booby trapped cars down town; first in Hasolel Street near the Palestine Post offices (11/2/48), then in Ben Yehuda Street (22/2/48), wreaking death and destruction (50 dead and 100 wounded), and finally there was the explosion inside the office building of the Jewish Agency (11/3/48) (12 dead and 44 wounded). Moreover, the debacle at Nebi Daniel had a crushing effect on morale in Jerusalem. At the end of March, the Jews of Jerusalem had their first taste of siege. Contact with the coastal plain was severed, and provisions began to dwindle. The atmosphere was gloomy, and the leaders lost their nerve. The exhilaration roused by the November 29 UN resolution, gave place to grave concern and disillusionment as to the ability of the Jewish defence forces to repel the enemy. By the end of March, some 850 Jews had been killed throughout the country1, most of them in Jerusalem.

In view of the Jew’s failure to beet off the Arab attacks, the United State’s government decided to withdraw its support of the partition plan, and proposed to establish a special Trusteeship regime sponsored by the United Nation.

By the end of March 1948 the fight for the way to Jerusalem became a decisive battle for the city itself. Therefore it was decided to concentrate a big countrywide effort to open the road to Jerusalem, and on April 6 operation “Nachshon” began. This operation included for the first time an initiated military attack by a force of a Brigade.

At the self-same time the Irgun and Lehi in Jerusalem were busy preparing the attack on Dier-Yassin, which was part of plan of operation “Nachshon”.

Deir-Yassin lies on a hill west of Jerusalem, eight hundred meters above sea level, and 700 meters from the Jewish neighbourhood of Givat Shaul. The Deir-Yassin fortified position overlooked the westerly Jewish neighbourhoods: Givat Shaul, Bet Hakerem, Yefe Nof, and the road to Bayit Vagan. The village also overlooked the section of road linking Jerusalem to Tel-Aviv. Deir-Yassin served as a halfway site for forces moving up from the Arab villages of Ein Karem and Malha in the south to Kastel and Kolonia, which overlooked the main Jerusalem – Tel Aviv road.

Deir-Yassin was listed among the Arab villages to be occupied during Operation Nachshon, which began on April 6. When the fierce battle for the Kastel raged at the beginning of April, Arab reinforcements passed through Deir-Yassin on their way to the battlefield, and helped to drive out the Jewish force which had occupied the Kastel.

When the Haganah command learned of the plan to occupy Deir-Yassin, Shaltiel asked Raanan to co-ordinate the operation with the scheduled renewed assault on the Kastel. Shaltiel even despatched identical letters to Raanan (Irgun commander) and Zetler (Lehi commander), in which he approved the operation in advance. In it, he wrote:2

To: Raanan
From: Shaltiel

I have learned that you intend to carry out an operation against Deir-Yassin. I would like to call your attention to the fact that the occupation and holding of Dir Yassin is one of the stages in our overall plan. I have no objection to your carrying out the operation on condition that you are capable of holding on to it. If you are incapable of doing so, I caution you against blowing up the village, since this will lead to the flight of the inhabitants and subsequent occupation of the ruins and the abandoned homes by enemy forces. This will make things difficult rather than contribute to the general campaign and reoccupation of the site will entail heavy casualties for our men.

An additional argument I would like to cite is that if enemy forces are drawn to the place, this will disrupt the plan to establish an aerodrome there.

When Shaltiel wrote the letter to Raanan, it had already been known to the Haganah intelligence that armed forces, including Iraqi volunteers and Palestinian guerrillas entered Deir-Yassin. It was the Mukhtar of the village who met with the Haganah liaison in order to inform him that he had no control over the armed forces that entered the village, and that the promise that Deir-Yassin would be a quiet village had no more power.

Akiva Azuly who served as Haganah second in command in the Givat Shaul area testifies that the Mukhtar’s brother did not support the agreement and that shots were fired toward Givat Shaul from time to time.3 On a bundle of news released by the Haganah Intelligence Service on the goings-on in Deir-Yassin4 we find that as early as January 28 a group of 25 people had been seen training on the south-western slope of Deir-Yassin and among them a man with the Arab Legion uniform. On 3.3.48 a group of 30 Arabs were seen training in the village. On 3.4.48 fire was opened from Deir-Yassin towards the Jewish quarters of Beit-Hakerem and Yeffe-Nof. In addition we find that the Arabs built fortifications in the village and a big amount of ammunition was being stored there. A few days before the attack on Deir-Yassin there were reports about the presence of foreign fighters in the village, among them Iraqi soldiers and Palestinian guerrillas.

A research carried out by Arabs at the University of Bir Zeit5 tells that more over,

Arabs from Deir-Yassin took an active part in violent actions against Jewish targets and that in the battle of the Castel many of the villagers participated, helping Abd-el-Kadr el-Husseini. It is also stated in the above research that ditches had been dug in the various entrances to the village; and that more than l00 men had been trained and equipped with rifles and 2 Bren guns. There was also a local guard force, and every night, 40 villagers were busy taking turns guarding.

The armed forces, which had taken over the village, constituted a grave threat not only to the small airfield, which was to be constructed nearby, but also to the adjacent Jewish neighbourhoods and to vehicles on the main road to the coastal plain.

Going into Battle

On Thursday, April 8, about 80 Irgun fighters assembled at the Etz Hayim base (the Lehi people met separately at Givat Shaul). This was the first time that so large a number of underground fighters had gathered openly, without fear of British policemen or soldiers. The atmosphere was festive and our spirits were high; at last we were going out to hit back at the enemy which had inflicted such heavy blows on us for four months. The fact that two underground movements were acting together increased our sense of security and solidarity, and in honour of the event, we chose the slogan ‘Fighters Solidarity’ (ahdut lohemet).

Raanan, Commander of the Irgun in Jerusalem, opened the meeting. He said that the aim was not only to free the western suburbs of Jerusalem from the threat of Deir-Yassin but also primarily to seize the initiative. The time had come to abandon the defensive stance and take the offensive and move into enemy territory. Occupation of the village would demonstrate to the Arabs that the attacker could also be attacked. It would also elevate the morale of the people of Jerusalem and restore their self-confidence. Politically speaking, the operation would mark a change in conception and would alter the direction of the war: no longer retaliation operations, but occupation with the intention of holding on to gains. Our own people and the entire world would realise that the Jews were not ready to relinquish Jerusalem, and if necessary, they would take it by force of arms.

Raanan added and said that as the issue was conquest and not retaliation, we should avoid, as much as possible, hurting any Arabs unnecessarily. He warned time and again not to harm women, children and the old. Even more so: any Arab that would surrender, even a fighter, should be taken prisoner and he should not be harmed in any way. Raanan said that in order to avoid any unnecessary victims, it had been decided that the attack would start with an armoured car equipped with loudspeakers, which would enter the village before the sign to open fire. The loudspeaker would tell the villagers that the village was surrounded by Irgun and Lehi fighters and that they are called to leave and go to Ein-Karem or surrender. The announcement added that the way to Ein-Karem was open and safe.

Gal, Irgun operations’ officer in Jerusalem, spoke after Raanan. He explained that the objective was to occupy the village, and hold the position. The plan was to attack in two spearhead forces of two Irgun platoons would attack from the Bet Hakerem direction, and a platoon of Lehi would attack from Givat Shaul.

At 2 a.m., the Irgun fighters were driven from the Etz Hayim base to Bet Hakerem. The force moved into the wadi, where the platoons split up, each unit climbing up the terraced slope to its assigned area of action.

The Lehi unit assembled at Givat Shaul and proceeded from there towards the target. Some of the force advanced behind the armoured car, which was proceeding along the path towards the center of the village.

Close to 04:45, the village guards spotted suspicious movement. One of them called out in Arabic: ‘Mahmoud’, and an Irgun fighter, who misheard the cry, thought that some one had shouted the password ‘ahdut’ (solidarity). He responded with the second half of the password in Hebrew (‘lohemet’). The Arabs opened fire and as a result shots were fired from all over.

The armoured car advanced along the path and when it reached the outskirts of the village, it encountered a trench along the width of the path and was forced to come to a halt. The loudspeaker was switched on and the message was read out at the entrance to the village. Heavy fire was directed at the armoured car from the adjacent houses and it was necessary to rescue the fighters and wounded trapped inside

The other units launched an onslaught, accompanied by explosions and gunfire. The Arab resistance was strong, and every house became an armed fortress. Fierce fighting was conducted from house to house. Many of the attackers were injured in the first onslaught, including a number of commanders who had been advancing ahead of their units, as was the custom.

The pace of the battle was slow, because the fighting was conducted in a built-up area, and both sides suffered heavy losses. In order to silence the source of fire, the Irgun fighters were forced to use hand-grenades, and in some cases even to blow up houses. Very soon, about 30% of the attackers were out of action: most were wounded. And, to make things worse, the ammunition ran out. Fortunately, there was a stock of ammunition in one of the houses, so that the fighting could go on.

A report on the course of the battle was transmitted by courier to headquarters at Givat Shaul (neither the Irgun nor the Lehi had wireless equipment then). When word was received of the steadily growing number of casualties, and the shortage of ammunition, several Lehi people went to the Schneller camp and asked a Palmach unit to come to the aid of the attackers. After receiving the approval of the brigade HQ, the Palmach troops set out on an armoured car, equipped with a machinegun and a two-inch mortar. On arrival at the village, they fired several shells and machinegun rounds at the mukhtar’s house. At that very moment, without prior co-ordination with the Palmach, Avni charged the mukhtar’s house with several fighters. The attack was successful, and the house was captured and cleaned up. Now that the mukhtar’s house had been occupied, firing ceased and the occupation of the village was completed. Avni was so excited at having silenced the gunfire that he did not notice that he had been wounded and that his face was covered with blood. He was bandaged and evacuated to the hospital immediately.

Only years later was permission given to publicise the report written at the time by Eliezer, Haganah intelligence officer, describing the role of the Haganah in the battle for Deir-Yassin. It reads, in part, as follows:6

In the morning hours, it was decided to extend fire support. This support took two forms:

a) Blocking the way to Arab reinforcements coming up from Malha and Ein Karem.

b) A rear attack on Arabs dug in on the western slope of the village.

The two actions were carried out from the Masrafa positions. In order to enable the forces to attack from the rear, a Spandau machinegun was brought. The Arabs were taken by surprise by the gunfire and suffered considerable losses when forced to reveal themselves to our positions.

When the fighting ended, it was discovered that hundreds of villagers had retreated to Ein Karem, taking advantage of the fact that the road was open. Those who remained in the village surrendered and were taken prisoner. The prisoners, mostly women and children, were loaded onto trucks and taken to East Jerusalem, where they were handed over to their Arab brethren.

Because of the fear of a RAF (Royal Air Force) bombardment, Raanan informed Shaltiel that the Irgun could no longer hold on to the village. And, in fact, three days later, Irgun forces withdrew from Deir-Yassin and were replaced by the Haganah.

Facts and Commentaries

So much has been written and said about what happened at Deir-Yassin, that the battle, waged on the morning of April 9 became known as ‘the Deir-Yassin affair’. It is important to analyse the events and distinguish between facts and commentary.

The first question which should be clarified relates to the number of Arab casualties in the battle.

On Saturday night, April 10th, the Irgun radio station ‘Kol Zion Halohemet’, broadcasting from Tel Aviv, announced that, according to a wireless report from the Irgun HQ in Jerusalem, the attackers had suffered four dead (the number later rose to five, whenYiftah died of his wounds) and 32 wounded. Two hundred and forty Arabs had been killed, according to the report:7

The news item from Jerusalem concerning the number of dead Arab was inaccurate. The Irgun commander in Jerusalem deliberately exaggerated the number for psychological warfare tactics. In his testimony, Raanan related that, when he radioed HQ in Tel Aviv that 240 Arabs had been killed, he did not, in fact, know the precise number. He had invented the figure although he was well aware that the true figure was much lower. Exaggerated reports of enemy casualties, Raanan argued, would arouse fear and confusion among Palestine’s Arabs and deter them from attacking Jews8. It is interesting to note that the Supreme Arab Committee, in its turn, believed that claims of a high number of Arab dead, would rouse the Arab fighters to seek vengeance and render them more militant. Hence, the Committee emulated the Irgun, and announced that 254 Arabs had been killed. Only later was it realised that this was a miscalculation, since the report only aroused apprehension. Research conducted some time later, based on Arab sources, revealed that the number of Arab dead did not exceed one hundred9. An accurate body count of the Arab victims was conducted after the battle by two physicians, Dr. Z. Avigdori (who was Chairman of the Palestine Physicians Association, Jerusalem Branch), and Dr. A. Druyan (his deputy). These physicians came to the village and asked permission to examine the corpses. They told the Irgun commander they had been sent by the Jewish Agency to report on possible mutilations and other atrocities committed by Irgun and Lehi fighters against the Arabs. However, they said, if they were allowed to move freely about the village without restriction, they would report only what they had seen with their own eyes. This, in fact was the case: they went from house to house without interference, counted the corpses in the village and checked the cause of death. The report, which is filed in the IDF Archives, attests that there were no more than 46 corpses in the village. In addition, it was reported that death had been caused by bullets or bombs, and that “all the bodies were dressed in their own clothes, limbs were whole and we saw no signs of mutilation.”10

It turns out that the Haganah knew already two days after the battle that the number of casualties did not exceed l00, as one can learn from the following telegram which was sent from Jerusalem11.

To: Beit Horon
From: Hashmonai

Appendix for concentration of news No. 151

[…] A reliable Arab source summing up Deir-Yassin, says there are some l00 dead (killed) who have to be buried.

The enhanced prestige of the Irgun was anathema to the leaders of the Yishuv. The occupation of the village as such, and the Irgun report that such actions would continue, were irreconcilable with the treaty with Abdullah and with Ben Gurion’s plans for the future of Jerusalem. It should also be recalled that at that time, the Zionist Executive was discussing the possibility of an accord with the Irgun, to which the Mapai leaders were vehemently opposed. This was the background for the smear campaign launched by the Jewish Agency in the wake of the occupation of Deir-Yassin.

Three days after the battle, David Shaltiel published a leaflet, packed with lies and slanders, in which he ignored the report of the physicians and the report from the Haganah unit which had taken part in the battle.

In this leaflet, Shaltiel chose to disregard the fact that he had known of and even approved the action and had claimed, in a letter to Raanan that the conquest of Deir-Yassin was part of the Haganah’s plan. On the other hand, he described the Irgun and Lehi fighters as a band of robbers, whose only aim was murder and looting.

The Irgun hastened to reply, and issued a leaflet, denying the Haganah charges one by one. The leaflet states that:12

Deir-Yassin was captured after heavy fighting. Our fighters were shot at from almost every house with rifles and machineguns. The large number of our casualties, several dozen, bears witness to this, as do the amount of arms which fell into our hands and the number of Syrian and Iraqi dead, who were part of the regular army force there…. Our troops conducted themselves, as no other military force would have done: they waived the element of surprise. Before the actual battle began, they cautioned the villagers by loudspeaker and appealed to women and children to leave at once and find shelter on the slope of the hill…. We would like to express our deep regret at the fact that there were women and children among the casualties, but this is not the fault of our fighters. They did their humanitarian duty and even more […]

The Irgun even published Shaltiel’s letter to Raanan, which revealed that Shaltiel had known about the operation and sanctioned it. Moreover, Shaltiel noted in his letter that the capture of Deir-Yassin was part of the Haganah plan. The publication of the letter caused great embarrassment to the Haganah leadership and undermined Shaltiel’s credibility.

The Jewish Agency went even further, when, in addition to the leaflet war, it sent a cable of condolences to King Abdullah. This cable was unprecedented and hence worthy of deeper scrutiny. Even Kirkbride, the British Minister in Amman, noted, in his cable to London, his surprise at the despatch of such a message to Abdullah, since Jordan was part of the Arab League which had declared war on Israel even before its establishment. Legion soldiers, stationed in Palestine, had often taken part in acts of hostility perpetrated by Arabs against Jews. Jordan had even allowed Iraqi troops to pass through her territory to join Arab forces fighting the Jews. And, even in Deir-Yassin, Iraqi soldiers fought alongside the Palestinians. Hence, Jordan should be regarded as an enemy or at least a potential foe. But perhaps this was the reason which induced the Jewish Agency to send the cable to Abdullah; to indicate to him that the Jewish Agency did not consider him an enemy, and continued to honour the agreement made with him in November 194713. Furthermore: although Abdullah was monarch of Transjordan, for the Jewish Agency he was also the uncrowned leader of Palestine’s Arabs and thus the address for any apology concerning the ‘barbaric acts’ committed against the Arabs of Deir-Yassin who were not Jordanian subjects. The Jewish Agency wanted to indicate to King Abdullah that it dissociated itself not only from the acts of the ‘dissidents’ at Deir-Yassin, but also, or mainly, from their declaration concerning the liberation of Jerusalem and the entire country, which ran counter to Jewish Agency policy.

King Abdullah did not accept these explanations and rejected the apology. In his reply, Abdullah noted that it was generally accepted that the Jewish Agency was responsible for all Zionist activities everywhere and that no Jew would act in such a way as to flout its policies. Abdullah concluded his cable by leaving open the option for dialogue, and wrote that “the Jewish Agency will do all that is necessary with regard to such atrocities…”. He added that the Irgun and others ” must take careful note of the possible consequences of their savage acts and their inevitable outcome, if they continue in this manner.”14

Deir-Yassin became synonymous with Jewish atrocities against Arabs, and the event is often referred to as ‘the Deir-Yassin massacre’.

The Arab village of Deir-Yassin was located in a spot of great strategic importance, and in the course of the war which was imposed on us by the Arabs, we had no choice but to capture it.

Was there in fact a massacre at Deir-Yassin and were Arab corpses mutilated?

Massacre means the killing of defenceless human beings. The unprovoked Arab attack on the peaceful Jews of Hebron one night in 1929 and their indiscriminate killing was a massacre. When, in February 1948, Arab workers at the Haifa Refineries attacked their Jewish co-workers on their way to work, and murdered more than 40 Jews in cold blood – that was a massacre. In both cases, the massacre had been planned and the acts of murder were premeditated. The loathsome murder of Kfar Etzion settlers by Arab Legion troops, after the defenders had surrendered and were unarmed was another such example.

And what happened at Deir-Yassin?

First, one should recall the strict orders given to the fighters before the battle, not to harm women, children and old people. It was also stated explicitly that any Arabs who surrendered, even fighters, should be taken captive and treated in accordance with the Geneva Convention.

Secondly, an unprecedented thing was done at Deir Yassin: a loudspeaker was installed on an armoured car, and the attackers informed the villagers that the road to Ein Karem was open and secure and that those who left would not be harmed. By using a loudspeaker, the attackers forfeited the surprise element. However, the commander of the Irgun in Jerusalem believed that every effort should be made to avoid Arab civilian casualties even if that was the cost. The Arabs have never denied that a loudspeaker was used, and an Arab League publication on ‘Israeli aggression’ notes, inter alia: “On the night of April 9, 1948, the quiet Arab village of Deir-Yassin was taken by surprise when a loudspeaker called the inhabitants to evacuate the village immediately”15.

Thirdly, it is universally conceded that a fierce battle raged at Deir-Yassin. In the research carried out at the Bir Zeit University, as mentioned, it was stated that there were more than 100 Arab fighters in the village equipped with rifles and 2 Bren-guns with plenty of ammunition. The Arabs were holed up in the stone buildings of the village while the attackers were exposed to enemy fire. The fierce gunfire directed from the houses forced the attackers to use grenades and in several cases even to blow up houses in order to advance. Thus, it happened that there were women and children among the victims. a

It seems appropriate at this point to quote Ben Gurion’s remarks at the Mapai Central Committee in January 1948:

This is a war and there is no possibility, I want to stress this with the greatest clarity, of distinguishing between people. In war, one cannot avoid harming the innocent16.

The number of dead is of great importance to the question of whether it was a battle or a slaughter. According to all extant documents and testimony, it is now clear that the number of Arabs killed at Deir-Yassin was less than one hundred, and not 240, as published. Moreover, the battle was the first in the War of Independence to be waged in a built-up area, and this is accepted as one of the most difficult forms of warfare, and the costliest in human terms. This is the reason why 35% of the attacking Irgun and Lehi force were injured or killed by enemy fire. Incidentally, the second battle of this kind conducted in the War of Independence was the Palmach attack on Qatamon, some two weeks after the capture of Deir-Yassin. In that battle, which was waged from house to house, some 40% of the force were injured or killed, while among the Arabs, 80 were killed and some 150 injured.

All the Arab victims at Deir-Yassin were killed in battle, and the moment the battle ended all killing ceased. Those villagers; men, women and children who surrendered, were taken prisoner, and no harm came to them. When the fighting was over, they were conveyed by car to East Jerusalem and handed over to their Arab brethren.

As regards the accusations of mutilation and rape, it is enough to quote the report of the physicians sent by the Jewish Agency to examine the situation: “all the bodies were dressed in their own clothes, limbs were whole and we saw no signs of mutilation.”

In light of the facts of the battle for Deir-Yassin, one cannot escape the conclusion that, in condemning the Irgun and Lehi, the Jewish Agency leaders were guided by purely political motives and not by their consciences.

They were motivated by internal and external political considerations. The former were connected to the growing sympathy for the Irgun in the country at large and Jerusalem in particular. An increasing proportion of the Yishuv now recognised the justice of the Irgun cause and believed that the end of the British mandate was the outcome of the stubborn underground struggle against the foreign rulers.

The unique situation in Jerusalem had intensified support for the Irgun in the city. The people of Jerusalem felt like stepchildren, since the city was not included within the borders of the Jewish State. The Arab onslaughts, growing more frequent, the large number of casualties (higher than anywhere else in the country) the detachment from the coastal plain and the increasing shortage of food and water, all these had evoked disillusionment with the Haganah and the Zionist Executive. The growing support for the underground movement greatly concerned the establishment leaders who had remained in Jerusalem, and they emphasised this in their reports to Ben Gurion.

Support for the Irgun gained momentum after the capture of Deir-Yassin. The feeling was that at last someone had proved capable of giving the right answer to the murderous Arab attacks.

As noted, the Zionist Executive was holding feverish discussions at the time on the possibility of an accord with the Irgun. The Mapai leaders, who were emphatically opposed to the idea, hoped that their shameful smear campaign against the Irgun would forestall this move. And, in fact, one of the arguments cited against ratifying the accord was: “See what the Irgun is capable of. We cannot enter into an agreement with such people.” The champions of the accord, on the other hand, argued that the Deir-Yassin incident demonstrated what could happen when the Irgun operated alone, without an agreement17. Ben Gurion feared that the rise in the Irgun’s strength in Jerusalem was liable to disrupt his political plans for the future of the city. He hoped that the charges against the Irgun and Lehi would reduce public sympathy for them.

The external political reason was related to the treaty with King Abdullah. The Jews had agreed to the Arab Legion’s occupation of Judea and Samaria, which would then be incorporated in the Kingdom of Jordan, and in return, the Legion was to refrain from attacking the Jewish State.

Ben Gurion feared that the capture of Deir-Yassin would be interpreted by Abdullah as a Jewish volte-face. A particularly profound impression had been made in Britain, and subsequently also in Jordan, by the statement of the Irgun commander at the press conference convened at Givat Shaul after the battle:

[…] We intend to attack, to occupy and to hold fast until all of Eretz Israel [Palestine] is in our hands. The attack on Deir-Yassin is the first stage….18

In its smear campaign against the Irgun and Lehi, the Zionist leadership tried to create the impression that these were marginal groups without influence, and that their actions and declarations should not be taken into account. The leadership wanted to isolate the two underground movements, both within theYishuv and vis a vis the outside world. It failed to do this, however: the Jewish community in Jerusalem displayed even greater sympathy with the Irgun, and foreign diplomats now perceived the Irgun as a factor to be reckoned with in discussing the future of Jerusalem.

The Deir-Yassin affair had a strong impact on the course of the War of Independence, and was summed up as follows in the “History of the War of Independence” produced by the History Division of the IDF:

The Deir-Yassin affair, known throughout the world as the ‘Deir-Yassin massacre’, damaged the reputation of theYishuv at the time. All the Arab propaganda channels disseminated the story at the time and continue to do so to this day. But it indubitably also served as a contributory factor to the collapse of the Arab hinterland in the period, which followed. More then the act itself, it was the publicity it received from Arab spokesmen which achieved this aim. Their intention was to convince their people of the savagery of the Jews and to rouse their militant religious instincts. But, in actual fact, they succeeded only in intimidating them. Today they admit the error themselves.

Notes:

1 out of a Jewish community numbering 600,000

2 Yoshua Ofir, On The Walls, p. 63

3 Akiva Azuly a Man of Jerusalem, p. 70

4 IDF Archives, 2504/49/16

5 Knaana Sharif, The Palestinian Villages Destroyed in 1948 – Deir-Yassin, Bir-Zeit University, 1987

6 David Shaltiel, Jerusalem 1948, p. 141

7 Menachem Begin, In The Underground D, p. 247

8 Interview with Mordechai Raanan

9 Dan Kurzman, Genesis 1948, p. 148

10 IDF Archives, 500/48-54

11 Central Zionist Archives, M 16/19

12 Menachem Begin, In The Underground D, p. 276

13 In November 1947 a meeting was held in Naharayim between Golda Meyersson (Meyir) and King Abdullah. In this meeting it was agreed between the two that after the British left Palestine, the Arab Legion would invade the western part of Palestine and would take Judea and Sammaria (the West Bank), an area allocated for the Palestinian State. In compensation, the King promised not to attack the Jewish State that would be established.

14 Central Zionist Archives, S 25/1704. English Translation S 25/4150

15 Deir-Yassin, Publication by the Israeli Foreign Ministry, March 1969

16 Michael Bar-Zohar, Ben-Gurion, p. 680.

17Haaretz newspaper, 12/4/1948

18 Public Records, London, CO 733 477/514

Arafat Employs Convicted Terrorists in Security Apparatus Letting His People Go

Yasser Arafat doesn’t merely set free some Palestinians suspected of violent attacks on Israelis. He often give them jobs in his security apparatus.

In early February, Gen. Tawfik Tirawi, the head of the muhabarat, the Palestinian secret police, arranged for the head of the CIA station in Tel Aviv to accompany him to the Jericho jail, where Youssef and Shaher Ra’i are confined.

The Ra’i cousins, from Qalqilyah, serving seven-year sentences, have been linked to the killings of Ohad Bachrach and Uri Shahor — Israeli hikers stabbed to death in Wadi Qelt, between Jerusalem and Jericho, in 1995. Bachrach’s and Shahor’s relatives, who accompanied Benjamin Netanyahu on his January visit to Washington, had claimed that the Ra’is were free to wander at will in the Jericho area — a claim endorsed by Netanyahu aides; Gen. Tirawi proclaimed that the Jericho jail visit showed up “the lie of Netanyahu.”

The CIA visitor was shown a four-man cell, with Shaher Ra’i sitting in it. He had a TV, a radio and a refrigerator; on the walls were photographs of his two daughters and of his heroes — Cuban revolutionary leader Ernesto (Che) Guevara, and master Hamas bombmaker Yihya Ayyash, “the Engineer,” who was killed by Israel in 1996. Jericho jail commander Walid Jabali insisted the Ra’is had not left the jail since September 1995, when they were arrested and jailed — in a 10-minute trial — for damaging Palestinian national interests, rather than as accomplices to murder.

But, the Report has learned, the visit was an elaborate ruse to placate the Americans. The Ra’is are prisoners only in name; until recently the two activists of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine had been leading normal lives outside the prison walls, albeit inside Jericho city limits. Eye witnesses have seen them at coffeeshops and markets in the town, in the company of family members and friends.

The Ra’is, on a list of 36 alleged terrorists whose extradition is demanded by Israel, represent the rule, not the exception. A few of those on the Israeli list are indeed in prison, but others have long since been freed — and many more have never been arrested. Israel often complains about what it calls the PA’s “revolving-door policy” of quickly freeing those involved in terrorism. Ironically, having kicked up an international furor over the Ra’is, Israeli government sources now privately admit that they are no longer absolutely certain the cousins were actually involved in the Wadi Qelt murders at all. On the basis of The Report’s investigation, however, many other of the Israeli complaints are well founded.

On the orders of Yasser Arafat, Palestinians arrested for attacking Israelis are tried almost instantly by special State Security Courts, and convicted and sentenced before Israel can begin extradition proceedings. The courts often mete out sentences that seem severe — but defendants rarely serve more than a few months behind bars before they are reunited with their families, and allowed to move freely in PA-controlled territory. If they renounce membership in Hamas or one of the other radical organizations, and pledge their allegiance to Arafat’s mainstream Fatah organization, they often find employment with one of the 10 official PA security agencies operating in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

The Palestinian Authority refuses to provide statistics on terror-linked convicts released before the end of their terms. But Palestinian sources say that between their foundation in April 1995 and the end of 1997, the courts tried and sentenced 46 Palestinians for direct and indirect involve ment in anti-Israel terror. Sentences ranged from six months in jail to life; many of those jailed, particularly those sentenced to two years or less, were freed in months.

They are the beneficiaries of a Palestinian strategy — repeatedly underlined by officials — that no Palestinian will ever extradite his brother, under any circumstances, to the Israeli enemy. “If some day Jewish terrorists responsible for killing Arabs are handed over to us, we might consider making a reciprocal gesture,” says Sufyan Abu Zaideh, the head of the Palestinian Authority’s “Israeli Desk.” “In the meantime, Israel has no right to ask for the extradition of Palestinians who have already been sentenced by our courts.”

The Israeli extradition list includes at least 10 people who are now members of the various Palestinian security forces — and is topped by Ghazi Jabali, the Palestinian police commissioner for Gaza and the West Bank, who heads the 12,000-strong, blue-uniformed police force. Israel suspects that Jabali has organized terror cells inside the force itself, and instructed individual policemen to carry out attacks against Israelis. Jabali calls the charges “ridiculous,” and warns that any attempt to arrest him will lead to armed confrontation.

Others on the Israeli list, now serving in Palestinian law enforcement, include:

  • Iyad Abu-Shakafa, a Fatah activist accused of the attempted murder of Shaul David in Ramlah, in 1994, who is now a captain in Jabali’s police force in Gaza
  • Iyad Basheeti, a former Hamas activist from Rafah in the Gaza Strip, who is suspected of involvement in two murders in Ramlah in 1994. Basheeti’s relatives have told The Report he works as an interrogator for Palestinian military intelligence.
  • Atef Hamdan, today employed by Palestinian Preventive Security, who was arrested in 1996 amid allegations of his involvement in a 1992 attempt to murder a soldier, but was freed almost immediately.
  • Ibrahim Shadeed, now a policeman in Tul Karm, who allegedly took part in the October 1994 killing of a collaborator.
  • Bassam Aram and Yasser Aram, accused of the December 1993 attempted murder of Zvi Fixler, at Moshav Gan Or in the southern Gaza Strip, who are reportedly on the Palestinian security forces payroll.
  • Bassam Issa, a former Hamas activist, who is suspected of involvement in the murder of three Israeli soldiers in April 1993, and in the attack with assault rifles and grenades on Yoel Salomon Street in Jerusalem in October 1994 (in which two Israelis died), and who is now an officer in the Palestinian Preventive Security police.

The ranks of the various Palestinian security forces also include a large number of Palestinians guilty of crimes against other Palestinians, particularly those who collaborated with Israel during the Intifada. Israel released them as part of the 1993 Oslo Accords — on condition they be confined to Jericho. But many of them have been given weapons, military or police ranks, and security posts in the West Bank and Gaza.

Take the case of Nasser Abu Hmeid, of the Al-Amari refugee camp near Ramallah, sentenced by Israel in 1993 to nine life terms for his role in the decapitation killings of collaborators. Shortly after his post-Oslo transfer to Jericho, Abu Hmeid — who headed a group called the Masked Lion — joined the Palestinian Preventive Security apparatus as an interrogator. In 1994, a few weeks before control of West Bank cities was handed over to the PA, Abu Hmeid was caught by an undercover Israeli patrol in Ramallah. He is now back in an Israeli prison — because he violated the terms of his release by leaving Jericho.

Not all freed prisoners join the ranks of the Palestinian police. Some have gone on to carry out other terror acts. The best-known case is that of Moawiya Jarara, Bashar Salawah and Tawfiq Yassin, who blew themselves up in the September 1997 Ben-Yehudah mall attack. All three had been detained by Arafat’s police in Nablus in March 1996, but unexplainably strolled free six months later.

Palestinian officials admit that some of those accused of security offenses have been freed, but say they don’t understand why Israel is so agitated. “So what if Israel says these people are involved in attacks,” says a Palestinian general based in Ramallah. “That doesn’t automatically make it true. Besides, some of the accusations go back to before the Oslo Accords. If we punish everyone guilty of acts of violence between 1967 and Oslo, in 1993, we will have to arrest tens of thousands of Palestinians.

“The next thing the Netanyahu government will do,” he continues, “is ask for the extradition of Abu Amar, Yasser Arafat. If that happens, we’ll have the right to ask for the extradition of Yitzhak Shamir and other Israeli leaders who are responsible for atrocities against our people.”

Jews Grit their Teeth While CIA and EU Train the Palestine Liberation Army

Today, April 22, 1998, marks Jewish holocaust Remembrance Day, when people around the world recall the slaughter of six million Jews in twenty one countries that occurred over a period of six years, while the US, Great Britain and other great nations of the world closed all avenues of exits to the European inferno.

It goes without saying that most people would take a dim view of killing Jews. Yet on March 5, 1998, the New York Times published a front page investigative story that documented how the CIA tains the Palestine Liberation Army, which spearheads the war against the state and people of Israel, aligned and in coordination with the Arab states who remain in a state of war with the Jewish state since its inception almost exactly fifty years ago. These nations still in a state of war include Syria, Iraq, Libya, Algeria, and, most recently, Iran. Meanwhile, the Palestine Liberation Army openly supplies weapons and training for Hamas, Islamic Jihad, the Fatah Hawks, the Palestine Front for the Liberation of Palestine and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine – all of which continue terror activity against the Jewish state. In addition, the Palestine Liberation Army operates its own Preventive Security Service, which maintains iron fist control over the Palestinian Arab population, also in East Jerusalem, suspecnding any notion that the Palestine-state-in-the-making will maintain any respect for human rights or civil liberties. Just ask the Palestinian human rights organizations. American and Israeli security experts concur that the PLA, operating on its own, represents no serious threat to Israel’s ultimate security. However, an Israeli military expert recently gave an interview to the Associated Press in which he expressed an overriding concern in all Israeli security circles that the CIA-trained PLA security forces, which have swelled to well over 50,000, could easily hamper the dispatch of Israeli troops to the front at a time of war. It would be no problem for many of the PLA forces to melt into the Palestinian west bank civilian population.

In terms of the coordination with the Arab states in the area, I asked Yassid Abd Rabu, Yassir Arafat’s senior security aide, as to whether the Palestine Authority’s PLA security services would give logistical support to Syria in a time of war between Syria and Israel. I reminded him of the enthusiastic PLO support for Iraq during while Bagdad reigned scud missiles on Israel in 1991. Abd Rabu responded that “we all hope for peace with Syria”. When I pressed Abd Rabu about the possibility that war would indeed break out between Israel and Syria, he firmly acknowledged that the PLA would “give all logistical support” to Syria at a time of war.

In its March 5 investigative story of the CIA training exercises for the PLA, the New York Times was quick to mention that these activities were being carried out with the full knowledge of the Israeli security establishment.

“Knowledge does not mean approval”, gritted Dr. Uzi Landau, the chairman of the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Security Committee. It also goes without saying that the European Communitty-Palestine Liberation Army security pact that was initialled by British Prime Minister Tony Blair and Yassir Arafat on April 21, 1998 was with the “knowledge and not the approval” of the state of Israel”.

Landau, like others with whom I have discussed this with in the Israel Ministry of Defence and the IDF, would prefer not to launch a frontal attack on the American government. That would be like biting the hand that also feeds you.

Perhaps the peoples of the world do take a dim view of killing Jews. That does not prevent the nations of the world from participating in the process, while Jews grit their teeth.

The Hamas

The following are excerpts from articles which appeared in the Egyptian English weekly, “Al-Ahram” of Al-Ahram Weekly 8th – 15th April, 1998

Close Up — “Boiling Over”
by Salama A. Salama

The Palestinian Authority (PA), for reasons of its own, has in the past few days offered three different versions of killing of Hamas bombing expert Mohideddin Al-Sharif, finally exonerating the Israeli intelligence services from the charge of having assassinated Al-Sharif, throwing the blame instead on financial and political strife within the ranks of Hamas.

… The absence of compelling evidence absolving Israel of Al-Sharif’s murder should be weighed against the compelling circumstantial evidence in favor of its involvement, The Israeli intelligence services have been hunting Al-Sharif for months — even years.

… Sharif may have been killed by Israeli agents, or possibly by the double agents active throughout the Palestinian political spectrum. This time, through its constant denials, Israel seems to be giving itself away.

Since its establishment, Israel has commonly resorted to assassination as an expedient means to its policy ends. By assassinating Ayyash, Israel triggered retaliatory suicide bombings which claimed 60 lives, precipitated the downfall of Peres and the accession of Netanyahu and the Likud, and put an end to the peace process.

… US efforts to urge Israelis and Palestinians to exercise self-restraint are totally unrealistic. Such US endeavors only buttress Israeli state terrorism and prevent the Palestinians from retaliating or evening the score, since Hizbullah in southern Lebanon has taught Israel the dangers of such retaliation.

Hamas may have complied recently with the Palestinian Authority’s urging that it suspend operations against Israel, in the hope that some progress would be achieved. But with the assassination of one of its leaders, threats to escalate the violence against Israel would be fully justified. Does Israel truly want to see an end to violence against its own people? Does it seek to help the Palestinian Authority abide by its commitments in security guarantees, which Israel uses as a pretext for its reluctance to withdraw from Palestinian land? On the contrary, it is quite clear that Israel seeks to maintain a certain level of insecurity and violence, beyond its genuine security needs. Without this process of violence and counterviolence, Israel cannot sustain its occupation of Palestinian land on any grounds. In other words, when the Palestinians refrain from violence, Israel deliberately incites their fury — precisely the situation created by Al-Sharif’s assassination.

“Waiting for Hamas”
by Graham Usher

[Heading:] The Palestinian Authority has exonerated Israel from responsibility for the killing of Hamas military leader, Mohieddin Al-Sharif. Much will depend on Hamas’ next move writes Graham Usher from Jerusalem.

The Israeli government is adamant that it had “no hand” in the death of Hamas military leader, Mohieddin Al-Sharif, whose dismembered corpse was found beside a wrecked car in Ramallah on 29 March. Once it became known that the victim was Al-Sharif — wanted by Israelis as the alleged “second engineer” behind the suicide operations that have rocked Israel in recent years — Israel has spared no channel to convey to Yasser Arafat that it was not involved and that the Palestinian Authority (PA) would be held “responsible” for any reprisals against Israelis by Hamas or its military arm, Ezzeddin Al-Qassam. Madeleine Albright too has reportedly told the Palestinian leader that “any terror attack now would destroy the peace process.”

Arafat probably understands this better than Israel or the Americans. He is also aware that Israeli disclaimers and American warnings are likely to cut little ice with Palestinian public opinion.

On Thursday, thousands of Palestinians attended Al-Sharif’s funeral…. Although Hamas supporters led the procession, many of those present were nationalists known for their support of the peace process, including the PLO’s head of Jerusalem affairs, Faisal Al-Husseini.

… The fact that the PA’s official account of Al-Sharif’s killing now seems to coincide with Netanyahu’s is unlikely to lessen Hamas’s suspicions. Nor is it likely to avert Hamas’s expected response…

… Yehia Ayyash was the “first engineer”, allegedly responsible for a wave of suicide attacks inside Israel in 1994 and 1995. Following his certain Israeli sponsored death in Gaza in 1996, Ezzeddin Al-Quassam responded with suicide attacks in Jerusalem and Ashkelon that left 45 Israelis dead, brought the peace process to its knees and effectively lost the elections for Shimon Peres’s Labour Party.

With Netanyahu and Likud in power, Arafat is aware that any repeat of such vengeance will draw consequences even more mortal for the Oslo process.

The PA’s conclusion that Al-Sharif was killed by members of his own movement, if true, is thus a denouement that will be welcomed by Israel and Arafat alike. But if Hamas rejects this conclusion, then the likelihood is that “revenge” will still be the price of Al-Sharif’s death for the Israelis. As for the political consequences of such retaliation, this, almost certainly, will be the PA’s price to pay.

Why is Pollard Still in Jail

A study published by the Simon Wiesenthal Center in 1991 and authored by investigator Kenneth Timmerman documents that tens of American firms do business with Iran, Iraq, Syria and Libya, in the areas of conventional and non-conventional weaponry.

The vast majority of these firms are German owned, partially or completely.

That is the way in which German firms circumvent the ban on German firms exporting such substances.

What I learned from my visit to the Bundestag in Bonn from German opposition leader Rudolf Dessler was that this loophole allows German firms to simply establish subsidiaries abroad which operate with the full knowledge and consent of the German government.

These firms often seek out the best and brightest of Jewish minds to develop their technical capacity to its finest.

Meanwhile, all of these firms work on contractual arrangements and with the full clearance and authorization and confidentiality of the US Department of Defence.

As a US state department official once told told me, “we keep Pollard in jail to make sure that we’ll see no more Jew-boy heroes ever again”.

What we need now are a hundred Pollards who will indeed blow the whistle on the dealings of the American/German industrial complex with the nations who remain in a state of war with Israel and the Jewish people.

The problem remains that many of these companies also do business in Israel, thereby muting many potential Israeli whistle-blowers.

A theory? Perhaps.

Run it up the flagpole, see if anyone salutes.

Two Sides of Sesame Street

The April 1 front page story that ran in the Philadelphia Inquirer concerning Jewish-Arab cooperation in the production of a sesame-street style production on a private Palestinian TV station was not an April fool’s joke.

It was very real.

Dauod Kuttab, the Palestinian Arab journalist who takes appropriate credit for the initiative, represents a grass roots Palestinian desire for cooperation between peoples on all levels. However, the official “Sesame Street” that runs on the Palestine Authority’s official Palestine Broadcasting Corporation, funded by US AID and administered directly under the supervision of Palestine Authority chairman Yassir Arafat, also known as the “children’s workshop” runs a program which takes an different view of Jewish-Arab cooperation.

Imagine this: On this past Tuesday, March 31, the morning that Yassir Arafat made a surprise visit at the Anne Frank House in Amsterdam, the museum which has become a symbol of the one and a half million Jewish children who were slaughterer by the Nazis.

On that same day, the PBC TV program modelled after “Sesame Street,” with children (some as young as 4 years old, most about 8 or 9) seated in a semi-circle around a group leader, dressed in costumes and party clothes, with cartoon characters decorate the walls. >From among the group a little boy stands up and, with the nursery school teacher holding the mike he says that “I will grow up to kill every Jew that I meet” On an earlier program, a young girl stands up, raises her fist and cries: “When I wander into the entrance of Jerusalem, I will turn into a suicide warrior in battledress! In battledress!”

In both cases, The leader of the official Palestinian “Sesame Street”cheers:

“Bravo! Bravo! Bravo!”

On yet another segment, a beautiful, dark haired young girl who looks to be about 6 years old sings the following words, barely a blinking of her eyes: “Each and every part of your soil I have drenched with all my blood. And we shall march as warriors of Jihad. Oh, my exalted martyr, you are my example. Oh, my companion, you are beside me. Oh, my sister, sing constantly about my life as a suicidewarrior, how we remain steadfast. Oh, my country, you are my soul. Oh, my dawn, you are my heartbeat.”

Samplings of the official PBC children’s workskop were aired at the March 11 hearing held at the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee special session that was convened to deal with some of the issues of the middle east peace process.

The clips were prepared by the Jerusalem-based “peace for generations” monitoring group and presented to the Senate by Dr. Daniel Pipes, editor of the Philadelphia-based Middle East Quarterly.

So there you have it. Dissonant messages from Palestinian TV shows.

From my daily contact with Palestinian Arabs in Jerusalem and the west bank, I can attest to the fact that Daoud Kuttab and the spirit behind him represent the dominant Palestinian mood that favors peace, reconciliation and dialogue with Israel and with the Jewish people.

However, Daoud Kuttab is not in power at the Palestine Authority.

Indeed, Kuttab was jailed by the PA for telecasting debates in the Palestinian parliament that Arafat was not interested in publicizing.

And while Israel Educational Television is considering the purchase of Kuttab’s programs that promote reconciliation, the Palestine Broadcasting Corporation has rejected any such possibility.

PBC head Radwan Abu Ayash was asked in a videotaped interview as to when he will have programs that promote peace on PBC TV.

Ayash responded matter of factly that he is not allowed to feature stories that “promote peace with the Israelis”.

It should be recalled that on Sept. 7, 1997, the Philadelphia Inquirer reported that “the PBC network was nurtured with about $500,000 in equipment and training from the U.S. Agency for International Development,” and cited as its source the network’s chairman, Raddwan Abu Ayyash.

PBC policies did not begin with the election of Netanyahu as the prime minister of Israel in May, 1996. Since its inception in 1994, the PBC TV and PBC Radio have adopted a policy of promoting speeches, interview programs and children’s shows that only exacerbate war rather than promote peace.

There are two sides of Sesame Street in Palestine. One, from the Palestinian people, that desires peace. The other, dictated from the Palestine Authority, that is made up of people who came from PLO headquarters in Tunis back in 1993, that promotes war and continued conflict.

PBC shows such as the official PBC “The Children’s Club” reveal how thoroughly committed Arafat and his authority are to the idea that their struggle against Israel is a jihad – a holy war – against Israel.

In the Oslo peace accords and later agreements, the Palestine Authority agreed in no uncertain terms to take all necessary steps to prevent violence, or the incitement of violence, against Israel.

The Clinton Administration is not ignorant of the Palestinian Broadcasting Corporation’s programming. At the US Senate subcommittee hearing in March, Assistant Secretary of State Martin Indyk actually watched footage from “The Children’s Club.” Indyk knows full well that the incitement to violence is in violation of the Declaration of Principles signed by Israel and the PLO.

Yet when the U.S. government makes demands for concessions, it makes specific requests of Israel, and generalized demands of Arafat.

The question remains: why does the US not make a specific request of Arafat that the message conveyed to Palestinian children on his TV station emanate from Daoud Kuttab and not from Radwan Abu Ayash?

Har Homa Monitoring Committee

Yerushalim Shelanu (Our Jerusalem) has established a Har Homa monitoring Committee. Monitors, in a car with Israeli flags flying from it will travel to Har Homa regularly and issue reports about the pace of building at Har Homa.

In announcing the Monitoring Committee, Jonathan Levy, spokesman stated, “With all of the world focusing on Har Homa, it is important that someone report on what is actually taking place there. We intend to provide a service to journalists and tourists who want to see and understand what is actually, on the grond taking place at Har Homa.”

Additionally, with the increase of tourists and foreign media visiting Israel for Passover and the 50th Anniversary of the State of Israel, increased tours of Eastern Jerusalem, including stops at Har Homa, Ras al Amud, (Har Ha Zetim), Orient House, and the Jerusalem Tunnels will be offered.

For more information, or to arrange a tour of Eastern Jerusalem, contact Ronn Torossian at ourjrlm@netvision.net.il, or call (972-53) 510-214 [(053) 510-214 from Israel].

After Sharif

Even if the Hamas leadership in Gaza tries to respond to the Palestinian Authority’s request to avoid attacks, it is doubtful if it has the power to influence the leaders of its military wing in the West Bank.

There were those among the leaders of the Palestinian Authority last week who accepted the Israeli version, as explained to Yasser Arafat by GSS Director Ami Ayalon, that Muhi a-Din Sharif was not killed by Israeli agents. This was also hinted by the fact that the official Palestinian announcement published yesterday avoided allocating responsibility for Sharif’s death. But the Palestinian leaders found it difficult to withstand the crowd’s rage in Gaza and the West Bank, which is convinced that Israel was responsible for another assassination, this time of the man called by the Palestinian street the ‘Engineer no. 2’.

Recent Hamas announcements and leaflets (whose authenticity is not always clear) say that revenge for Sharif’s murder will be harsher than for Yehiye Ayash. The connection between the two cases was demonstrated by Hamas activists who invited Ayash’s father to stand beside Sharif’s father during the large funeral held last Thursday in Ramallah.

The possibility that they will launch revenge attacks in Israel also arouses concern among Arafat and his aides. There are preliminary signs of economic revitalization in the territories due to the easing of the closure. Crossing the roadblocks from the West Bank into Israeli territory is nearly frictionless, the soldiers rarely stop to check anyone and raids on workplaces to catch unregistered Palestinian workers within Israel itself have stopped. Many vehicles with Palestinian license plates can be seen on Israel’s roads, and the Liaison Office in Gaza permits more workers and merchants to enter Israel. Trucks from Gaza, too, loaded with goods, travel in organized convoys to the ports of Ashdod and Haifa, and eastward to Jordan, in greater regularity and numbers than in the past. A terrorist attack could put a stop to all this.

In order to try and stop imminent revenge attacks, the Palestinian Authority has taken an unusual step. Its representatives, headed by Authority Director-General a-Taib Abd al-Rahim, last Thursday summoned Hamas’ political wing in Gaza, headed by Sheikh Abd al-Aziz al- Rantisi, to an urgent meeting. Hamas activists were offered participation in a joint investigation on Sharif’s death.

Although the Palestinian police have collected all the evidence of the explosion, they have no information on Sharif’s movements in the final hours and days prior to his death. If it was indeed an Israeli operation, as Hamas agents believe, it was carried out in cooperation with Palestinian forces (as happened in the case of Ayash), and the only way to find them and their Israeli handlers, if any, is to check the people with whom Sharif recently met. Anyone who knew of the warehouse, or laboratory, where the explosion took place, where Sharif was before arriving at the location, whom he met with, who brought him there and other classified details which only Hamas activists, Sharif’s colleagues, know about. It is hard to imagine that Hamas military activists would agree to hand over classified information on their agents to Arafat’s security apparatus. They know that Palestinian security officials give information to the Israeli GSS and suspect that they hand Hamas agents over to Israel.

Arafat’s messengers also asked the Hamas leaders in Gaza to restrain and not react with attacks at this time, because such a response could cause severe damage to Palestinian interests. There could be political damage besides any economic harm. Arafat now expects the American proposals regarding the continued Israeli withdrawal to be announced at any time, and it is clear that a terrorist attack would help Netanyahu’s government to reject any such proposal.

But even if the Hamas leadership in Gaza were to try to act on the Palestinian Authority’s request, it is not clear if it has the power to influence the leaders of the organization’s military wing in the West Bank. The questions: When do the leaders of the Hamas cells decide to carry out an attack; who among them takes orders and religious and political instruction and what considerations motivate the decision makers, have for years not only worried Israeli intelligence, but also the leaders of the Palestinian Authority, and no-one has any clear answers.

Israeli intelligence sources, for example, point to the fact that “Izz a-Din al-Qassam” brigade commanders (Hamas cells) in the West Bank are connected to the Hamas leadership in Jordan more than they are to the leadership in Gaza. According to (Israeli) suspicions, the men who transfer instructions and funds from Jordan to the cells in the West Bank are Khaled Masha’al and Imad al-Alami, who reside in Amman, as well as other known political activists such as Mahmoud Nizal and Ibrahim Rousha. It is also known that Hamas leaders residing abroad generally support the hard line — of terrorist attacks — more than the leadership in Gaza and the West Bank do. The reason for this is that the leaders abroad are not subject to the persistent pressures of the Palestinian Authority, and no-one from the street comes up to them to complain that their sources of income in Israel are blocked due to the attacks.

Because of the differences in the positions between the Hamas leadership scattered in Israel and abroad, Hamas leaders tend to periodically call coordination meetings, where important decisions are made. In the past, Mussa Abu Marzook, who is known to be the head of Hamas’ political wing, and Mustapha Lindawi, considered to be the Hamas leader in Lebanon, as well as other activists from Jordan and Egypt used to come to these meetings (usually held in Cairo or Khartoum). There have been cases when the Israeli government granted permission to Hamas leaders in Israel to travel abroad, hoping that they would bring moderate positions to these meetings. There have also been occasions where Israel prevented them from leaving. Hamas leader Sheikh Ahmed Yassin was recently permitted to leave for medical treatment in Saudi Arabia.

A large group of senior Hamas leaders asked to accompany him. Israel thought that the Hamas leadership in the country and abroad intended to convene another senior leadership meeting, this time in Saudi Arabia, and decided not to allow them to go.

It is further known that the leadership of Hamas’ military wing has a considerable degree of freedom. They have the authority to decide on all matters regarding the operational side and timing of attacks. But they need the political-religious authority and permission on all matters regarding the act of carrying out attacks. Following the assassination of Yehiye Ayash in January 1996, Hamas activists waited nearly two months before before carrying out their revenge attacks. No-one can prophesy what will happen now. Meanwhile people in the West Bank and Gaza are preparing to celebrate Id el-Adkha, which begins this week; on the streets of eastern Jerusalem, Palestinians could be heard saying that the quiet will last at least until the holiday is over.