Daniel Sokatch’s can we talk about Israel?

Daniel Sokatch, CEO of the New Israel Fund and founding Executive Director of Bend the Arc (formally, the Progressive Jewish Alliance) has written a book entitled Can We Talk About Israel? A Guide for the Curious, Confused and Conflicted (Bloomsbury Publishing, 2021). This is a preliminary report covering Sokatch’s presentation of the historical backdrop to the Six Day War in 1967 which is “Part One” of the book covering pages 1-210.

 

Sokatch is forthright about his “perspective”, stating that he is “a product of the liberal American Jewish community”. Asserting that he possesses intimate familiarity with various aspects of the pro-Israel narrative held by Americans, he suggests that readers listen to the story as he sees it and draw their own conclusions. The reader is warned that “you are probably not going to agree with, or perhaps even believe, everything you read here” (p. 6) and “while I won’t engage in propaganda, I do (italics in original) have an agenda” (p. 5). Sokatch’s stated purpose in writing the book is “to explain why Israel and the Israeli-Palestinian dispute seem to drive so many otherwise reasonable people completely bonkers” (p. 3-4). The book reflects the author’s view that the struggle, in line with Benny Morris’ famous paradigm, is between two groups of “righteous victims” (p. 5).

 

This reviewer has sought to relate solely to those items that, in his view, were misrepresented in the book (1) factually, (2) by omission of relevant historical factors, or (3) by suggesting an anachronistic spin. In such cases, an alternative understanding of the issue has been suggested. Essentially, the reviewer has attempted to identify how Sokatch’s perspective is shaped by his errors and how his errors could shape his readers’ understanding. As Sokatch himself notes: “people have strong feelings…but that doesn’t mean those feelings are actually based on…well, facts – on an actual understanding of the situation…” (p. 3). I thus ask: Does Sokatch frame his historical overview and presentation of Israel in order to persuade his readers to adopt a particular political position?    

The review is organized as follows. Following this brief introduction, I proceed on a page-by-page basis, discussing items that stand out in the book as in need of examination. In the final section, I offer conclusions. Specifically, I try to answer the question of whether Sokatch indeed provides a guide for the “Curious, Confused and Conflicted” – or rather, whether his book adds to the confusion and exacerbates the conflict by providing an anti-factual presentation of Judaism, Zionism, Israel and Jewish history.

Let us now begin the review.

 

  1. 9: “King Hussein…flew his royal Jordanian jet around Jerusalem in a salute to the city he once ruled”. 

The author does not mention that Hussein’s “rule” was the result of the 1948 invasion of Mandate Palestine by his grandfather, Abdullah, itself a violation of United Nations appeals to refrain from aggressive actions; an illegal occupation followed, in April 1950, by a further illegal act of annexation. (Relatedly, on p. 372, the Index entry for “Jerusalem, East” contains this term: “Israeli annexation”. The term “Jordanian annexation” does not appear there, nor does it appear in the entry for “Jordan”.) What we learn here is that what is missing in Sokatch’s telling can be at least as important as what he includes. 

 

  1. 12: “The idea of Israel in the Jewish imagination”

 

While the term “imagination” in academia is often taken to mean “a power of the mind,” “a creative faculty of the mind,” or a “process” of the mind to indicate thinking or remembering, its appearance in this context might mislead the reader into thinking that “the idea of Israel” is a contrived notion.

 

  1. 13: “(“Nablus,” in Arabic)”

 

Indeed, Shechem is now known in Arabic as “Nablus”. Yet “Nablus” originated as a corruption (Arabic lacks a “p”) of the Latin “Neapolis”, or Flavia Neapolis, as named by the Roman emperor Vespasian in 72 CE following Jerusalem’s destruction, a precursor to the naming of Judaea as “Palaestina” by Hadrian at the time of the Bar Kochba Revolt in 132 CE, or just prior. Given the importance of the idea of an Arab Palestine, this background should have been provided.

 

  1. 13: “the Palestinian territories in the West Bank”

 

Following the comment above, regarding p. 9, this is the place for the term “West Bank” to have been contextualized as created only in 1950 as part of Jordan’s illegal annexation of the area. Indeed, the Lexicon chapter, pp. 321-324, discusses at length the “West Bank” but avoids any mention of its status during 1948-1967.

 

  1. 13: “The Hebrew Bible is…the origin story…for some people”

 

The qualification “some” in this sentence seems odd, as the majority of Jews, Christians, and Moslems – in other words, a significant portion the world’s population – accepts the reliability of the Hebrew Bible as a source text. Ancient steles, other writings and archaeological finds confirm, to a very large degree, the outlines of the Biblical narrative, at the least regarding Jewish settlement and residency in the Land of Israel and the Jewish people’s history in that land.

 

  1. 13: “The conquest by Israel of the West Bank in 1967”

 

While perhaps technically correct, “conquest” is a loaded term, especially as Jordan’s 1948 conquest of that area is completely absent from his book. This is one example of Sokatch’s semantic biasing of the reader. 

 

  1. 14: “sets the stage for yet another musical”

 

Recourse to humor would seem inappropriate in this context except, perhaps, as an expression of the author’s mocking of Jewish heritage values.

 

  1. 14: “Jewish kingdoms rose and fell in what is now Israel and the West Bank”

 

While technically true, the omission of the proper geo-historical place names of “Judea and Samaria” appears deliberate and purposeful.

 

  1. 14: In footnote at the bottom of the page, relating to his use of the phrase “Jewish story”, rather than, say, the Jewish record, Sokatch writes: “this is the Jewish version of the same kind of faith-based views on land ownership that motivated the Muslim conquests of the Middle East and the Indian subcontinent; crusades…Manifest Destiny…and Soviet hegemony over Eastern Europe”. Here, the author both creates a false equivalence and imposes a highly debatable ideological framework.

 

  1. 15: “a group of Jewish rebels (and, by all accounts, religious fanatics)”

 

If all religious groups were described in the book as “fanatics”, this might be considered a side point. Since this is not the case, it once again indicates Sokatch’s derogatory approach to things Jewish. In the footnote at the bottom of the page, Sokatch describes the Hasmoneans as “religious extremists”.

 

  1. 16: “the Western Wall is considered the holiest site in Judaism”

 

This statement is factually inaccurate. The Temple Mount, not the Western Wall, is the most sacred site in Judaism.

The Western Wall and the Mughrabi Gate leading to the Temple Mount.

(Photo: MILNER MOSHE, GPO)

 

  1. 17: “While there were always small communities of Jews living in the Land of Israel between 70 C.E. and the late nineteenth century…”

 

The first date should properly be 135 C.E. In the early 2nd century, hundreds of thousands of Jews resided in the country. At this point, Sokatch provides a three-page précis of 1800 years of the Jewish Diaspora experience. Yet he is silent on crucial topics such as the history of Jewish emigration to the Land of Israel, including, for example, the rise of Safed and Jewish mysticism, the continuous Jewish life in Jerusalem and Hebron, the emigrations of Hasidim in 1777 or the pupils of Rabbi Eliyahu of Vilna in 1810, the various settlement schemes and more (see, e.g., Arie Morgenstern’s “Dispersion and the Longing for Zion, 1240-1840”, AZURE, Winter 5762 / 2002, no. 12). On p. 22, Sokatch returns to the 1850s and writes, “As I mentioned, even after the Roman exile, some Jews remained in the Land of Israel”. This makes for a rather inadequate presentation, especially in light of the Arab claim that Jews are a foreign entity in the region or that they are non-indigenous to it.

 

  1. 19: “the Church adopted a position of hostility toward Jews…this resulted in…stereotyping…persecution and violence.”

 

No indication is provided in this comment that that the “violence” – at the times of the Crusades, the Black Death, or the Inquisition – resulted in mass murder, expulsions, accusations of ritual murder and more. Another downplaying of Jewish suffering.

 

  1. 22: “the General Jewish Labor Bund…rejected emigration.”

 

As this statement appears after Sokatch mentions the mass emigration of East European Jewry to America, one would think the Bund was anti-emigration to another Diaspora land. Yet, the Bund was anti-Zionist.

 

  1. 23: “This philanthropy resulted in the founding, starting in the 1850s…”

 

Further to the above-mentioned waves of Jewish immigration in the 16th, 17th and 18th centuries, Sokatch ignores the so-called “Forerunners of Zionism”, the rabbis Yehuda Alkalai, Elijahu Guttmacher, Yehuda Bibas and Zvi Hersh Kalischer, the prominent American author Mordecai Manuel Noah and the European socialist Moshe Hess, all active in a proto-political sense prior to 1860. Nor does he mention American presidents who supported a return to Zion such as John Adams, who wrote in 1818 that Jews should be “restored to an independent government” and ‘’I really wish the Jews once again in Judea, an independent Nation…I wish your nation may be admitted to all the privileges of nations in every part of the world.’’ All this, it should be noted, was less of a response to nti-Semitic pogroms (such as occurred in Russia in the 1880s, and the Dreyfus Case of 1894) that Sokatch does detail as a springboard to political Zionism.

 

  1. 25: “Herzl was somewhat less wedded than other early Zionists to the notion that the Jewish State be established in Palestine…[emphasis in original]”

 

Herzl’s consideration of East Africa was not a free choice but one of temporarily saving the Jews in areas being ravaged by pogroms. In the Zionist Congress that voted down his proposal of a Nachtasyl (“night shelter”), he swore allegiance to Jerusalem, quoting Psalms 137:5, “Let my right hand forget its cunning if I forget Jerusalem”. Sokatch implies that perhaps even Herzl would have sought another area for the Jewish State than the Land of Israel, but this implication is not accompanied by an explanation of the historical framework.

 

  1. 26: “I’m often asked if I’m a Zionist…Israel is a reality, so asking about someone’s stand on the nineteenth-century movement…doesn’t seem particularly relevant”.

 

Sokatch would have us believe, as he writes on p. 26, that the sole aim of Zionism was self-determination, and in May 1948, that goal was realized. In his answer to aforementioned question, he both avoids characterizing himself as either a Zionist or not a Zionist, and constrains Zionist goals to the borders of May 1948, which, of course, were the 1947 proposed partition lines. On p. 30, he returns to this “silly” question but again skirts the issue, writing that he simply supports “the liberal vision of Israel enshrined in its Declaration of Independence”. 

 

  1. 27: “right-wing (‘Revisionist’) Zionists preached a militant gospel of territorial expansion…their early symbols included a map that showed a ‘Greater Land of Israel’…based on the borders of a biblical Kingdom of Israel”.

 

The map to which Sokatch here refers, commonly known as the “Two Banks has the Jordan” map, actually outlines the original Mandate of Palestine area of what became only Israel and TransJordan (Lebanon was not included in that map as he suggests). The 1919 map that Chaim Weizmann tabled for deliberation of the Versailles Peace Conference did include parts of Lebanon, Syria and, in TransJordan, up to the Hejaz Railway line some 50 kilometers east of the Jordan River (the area of the Biblical tribal portions of Reuven, Gad and half of Menasheh). 

It was in July 1922, as per Article 25 of the League of Nations Mandate, that all “the territories lying between the Jordan and the eastern boundary of Palestine as ultimately determined” were effectively separated from the Jewish National Home. The 1923 Carlsbad Zionist Congress, representing all the Zionist parties, adopted the following resolution: that Transjordan and Cisjordan are “one historical, geographic and economic unit” and “in accordance with the legitimate demands of the Jewish people”, the Congress expects that an expression of such will be achieved in Transjordan and eventually will be carried out. Thus, we see that, in contrast to Sokatch’s implication, the “Two Banks has the Jordan” map was not devised for purposes of expansion but against the territorial whittling down of the Jewish National Home.

The area of ​​the British Mandate for Palestine / Israel

https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0/

 

  1. 28: “[Jabotinsky] argued in his essay ‘The Iron Wall’ that…the native Arabs [would need be beaten] into submission”

 

Factually inaccurate. Jabotinsky’s 1923 Iron Wall concept was one of defense against an Arab wave of violence that had murdered, maimed, and raped Jews in Jerusalem in April 1920, Jaffa and Petach Tikva in May 1921 and again Jerusalem in November 1921. He wrote that Zionism “can proceed and develop only under the protection of a power that is independent of the native population – behind an iron wall, which the native population cannot breach… the iron wall, which is to say a strong power in Palestine that is not amenable to any Arab pressure.” Here Sokatch has twisted Jabotinsky’s meaning and intent.

 

  1. 28: “today, most right-wing Zionists would never describe Zionism as a colonialist movement”

 

This statement is correct but not to the extent as Sokatch notes, that it ‘doesn’t serve political talking points’. There is a vast difference between the connotations of the term today and what the term symbolized in the minds of pre-State Zionist leaders and pioneers. For them “colonizing” meant “settling the land” and bringing in Jewish immigrants according to the age-old Jewish legacy.  During the period of the early Zionist settlement initiatives from 1878 on, kibbutzim and moshavot were referred to as “colonies”. Today, by contrast, colonialism a term referring to the practice of European or ‘North’ countries to control a native people by a foreign people by establishing colonies with the aim of economic exploitation and dominance. During the period of modern Zionism, namely, post-1878, Jews were returning home and sought to build social and economic cooperation with the local Arabs, themselves a people who had invaded the country and economically disenfranchised the Jews living there.

 

  1. 29: “from…1948 to 1977, the proponents of right-wing Zionism were in perpetual opposition…”

 

Here, one might mention that Gahal, the Herut-Liberal Bloc led by Menachem Begin, was a full member of the 1967-1970 National Unity Government coalition with ministerial responsibilities.

Menachem Begin speaks at an election rally in Tel Aviv. Sitting next to him, Haim Landau.

(Photo: HANS PIN, GPO)

 

  1. 29: “in order to gain a majority in the…Knesset, Zionist political parties found it necessary to work with ultra-Orthodox religious parties”

 

While this statement is accurate, it is worth noting that such cooperation is quite normal, especially in a parliamentary system that relies on coalitions, even with groups outside the elected bodies of governing, and that such cooperation existed during pre-state days with the World Zionist Organization in various periods and circumstances. For example, in 1933, an agreement was made with the Jewish Agency whereby Agudat Yisrael would receive 6.5% of the immigration permits allotted by the British.

On June 19, 1947, David Ben-Gurion sent his “status quo” letter to the leaders of the Agudat Yisrael party to soften their opposition to the establishment of the Jewish state and achieve a united policy to be presented to the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP). The 1943 Teheran Children’s Agreement was also made with Agudat Yisrael.

 

  1. 30: “Jews were heading back to Palestine. Beginning in the 1880s…”

 

Once again, Sokatch misses an opportunity to highlight centuries of continuous Jewish immigration to the Land of Israel from all over the world – and not only persecution-driven, modern-day nti-S. 

 

  1. 31-32: “a large native Arab population who quite understandably became more and more hostile…”

 

First, the indigenous nature of the Arab population is a matter of debate. Second, why “understandably”? Why even intimate that the Arab hostility was justified without providing a more sophisticated presentation of the context?

 

  1. 33-34: “Is Zionism Justifiable?”

 

In responding to a young camper’s question that includes the metaphor of a stranger coming into someone’s house, Sokatch is negligent in overlooking points have been highlighted previously: that Jews, albeit without sovereignty, were present in the Land throughout the years of exile; that Arabs themselves were strangers who arrived as conquerors and occupiers and had come to someone else’s “house”; that the Arabs, based on the Quran, were aware that this land is the Jewish homeland; and that the Jews attempted, to the greatest extent possible, to come in peace, to purchase back their homeland and to accommodate the local non-Jewish residents. 

 

  1. 35-36: “one school of thought has today’s Palestinians descending from the Biblical Canaanites and Philistines (which is where the name ‘Palestine’ comes from.”

 

Importantly, no such “school of thought” exists. Instead, this is a pure propaganda claim. The name ‘Palestine’ comes from, as noted above, the Romans. The Philistines of the Bible were the Sea People from the Aegean area – although Sokatch does not even bother to present that “school of thought” to balance his argument. One might be relieved to note that he did not mention Saeb Erekat’s claim to be descended from the Natufians. Or that of Yasser Arafat and Faisal Husseini, who stated that Palestinian Arabs are descended from the Jebusites, following the Al-Mawsu’at Al-Filastinniya (Palestinian encyclopedia) asserting that Palestinians are “the descendants of the Jebusites, who are of Arab origin.”

 

We are dealing here with historical fact – but more than that as well. As the above clearly demonstrates, Arabs construct “facts” out of whole cloth. Moreover, the author’s presentation sets a pattern of ‘they claim/they claim’ – as if truth were a matter of choice. 

 

  1. 40: “World War I temporarily interrupted the waves of Jewish immigration to Palestine.”

 

At this time, more than 40,000 Jews were forcibly deported from their homes and also expelled from Tel Aviv and surrounding communities to the Galilee and to Egypt by the Ottoman regime.

 

  1. 41: “The nations of the world had given the United Kingdom another colony to run.”

 

Again, Sokatch reinforces the false status of the Jewish National Home within the special status it had been defined as a Class “A” Mandate, different from the others in that a nation is provisionally recognized as independent, but receives the advice and assistance, as well as employing the false term “colony.”

 

  1. 42: “The Palestinian Arab community’s increasingly furious opposition.”

 

Furious is an understatement. In April 1920, Arabs in Jerusalem rioted, after a series of unruly demonstrations demanding Palestine, which they referred to a “Southern Syria”, be rejoined to Greater Syria. In those riots, Jews were raped and killed. On p. 43, Sokatch only notes the May 1921 riots and does not mention the killings of Jews at Tel Hai in two separate attacks at the end of 1919 and in February 1920.

 

  1. 43-44: “the McMahon-Hussein Correspondence…didn’t actually apply to Palestine.”

 

Indeed, it did not. Moreover, when Faisal and Weizmann worked out a Zionist-Arab agreement in January 1919, the wording therein was clear: there was to be an “Arab State”, for the Arabs, meaning today’s Saudi Arabia, Yemen, the Emirates, Lebanon, Syria, Jordan and Iraq and a Jewish “Palestine.”

 

  1. 46 “the Irgun…clashed with the Hagana.”

 

This is inaccurate. In fact, the Hagana clashed with the Irgun, including kidnappings, beatings and handing over Irgunists to the British, in the so-called ‘Saison’ operation which is alluded to on p. 47.

 

  1. 46: “The Irgun…engaged in tactics that today we would describe as terrorism.”

 

While this assertion is probably accurate, Sokatch could have indicated that perhaps they need not have – or better, have compared the actions of the Irgun to those of other underground militias held in esteem by today’s progressive liberal left. Additionally, he could have noted that some of the Hagana’s actions would be termed terrorism today.

 

  1. 48: “Palestinian Arabs…in 1936…launched a massive general strike.”

 

Sokatch here omits the violence in which the Arabs engaged, murdering many dozens of Jews, burning kibbutz fields, cutting down Jewish-planted trees and stoning Jewish traffic on the roads. At the bottom of the page, mentioning the “Arab Revolt of 1936-1939,” again he hides its anti-Jewish nature but notes British, Hagana and Irgun attacks on the Arabs and that, on p. 49, “thousands of Arab fighters were killed,” as if this had been a one-sided conflict against Arabs. He also does not mention that the forces of the Mufti assassinated leading local Arab politicians, who adopted a moderate line. In short, this summary is a total reversal of historical fact.

 

Moreover, this section is introduced by highlighting the rise of Nazism and fascism. The author ignores the vast academic research on the Mufti’s outreach to Hitler in 1933 and the funding of Arab terror in Palestine by Germany and Italy. Only on p. 50 is the Mufti’s alignment with Hitler defined as “an extreme case of sympathy” for the “Axis powers.”

Adolf Hitler and the Mufti al-Husseini, NOV.1941 

(Photo: Heinrich Hoffmann)

 

  1. 49: “the Arab Revolt did have…one arguably positive outcome…it convinced the British that partition was unworkable.”

 

It is unclear in the extreme about what was positive about this outcome. A decade later the Arabs again rejected partition, proving their diplomatic rejectionism and leaving them with no state at all.

 

  1. 49: “yet another white paper…that envisioned a Jewish national home…as part of an independent Palestine”.

 

That 1939 White Paper, Britain’s statement of policy termed by David Ben-Gurion as a betrayal, contained this sentence: “His Majesty’s Government therefore now declare unequivocally that it is not part of their policy that Palestine should become a Jewish State.”  In September 1939, Ben-Gurion stated: “we must fight the White Paper” (and not as Sokatch translates on p. 50 as “we must stand against the White Paper”). Sokatch does not mention any Zionist opposition to the White Paper. He could have noted the Jewish Agency reaction as published in the Palestine Post, May 18, 1939: that this was “breach of faith as a surrender to Arab terrorism.” Was this what he meant by something “positive” that emanated from the Arab Revolt?

 

  1. 52: “Exodus, by Leon Uris…has served as a compelling, if extremely romanticized and rather biased, introduction to Israel.”

 

Indeed, Exodus was a romanticized novel. And it did underplay the role of the Irgun and Lechi. Yet, it is unclear how it was biased as an introduction. Sokatch provides not a single example to support his claim here.

 

  1. 53: “The Palestinian Arab leadership had fallen into a state of weakness and disorganization…”

 

In discussing the rejection by the Arabs of Palestine of the 1947 partition proposal, Sokatch again offers an excuse, namely, that they were weak and disorganized. In actuality, however, the Higher Arab Committee had won UN recognition and its representatives, Henri Kattan and Emil al-Ghouri had appeared before the UN committee. In addition, they were supported by Arab states who were members of the UN. However, following the Mufti’s instructions, they later boycotted the deliberations out of what they perceived was a position of strength based on their 1939 experience. If anything, it can be said that the Arabs preferred a zero-sum outcome, continuing their three-decade policy of rejectionism, and put forth contradictory approaches. 

 

  1. 54: “[Palestine’s Arabs] felt that they were being asked to pay for someone else’s (Europe’s) sin…”

 

While Sokatch’s assertion may be accurate, he should have included a discussion of the veracity of this Arab claim, and whether the leadership of Palestine’s Arabs – the Mufti and top aides – were complicit in the Nazi attempts to exterminate Jews: in anti-Jewish riots in Arab countries during the war, including Nazi-inspired pogroms in Algeria in the 1930s, and in attacks on the Jews of Iraq and Libya in the 1940s. In 1941, 180 Jews were murdered and 700 were injured in the anti-Jewish riots known as “the Farhud”; Sokatch should have discussed whether Arab nationalists such as Rashid Ali al-Gaylani of Iraq and Anwar Sadat in Egypt were sympathetic to Nazism.

 

  1. 55: “Almost immediately (following the UN Partition approval), fighting broke out between Arabs and Jews…”

 

This wording is quite deceptive. Arabs attacked Jews the following day across the country and Jews were forced to defend themselves as the British were called upon to defend them. In fact, already during the summer of 1947 there were Arab attacks on Jews, reflecting the Arab lack of confidence in the UN deliberations.

 

  1. 56: “the ultraright Irgun and Lehi organizations entered the Arab town of Deir Yassin…there they massacred between 100 and 250 people.”

 

According to a 1987 study conducted by the Research and Documentation Center of Bir Zeit University, a Palestine Arab academic institution, the number of Arab dead was 107. In May 2018, Professor Eliezer Tauber published in English the results of his research that there was no massacre in Deir Yassin and that the claim was a fabrication and itself was responsible for the flight of many thousands of Arabs out of the country. Uri Milstein published in 2012 the book “The Myth of the Deir Yassin Massacre.” Sokatch does not mention any of the counter-claims of these scholars. 

 

On the following page, Sokatch writes of Menachem Begin’s bragging about “the story [his emphasis] of the massacre,” as if the no-massacre claim is just a story. Moreover, in a footnote, he writes of Jewish college students unaware of the massacre, it having been “swept under the rug,” and suggests “if they bother to do a bit of research…[they’ll] find out that the massacre there actually happened.” Yet Sokatch failed to heed his own suggestion and research the matter.

 

At the end of this section, Sokatch writes of: “the massacres of Jews by Palestinians before”; this is the first time he applies such a loaded term to the Arab side of the conflict. Of course, during the time of the Mandate, Jews were also “Palestinians” and so Sokatch again compounds his ignorance, his political outlook and a false presentation of history in order to mislead his readers.

 

  1. 59: “this moment of promise for the Jewish people was one of catastrophe for the Arabs of Palestine: it was a moment their homeland disappeared.”

 

In making an analogy between Zionist leaders’ declaration of independence on May 14, 1948, with an outstretched hand of peace to the Arabs of the country and those already invading it, and what happened to the Arabs of the country at the end of the aggressive hostilities that they initiated, Sokatch misrepresents what took place at the time as well as what was at stake. The Jews were willing to compromise and live together with Arabs. The Arabs, by contrast, were not willing to do so. The “moment of their catastrophe” was in rejecting the partition and going to war six months earlier. 

 

As for a “disappearing homeland,” as noted above, that term is a misreading of the geopolitical reality of the area of Palestine and its Arab inhabitants who, in the decade prior to 1948, especially during the war years, had been a magnet for Arabs from all over the Middle East due to the growing economic advantages. Their community collapsed, their leadership abandoned them, and their wealthy fled. The peasant folk blindly followed the calls for jihad and a war of extermination heard over the radio and in the Arabic press.

 

  1. 59: “the militant groups [Irgun and Lehi]…continued to make secret attempts to procure arms…”

 

Sokatch, as he expands further in the book, is referring to the Altalena arms ship affair that occurred June 20-22, 1948. But there was nothing secret about these attempts. Already in March, the Irgun was in contact with the Hagana in France, who reported to Ben-Gurion and other senior defense leaders of the Yishuv. Two high-level negotiation meetings were conducted with the Hagana and then the IDF. The IDF agreed that the ship would arrive and dock at Kfar Vitkin, a Mapai moshav. All this and more can be found with a simple Google search. Once again, Sokatch displays either ignorance or willful disregard of the historical facts. 

 

It is worth mentioning that on the very same day the Altalena beached at Tel Aviv, a few hundred meters away, the Palmach brought in its own arms ship, the Inaco, with a large quantity of ammunition and 200 tons of explosives.

The Irgun ship “Altalena” goes up in flames, off the shores of the city of Tel Aviv.

(Photo: PINN HANS, GPO)

 

  1. 61: “while Rabin was no peacenik…”

 

While it is true that Yitzhak Rabin’s last policy address in the Knesset, on October 5, 1995, a month prior to his assassination, did not support a Palestinian Arab state – “a Palestinian entity…which is less than a state…The borders of the State of Israel, during the permanent solution, will be beyond the lines which existed before the Six Day War. We will not return to the 4 June 1967 lines” – Sokatch is rather dismissive of the man who signed the Israel-Jordan Peace Treaty and agreed to the Oslo Accords.

 

  1. 61: “When the fighting stopped…Israel…held 78 percent of the territory of historic Palestine”

 

This is factually incorrect. “Historic Palestine” territory included all of Transjordan, and, as noted above, the territory east of the Jordan River was effectively removed from the intended Jewish National Home in 1922 as per Article 25 of the League of Nations Mandate. In fact until 1946, Jordan was ruled by the same British High Commissioner who also ruled the Palestine Mandate. The figure of 78% is an Arab propaganda claim without foundation.

 

  1. 61: “Jordan held the West Bank and East Jerusalem…the Palestinians held nothing.”

 

The terms “West Bank” and “East Jerusalem” did not exist in 1948. Jerusalem was a united city, as it had been for 3000 years. The term “West Bank” was coined in 1950 when Jordan illegally annexed the area known in Mandate period as Judea and Samaria. Several thousands of Arabs of Palestine, according to their narrative, including the mayors of Hebron, Bethlehem, Ramallah, the Arab Legion Military Governor General, military governors of all the districts, and other notables, convened in Jericho on 1 December 1948 and expressed the desire for unity between Transjordan and Arab Palestine and their wish that Arab Palestine be annexed immediately to Transjordan. They also recognized Abdullah as their king and requested that he proclaim himself king over the new territory. They did not have “nothing”; they had a new king. That he kept them mostly in refugee camps had nothing to do with Israel.

 

  1. 61: “Around 10,000 Jews were kicked out of or fled their homes in territories captured by Arab forces”.

 

This is factually inaccurate. In October 2003, B. Scott Custer Jr., chief of the international law division of UNRWA (Gaza), informed me that during 1949-50, some 17,000 Jewish Palestinians were cared for by UNRWA and its predecessor agency, just as Arabs were, and by 1952, the responsibility for the remaining 3000 Jews still then receiving assistance was transferred to Israel. Of course, during the period 1920-1948, thousands of Jews resided in Judea and Samaria, mainly Hebron but also in the environs of Jerusalem, the Etzion Bloc, the Dead Sea and even in the majority-Arab cities of Shechem/Nablus, Jenin, Tul Karem and even Gaza and Jericho. And they were ethnically cleansed by the waves of Arab pogroms and riots during those three decades. 

 

While he does, however, on p. 69, mention population transfers between the 1920s and 1950s, he does include what Arabs did to Jews in the Palestine Mandate in his list. To that number should be added some 60,000 Jews, Internally Displaced Persons, who were either displaced or temporarily displaced from their homes, according to Nurit Cohen-Levinovsky in her “Jewish Refugees in Israel’s War of Independence” (2014) 

 

According to Cohen-Levinovsky, some 97 Jewish villages were attacked: of these, 11 were destroyed entirely, and six were conquered and lost – until after the 1967 Six Day War.

In truth, between 10% and 20% of the total number of “Palestinian” refugees were Jews. In his book, “1948,” Benny Morris puts the number of Jewish refugees even higher, at 70,000.

 

On p. 67, Sokatch returns to the subject and notes that 10,000 Jews were expelled from “behind Jordanian lines” and 2,000 from the Old City. He continues there: “This being Israel and Palestine, even the factual history I’ve related here remains a subject of controversy”. Yet Sokatch contributes to that controversy.

 

  1. 61: “Both narratives are true”.

 

No, they are not. Narratives are imagined realities. In this case, they contain some elements that are indisputable and some elements that are less so. And there are lies, misrepresentations and propaganda, on both sides.  Each narrative, that of Israel and that of the Arabs, should be subjected to objective historical research and inquiry.

 

  1. 65:  “The population transfers that shaped the Arab-Israel conflict have a terrible sort of symmetry…”

 

Comparing the nti-Semitic persecutions that Jews suffered in Europe from the Crusades to the Black Death to the Inquisition and on to the pogroms of Eastern Europe from the 17th century and on to the 20th century Holocaust, when Jews did nothing to cause that violence except to exist to the supposed “mass expulsion and fight of Palestinian Arabs in 1947-48”, as Sokatch does, is a travesty.

 

Jews did not blow up marketplaces where Christians shopped nor did they throw rocks at buses, as Arabs did in the 1920s and 1930s. They did not slaughter Christians in their churches. To attempt to create a false historical parallel is not, as Sokatch’s title indicates, an invitation to talk but more an invitation to confuse the interlocutor. Moreover, and as previously noted, this false parallel gives a pass to the Arab campaign to ethnically cleanse Jews during the Mandate years.

 

  1. 71: “the Palestinian diaspora – today numbering more than five million people who are the descendants of the “’48 refugees””

 

On the bottom of p. 72, Sokatch mentions that these refugees “pass down, patrilineally, their refugee status” but does not discuss the uniqueness of that status transferal or other issues connected to the UNRWA, such as the fact that to be a ‘refugee’, required but two years of residency in Palestine, quite a short period of time, or that the UN maintains two refugee agencies: one for Palestine’s refugees and one for all the rest of the world’s refugees. He does mention UNRWA support of anti-Jewish incitement and terror (such as permitting the storage and the firing of rockets at Israel from UNRWA institutions). According to the index, this is the sole mention of UNRWA in his book.

 

  1. 75: “we have come here and stolen their country”

 

David Ben-Gurion, who made the above statement, was describing how the Arabs view the conflict, not stating his own position. And while Sokatch does write that Ben-Gurion “well understood both the terrible predicament and the unending anger of the Arabs of Palestine, now Israel”, to use that quotation to end his chapter (which is found in Nahum Goldmann’s “Le Paraddoxe Juif” [The Jewish Paradox] p. 121) is to use a source, given Goldmann’s own conflicts with Ben-Gurion, which is less than responsible.

Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion.

(Photo: COHEN FRITZ, GPO)

  1. 77: “This wasn’t quite as North Korea as it may seem: early Israel was still a democracy, but individualism was less important than societal cohesion.”

 

This throw-away reference to North Korea is as jarring as it is ridiculous. In any case, as the kibbutz movement was the perennial darling of the old progressive left, it is interesting that Sokatch points to it as a problem.

 

  1. 81: “local anti-Israel militants”

 

Sokatch holds off on referencing Arab terror until the sixth page of his chapter on Israel during the 1950s. His chosen term, “militants,” is anachronistic, one that is currently in use but not then. According to Wikipedia, “According to the Jewish Agency for Israel between 1951 and 1956, 400 Israelis were killed and 900 wounded”. That is an unusual number of terror victims. To provide just one outrageous example of this terror, completely elided by Sokatch, on March 17, 1954, at the Scorpions Pass, an assault was made on an Israeli civilian passenger bus; eleven passengers were shot dead by the attackers, who had ambushed and boarded the bus.

 

Besides omitting a retelling of Israel’s security difficulties, and the usage of a disguised term for naked terror, Sokatch thus manages to elide the crucial question of whether Arab terror started only after the Six Day War, or was triggered by an “occupation” or “settlement construction”, or, alternatively, was present from the Mufti’s first anti-Zionist riot in 1920, throughout the Mandate and on into the Israel of the 1950s? On p. 86, in passing, he notes the 1964 founding of the PLO but does not discuss the “Palestine” that Arafat and his comrades were intent upon “liberating”. 

 

  1. 81: “For his part, Ben-Gurion hoped that the invasion [of the Sinai Peninsula in 1956] would lead to expanded borders”

 

As already noted, Sokatch ignores the eight-year nti-Sem terror campaign against Israel, sponsored by Egypt and backed by Jordan. He also ignores the constant sniper fire toward Jews in Jerusalem during those years. For example, earlier, on September 18, 1948, 12-year-old Yonatan Abramsky was killed by gunfire from the former Mandate era Police School in Sanhedria while he was in his own courtyard in the Kerem Avraham neighborhood. On September 12, 1948, Isaac Fried and Zalman Deutsch were stabbed to death in an orchard at Udim, east of Netanya, their bodies mutilated. 

 

On September 24, 1948, 50-year-old Shlomo Rzabari was knifed to death by infiltrators, and his body was disfigured, east of Petah Tikvah. The victims of hundreds of the nti-Sem infiltrators were civilians, as on October 12, 1953, when a squad infiltrated and reached the village Yehud. There, they threw a grenade into a civilian house, killing Suzanne Kinyas and her two children, a 3-year-old girl and a one-and-a-half-year-old boy. The tracks of the perpetrators led to Rantis village in Jordan.

 

Israel had a specific security objective during the early 1950s in linking up with Britain and France, a fact that Sokatch overlooks. The Arab states did not accept Israel’s legitimacy. In fact, those security problems could possibly have justified border rearrangements. At the very least, the problems could have demonstrated the inadequacy of those pre-’67 borders and indicated to Sokatch’s readers that Israel may have a valid justification for refusing to “return to the ’67 borders”. 

 

It is worth mentioning that in November 1969, in an interview with the German magazine Der Spiegel, the moderate Israeli politician and diplomat Abba Eban termed those borders “reminiscent of Auschwitz”. He was indicating their extreme indefensibility, is not mentioned at all in Sokatch’s book (based on the index). Sokatch, in leading up to the Six Day War, thus minimizes the ongoing existential threats Israel faced throughout the 1950s and early 1960s.

 

This apparently minor observation points to a consistent effort on Sokatch’s part to misrepresent the history of the Arab-Israel conflict.

Foreign Minister Abba Eban

(Photo: COHEN FRITZ, GPO )

  1. 86: “In 1964, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) was founded”

 

In fact, the PLO dates to 1959, when Fatah (which is the acronym PLO in reverse Arabic: Harakat al-Tahrir al-Watani al-Filastini which translates into “The Palestinian National Liberation Movement”) was founded. Moreover, Sokatch does not discuss the early ideological positions of the PLO and their ramifications for comprehending the real conflict between Jews and Arabs, such as:

 

Article 2: Palestine with its boundaries that existed at the line of the British Mandate is an indivisible territorial unit.

 

This excludes any Jewish state in “Palestine”.

 

Article 3: The Palestinian Arab people possesses the legal right to its homeland, and…it will exercise self­determination solely according to its own will and choice.

 

That would indicate that solely Arabs of Palestine possess a legal right to self­determination, not the Jews.

 

Article 6: Jews who were living permanently in Palestine until the beginning of the Zionist invasion will be considered Palestinians.

 

As Arab literature marks 1917 as the “Zionist invasion”, being the year the Balfour Declaration was announced, it would seem no Jew born in Israel after 1917 would be allowed to remain.

 

Article 19 – “Zionism is a colonialist movement in its inception, aggressive and expansionist in its goal, racist and segregationist in its configurations and Fascist in its means and aims.”

 

Aligning Israel with the idea of colonialism automatically rejects any historical connection of Jews to their national homeland.

 

  1. 89-94 “Lighting the Fuse”

 

Whereas Nasser of Egypt comes across in Sokatch’s presentation as bumbling, uncertain, taking moves based on being humiliated by Arabs states, led by the nose by Russia and so on, virtually stumbling into the 1967 war, and avoiding the bloodthirsty mass marches in the streets of Arab capitals and calls for Israel to be thrown into the sea, Moshe Dayan is “hawkish” and Israelis are “determined”. This is another example of Sokatch’s “those poor Arabs” portrayals.

 

Sokatch also omits mention of Israel’s diplomatic attempts, including multiple visits to Washington and other Western capitals, to achieve international assistance to prevent war and keep the peace. For example, the 1950 Tripartite Agreement (which Washington had ‘lost’ a copy of). It was to assure Israel of freedom of safe passage after the 1948 war with Egypt. But he does write – based on Gershom Gorenberg, an “anti-occupation” activist – of Israel’s “political and military leadership” who “began to think war…was necessary…they wanted an opportunity to destroy, once and for all, the enemy armies”. 

 

  1. 96: “the IDF…drove deep into the Jordanian-held West Bank…and captured the ancient cities…whose names evoke the biblical past: Hebron, ‘Shechem’, Jericho.”

 

It is only here, nearly one hundred pages into his book, that Sokatch hints at Jordan’s illegal occupation and annexation of Judea and Samaria, as well as the rich Jewish national past of the area.

 

  1. 97: “Israeli leaders declared that Israel would trade some of (but not all) the land it had captured for peace…”

 

Sokatch may be referring here to a secret decision made on June 19, 1967, which was relayed to the United States for transmitting to the Arab states. Despite disagreement among ministers on which territories to keep or even annex, the decision was simple: the government unanimously approved the statement that, “Israel proposes reaching peace with Egypt [and with Syria] on the basis of the international border and the security requirements of Israel”.

 

In his discussion, Sokatch does not mention the famous Khartoum ‘Three Noes’, but adds that “Israelis weren’t worrying too much about that [Khartoum resolution]” – as if Israel had not taken an important diplomatic initiative based on territorial surrender and compromise. Nor does he deal with Arab rejectionism, which has long perpetuated the conflict.

 

  1. 102: “In other words, give up land for peace…although they continue to argue over its meaning”.

 

In dealing with the late 1967 diplomatic moves in the UN leading up to its Security Council Resolution 242, Sokatch leaves aside the famous “the territories”/“territories” debate. Readers seeking clarity on this issue will not find it anywhere in the book, including in the endnotes, which also do not engage with the topic.

 

As has been noted by many researchers, at this time the United States had adopted a critical change in its position and was no longer demanding an unconditional full withdrawal prior to any discussion of the conflict (as it had demanded in 1957). “Territories” – notably, not “the territories” or “all the territories” – were now bargaining chips. The United States rejected Soviet and Arab efforts to obtain an Israeli withdrawal to the prewar lines. In other words, Israel had a right to expand its borders. The United States secured the adoption of UNSC 242 that predicated a withdrawal for peace yet no withdrawal without a binding peace.

 

Moreover, UNSC 242 does not mention the term “Palestinians”. It mentions “Arab states” and, as is well-known, Palestine did not exist as a state, ever. This resolution calls for “a just settlement of the refugee problem”, not of a Palestinian people. In addition, it stipulates that there be a “withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict”, a clause that Sokatch does include. Does that mean that Israeli citizens may reside in those territories? Sokatch declines to engage in these matters.

 

  1. 106: “Palestinians remaining in the West Bank retained their Jordanian citizenship until 1988…”

 

While this footnote at the bottom of the page states a fact, Sokatch misses an opportunity to point out that, aside from denial of citizenship, Arabs who left Mandate Palestine were never afforded normative refugee rights in Arab countries and have been discriminated in these places on an infinitely greater scale than the Arabs who remained in Israel. One example among many is Lebanon, where these refugees live under conditions of extreme poverty and repression.  

 

  1. 106: “militants from the PLO set up new bases of operations in Jordan” 

 

This remark could be misunderstood. Those “new bases” were actually additional bases. PLO bases existed in Jordan prior to 1967. In addition, as noted previously, the continued use of the term “militants” is in error and whitewashes Arab anti-Israel violence.

 

  1. 107: “the final straw for Hussein”

 

Sokatch would have his readers think that the “final straw” (a reference to Avi Shlaim’s book) that led to the “Black September” attacks on the PLO was the hijacking of three commercial airlines. This is a highly tenuous and widely disputed view. The confrontation between the PLO and Jordan was two years in the making and the hijackings, while they provided heightened publicity for the PLO were quite incidental to the reason for the shelling of refugee camps in Amman by Hussein’s army, an action that killed thousands. The reason was that the PLO’s armed attacks on his regime were aimed at destabilizing it. Hussein supported the PLO terror campaign against Israel but it was when his own regime was threatened that he launched the attacks. The real narrative is dismissed.

 

Here is from a review written by Tomáš Michala, a Slovak Foreign Ministry researcher:

 

The Jordanian authorities were gradually losing respect in the Palestinian refugee camps. The PLO fighters were openly carrying weapons; they refused to coordinate their attacks on Israel with the Jordanian army, and, moreover, they even attempted to extort taxes from local residents…At the time [of the hijackings] King Husayn was already taking steps of his own. He dissolved the government and established military rule, asking the guerrillas to withdraw from Amman and to give over their weapons. They ignored this demand and stated that they were ready to fight.”

 

Interestingly, no note here is made of the 1972 Munich Olympics terror attack perpetrated by the subsequently named Black September PLO group; its first mention is on p. 108. Nor is the assassination on November 28, 1971, by four Black September gunmen of Jordan’s Prime Minister Wasfi Tal in Egypt. In addition, the Black September attack on March 1, 1973, when PLO terrorists seized the Saudi Arabian Embassy in Khartoum, is left out of the discussion. The United States Ambassador, Cleo A. Noel, and the Belgian Charge d’Affaires and the United States DCM, among others, were taken hostage. The operation was planned and carried out with the full knowledge and personal approval of Yasir Arafat, Chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), and the head of Fatah. 

 

After negotiations failed, and on orders from Fatah headquarters in Beirut, they killed the two United States officials and the Belgian Charge. Is Sokatch whitewashing the PLO terror? Had the author included these facts, he would have helped to contextualize this statement of his: “the U.S.-Israel alliance emerged from the Black September crisis much stronger”. As he let things stand, his readers are left to wonder if the aforementioned alliance is based, perhaps, on anti-Semitic/anti-Zionist conspiracy theories.

 

  1. 107: “PLO leadership and fighters fled across the border into Syria and then into Lebanon”

 

These individuals also fled across the Jordan River into Israel. It seems strange that Sokatch doesn’t mention this fact, even as an oddity. Omissions of this sort leave one with the impression that the author is lifting material from Wikipedia and books but, lacking a broad-based foundation of knowledge or reasonable familiarity with his subject, fails his readers even as his narrative props up his narrow view of the so-called “conflict”.

 

  1. 109: “but President Nixon authorized an airlift of arms to Israel [during the 1973 Yom Kippur War]”

 

Sokatch here provides a remarkably thin description of the events. There was a delay in the delivery of these arms which began only on October 13, and Israeli diplomats were, for all intents and purposes, in a near-panic. Kissinger blamed Secretary of Defense Schlesinger while there is the published version that Kissinger said “let Israel bleed a bit”. There were administration officials who felt it would not be justified to pay the political price of an angry reaction from America’s Arab allies for an urgent delivery of tanks and planes. William Clements, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, was the main obstacle at the beginning and the Pentagon was dragging its feet about organizing resupply flights to Israel.

 

In his section on the lead-up to the Yom Kippur War, Sokatch neglects to discuss in any depth the War of Attrition, although it appears on page 320 in a list of other wars. Conservative casualty lists indicate some 1000 Israelis, both soldiers and civilians, were killed.

Prime Minister Golda Meir, Political Adviser Simcha Dinitz and Henry Kissinger at Israel’s Ambassador to Washington.

(Photo: MILNER MOSHE, GPO)

 

  1. 112: “Mizrachi Israelis…still resented the transit camps to which they (unlike European immigrants) had been sent when they arrived in the country…”

 

European immigrants also were sent to these camps, the ma’abarot. It was only in the third year of these camps, first opened in early 1950, that the proportion of Mizrahi Jew became predominant. 

 

  1. 113: “Begin saw them [the Palestinians] as local Arabs…they deserved decent treatment, he believed, but – ironically….not a state of their own”.

 

Sokatch here adroitly sidesteps the issue of discussing the identity of the local Arabs. This could have been a teaching moment, showing both sides of the matter. Are they “Palestinians”? Who are Israeli Arabs? Who are Jordanians? Do they deserve a state? All he adds on p. 114 is that Begin’s nationalism created a “blind spot” regarding the “aspirations” of the Arabs of Palestine, thus implying that those aspirations are fully justified.

 

  1. 114: “Sadat…shocked the world [by visiting Israel in 1977]”

 

Sokatch’s diplomatic history has it that President Jimmy Carter envisioned a grand regional peace plan and for Sadat of Egypt; as the author puts it: “this represented an opportunity…” There are, however, two problems with this narrative. First, Sadat was furious at Carter for suggesting a summit that would include the Soviet Union. He opposed communism and sought a direct, non-American-supervised peace process with Israel. Second, Sokatch ignores Begin’s pre-Sadat visit diplomacy, his visit and talks with Romania’s Nicolae Ceaușescu and Moshe Dayan, incognito, flying to Morocco for talks with Egyptian senior diplomats.

Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and Prime Minister Begin at a meeting in Alexandria, Egypt.

(Photo: MILNER MOSHE, GPO)

 

  1. 114-115: “Begin…was committed to thwarting any process that might lead to a Palestinian state in the West Bank, instead favoring some form of limited autonomy”

There is no real discussion of the Begin Autonomy Plan nor its eventual rejection by the PLO, or earlier plans for compromise, such as the Allon Plan. Sokatch allows his readers to assume that a state is the sole option, without analyzing the pros and cons of such a decision, at least vis-à-vis Israel.

  1. 120: “In 1981, Begin was reelected as prime minister”

Neither in the previous pages, nor those after, does Sokatch mention or discuss the bombing of Iraq’s nuclear reactor, its advantages, disadvantages and its ramifications…ramifications which took place just prior to the elections.

  1. 122: “On the evening of September 16…by the time they left the camps on September 19”

This is an inaccurate time-frame for the Sabra and Shatila massacre. The Christian forces entered the camps at approximately 18:00 on September 16 and remained until 08:00 on September 18, 1982.

  1. 124: Again, Sokatch brings in the Deir Yassin “massacre,” this time as an identifying background element of Yitzhak Shamir. Shamir, however, wasn’t in the country in April 1948 but in Africa, escaping from a British detention camp. But he did serve in the Mossad. Sokatch thus hammers away at themes that would strengthen negative views of right-of-center politicians. 
  2. 130: “Reagan considered the settlements…a violation of international law”.

He did not. Even a simple Wikipedia check reveals that: “In February 1981, Ronald Reagan announced that he didn’t believe that Israeli settlements in the West Bank were illegal. He added that “the UN resolution leaves the West Bank open to all people, Arab and Israeli alike”.” The sources: 

Laham, Nicholas (2004). Crossing the Rubicon: Ronald Reagan and U.S. policy in the Middle East. Ashgate Publishing and Hiro, Dilip (2013) [First published 1982]. Inside the Middle East. Routledge.

US President Ronald Reagan and Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir.

(Photo: AYALON MAGGI, GPO)

Moreover, on p. 254, Sokatch again writes that all Republican and Democratic administrations endorsed a claim according to which “settlements are illegal/illegitimate”, thus repeating his error here regarding Reagan. In noting there that the Trump Administration broke with this, he avoids the announcement of then Secretary of State Mike Pompeo that explains how the former US position was in legal error.

  1. 131: “Palestinians watched as land near Palestinian villages was expropriated and handed over to Israeli settlers”.

Three points draw our attention here. First, Sokatch implies that this land was all privately owned. In fact, little of it was. Second, only the land’s use was transferred, not its title. Third, as noted earlier, Article 6 of the Mandate decision guaranteed a unique right to Jews, that of “close settlement by Jews on the land, including State lands and waste lands not required for public purposes.” In ignoring this right – consistently so throughout his book – Sokatch impairs his readers’ ability to make a fair judgment on the issue. And, in leaving them thus confused, he achieves the very opposite of his stated goal.

  1. 133: “Rumors that the collision had been deliberate…”

In outlining the start of the First Intifada, Sokatch conceals from his readers an earlier event pertaining to the above-mentioned rumor. On December 6, 1987, an Israeli was stabbed to death while shopping in Gaza. The following day, four residents of the Jabalya refugee camp died in the traffic accident referenced above, and rumors that they had been killed by Israelis in revenge for the Gaza murder began to spread among the Palestinians.

As to the term “First Intifada”, even the newspaper Haaretz, in a piece written by Ofer Aderet on April 16, 2016 (and earlier in several academic articles and books, including Professor John Newsinger and Charles Townshend), recognized that the 1936-1939 period of Arab-initiated anti-Jewish violence was the first intifada. Once again, Sokatch exposes the shallow nature of his historical presentation.

  1. 135: “do they [Israelis] really relate to Jerusalem as an undivided city”

In seeking to prove that the city is undivided by the fact that Israelis do not visit most parts of the former pre-1967 neighborhoods, while, at the same time, Sokatch notes “politically motivated” urban planning and transportation elements, he ignores totally any Arab violence as a cause for that pattern of behavior.

  1. 144: “Hamas called for armed struggle against Israel, including terror attacks against civilians…”.

Sokatch does not mention the anti-Jewish/anti-Semitic components of the Hamas ideology, as found in its covenant. Here are a few examples of these outrageous and nti-Semitic statements: a) “Our struggle against the Jews is very great and very serious”; b) quoting the al-Bukhari hadith of “The Day of Judgement will not come about until Moslems kill the Jews…stones and trees will say O Moslems, O Abdulla, there is a Jew behind me, come and kill him”; c) “In face of the Jews’ usurpation of Palestine, it is compulsory that the banner of Jihad be raised”; d) “[Israel is] a vicious enemy which acts in a way similar to Nazism…In their Nazi treatment, the Jews made no exception for women or children”; e) “when the Jews conquered the Holy City in 1967, they stood on the threshold of the Aqsa Mosque and proclaimed that ‘Mohammed is dead, and his descendants are all women’. Israel, Judaism and Jews challenge Islam and the Moslem people”; f) “The Zionist plan is limitless. After Palestine, the Zionists aspire to expand from the Nile to the Euphrates. When they will have digested the region they overtook, they will aspire to further expansion, and so on. Their plan is embodied in the “Protocols of the Elders of Zion”.

  1. 145: “In December 1988, Arafat announced that the PLO “accepted the existence of Israel as a state in the region…we accept two states, the Palestine state and the Jewish state of Israel…something was clearly changing.”

Arafat’s announcement was delivered at a meeting with members of the International Center for Peace in the Middle East, a Tel Aviv-based leftist group with branches in Israel, the United States and Europe. The AP news item reporting on it noted that “Arafat ended two days of talks with a U.S. Jewish delegation Wednesday by endorsing a statement accepting Israel’s right to exist. At a news conference that followed the talks, however, Arafat hedged, declining to confirm or repeat the statement’s key clauses.” 

The AP went on: “Arafat described it as ‘nothing new,’ but rather was ‘an accurate reading and interpretation’ of the policy declaration adopted last month by the PLO’s legislative arm, the Palestine National Council. The PLO’s parliament-in-exile endorsed U.N. resolutions 242 and 338, which recognize the right of all states in the region to exist within secure borders. But the council did not mention Israel by name.” As was recognized at that time and later, the clause that “accepted the existence of Israel” was but a simple acknowledgement that, temporarily, Israel existed.

 

Moreover, the read-out statement included “the right of the Palestinian people of self-determination, without the external interference” and “called for a solution to the Palestinian refugee problem”. These issues were intended to be open-ended matters that would eventually lead to Israel’s eradication.

 

In other words, Arafat was playing with the delegation. Sokatch should have noted this possibility, especially as the news report included the statement that Arafat had also announced “the renunciation of terrorism” in his remarks – which was clearly untrue.

 

This is but one example, in a book filled with such examples, of a historical presentation that consistently awards benefit of the doubt to a specific side: the Arab one. 


Yasser Arafat

(Photo: SAAR YAACOV, GPO)

  1. 146: “a furious President Bush leveled sanctions on Israel”.

Sokatch could have included in his discussion that in 1991, Bush lashed out at pro-Israel activists who were lobbying Congress in response to his reluctance to approve the loan guarantees requested by Israel to help absorb Jews from the Soviet Union. Bush termed himself “one lonely guy” battling “a thousand lobbyists on the Hill.” Jewish leaders saw that as an insinuation that the pro-Israel community was possessed of a sinister power, and as borderline anti-Semitic.

He also could have mentioned the role of James Baker, Bush’s Secretary of State, who famously denigrated Israel when he recited the White House phone number at a press conference, advising the Israelis to let their fingers do the walking and saying “When you’re serious about peace, call us’’ or his remark, uttered in the presence of Bush’s Housing Secretary Jack Kemp, “Fuck the Jews; they don’t vote for us.” 

  1. 147: Footnote reads “Today, it’s hard to imagine a U.S. president…pressuring Israel over its settlement policy” referring to the Bush/Baker-Shamir rift.

All presidents did, to various extents, especially Obama. Indeed, he mentions Carter. Moreover, the State Department consistently expressed opposition to Israel’s settlement policy, throughout all administrations. It threatened pro-Israel charities, falsely claiming they would lose their tax-exempt status if they contributed funds across the Green Line. It appears than Sokatch, as noted above, is intent on highlighting issues and framing them so that they fit his and his organization’s political outlook rather than an objective review of history.

  1. 153: “Rabin’ made an initial peace overture to Syria…it didn’t amount to much; the Syrians weren’t willing to take the risk.”

It would have been appropriate to expand on that overture, as well as to the purported “risk” involved.  According to a Brookings Institute paper, “While expressing a willingness to make a massive territorial concession in the Golan, Rabin declined to commit to a full withdrawal from that territory…the Israeli-Syrian negotiation was hindered by Assad’s refusal to explain what, in his view, peace with Israel entailed—whether it included full normalization and what the security arrangements might be—before Israel committed to a full withdrawal from the Golan. All efforts by the Clinton administration to persuade Assad to adopt a more flexible attitude failed.”

This illustrated that Israel could be flexible on territorial issues, which would have helped to convince young people that Israel is not firmly rejectionist regarding peace negotiations.

 

  1. 154: “In fact, the [Oslo] negotiations had been under way for a while, even before Rabin approved them.”

 

In fact, Rabin had no idea any negotiations were being conducted by two private individuals until a half year had gone by. It was Yossi Beilin, Foreign Minister Shimon Peres’ deputy, the person overseeing the secret process, who had concealed those negotiations from Rabin until May 1993. Is that style of government attractive to a liberal audience? Would that style be permissible for any government? In areas other than peace concerns?

Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin

(Photo: SAAR YAACOV, GPO)

  1. 157: “Negotiations…were interrupted…by the first of a long string of terrorist assaults from extremists on both sides…On February 25, 1994, a fanatically right-wing settler…opened fire…killing twenty-nine [Moslems].”

 

There was no “long string of terrorist assaults from extremists” on the Jewish side. To elaborate on the only attack on the Jewish side at that time, which occurred at the Cave of the Patriarchs in Hebron, is a lopsided presentation of the terror. Until that date, over the same period, almost 30 Israelis had been shot and stabbed to death by Palestinian terrorists, and no Arabs were Jewish terror victims. 

 

  1. 158: “Just like the militant Jewish settlers, the fundamentalists Palestinian groups Hamas and Islamic Jihad wanted to murder the Oslo process.”

 

Sokatch continues to create a false parallelism, as if the two sides, in seeking to halt the diplomatic engagement, were also equal in their chosen means. Jews did not blow up restaurants and buses and did not become suicide bombers. They were not “just like” Arab terrorists.

 

  1. 165: “At a massive rally…in October 1995, Netanyahu…said nothing [about chants ‘Death to Rabin’]”.

 

Even if Sokatch believes this claim, in dealing with themes of confusion and conflict, he should have provided some balance by quoting Zalman Shoval’s letter to the New York Times, published on Dec. 1, 1995, which reads: “…the new big lie of the Israeli left: that the Likud leader, Benjamin Netanyahu, ignored chants that termed the late Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin a traitor and ignored a placard showing Rabin in an SS uniform during an Oct. 5 demonstration in Jerusalem. As Ha’aretz reported the next day: ‘The crowd chanted ‘Rabin Traitor’ and Mr. Netanyahu silenced them, saying such calls do not belong here. ‘We will not replace the government through fire and blood but through the ballot box, and through it alone,’ Mr. Netanyahu declared.”

 

To the contrary, in a footnote, he relies on Uri Savir’s “The Process” to state that “at those anti-Rabin rallies, Netanyahu didn’t urge his followers to stop portraying Rabin as a Nazi or stop calling for his death”. But there is video evidence Netanyahu did call for a halt to extreme language being used. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MgGqprMVR44

 

Moreover, the entire controversy of Avishai Raviv, a GSS-employed agent provocateur, and his relationship to the incitement and violence in the period leading up to Rabin’s assassination, is missing from Sokatch’s narrativeeven if to deny its validity or argue with its relevance.

 

  1. 172: “…Netanyahu ran a campaign aimed at manipulating the anxieties of a nervous public and stoking fears…the appeals to fear and tribalism worked.”

 

Given the background of that time frame, including the fighting in Lebanon and the continued Arab terror including suicide bombings, Sokatch’s description of Netanyahu’s electoral campaign is narrow, unrepresentative and unfair. Moreover, as he notes on the next page, Netanyahu fulfilled the Hebron Agreement and agreed to the Wye Agreement, thus acting in accordance with the Oslo Accords framework.

 

  1. 176: “Barak kept his campaign promise, withdrawing the IDF from Southern Lebanon.”

 

Sokatch does not mention the way in which retreat was accomplished (by contrast, on p. 178, he goes into detail regarding Camp David II) and, given his liberal outlook, oddly does not mention the fate of the Maronite forces who supported and assisted Israel left behind nor the absorption of many hundreds of them into Israel.

 

  1. 178: “92 percent of the West Bank really meant 92 percent of 22 percent of historical Palestine”

 

“Historical Palestine” comprised of today’s Jordan so all of Sokatch’s   percentages are skewed. In comparison, in 1947, the Yishuv accepted some 40% of the area of west-of-the-Jordan-River Mandate territory, having been forced to yield Trans-Jordan, some 75% of “Historic Palestine” in 1922, but Sokatch awards the Jews no credit for this.

 

  1. 179: “Camp David was not quite the end of the line for the peace process.”

 

Sokatch declines to include the Clinton Parameters in his discussion here but does mention them on pp. 183-185.

 

  1. 180: “Even as Israel claims sovereignty over the Temple Mount, it has allowed Palestinian Muslim religious authorities to control and administer the Muslim holy sites there”.

 

In a footnote, Sokatch avoids discussing in any detail the status quo arrangement of 1967 in which Israel agreed, voluntarily, to restrict Jewish prayer there while, in practice, permitting Moslems to destroy Jewish historical artifacts and prevent any religious customs at the site.

 

  1. 181: “Sharon and his entourage entered the Temple Mount.”

 

Sokatch does not inform his readers that there was a pre-visit discussion on September 27 between Israeli Internal Security and Acting Foreign Minister Shlomo Ben-Ami and Palestinian Preventive Security Service chief Jibril Rajoub, who informed Ben-Ami that “there was no reason for concern.”

 

Sokatch claims on p. 182, that the visit had “lit the fuse” but ignores the many warning signs that were developing that a renewed intifada was being planned, among them the Gaza summer camps for children as young as nine in which guerrilla training (including weapons training) was a focus of activity; the May 21 statement of U.S. National Security Advisor Samuel 

Berger on Israeli Independence Day riots by Palestinians and Israeli Arabs; Yasser Arafat’s June 25 threat that if his demands were not met, a renewed intifada would result, with an unprecedented intensity; and the killing by Palestinian security forces of IDF Sergeant David Biri, 19, when their convoy was ambushed at night at Netzarim junction in the Gaza Strip the day prior to Sharon’s visit. In other words, Sharon’s visit, however one views it, was purposefully exploited.

Prime Minister Ariel Sharon against the background of the Temple Mount.

(Photo: OHAYON AVI, GPO)

  1. 183: “the unarmed protestors.”

While not armed with guns, the violent Arab demonstrators attempted to injure and kill Jewish civilians driving the roads in the North over the Rosh Hashana holiday period and sometimes succeeded in doing so. Cars were smashed with rocks, fiery roadblocks were set up and other violent actions were pursued.

  1. 186: “the Oslo Process was murdered.”

The claim that the Oslo process was not flawed or that the two-state solution was not unachievable but rather that the Process was “murdered” is debatable, to say the least. In any case, substantiating the claim would take a great deal more proof than Sokatch offers. Sokatch, asserting (on p. 187) that what was directly responsible (his words: “in concert”) for the failure of peace was Rabin’s assassination and a Jewish terrorist in Hebron whose “militant movement” worked “together” with the Hamas, Islamic Jihad “and other violent enemies” (one wonders why he does not mention Arafat’s Fatah), is but proffering a propaganda conceptualization rather than a fact-based political analysis.

  1. 188: “armed attacks.”

Several points are important to note here. First, Sokatch flips the actual chronology, stating first that the IDF killed Arabs before he informs his readers that “Palestinian militants target[ed] Israeli soldiers and civilians”. It is only nine lines later that those attacks are revealed to include suicide bombings, and that overwhelmingly Israeli civilians were those murdered. It is only in a footnote that one learns that more than twice as many Israeli civilians were killed than IDF soldiers. Sokatch does not offer any analysis of the suicide bombings on the backdrop of Arab culture or politicsas if, he seems to imply, this is a normal method of waging a militant campaign.

  1. 192: “It would seem that once in power, Sharon… [concluded Israel could not both hold onto the territories had Israel remained democratic]”.

This is the sole explanation Sokatch provides for Sharon to propose his plan of withdrawal, despite the significant material pointing to other reasons for his change of policy. He also avoids discussing the protective media treatment of Sharon, from the “ethrog” wrapping as coined by Amnon Abramovitz and to the “peccadilloes” mentioned by David Landau which were, Landau suggested, minor compared to Sharon getting Israel out of the territories. In doing so, Sokatch is steering the conversation in a very specific direction rather than explaining the context to the confused.

  1. 195: “In February 2005, Sharon and Abbas…pledged to end Israeli-Arab violence.”

Israel’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs website (https://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/foreignpolicy/terrorism/palestinian/pages/victims%20of%20palestinian%20violence%20and%20terrorism%20sinc.aspx) lists, from the end of February to the end of December 2005, 42 Jewish victims of Arab terror and hundreds of fatalities. The list continues with many more victims into 2006 and on. Sokatch avoids these statistics and goes on to the Second Lebanon War.

  1. 197: “with some regularity, Hamas and Islamic Jihad militants in Gaza fired rocket…”

Sokatch does not address the abject failure of the Israeli government’s total withdrawal from “Palestinian territory” and the total dismantling of Jewish communities and the removal of their Jewish residents to placate Arabs or at least, result in a ceasefire.

  1. 203 – “Right-wing GONGOS (government-organized nongovernmental organizations) first attacked the New Israel Fund.”

In a three-page treatment of the Goldstone Report, which inquired into claims of war crimes during the 2008-09 Gaza military action, in which he accuses the “right-wing” in Israel of an “assault’ which caused a “democracy recession”, Sokatch astonishingly avoids informing his reader that Justice Richard Goldstone, in April 2011, expressed regret that his report may have been inaccurate, writing “if I had known then what I know now, the Goldstone report would have been a very different document”. He indicated that, “civilians were not intentionally targeted as a matter of policy” by Israel.

  1. 204-205: “legislation designed to power the Jewish majority…”

Sokatch makes no attempt to offer a possible rationale for his list of problematic laws, thus allowing the reader to make an independent decision. Far from writing a book for the confused in order to “to know how [events] will fit into the bigger narrative we are trying to understand” (p. 210), by all indications, he appears to have written a book in order to persuade readers of his partisan agenda

______

Yisrael Medad holds an MA in Political Science from the Hebrew University in Jerusalem and is a Research Fellow at the Menachem Begin Heritage Center in Jerusalem. Born in the United States, he moved to Israel in 1970. He has taught and researched Zionist History for almost six decades.

R&B Monthly Seminar: “In Jewish Blood” (Episode #3 — Monday, August 29th, 2022)

R&B Monthly Seminar: “In Jewish Blood” (Episode #3 — Monday, August 29th, 2022)

NGO Monitor Press @GeraldNGOM : “Even without any classified intelligence, open source information published by NGO Monitor clearly shows the links between the PFLP and the European-funded NGOs.”

“Even without any classified intelligence, open source information published by NGO Monitor clearly shows the links between the PFLP and the European-funded NGOs.”

 

Launching a “Hope for the Future” Campaign at the fall session of the UN General Assembly

To ask UNRWA donor nations to oversee   UNRWA schools, stop war advocacy , advocate  transparency and  advance resettlement of 6.7 million “refugees for perpetuity”,  confined to  the indignity of 59 “temporary” refugee camps… under the promise of the “right of return” to villages that no longer exist. 

The Campaign   

  1. Commission studies on How to Resettle Refugees with Dignity
  2. Translate  and Present current UNRWA text books in English, German, French and Spanish , since Germany,  France, Switzerland, Spain, the US, Canada and the UK remain the most influential UNRWA donors. Monitor the use of these texts in the curriculum of UNRWA schools and programs of UNRWA youth clubs.
  3. Commission new movies in the languages of donors, shot on location at UNRWA schools.
  4. Investigate the involvement of terror groups in  UNRWA,  beginning with teachers unions.
  5. Commission still pictures at each UNRWA camp, especially posters and graffiti.   
  6. Monitor NGOs that operate in UNRWA…for evidence of terrorism and corruption.

    7. Organize descendants of those who were murdered by Dalal El Mugrabe to demand removal of the leading PA/UNRWA text which glorifies her as a hero.
  7. 8. Facilitate weapons and munitions inspections of UNRWA schools.
  8. Monitor cash donations to UNRWA for evidence of organized crime and funds for terror.
  9. Hire local and international PR firms to publicize our research on UNRWA.  

Campaign Financed Only Through Private Donations: https://israelbehindthenews.com/donations/

 

Rafael Grossi Is the Last Man Standing For Nonproliferation

“Grossi is still the main obstacle to the finalization” of a nuclear deal between Iran and six world powers, proclaimed Nour News, an outlet frequently used by Iran’s supreme leader for unofficial commentary. Rafael Grossi, the director-general of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), may in fact be the last man standing against a shorter, weaker version of the 2015 nuclear deal that would irreparably harm the nuclear nonproliferation regime. Despite imminent pressure from all sides, including Washington, Grossi is refusing to close his agency’s probe into Tehran’s suspect atomic activities to pave the way for the accord’s revival.

Iran demands the permanent closure of the IAEA’s four-year-old investigation before a new deal can unfold, aiming to keep its nuclear weapons work hidden from the prying eyes of inspectors. The IAEA has already given in once: In 2015, the so-called P5+1 group of countries—the United States, United Kingdom, France, Germany, Russia, and China—joined the rest of the IAEA’s 35-nation Board of Governors in a unanimous vote to close the agency’s inquiry into the possible military dimensions of Iran’s nuclear program. The IAEA, led by then-Director-General Yukiya Amano, took this step despite Tehran’s untruthful answers to the agency’s questions.

Thankfully, Grossi has refused to bow to political pressure and repeat his predecessor’s mistake. Now, he must prepare for a potential showdown not just with Iran, but also with the rest of the IAEA’s member countries, including those negotiating the new nuclear deal.

Since 2018, the IAEA has been investigating Iranian activities related to the production of nuclear material at four sites in the early 2000s that the regime failed to declare at the time to the IAEA, as required by Iran’s safeguards agreement with the agency. This legal obligation stems from the regime’s adherence to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which mandates the IAEA with important safeguarding duties to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. The investigation is therefore not directly related to the 2015 nuclear accord, formally known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.

Grossi must prepare for a potential showdown not just with Iran, but also with the other countries negotiating the new nuclear deal.

U.S. President Joe Biden seems so desperate to revive a weaker version of the 2015 deal that he would take a page from the Obama administration’s playbook and agree to temporary nuclear restraints while overlooking Iranian proliferation infractions. Tehran would get sanctions relief worth $275 billion during the first year of the new deal and more than $1 trillion by the start of 2030.

In June, after Iran had initially promised to cooperate with IAEA investigators, Grossi reported that Iran failed to provide “technically credible” explanations for the presence of uranium at three sites. He reiterated on Monday that the IAEA cannot settle its inquiry until Tehran obliges. He stated that the IAEA has a “legal obligation” to continue the investigation and needs to know where Iranian nuclear material and equipment in question are today. He said Iran must “give us the necessary answers, information, access to people and places so that we can clarify the many things that are still in need for clarification.”

In 2018, just before then-U.S. President Donald Trump withdrew the United States from the nuclear deal, the IAEA received new information from Israel about undeclared Iranian nuclear sites. In early 2018, Israel seized a set of Iranian nuclear files detailing that Tehran had a robust nuclear weapons program up until 2003. The archive revealed that under international pressure, the regime downsized and better camouflaged its nuclear weapons activities in mid-2003.

In 2019 and 2020, the IAEA asked Iran for access to three Iranian sites, based on archive information and other evidence suggesting Iran had used or produced nuclear material there. Iran delayed access and tried to sanitize and remove evidence from the three locations, yet inspectors detected human-made uranium at all of them.

The nuclear archive indicated that one of the three locations, known to the IAEA as Marivan, was a former high explosive testing location relevant to nuclear weapons development. The archive revealed that a second location, known to the IAEA as Varamin, was a former pilot uranium conversion facility for nuclear weapons production.

A third location, an outdoor warehouse known as Turquzabad, was not mentioned in the nuclear archive. Israel, however, discovered and informed the IAEA about the site, which purportedly held equipment and nuclear material related to pre-2003 activities, including those carried out at Varamin. Iran moved cargo containers from Turquzabad and scraped the grounds before the IAEA asked for access, but the agency still detected the presence of uranium during its visit.

The IAEA also raised questions about Tehran’s activities at a fourth site, Lavizan-Shian, known to the agency as the former headquarters of Iran’s past nuclear weapons program. The IAEA, which learned about this location from the archive, did not request access to the site, which Iran razed in 2003 and 2004, but the agency reported in May that Iran had used the site to work on a uranium metal disc, a step in nuclear weapons development. The IAEA further said that it could not ascertain where the nuclear material once present at the site is today and found Tehran in breach of its NPT safeguards agreement for not disclosing this and other information.

Yet the archive indicates that the IAEA has far more to investigate than these four sites. The Institute for Science and International Security, a Washington-based nonproliferation group, has translated and analyzed the contents of Tehran’s archive and estimates that between 19 and 23 current and former Iranian sites require investigation to ascertain whether the regime maintains nuclear weapons activities banned by the NPT. Importantly, the archive also contains memorandums of meetings by senior Iranian officials discussing where and how to hide ongoing nuclear weapons activities. All of this merits serious international scrutiny.

The P5+1 have reportedly acquiesced to Iran’s last-minute demand to link the nuclear deal’s revival with the closure of the IAEA’s investigation. This is eerily similar to the P5+1’s misguided 2015 decision, as part of the nuclear deal’s original implementation, to close the earlier IAEA probe into the military dimensions of Iran’s nuclear program. In 2015, Amano’s role in ending the agency’s investigation provided the equivalent of a nonproliferation stamp of approval on the nuclear deal. But Grossi is unlikely to follow his predecessor’s flawed approach. He is now the only person standing in the way of world powers willing to sacrifice the global nonproliferation regime for a second time.

Grossi must insist—loudly and publicly—that the agency will resist outside pressure and will not prematurely close its investigation.

Under a revived deal, the P5+1 would reportedly ask Grossi to issue a report on Tehran’s cooperation with his probe before the deal could be re-implemented. It will ultimately be up to the IAEA’s Board of Governors to vote on closing the matter. Even if Iran provides new or additional explanations to the IAEA that are not technically credible, the board can nonetheless vote to close the investigation. Grossi could be forced into the uncomfortable position of speaking out against such a move—in the face of enormous pressure from the world’s major powers to acquiesce.

If Grossi is unsuccessful, with a new deal in place and revenue flowing in, Iran can continue unmonitored, covert nuclear weaponization or missile-delivery activities—all while complying with the accord’s monitored caps on its ability to produce fissile material for weapons. Under the new nuclear deal, Tehran could emerge with a fortified economy and an unstoppable threshold capability to break out to nuclear weapons.

Grossi must insist—loudly and publicly—that the agency will resist outside pressure. He must make clear to the P5+1 that it should not prematurely close the agency’s investigation. It is time to ascertain once and for all whether Iran’s nuclear activities are peaceful. All other issues, including a political nuclear deal, must remain secondary.

Running for cover

President Joe Biden speaks outside Independence Hall, Thursday, Sept. 1, 2022, in Philadelphia. (AP Photo/Evan Vucci)

Pick one of these definitions, and you will have a perfect explanation of current developments.

“Attempt to guard yourself from a bad situation or from being criticised.”

“Attempt to avoid the fallout from some negative outcome or encounter.”

Those of us who have been “round the block” a few times will recognise the classic symptoms of political blame avoidance which sees our elected representatives heading for the hills every time the chickens come home to roost, and something nasty is about to hit the fan.

The perfect example of this phenomenon took place last week when the Israeli Prime Minister attempted to raise Joe Biden on the ‘phone to tackle him about the rapidly developing sell-out to Iran being cooked up behind the scenes. In a crystal clear demonstration of the “special relationship” endlessly touted by the US Administration and our own eternally hallucinated “progressives”, nobody answered the call because, in the words of a spokesperson “, Biden is on holiday.” Apparently, he was riding his bike somewhere and thus unable to take an urgent call from his supposedly closest Middle East ally.

There is nothing really mysterious about the reason for this unsuccessful phone connection as the cause is blindingly obvious except to those who prefer to bury their heads in the sand like ostriches.

At the same time, Israel’s Minister of Defence and aspiring Prime Minister, Benny Gantz, visited the USA but was unable to meet the US Defence Secretary because he was “unavailable.” This is no doubt another case of running for cover or heading for the hills.

The US is on the cusp of rewarding Iran with billions of frozen funds, lifting sanctions and guaranteeing that terror groups will benefit from this largesse. It also gives a green light to the Iranian deployment of offensive missiles and drones and an accelerated motivation for the elimination of Israel.

Anyone who thinks that the IAEA will now have enhanced powers to monitor and censure Iranian cheating is living in cloud cuckoo land. In actual fact, the Iranian President has now demanded that the IAEA cease its investigation of previously undisclosed nuclear activity sites. This should give all but the most unhinged an indication of how Iran is cheating its way to nuclear blackmail.

With the help of China and Russia and likely North Korea, the path will be paved for instability and human rights abuses on a massive scale.

There is a complete absence of any sort of demand for the immediate cessation of persecution of the Baha’i and Christian minorities, let alone a demand for equal rights for women.

Witnessing the debacle of how Afghanistan was abandoned to the murderous Taliban, one should not be surprised at what is now unfolding with Iran.

I have just finished reading a most enlightening historical novel (The Return by Victoria Hislop) which recounts the events of the Spanish Civil War from 1936 to 1939. The horrendous carnage and destruction to lives and infrastructure and indeed to the Spanish State is described in vivid detail and provides a stark reminder and lesson for what is happening today.

The trouble these days is that historical events dating back more than a mere few years are a complete blank as far as most are concerned, and therefore the lessons of the past and how to avoid the same pitfalls never feature in any political, media, or so-called experts’ thinking.

That is why learning what transpired as Spain was torn apart and its population murdered, persecuted and exiled is so crucial. We can prefer to ignore the lessons, but we do so at our peril because the toxic byproducts of our current politicians’ weak appeasement guarantee similar lethal mayhem.

Four main components contributed to the disintegration of Spanish democracy and subsequent tragedies, which should serve as warning signals for us these days.

These were civil disunity, the failure of the democracies to counter Nazi German and Italian fascist intrigues, the role of the Catholic Church and the return of heresy dogmas.

The combustible components waiting for an inevitable explosion were extreme social inequalities that doomed vast numbers to virtual slavery status and a privileged aristocracy land-owning class that refused to contemplate any sort of emancipation or social and economic reforms. When the monarchy was abolished, the subsequent Republic comprised of various warring liberal and left-wing factions that failed to unite and legislate the much-needed reforms. The disunited Republic was ripe for a coup and military dictatorship because of determined opposition led by the armed forces, the Church and a rising fascist movement.

It might still have been possible for the tottering democracy to overcome the impending catastrophe, but unfortunately, they woke up too late to the looming threats. One of their biggest mistakes was their naïve faith that the democracies of the UK and France would come to their aid and help. With appeasement rampant, the Spanish democratic Republic was abandoned and left to battle the merciless and lethal Nazi German and Italian Fascist onslaughts alone. Volunteers who flocked to the Republic’s aid from many nations were stigmatised by their own Governments. In the face of an arms embargo, the Spanish Government turned in desperation to the Soviet Union, which turned out to be an exercise in lethal futility.

The Spanish Roman Catholic Church exercised a stranglehold on society and sided wholeheartedly with the entrenched forces of repression and privilege. This, in turn, generated extreme hatred on the part of the oppressed classes and set the scene for subsequent terror and violence. The Vatican, as the ultimate authority on Church policies and dogmas, came down unequivocally on the side of the fascists. When Franco finally emerged victorious after 3 years of carnage and civil war, the Pope (Pious X11) issued the following declaration: “Lifting our hearts to God, we give sincere thanks with your Excellency for the victory of Catholic Spain.”

This Apostolic blessing to the fascist dictator set the scene for subsequent Vatican silence in the face of the German crusade of genocide against the Jews of occupied Europe.

During the time of the Inquisition, the Jews of Spain and its colonies were branded as the ultimate heretics doomed to be targeted for forced conversion and exile. With the sanction of the Vatican in the 1930s, all those who opposed the fascist dictatorship were branded heretics and seen as worthy targets for death and exile.

What lessons can we, as Jews, draw from those times?

First, we need to remember that although we may have different opinions and political allegiances, our spiritual and physical survival is paramount. That means uniting in the face of existential threats posed by those who plot our demise as a faith or nation.

Second, we must never ever make the same mistake again and rely on false friends or those who promise one thing and act against us behind our backs. Trusting corrupt bodies such as the UN to save us is a losing proposition.

Third, religious leaders should stay out of politics and concentrate instead on outreach to all sectors and making society more just and equitable.

Finally, we need to fight the recycled dogma of heresy which today demonises Jews, Israelis and Zionists as the new heretics.

Preocupante mensaje de la Autoridad Palestina a su sistema de educación

No hay ninguna posibilidad de concretar la solución de dos Estados

Esta nota nos ha sido enviada por el Centro para la Investigación de la Política del Cercano Oriente, encabezado or David Bedein. Está basada en las investigaciones del Dr. Arnon Groiss sobre los libros de estudio palestinos.

 

El mensaje que transmite a su pueblo la Autoridad Palestina, inclusive en sus libros de estudio, tiene tres elementos fundamentales:

1)    Presentar como algo ilegítimo tanto la existencia de Israel como la sola presencia de Judíos en el país, lo cual incluye la negación de la historia de los Judíos y la existencia de cuaquier sitio sagrado Judío en su tierra.

2)    Demonización de Israel y los Judíos. Esto incluye la dimensión religiosa, difundiendo imágenes negativas de judíos.

3)    La ausencia de un llamado a la paz con Israel.En lugar de ello, hay un llamado a la lucha violenta destinada a “liberar” todo el país, incluyendo el territorio de Israel previo a la guerra de los Seis Días o sea antes de 1967, la guerra en la que Israel conquistó los territorios en disputa. A esta lucha le atribuyen un fervor religioso, por lo que el terrorismo y el aliento al asesinato de judíos, es  parte integral de la misma.

 

De-legitimización

1 – Los ciudadanos judíos de Israel son considerados extranjeros colonialistas.

“Nosotros vamos a pensar y discutir: Yo voy a comparar la tragedia de los Indios, habitantes originales de América con la tragedia del Pueblo Palestino.”

(Estudios Sociales, 8° grado,Parte 2 (2020) p. 34)

 

2 – Se niega la historia Judía del país, haciendo caso omiso inclusive de la cuantiosa existencia de pruebas arqueológicas. Dice que “el conquistador ha construído por si mismo una entidad artificial de la que deriva su identidad y la legitimidad de su existencia, usando cuentos, leyendas y fantasías, y ha tratado por todos los medios y formas de crear evidencia material viva de estas leyendas, o pruebas de arquitectura arqueológica que podrían determinar la verdad y autenticidad de lo que afirman, pero en vano”.

(Lenguaje Arabe Grado Académico 10° curso, Parte 2 (2020) Pág.68

 

3 – La existencia de lugares sagrados Judíos en el país es sistemáticamente desmentida, incluyendo el Muro Occidental, (Muro de los Lamentos) en Jerusalem. Por favor notar que la foto ha sido cortada de manera tal que oculta la existencia de Judíos que oran allí.

“El Muro Al Burak”

El Muro Al Burak ha recibido su nombre de “AL BURAK” la bestia sagrada que llevó al Mensajero [de Dios, Mahoma] durante su Viaje Nocturno [desde La Meca hasta la Mezquita de El Aksa, en Jerusalem, de acuerdo a la creencia Islámica] y la Ascensión [Al Cielo]

El Muro Al Burak es parte de el Muro Occidental de la Mezquita de El Aksa. La Mezquita de El Aksa, incluyendo el Muro, es tierra palestina, y los musulmanes tienen derecho exclusivo sobre ella.

Educación Islámica, 5° grado (Parte 1) (2020) pág. 63

 

 

4 – Habiendo sido considerado ocupantes extranjeros, los Judios en el país no son considerados como habitantes legítimos, y las ciudades que ellos construyeron, incluída Tel Aviv, no figuran en los mapas de textos usados por las escuelas de la Autoridad Palestina. El mapa que decimos, se ve

más abajo, titulado “mapa de Palestina”, no muestra ninguna ciudad Judía, excepto la ciudad sureña de Eilat que aparece bajo su nombre árabe, un lugar desolado donde luego fue construida – “ Umm al Rashrash”

Estudios Sociales, 6° Grado Parte 1 (2020) pág.6

 

 

5 – Las conexiones históricas y religiosas de los Judíos con Israel son ignoradas.Según los libros de texto de la Autoridad Palestina,  Jerusalem fue construida por los ancestros “árabes” de los alestinos (por

ejemplo,los “Arabizados” Canaanitas y Jebuseos) y es sagrada para Musulmanes y Cristianos´solamente. Los Judíos no son mencionados en el contexto del siguiente párrafo “ Jerusalem es una ciudad árabe,construida por nuestros ancestros árabes hace miles de años. Jerusalem es ciudad

sagrada para Musulmanes y Cristianos solamente”.

Educación Nacional y Social 3° grado parte 1 (2020) Pág. 29

 

6 -Una corta descripción histórica de los nombres de la ciudad muestra una enorme brecha de 1000 años entre la época de los Jebuseos y los Romanos, o sea, el período histórico Judío.El nombre “Jerusalem” en sus varias formas que es usado en cientos de lenguajes alrededor del mundo, está completamente ausente:

“La ciudad de Jerusalem era conocida como “Jebus” después que los Jebusitas la construyeron 5000 años atrás. Los  Romanos la nombraron “Aelia”y luego se la conoció como “Al Quds” o “Bayt al Maqdis”, después que el Califa musulmán Umar ibn al Khattab la conquistó en el año 637 de la Era común”

“Geografía e Historia Moderna y Contemporánea de Palestina, 10° grado Parte 1, (2020) Pág. 43

 

Demonización

1-Los Judíos, a los que se hace a veces referencia como “sionistas”, sin ninguna  diferenciación real entre estos dos términos, son demonizados y acusados de albergar intenciones genocidas hacia los palestinos.”Los Judíos han establecido su entidad sobre el terror, la exterminación y el colonialismo. Nosotros explicaremos esto”

Lenguaje Arabe, grado académico 10° parte 2 (2020) pág.28

 

2 – Los Judíos son demonizados como infieles y como ayudantes del Demonio. A continuación, un verso tomado de un poema: “Dónde están los jinetes (que cabalgarán) a Al Aqsa [Mezquita] para liberarla del puño de los infieles, los ayudantes del Demonio”?

Lenguaje Arabe, 7° grado, Parte 1 (2020) pág. 67

3- Los Judíos también son demonizados fuera de contexto de la guerra, como enemigos del Profeta Mahoma y el Islam en sus primeros años. Se les atribuyen rasgos negativos como traicioneros y hostiles, lo cual los presenta como eternos enemigos del Islam, también al día de hoy:

“Pero los Judíos en la ciudad de Medina no respetaron el tratado que habían concretado con Mahoma y  recurrieron a todo tipo de trucos , traiciones y agresiones que obligaron a los musulmanes a luchar contra ellos”

Educación Islámica, 7° grado, parte 1 (2020) pág. 52

4 – Es más: los judíos son presentados como enemigos de los Profetas de Dios, e implícitamente como enemigos del propio Dios en si mismo, una representación que causa un tremendo impacto en estudiantes que provienen de una sociedad tradicional: se debe luchar contra los enemigos de Dios

hasta su completa destrucción.El siguiente ejemplo muestra la primera de algunas lecciones que deben ser estudiadas en un capítulo sobre Jesucristo, quien es considerado un profeta en el Islam:

“exponiendo la naturaleza de los niños de Israel y su hostilidad para con los profetas”

Estudio Islámico 9° grado parte 2 (2020) pág. 21

 

Alentando la muerte de Judíos

La muerte de Judios es presentada como una parte integral de la lucha por la liberación, y está bien caracterizada en la primera página de una lección de cuatro páginas, exaltando la figura de la mujer que comandó un ataque terrorista contra un ómnibus civil en la carretera costera de Israel en el año 1978, atentado que terminó con el asesinato de más de 30 hombres, mujeres y niños. utopista de la

Dhalal al Mughrabi

El texto comienza con la afirmación:

Nuestra historia Palestina se forjó con muchos nombres de mártires que

sacrificaron sus almas por la patria, entre ellos la mártir Dhalal al Mughrabi, quien con su lucha pintó un cuadro de desafío y bravura, que ha hecho su memoria eterna en nuestros corazones y mentes. El texto inmediato anterior nos muestra su bravura y como la demostró.

Lenguaje Arabe 5° grado Parte 2 (2020) pág 51

 

En conclusión, los libros de texto de la naciente Autoridad Palestina delegitimizan la existencia del Estado de Israel, y la misma presencia de los 7 millones de ciudadanos Judíos en el país, cuya historia y lugares sagrados allí es negada.Los libros de texto de la AP no auspician en ninguna parte una solución pacífica. En lugar de ello, los libros llaman a una lucha violenta para la liberación de toda la Palestina, con fuertes características religiosas,liberación que no está limitada por las fronteras de 1967, y en la cual el terror juega un rol central.

En otras palabras, la educación en la PA no deja espacio para “una solución de dos estados.”

What UNRWA’s Leader Didn’t Tell the UN Security Council

Last Thursday, UNRWA Commissioner-General Philippe Lazzarini gave a statement to the UN Security Council saying — as the agency has said every year for decades — that it is in existential danger.

There is plenty UNRWA can do to cut costs, though.

For example, it can end nearly all of its operations in Jordan, with some two million so-called refugees. The vast majority of them are Jordanian citizens, and UNRWA has never explained why it should provide services like schooling and free medical care to people who are full citizens of Jordan, and who are not refugees by any definition. Why should Palestinian children in Jordan attend different schools from other Jordanians? Why should they get free housing in “camps” when they have the same opportunities as other Jordanians?

The UNRWA recipients who live in the West Bank and Gaza are not refugees either — after all, they live in the areas of British Mandate Palestine. To call the descendants of those who left from the pre-1967 borders of Israel “refugees” is wrong, but it is even more absurd to consider them “internally displaced persons” after 73 years. They are citizens of “The State of Palestine.” They have passports recognized by most countries. They should be taken care of by their own governments of the Palestinian Authority and Hamas.

 

Lazzarini touched upon how UNRWA’s Lebanon “refugees” are emigrating to Europe. What he didn’t mention is that most of the “registered refugees” have already left, but UNRWA still counts them as people they are helping. UNRWA claims to be helping 479,000 “refugees” in Lebanon, when the actual number is 300,000 less. Hundreds of thousands of UNRWA “registered refugees” live in Europe or the US, but UNRWA still claims them as their own. This would be considered a scandal for any other publicly-funded institution.

Also left unanswered is why the UN has one agency solely responsible for the education, housing, and medical care of Palestinians — but no other groups.

Lazzarini did, however, mention people who ask these tough questions about UNRWA.

“Coordinated campaigns to delegitimize UNRWA with a view to erode the rights of Palestine refugees are increasing in frequency and in maliciousness,” he told the Security Council.

I didn’t know that the many critics of UNRWA throughout the decades were part of a “coordinated campaign.” This is Elders of Zion-level conspiracy thinking.

Lazzarini also said, “Shifting geopolitical priorities, shifting regional dynamics, and the emergence of new humanitarian crises have deprioritized the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.” In plain English, this means that even though the world has much bigger problems and crises to deal with, it should prioritize Palestinians above all of them — because otherwise, the UNRWA budget would plummet.

And that is the key issue.

UNRWA’s existence implies that Palestinian “refugees” are more important, more desperate, needier, poorer, and hungrier than any other refugees and any current victims of war. But by any objective measure, the Palestinians are in better shape than the citizens of many poor countries. And the vast majority of UNRWA’s charges do not meet the definition of “refugee” in the Refugee Convention.

UNRWA was created to be a temporary agency. Lazzarini’s appeal is to ensure that it remains permanent, and that it continues to grow unimpeded, forever.

Therefore, it is up to the world that created UNRWA to create a plan to phase it out.

Mahmoud Abbas’ “50 Holocausts” Remarks Are Part of the Palestinian Narrative

Institute for Contemporary Affairs

Founded jointly with the Wechsler Family Foundation

Vol. 22, No. 19

  • Mahmoud Abbas’ remarks about the “50 holocausts” carried out by Israel and the subsequent international criticism catalyzed Palestinians to support the Palestinian leader, echoing and intensifying his antisemitic messages.
  • Abbas’ claims are part of the distorted and antisemitic Palestinian narrative according to which there was no history of Jewish sovereignty in the Land of Israel compared to the ancient indigenous Palestinian people with historical roots in Palestine, so the solution to the Jewish problem should not be in this land.
  • This narrative also states that the Palestinians are the only victims of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, suffering the expulsion, the refugees, and the various Israeli measures against them. As long as Palestinians have not achieved their goals and eliminated the injustice done to them, they must engrave in the world consciousness their suffering and perpetuate it, as Abbas did at the press conference in Germany.
  • Despite Abbas’ relentless promotion of this narrative that encourages the struggle against Israel, Israel’s defense establishment and government are fully committed to the arguments that justify the dialogue with the PA and its strengthening. Their primary consideration is to prevent an outbreak of violence in the near future, and they believe, based on questionable arguments, that strengthening the PA contributes to this while ignoring the medium and long-term repercussions.
  • The best way for Israel to deal with the dilemma is to recognize that the status quo is the least of the evils and must be lived with. A gradual improvement in the situation may be achieved by directly encouraging the many Palestinians who do not promote the problematic narrative and are not involved in terrorism through measures that will improve their quality of life and do not harm Israel’s ability to prevent security risks to the extent possible.

The uproar caused by Mahmoud Abbas’ remarks about the “50 holocausts” he claimed Israel had carried out against the Palestinians since 1947 catalyzed Palestinians, with all their factions, spokespersons, and media, to support the Palestinian leader, echoing and intensifying his antisemitic messages. The Palestinians claim that the attack against the PA chairman’s allegation is an attack against the Palestinian narrative, which has faced many challenges in recent years. The mobilization to defend the narrative has once again exposed Abbas’ “seven pillars” of Palestinian misinformation (mostly unfounded and partly antisemitic) of which it is composed.

  • First, there is no Jewish people, and therefore it has no right to its own state.
  • Second, there was no history of Jewish sovereignty in the Land of Israel compared to the ancient indigenous Palestinian people with historical roots in the land of Palestine, so the solution to the Jewish problem should not be in this land; moreover, the Ashkenazi Jews are not descendants of the Jews who lived in the Land of Israel in the past, but descendants of the Khazars.
  • Third, the Jews, in general, and the Zionists, in particular, are intolerable creatures, which caused Europeans to try to get rid of them. The cruelty and condescension that characterize Zionist policy toward the Palestinians, including the perpetration of 50 holocausts and the establishment of an apartheid regime, are a clear and undeniable expression of this.
  • Fourth, and here is the focus of the current discussion, the Palestinians are the only victims of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, suffering the expulsion, the refugees, and the various Israeli measures against them. As long as Palestinians have not achieved their goals and eliminated the injustice done to them – for example, by the return of the refugees – they must engrave in the world consciousness their suffering and perpetuate it, as Mahmoud Abbas did at the press conference in Germany.

    The Palestinian media intensively and daily portrays Israel’s treatment of Palestinians in Judea and Samaria, Gaza, the prisons, refugee camps, and even of Israeli Arabs as cruel and inhumane. As victims of Israel and the West, Palestinians have the right to act in any way to advance their goals, including terrorism, and their victimizers have no right to criticize them (and therefore, there is no room for an apology for the massacre of Israeli athletes at the Munich Olympics). The distortion of history, for example, by trimming the scope of the Holocaust, concealing Palestinian support for the Nazis led by Haj Amin al-Husseini, misrepresenting the ties between the Zionist movement and the Nazis, as Mahmoud Abbas did in his doctoral dissertation, and presenting Israel’s policy toward the Palestinians as a holocaust no less serious and perhaps even more severe than what the Nazis did against the Jews, are familiar elements of this concept. It is obligatory for every Palestinian to adopt it.

    Cartoon by radical Brazilian artist Carlos Latuff, 2009.
    Cartoon by radical Brazilian artist Carlos Latuff, 2009.

    The attack on Mahmoud Abbas threatens this right and the Palestinian ability to portray their suffering as one that justifies their actions and requires international and Arab mobilization for their cause, hence the Palestinian outrage, which for a moment raised Abbas’ prestige at home. Moreover, the attack on Abbas reflects, in the Palestinian perception, an Israeli plot to characterize the suffering of the Jews during the Holocaust not only as more severe than that of the Palestinians but as relevant to the conflict because it justifies the establishment of a Jewish nation-state in the Land of Israel/Palestine, and thus must be fought to the fullest.

  • Fifth, in light of all this, the Palestinians are committed to a multifaceted struggle against Zionism until it is resolved. As Abbas wrote in his book Zionism: From Its Beginning to Its End, there is no doubt that the Palestinian struggle, together with the activity of anti-Zionist Jewish elements, will lead to the end of Zionism and will enable the Palestinians to live peacefully in “their country” again. This struggle can be expressed in political and economic activity, adherence to the land, a “civil jihad” to strengthen the standard of living of the Palestinians (as defined by Israeli MK Mansour Abbas), and of course, a violent struggle. This struggle combines, according to cost-effectiveness considerations, a popular uprising (which Mahmoud Abbas called to adhere to in his remarks in Berlin as well), i.e., violence without the use of firearms and explosives, which Abbas has long preferred, and the occasional use of firearms favored by the more radical organizations such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad, as we experienced in early August 2022, and more recently also by Fatah and unorganized elements.
  • As far as the Palestinian Authority is concerned, all forms of struggle are legitimate. Therefore, Abbas stresses that he will continue to pay the salaries of all the terrorists imprisoned in Israel and all the families of terrorists who died in their terrorist attacks, despite foreign attempts to persuade him to end this policy. This is despite the high cost of this commitment (more than NIS 1.3 billion, which is about 7 percent of the PA’s budget) and a possible loss of revenue if the United States and Israel implement the punitive measures enacted against the PA for this terrible practice.
  • Sixth, the Palestinian struggle is national and Islamic simultaneously, and these two components are intertwined. Therefore, the violation of the sanctity of Islam attributed to Israel, with an emphasis on the Al-Aqsa compound, is also an expression of the dangerous nature of Zionism. The ability to portray the struggle as representing the national component, that is, the Arab nation to which the Palestinian people belong, suffered a severe blow because of the Abraham Accords. Still, the Palestinians refuse to accept the implications of this development.
  • And seventh, at this stage, recognizing the inability to reach the final goal of defeating Zionism, an arrangement based on an independent Palestinian state along the 1967 lines, with east Jerusalem as its capital, and an Israeli acceptance of the principle of the refugees’ right of return, should be sought as an interim solution. Under no circumstances can Palestinians accept Israel as the nation-state of the Jewish people and thus surrender the final goal of liberating all of Palestine within the framework of the “theory of stages.” Therefore, the current Palestinian goal is the two-state solution and not two states for two peoples, one of which is the Jewish people (which, remember, does not exist).

To this end, Mahmoud Abbas promotes academic and political initiatives to derail the Zionist narrative and instill the Palestinian narrative, inter alia, through the idea of unilateral international recognition of the State of Palestine as a full member of the UN. He works to inculcate the narrative among Palestinian youth; hence his refusal to change the Palestinian textbooks that teach this account with many elements of incitement. In fact, much of the Palestinian Authority’s activity is dedicated to promoting this narrative.

Why Support Abbas, Then?

In light of this, the question arises as to why it is so essential for Israel to strengthen Mahmoud Abbas and the PA he heads. This question becomes even more acute in light of the fear that Israel is strengthening a leader and a body who are not only hostile to Israel and committed to the struggle against the Jewish state but also suffer from great weakness at home, so there is no guarantee that Israeli assistance will benefit them. It is also likely that the Palestinian body will manage, perhaps even better, even without Israeli aid, which presents them as collaborators with someone they define as an enemy. As evidence, when the PA, on its own initiative, stopped receiving tax payments from Israel and ended its security coordination with Israel in 2020, its functioning was not impaired at all.

Israel has several reasons and excuses for this policy. These are presented and perceived as a deplorable necessity or an expression of sober realpolitik (Mahmoud Abbas is not Mother Teresa, but since the conflict cannot be resolved, Israel is working to reduce it, in the words of Defense Minister Benny Gantz).

  • First, Israel operates on the basis of a (baseless) assumption that the PA is liable to collapse at any moment if it is not strengthened and that the alternative to the current situation may be worse. While this is not necessarily the case, and there may be less bad alternatives (for example, the strengthening of pragmatic and/or regional elements in Palestinian society), the likelihood of chaos or the rise of Hamas, which may require an Israeli takeover of part of the territory after the Abbas era, is perceived as significant and justifies mobilizing on behalf of the PA and its leader even now.
  • Second, and following the same line, Israel sees the PA as a tool that exempts it from the need to manage the lives of the Palestinian population in Judea and Samaria, which is perceived as a heavy and undesirable civilian, economic, and security burden. As far as the security establishment is concerned, the PA is actually an effective arm of the Israeli Civil Administration, which takes care of education, health, and other governmental and economic services for the Palestinian population. The better the PA can play this role, the more it will serve Israel’s needs.
  • Third, coordination with the PA’s security apparatuses contributes to Israel’s security. The Israeli security establishment generally exaggerates the value of security coordination since the PA does not act against the terrorist elements operating in its territory. Nevertheless, security coordination ensures that the PA’s security apparatus does not interfere with Israel’s counterterrorism activities and detentions within the PA, returns Israelis in distress in PA territory, and acts against opposition elements that threaten the PA itself, thereby restraining Hamas. In an editorial last week, the editor-in-chief of the PA’s organ Al-Hayat Al-Jadeedah said that the security coordination was intended solely to help maintain order and security in the PA territories and was not directed against terrorist elements (the “Resistance,” as he put it). That, he said, was in contrast to Hamas, whose security coordination with Israel during Operation Breaking Dawn was directed against the “Resistance” (i.e., Islamic Jihad).
  • Fourth, Israel operates on the assumption that improving the quality of life of Palestinians reduces their inclination to encourage and carry out terrorism, although this assumption has no basis. The Palestinians indeed strive to improve their quality of life, but terrorism does not stem from feelings of economic distress but from a commitment to the narrative described above. The Palestinian Authority continues to promote this narrative whether it receives support from Israel or not, and the unrest among young Palestinians leading to their involvement in terrorism also continues despite all measures aimed at improving the quality of life of the Palestinian population.
  • And fifth, the international system, headed by the United States, Egypt, Jordan, and to some extent Israel’s partners in the Abraham Accords, expects Israel to act in this pattern and strengthen the PA in order to justify their readiness to push the Palestinian issue to the margins of the international and Arab agendas, to prevent the strengthening of Hamas, to promote an improvement in the quality of life of the Palestinians, and to build an infrastructure for the future implementation of the two-state solution as they perceive it. That means establishing a Palestinian state based on the 1967 territories, with its capital in east Jerusalem. (Gantz’s statements to a Saudi newspaper may indicate that he espouses elements of this concept.) All this may be joined by electoral considerations in Israel and a lack of sufficient familiarity with the Palestinian narrative, which is sometimes the result of the willful blindness of some of Israel’s leaders.

Added to this in recent years is a mirage that has been blown out of proportion to justify Israel assisting the PA and separating from the Palestinians at almost any cost. This is the false threat of a single binational state that will force Israel to give up one of the components of its identity since it will not be able to remain Jewish and democratic simultaneously. Even if many speakers repeat this claim, it will remain baseless. The Palestinian Authority is not about to dismantle itself of its own accord, and the Palestinians continue to see it as the most important achievement of their national struggle, even if they are highly critical of its rampant corruption, detest the trampling of the human rights of its own citizens, and have feelings of anger toward its leadership. It is also the Palestinians’ largest employer. Israel will never agree to establish a binational state, abolishing its identity as a Jewish and democratic state. In practice, for some time now, the Palestinian Authority and the Gazan entity led by Hamas have been the political and administrative entities responsible for managing the lives of Palestinians, except in areas that directly affect Israel’s security.

This reality will not change whether or not Mahmoud Abbas is strengthened, and even if the PA collapses due to a Palestinian civil war after he leaves office, the common aspiration of almost all the Palestinian elements will be to reestablish it.

Israel faces a difficult dilemma. The more the commitment of the PA and its leader to the hostile and antisemitic narrative is exposed, the more difficult it is for Israel to justify the willingness to engage in a cordial dialogue with him and his senior advisors, as is the custom of the defense minister and prime minister. At the same time, Israel’s defense establishment and government are fully committed to the arguments that justify the dialogue with the PA and its strengthening. Their primary consideration is to prevent an outbreak of violence in the near future, and they believe that strengthening the PA contributes to this.

From the Palestinian perspective, it is difficult for Mahmoud Abbas to fulfill the role that he believes Israel sees for him as acting head of the Civil Administration in Judea and Samaria. As far as he is concerned, the PA’s mission is to promote the Palestinian narrative, or as he presents it to foreign audiences, to advance in the political sphere, and not only in the civil-economic-security domains, on which Israel and even the United States focus, because at this stage they are interested in securing quiet and reducing the conflict by improving the quality of life of the Palestinians, in a way which will be attributed mainly to the PA.

As a result of its perceived support for Mahmoud Abbas, Israel is portrayed as compromising its dignity and long-term interests. The international system, like Israel, refrains from any step that makes it clear to Abbas that there is a price for adhering to his absurd and antisemitic narrative. Something almost changed following the Israeli law to deduct the amount the PA pays the Palestinian terrorists imprisoned in Israel from the tax revenues transferred to it, but still, the government quickly compensated Abbas and provided him with a large loan. Even now, the rage will subside, and the Israeli government will not take any action. Therefore, a frustrated Abbas will continue his efforts to promote his problematic narrative while fostering the perception that Israel is a criminal state. This is liable to cause serious political, image, and security damage in the medium and long term, and encourage terrorism in the short term.

Perhaps the best way to deal with the dilemma is to recognize that the status quo is the least of the evils and must be lived with. A gradual improvement in the situation may be achieved by directly encouraging the many Palestinians who do not promote the problematic narrative and are not involved in terrorism through measures that will improve their quality of life and do not harm Israel’s ability to prevent security risks to the extent possible. Such a policy would not present these steps as a gesture to the Palestinian Authority, which is committed to the obnoxious multifaceted narrative. The PA does not like it (notice its rage over the new policy allowing Palestinians to travel abroad from Israel’s Ramon Airport), which proves the effectiveness of these steps. This should be done while simultaneously promoting and expanding the Abraham Accords to show the Palestinians that the interests of the pragmatic Arab states entail freeing them from the grip of this narrative and, moreover, offering a path for the Palestinians to follow and improve their lot.

Approaching the Holocaust as a Moral Choice: Part VII: Providing Legitimacy for Murdering Civilians

Providing Legitimacy for Murdering Civilians

When the German officers who fired on innocent women, children and the elderly were lawyers, their academic status is certain to have influenced the soldiers under their command. A comparable case can be made with regard to SS General Max Thomas, Dr. Otto Rasch’s successor as commander of Einsatzgruppe C, who had medical and psychiatric degrees. [1]

Six of the 15 Einsatzgruppenführer had doctoral degrees. At least three others studied law. Moreover, 16 of the 69 Einsatzkommandoführer also had doctoral degrees. Most of the men in these leadership positions became members of the SS, the SA (Nazi Party militia) or the National Socialist German Workers’ Party (NSDAP) as soon as they were eligible to enlist. Their decisions reflected the esteem to which the Nazi Party was held by young students during the Weimar Republic. At a later point, most became civil servants in the Ministry of the Interior. From the ministry, they were arbitrarily sent to the East. [2]

Nine of the dissertations were completed before the Nazis assumed power, the rest were obtained during or after the Nazi legal takeover of the government. Twelve degrees were in law, three in political science, two in science and one in medicine and one in German literature. “That the authority of law and medical science can be used in this way,” asserted Benno Müller-Hill, a German biologist, “is certainly one of the most disquieting discoveries and achievements of the Nazis.” Furthermore, when science is seriously sustained by a government because the “leadership believes in it as if it were a religion, it has a great appeal to young people.” And the young Germans were eager to begin the new jobs the government had created. The message in Germany was clear: “We are the higher race, we shall therefore remain, and the others will disappear from this earth.”[3]

Most of the men who led the Einsatzgruppen were intellectuals. A large majority were professional men. As already noted, they were not thugs, delinquents, common crooks, or sexual deviants. [4]

A “Racial-Ideological War of Extermination”

On September 17, 1941, Max Thomas, SS-Gruppenführer and Generalleutnant der Polizei, called for the “complete extermination of the Jews in Western Ukraine “to remove thereby the most fertile soil from Bolshevism,” claiming they were “without any doubt less valuable as laborers compared with the damage they do as ‘ carriers’ of communism.” [5]

For Hitler, there was no difference between Jewish and Bolshevist power. He believed that by conquering Russia, Germany’s status as a world power would be restored, thus enabling Germany to confront even the United States. [6] Anti-Bolshevism became a critical factor in developing the extermination policies while Operation Barbarossa was still in the planning stages. Anti-Bolshevism also played a decisive part in the German military’s decision in the East—except for some—to provide significant assistance to the Einsatzgruppen. [7]

Linking alleged Jewish control of the world to Bolshevism was a strategically enlightened move. This is apparent in the “notorious orders” issued by Field Marshal Walter von Reichenau, Commander in Chief of the 6th Army as part of Army Group South, Colonel-General Hermann Hoth, commander of the 3rd Panzer Group and Field Marshal Erich von Manstein, commander of the 11 Army. [8]

On October 10, 1941, von Reichenau issued “Conduct of Troops in the Eastern Territories,” which stated:

“The most essential aim of war against the Jewish-Bolshevistic system is a complete destruction of their means of power and the elimination of Asiatic influence from the European culture. In this connection the troops are facing tasks which exceed the one- sided routine of soldiering. The soldier in the eastern territories is not merely a fighter according to the rules of the art of war but also a bearer of ruthless national ideology and the avenger of bestialities which have been inflicted upon German and racially related nations.

Therefore the soldier must have full understanding for the necessity of a severe but just revenge on subhuman Jewry. The Army has to aim at another purpose, i. e., the annihilation of revolts in hinterland which, as experience proves, have always been caused by Jews.” [9]

Walter von Reichenau’s order, which Hitler called “excellent,” was sent at his command to the OKH (Army High Command), in order to disseminate it to the military, with a request that similar directives be issued.[10]

On November 17, 1941, Colonel-General Hermann Hoth issued the following order: “Every  trace of active or passive resistance or of any kind of machinations by the Bolshevik -Jewish agitators are [sic] to be immediately and pitilessly rooted out. The necessity of severe measures against elements foreign to people and kind must be understood precisely by the soldiers. These circles are the spiritual pillars of Bolshevism, the tablebearers [priests] of its murder organization, the helpers of the partisans. It consists of the same Jewish class of people which have done so much to harm our Fatherland and by its hostile activity…and anti-culture, which promotes anti-German currents in the whole world, and which wants to be the bearer of revenge. Their annihilation is a law of self-preservation. Any soldier criticizing these measures has no memory of the former traitorous activity lasting for years carried on among our own people by Jewish-Marxist elements.”[11]

On November 20, 1941 Field Marshal Erich von Manstein, commander of the 11 Army, circulated his own report: “Since 22 June the German people have been engaged in a life-and-death struggle against the Bolshevist system. This struggle is not being carried on against the Soviet Armed Forces alone in the established form laid down by European rules of warfare.

The Jewish-Bolshevist system must be exterminated once and for all. Never again must it encroach upon our European living space.

The German soldier has therefore not only the task of crushing the military potential of this system. He comes also as the bearer of a racial concept and as the avenger of all the cruelties’ which have been perpetrated on him and on the German people.

The soldier must appreciate the necessity for the harsh punishment of Jewry, the spiritual bearer of the Bolshevist terror. This is also necessary in order to nip in the bud all uprisings which are mostly plotted by Jews.”[12]

A Final Note

It was this “identification” [Jews and Bolshevism] that “caused even a good many of those soldiers who held conservative views and rejected Nazi ideology to put up with the murders of the Einsatzgruppen,” declares Christian Streit, a German historian and expert on the Wehrmacht. General Carl-Heinrich von Stuelpnagel is such a case. Although his opposition to Hitler is well documented, “his army cooperated very closely with the Sonderkommando 4b, and Stuelpnagel himself, in a memorandum of August 1941, called for ‘an increased [propaganda] fight against Bolshevism and above all against…Jewry, which works for its objectives.’” [13]


Footnotes

[1] Benno Müller-Hill, “The Idea of the Final Solution and the Role of Experts,” in The Final Solution: Origins and Implementation, David Cesarani, Ed. (New York: Routledge, 1994), 67-68;  Jürgen Förster, “The Wehrmacht and the war of extermination against the Soviet Union,” Yad Vashem Studies Volume 14,(1981):7–34; Richard Rhodes, Masters of Death: The SS Einsatzgruppen and the Invention of the Holocaust (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2002).

[2] Benno Müller-Hill, op.cit.63; to review the academic areas of their dissertations of 22 men, please see 64-66.

[3] Ibid. 66, 68-69.

[4] Raul Hilberg, The Destruction of the European Jews Third Edition Volume I (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 2003), 291; Heinz Höhne, The Order of the Death’s Head: The Story of Hitler’s SS London: Secker &Warburg, 1970), 357-358, 655;https://yivoencyclopedia.org/article.aspx/einsatzgruppen);Yitzhak Arad, Shmuel Krakowski, and Shmuel Spector, eds., The Einsatzgruppen Reports: Selections from the Dispatches of the Nazi Death Squads’ Campaign against the Jews, July 1941–January 1943 (New York: Holocaust Library, 1989); Michael H. Kater, The Nazi Party: A Social Profile of Members and Leaders 1919-1945 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1983).

[5] Christopher R. Browning, The Origins of the Final Solution: The Evolution of Nazi Jewish Policy, September 1939-March 1942 (Lincoln, Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, Yad Vashem, 2004),296.In addition to annihilating “Jewish Bolshevism,” and the extensive exploitation of the newly conquered Russian territories for use by the Wehrmacht and Germans back home, meant millions of Soviet citizens and prisoners of war would die of starvation. Hitler called this destructive plan “Control, administer, exploit.” (Förster, “The Wehrmacht and the war of extermination against the Soviet Union,” op.cit.10- 11.

[6] Förster, “The Wehrmacht and the war of extermination against the Soviet Union,” op.cit.10- 11.

[7] Christian Streit, “Wehrmacht, Einsatgruppen, Soviet POWs and Anti-Bolshevism In the Emergence of the Final Solution,” in The Final Solution: Origins and Implementation, David Cesarani, Ed.(London: Routledge,1994),110.

[8] Ibid; Alex Grobman, License to Murder: The Enduring Threat of The Protocols of the Elders of Zion ( Norman, Oklahoma: Balfour Books, 2011).

[9] “Army Command 6. “Conduct of Troops in Eastern Territories,” Army H. Q., 10.10.41 https://phdn.org/archives/www.ess.uwe.ac.uk/genocide/USSR2.htm.

[10 ] Förster, “The Wehrmacht and the war of extermination against the Soviet Union,” op. cit.28.

[11] Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals, Under Control Council Law Number 10,  (October 1946-April 1949), 144.

[12] https://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/08-10-46.asp); Bartov, op.cit.130.

[13] Streit, op.cit.110.

Dr. Alex Grobman is the senior resident scholar at the John C. Danforth Society, a member of the Council of Scholars for Peace in the Middle East, and on the advisory board of The National Christian Leadership Conference of Israel (NCLCI). He has an MA and PhD in contemporary Jewish history from The Hebrew University of Jerusalem. He lives in Jerusalem.