[With IMRA explanation of true meaning] INSS Policy Recommendations on Issues of
National Security

Dr. Aaron Lerner – IMRA: For the benefit of IMRA readers, the following is
an English translation of some of the recommendations:

“3. Draft a list of measures Israel would be prepared to advance in the
framework of returning to the political process with the Palestinians:

initiate economic projects in Area C;” = facilitate the ongoing
internationally backed program to choke off Israeli communities in Area C.

” launch a multinational effort for Gaza reconstruction in exchange for a
sustained period of calm” = NEVER require a halt or dismantling of the
ongoing massive military preparations underway in the Gaza Strip.

“4. Agree with heads of the American administration on a mutual halt to
intervention in the internal political processes of both countries.” =
absolutely no public communication of disagreements with the Obama
Administration on the deal with Iran. Decline to provide any information to
any element in the American democratic system (congressmen, think tanks,
journalists, friends of Israel, etc.) that does not agree completely with
the positions of the Obama Administration.

“8. Initiate a political plan aimed at advancing the strategic goal of
“two states for two peoples.” This plan would be based on a multilateral
and multi-track approach to advance gradually and in a controlled manner.
These parallel and complementary tracks, as an alternative to the sole track
of a permanent arrangement, include: (a) establishing transitional
arrangements for shaping a reality of two states for two peoples, founded on
the principle of “what’s agreed upon is implemented”; ” = Israeli
withdrawal from any area that Israel does not intend to retain in a final
deal WITHOUT requiring first a final comprehensive agreement with the
Palestinians.

“(b) enlisting international and regional assistance for building a basis
for a responsible, stable, and functioning Palestinian state in the West
Bank;” = the deployment of international human shields in the West Bank
to cripple Israel’s ability to engage in vital security operations in those
areas.

“(C) integrating a collaborative, multilateral approach to the political
process with regional and international players that can provide guarantees
for moving forward in the process and safeguarding Israel’s security needs.
” = facilitating the development of a arrangements [including the threat of
sanctions] as a stranglehold against the Jewish State to insure “progress”
come-what-may with Israel accepting the concept that it can exchange its
security based on the IDF for nicely worded international promises.

“9. Promote the idea of reconstructing the Gaza Strip as a further step
in the process that has begun, with the aim of formulating understandings
with Hamas as to the establishment of a period of sustained calm. Such
understandings would include clarifying that Hamas is responsible for
preventing all aggressive actions and terror directed against Israel from
Gaza. A continuous state of security calm will enable construction of a
joint effort – Israeli, Palestinian Authority, Western, and Arab states – to
restore the Strip.” = NEVER require a halt or dismantling of the ongoing
massive military preparations underway in the Gaza Strip.

“4. Propose a new Israeli initiative for regional cooperation within the
framework of a comprehensive plan founded on the common interests of Israel
and the pragmatic Arab states.” = Focus on high profile photo-op programs
that may serve to undermine the stability of our Arab allies instead of
continuing with our very fruitful behind-the-scenes security relationships.

====================================

The First 100 Days of the New Israeli Government: Twenty Policy
Recommendations on Issues of National Security
May 28, 2015, Institute for National Security Studies
http://www.inss.org.il/index.aspx?id=4538&articleid=9551
.

SUMMARY: With the establishment of Israel’s new government and in
consideration of the multiple challenges facing Israel at different levels
of national security, INSS has prepared a set of recommendations designed to
help the government navigate the key strategic issues before it. Prepared by
members of the INSS research staff, this paper offers a concise review of
the leading issues Israel must deal with, as well as the “top 20” policy
recommendations to the new government. The recommendations refer to
regional, international, and internal levels of Israeli national security
policy, and focus primarily on matters that must be attended to immediately
on six levels: (1) US-Israel relations; (2) Iranian influence in the Middle
East; (3) the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; (4) Israel’s international
standing; (5) regional cooperation; and (6) national security
infrastructures.
.
The Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) analyzes issues relating
to Israel’s national security. Research conducted at INSS is policy-oriented
and intended to serve decision makers in Israel, as well as the general
public. With the establishment of the new government and in consideration of
the multiple challenges facing Israel at different levels of national
security, INSS has prepared a set of recommendations designed to help the
government navigate the key strategic issues before it.

Israel’s new government has no grace period. It is already called on to deal
with a series of immediate challenges, significant issues, and policy
decisions that if not handled within the first months will become far more
difficult to solve down the road. The recommendations presented provide a
firm base for policy shaping and for responses to the various challenges,
with the goal of bolstering Israel’s security and stability in the coming
years.

This paper offers a concise review of the leading issues Israel must deal
with, as well as the “top 20” policy recommendations to the new government
formulated by the INSS research staff. The recommendations refer to
regional, international, and internal levels of Israeli national security
policy and focus primarily on matters that must be attended to immediately
as the foundation for future actions.

A. Healing Israel-US Relations

The current crisis between Jerusalem and Washington reflects the diverging
perspectives of the two administrations regarding the central challenges in
the Middle East and how to respond to them. Moreover, how the new government
will attend to the bilateral relations has implications for Israel’s long
term interests, as well as its regional and international standing.
Therefore, we recommend adopting the predominant goal of repairing relations
and putting them back on track, reaching agreement on joint challenges, and
acting in mutually considerate fashion toward the interests of the other
side, in order to deal jointly with the common challenges facing the two
countries.

1. Jumpstart anew the strategic dialogue between Israel and the US as
soon as possible through a joint meeting between Israel’s Prime Minister,
Defense Minister, and Foreign Minister (if one is appointed) and their
American counterparts. If this attempt to renew the fundamental dialogue
between the US President and the Israeli Prime Minister proves overly
complicated, then leading officials on both sides should be chosen with whom
it will be possible to maintain a back channel (for example, Vice President
Joe Biden, Secretary of Defense Carter, and figures such as Hillary Clinton
and Senator Schumer).

2. Debate the Iranian issue with the most senior levels of the American
administration (despite fears Israel might be perceived as coming to terms
with the nuclear agreement). This dialogue would presumably pave the way to
“compensate” Israel in the form of advanced weapon systems and explicit
American commitments regarding the US response to an Iranian breach of the
agreement.

3. Draft a list of measures Israel would be prepared to advance in the
framework of returning to the political process with the Palestinians:
initiate economic projects in Area C; expand areas for the deployment and
activity of Palestinian police in Area B; launch a multinational effort for
Gaza reconstruction in exchange for a sustained period of calm; expand water
allocation to the Palestinian Authority, and more.

4. Agree with heads of the American administration on a mutual halt to
intervention in the internal political processes of both countries. In
addition, consideration should be given to the appointment of a new
ambassador to the United States, signaling a “new page” to senior levels in
the administration.

B. Curbing Iranian Influence in the Middle East

It appears that the emerging agreement on the nuclear issue between Iran and
the world powers cannot be stopped. Now is the time to focus efforts on
establishing an effective supervision-verification mechanism for holding
Iran to its commitments to the agreement, and developing a response in the
event Iran breaches the agreement. It is essential to achieve regional and
international agreement on preventing Iran’s abuse of the nuclear agreement
(for example, by funneling unfrozen money to terror elements and
destabilizing forces across the Middle East, or by threatening that any
international pressure exerted on it would constitute a breach of agreement
and thus legitimize its surge toward achieving a military nuclear
capability). Moreover, it is essential that Israel not be the party accused
of torpedoing negotiations should they be halted.

5. Continue operating through secret and reliable diplomatic channels
vis-à-vis the P5+1 in order to guarantee an effective
supervision-verification mechanism for overseeing implementation of the
nuclear agreement. Furthermore, Israel must devise a joint plan of action in
cooperation with the US, permanent members of the Security Council, and
Western countries in the event of Iran’s breach of the agreement.

6. Prevent further establishment of the military infrastructure and
terror capabilities of the Iranian axis, i.e., the Quds Force, Hizbollah,
and additional proxies in the Golan Heights, southern Lebanon, and the Gaza
Strip. Issue a warning to Iran, through secret channels, against moves in
this direction.

7. Prepare both militarily and on the civilian front for the possibility
of a flare-up in the north – a military confrontation with Hizbollah, backed
by Iran, on the Golan Heights and in Lebanon – subject to developments in
Syria.

C. Pursuing a Political Initiative for the Palestinian Arena

We believe that a solution in the form of a permanent arrangement that puts
an end to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and resolves the mutual demands
of the parties is not achievable in the near future. However, this political
deadlock creates a grave problem for Israel, since it weakens the legitimacy
of its political and military actions. For the sake of strengthening
Israel’s position as a democratic, responsible, and secure state with
recognized borders and a Jewish majority that enjoys international
recognition as a state of equal standing in the international community, the
following is required:

8. Initiate a political plan aimed at advancing the strategic goal of
“two states for two peoples.” This plan would be based on a multilateral
and multi-track approach to advance gradually and in a controlled manner.
These parallel and complementary tracks, as an alternative to the sole track
of a permanent arrangement, include: (a) establishing transitional
arrangements for shaping a reality of two states for two peoples, founded on
the principle of “what’s agreed upon is implemented”; (b) enlisting
international and regional assistance for building a basis for a
responsible, stable, and functioning Palestinian state in the West Bank; (C)
integrating a collaborative, multilateral approach to the political process
with regional and international players that can provide guarantees for
moving forward in the process and safeguarding Israel’s security needs.

9. Promote the idea of reconstructing the Gaza Strip as a further step in
the process that has begun, with the aim of formulating understandings with
Hamas as to the establishment of a period of sustained calm. Such
understandings would include clarifying that Hamas is responsible for
preventing all aggressive actions and terror directed against Israel from
Gaza. A continuous state of security calm will enable construction of a
joint effort – Israeli, Palestinian Authority, Western, and Arab states – to
restore the Strip.

10. Prepare – concurrently – for an additional round of escalation with
Hamas. The IDF must present recommendations for a different course of
military action than in the previous rounds of the conflict. Such action
must enable the long term neutralization, to the degree possible, of terror
organizations’ motivation to renew warfare against Israel, and prevent
Hamas’ ability to restore military capabilities over time. At the same time
a comprehensive response must be developed to the increasing trend of terror
(mainly on the part of lone individuals) in the West Bank, in order to
prevent deterioration into a sweeping outbreak of violence in the region.

D. Improving Israel’s International Standing and its Relations with the
International Community

Israel must formulate a proactive policy in the face of the intensifying
diplomatic, public, and legal campaign waged against it in the international
arena based on the efforts to delegitimize Israel and impose boycotts,
otherwise known as the Boycott, Divestment and Sanction (BDS) movement.

11. Devise and launch an offensive in the diplomatic, legal, economic,
and academic arenas, based on comprehensive preparatory staff work at the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Strategic Affairs. A leading
entity must be determined (our recommendation – the National Security
Council) to be responsible for synchronizing the various actions of
government ministries and public bodies involved in fighting the boycotts
and the delegitimization efforts. In addition, it is necessary to develop
an operational concept in the sphere of the new media and social networks to
influence world public opinion and neutralize anti-Israel initiatives.

12. Initiate, as soon as possible, a visit by the Prime Minister to EU
institutions and major European capitals. Such a visit must follow the
updating of policy for advancing the political process with the Palestinians
along with the formulation of an Israeli response to the nuclear agreement
with Iran. Israel must issue clear statements concerning “two states for
two peoples” and/or the division between Israel’s policy for construction in
Jerusalem and the settlements blocs, and the policy for building outside
those areas. Such statements would likely boost international willingness
to support an Israeli political initiative for the political process with
the Palestinians.

13. Challenge the international community – particularly France, which
intends to propose an initiative for an UN Security Council resolution in
determining the parameters for solving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict –
through an Israeli motion submitted to the Security Council regarding the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The Israeli draft resolution would express
Israel’s vital needs, headed by non-violation of its security and citizens,
recognition of Israel as the national home of the Jewish people, and
recognition of Palestine (once it is established) as the national home of
the Palestinian people. In addition, the resolution must express
consideration for conditions that have come about in the conflict arena over
the past 50 years.

E. Promoting Regional Cooperation

The multi-system shockwaves in the Arab world in recent years have led to
the overthrow of five regimes (including in Iraq, where the regime was
toppled through American intervention). Presumably the Assad regime in
Syria will likewise not return to the status it enjoyed before the outbreak
of the civil war. Following the change in the regional balance of power,
the increased level of security threats to countries in the region, and
Iran’s increasing involvement in the region, there is an overlap of
interests between Israel and the pragmatic Arab states – despite the
political deadlock between Israel and the Palestinians. Accordingly:

14. Propose a new Israeli initiative for regional cooperation within the
framework of a comprehensive plan founded on the common interests of Israel
and the pragmatic Arab states. Concomitantly, Israel must articulate its
willingness to proceed in the political process. The proposal would convey
readiness to examine the Saudi Peace Initiative as a framework for regional
negotiation with necessary adjustments in light of the new situation in the
region in recent years.

15. Give priority to tightened cooperation with Egypt and Jordan in
fighting terror and securing the common borders. Assist (indirectly) in
bolstering the stability of the regimes in the two countries via support in
the areas of economy, energy, water, and technology.

16. Increase humanitarian support for stricken population groups in Syria
and for refugees who have fled the regions of fighting. At the same time
identify organizations and players with the potential to fulfill a positive
role in shaping a post-Assad Syria and invest resources in creating
understandings with those groups while assisting them.

F. Attending to the Economy and National Security Infrastructures

The economy on all levels constitutes a central tier of Israel’s national
security policy. A stable mechanism is needed for the process of determining
the security budget. Moreover, it is necessary to attend to the issue of
energy as a vital Israeli asset and as a resource with strategic
implications for its regional status. A further important aspect of
Israel’s power is the civilian front and its functional capability in
anticipated future clashes with its enemies.

17. A mechanism must be set in place that will regulate the drafting of
the security budget between the Finance and Defense Ministries.

18. Establish a ministerial committee to discuss all aspects – economic,
legal, and strategic – of the extraction of natural gas and other natural
resources. A balance must be struck between competitive gas prices, Israel
as a country that honors international commitments, and exports to
neighboring countries for the purpose of strengthening strategic ties.

19. Strengthen capabilities for defending vital Israeli infrastructures,
with an emphasis on cyber security and defense of the electricity and energy
system.

20. Formulate a comprehensive plan for improving the strength of the
Israeli civilian front, in advance of possible future confrontations,
including severe impact to the home front and to strategic infrastructures.
In this framework it is necessary to prepare a plan for evacuating civilians
from communities adjacent to the border under immediate risk of being
targets of rocket/missile fire or a ground incursion. With that, the time
has come to formulate a national plan for dealing with natural disasters and
multi-casualty events of a non-military nature.

 

http://www.imra.org.il/story.php3?id=67392

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